FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217132. September 29, 2021.]
HON. RAMON J. P. PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), ATTY. ANSELMO C. ABUNGAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OIC-DIRECTOR FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS (DENR), ATTY. WILFREDO B. SARAOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OIC-DIRECTOR (DENR), LEGAL SERVICE FOR LUZON, JANE G. BAUTISTA, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION DIVISION (DENR), BENJAMIN T. TUMALIUAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DENR-REGION II, ATTY. ISMAEL T. MANALIGOD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF, LEGAL DIVISION OF DENR REGION II, PENRO AND MINDO AQUINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OIC HEAD OF THE COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE OF SAN ISIDRO, ISABELA, petitioners,vs. HEIRS OF ROMULA GANNABAN, NAMELY, MARITA G. DAVID, ANTONIO A. GANNABAN, MANUEL A. GANNABAN AND VIRGINIA A. DAQUIOAG, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 217132 — (Hon. Ramon J. P. Paje, in his capacity as the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Atty. Anselmo C. Abungan, in his capacity as OIC-Director for Legal Affairs (DENR), Atty. Wilfredo B. Saraos, in his capacity as OIC-Director (DENR), Legal Service for Luzon, Jane G. Bautista, in her capacity as Chief of the Records Management and Documentation Division (DENR), Benjamin T. Tumaliuan, in his capacity as Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region II, Atty. Ismael T. Manaligod, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Division of DENR Region II, PENRO and Mindo Aquino, in his capacity as OIC Head of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Isidro, Isabela v. Heirs of Romula Gannaban, namely, Marita G. David, Antonio A. Gannaban, Manuel A. Gannaban and Virginia A. Daquioag).
We affirm.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (3a)
In a long line of cases, the Court has summed up these requisites, viz.:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 1
Here, we fully concur with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that these requisites are all present here.
ONE. As successors-in-interest of Romula Gannaban, the beneficiary and grantee of a parcel of land awarded by the State, respondents have a clear and legal right thereto. This right includes the right to defend their title to the property against all persons, including the State itself, which may divest them or threaten to divest them of such right. This right subsists notwithstanding the contrary claim of the State that the lots subject of DENR Case No. 5131 and the land awarded to Romula refer to different properties. Until this declaration shall have attained finality, respondents' right to defend their asserted clear and legal right to the property remains in place.
TWO. There is a material and substantial invasion of such asserted right when portions of the lot which respondents claim were already awarded to Romula appear to have been awarded again by the State to several other individuals, without notice to respondents or Romula.
THREE. Respondents would have suffered irreparable injury if the implementation of DENR Decision dated June 1, 2011 was not enjoined by the trial court prior to the final adjudication of the case on the merits, specifically the exact identities of the lot awarded to Romula on the one hand, and the portions awarded to the individual applicants on the other. For if after adjudication on the merits, it turns out that these portions truly form part of the lot already awarded to Romula, it would then be too late as the lot belonging to her or respondents would have already been conveyed and titled in favor of the individual applicants.
FOUR. No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy existed to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury on respondents. Only a writ of preliminary injunction could do so.
Going now to Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, contrary to petitioners' argument, this provision does not require the application for preliminary injunction to be heard within the 20-day effectivity of the TRO. Depending on the circumstances and urgency of the matter, it is an option available to the court. What then is the effect of not hearing the application within the aforesaid twenty-day period or not hearing it at all?
The TRO simply expires or the application is deemed denied. Evy Construction v. Valiant Roll, 2 is apropos:
A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20 days "[i]f it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction during this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired. Notably, the Rules do not require that a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction be conducted during this period. (Emphasis supplied)
While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for preliminary injunction is granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined." Inversely stated, an application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. (Emphasis supplied).
As to how petitioners' lone representative fared during the hearing and the things he actually said there — is not for the Court to determine. After all, the Court is not a trier of facts. In any case, the fact that petitioners were able to file and ventilate their opposition to the writ of preliminary injunction through their subsequent motion for reconsideration is deemed to have cured the supposed lack of notice to them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 15, 2014 and Resolution dated February 24, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134576 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.St. James College of Parañaque v. Equitable PCI Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 466 (2010).
2. 820 Phil. 123, 133 (2017).