Our Lady of Pilar Montessori Center, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198143. November 7, 2018.]

OUR LADY OF PILAR MONTESSORI CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs.BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 7, 2018, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 198143 (OUR LADY OF PILAR MONTESSORI CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondent). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals May 24, 2011 Decision 2 and August 4, 2011 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 84886. The Court of Appeals granted BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.'s (BPI Family) Appeal and reversed the December 5, 2003 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court, which approved the Final Rehabilitation Plan filed by the Our Lady of Pilar Montessori Center, Inc. (Our Lady of Pilar) and denied Our Lady of Pilar's Motion for Reconsideration.

Our Lady of Pilar is a non-stock, nonprofit educational institution that offers pre-school, elementary, and secondary education in Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Piñas City, and in subdivisions and communities of Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Cavite, and Laguna. 5

It opened in school year 1979 to 1980 in Mercury Road, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. In school year 1985 to 1986, pre-school and elementary levels were issued recognition permits by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of Education). Its secondary level was completed and it was issued a recognition permit in school year 1989 to 1990. 6

In school year 1986 to 1987, Our Lady of Pilar entered into an agreement with Home Savings Bank to purchase a 5,000-square meter lot in Silver Road, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City for its campus and facilities' expansion. Construction of the school's elementary building began. 7

In school year 1992 to 1993, Premiere Savings Bank, the loan's transferee, granted additional loans to finance the upgrade, repair, and maintenance of the school. 8 This loan was later transferred to the Bank of Southeast Asia (now known as Development Bank of Singapore), which granted an additional loan to finance the school facilities' further upgrade, resulting in enrollment increase for school year 1993 to 1994. 9 CAIHTE

However, the number of enrollees gradually declined when a financial crisis struck Asia in 1997. Our Lady of Pilar also dealt with the increase in operating expenses and receivables. Thus, it was unable to pay its loan amortizations with the Development Bank of Singapore. 10

Meanwhile, the Development Bank of Singapore entered into a merger with BPI Family, the latter being the surviving entity. 11

Our Lady of Pilar discussed with BPI Family the possible restructuring of its loan, amounting to P15,645,133.68 as of December 31, 2002, but to no avail. Instead, BPI Family opted to foreclose the mortgage constituted on the 5,000-square meter lot where the school is located, and to have it sold at a public auction on January 6, 2003. 12

On January 3, 2003, Our Lady of Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition with Urgent Prayer to Stay Enforcement of All Claims/Proceedings against Petitioner. 13 It claimed that BPI Family refused to hear its urgent pleas for loan restructuring based on the 327 students enrolled at that time. 14 It contended that BPI Family's decision to pursue foreclosure is both "callous and heartless," 15 as the school had provided not only quality education to its students for 24 years, but also employment to 52 employees and free use of facilities for the communities' religious, civil, and social activities. 16

Our Lady of Pilar submitted a Rehabilitation Plan, 17 which covered the Lifeline Program and New Program. 18 The Lifeline Program expects an average of 30 new enrollees in the pre-school level, while old students will enroll in the succeeding grade levels. The New Program will be carried out under the assumption that the school's marketing strategies will bring in new students. 19

The Rehabilitation Plan also carried the following conditions: (1) a moratorium for three (3) years in paying the principal, and 20-year repayment schedule at an annual 8% interest rate; (2) monthly payment of P100,000.00 to cover the interest for the first three (3) years; (3) earnings from students in excess of 327 shall be applied to the principal; and (4) BPI Family's representative may join in the Executive Committee. 20

Our Lady of Pilar prayed that a stay order be issued to, among others, appoint a rehabilitation receiver and stay the enforcement of all claims against the school, particularly BPI Family's intended foreclosure and public auction sale. It also prayed that an order approving the Rehabilitation Plan be issued. 21 DETACa

In its January 27, 2003 Order, Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City (Rehabilitation Court) denied Our Lady of Pilar's prayer for the issuance of a stay order after it found the Petition to be insufficient in substance. 22

On April 9, 2003, Our Lady of Pilar filed an Omnibus Motion to admit its Amended Rehabilitation Plan 23 and to issue a stay order. The Amended Rehabilitation Plan: (1) proposed a new payment scheme for tuition and miscellaneous fees; (2) offered new vocational courses; 24 and (3) removed the third condition imposed in the first Rehabilitation Plan and reduced the repayment plan to 15 years. It also included a detailed implementation of the 15-year repayment plan. 25

In its April 10, 2003 Order, 26 the Rehabilitation Court admitted the Amended Rehabilitation Plan and issued a Stay Order 27 designating Bienvenido M. Araw II as Our Lady of Pilar's Rehabilitation Receiver. 28

In line with the Stay Order, the Social Security System and Securities and Exchange Commission filed their Comment and Manifestation, respectively, to the Petition for rehabilitation. The former asserted that Our Lady of Pilar should pay its contributions before seeking rehabilitation to prevent further deprivation of its employees' right to avail the benefits withheld due to its delinquency. 29 The latter neither supports nor opposes the petition, but mentioned Our Lady of Pilar's violation of its reportorial requirements, a ground for its certificate of registration's suspension and revocation. 30

BPI Family opposed 31 the Petition for being defective in form and in substance, saying that it failed to comply with Rule 4, Section 2, Paragraphs (c) and (d) of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. It also alleged that "aside from the non-viability of the rehabilitation plan which involves only projections, estimates[,] and assumptions, the proposed moratorium of three [3] years on the principal and [20]-year repayment schedule is unreasonable and too lengthy." 32

On August 27, 2003, the Rehabilitation Receiver, in his Initial Report, recommended Our Lady of Pilar's rehabilitation as its assets were greater than its liabilities. On September 29, 2003, he submitted his Second Report detailing his observations on the cash flow submitted by Our Lady of Pilar. He noted that even if only the Lifeline Program was actualized, Our Lady of Pilar could still afford to pay its amortizations on the PAG-IBIG Fund, Social Security System premiums, and BPI Family loan. 33 The assumptions used for the cash flow projection are reasonable and attainable. 34

On October 30, 2003, Our Lady of Pilar submitted its Final Rehabilitation Plan. BPI Family filed its Comment, claiming that the cash flow projection is inconsistent with the three (3)-year moratorium in the Final Rehabilitation Plan, and that despite the new mode of payment on miscellaneous fees and vocational courses offered under the New Program, the school's cash would still be tight regarding the subject proposals. 35

In its December 5, 2003 Order, 36 the Rehabilitation Court approved the Final Rehabilitation Plan and directed the Rehabilitation Receiver to submit a Progress Report on its implementation. 37 aDSIHc

On January 21, 2004, BPI Family filed its Notice of Appeal, to which the Rehabilitation Court issued a February 2, 2005 Order directing BPI Family to file its record on appeal. Upon BPI Family's compliance, the Rehabilitation Court transmitted the case records to the Court of Appeals. 38

In its May 24, 2011 Decision, 39 the Court of Appeals granted BPI Family's Appeal, and reversed and set aside the Rehabilitation Court's December 5, 2003 Order. 40 It agreed with BPI Family that the Final Rehabilitation Plan is not feasible because it was premised mainly on the increase in school enrollees. 41 Further, it found that Our Lady of Pilar's projected net income for the 15-year repayment plan was inadequate to settle its liabilities. 42

Our Lady of Pilar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the Court of Appeals August 4, 2011 Resolution. 43

Thus, Our Lady of Pilar filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. It argued that: (1) the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the Rehabilitation Court's December 5, 2003 Order, as the Final Rehabilitation Plan was feasible and successful; 44 and (2) BPI Family made the school's rehabilitation difficult by obstinately refusing to accept petitioner's monthly payments. 45 Moreover, it prays that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, arguing that the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings and the foreclosure of petitioner's mortgaged property would cause irreparable injury to the school, its students, and teachers. 46

On November 16, 2011, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 47 enjoining the implementation of the Court of Appeals May 24, 2011 Decision and August 4, 2011 Resolution.

In its Comment, 48 respondent states that the Rehabilitation Court has terminated rehabilitation proceedings in its February 11, 2010 Order, 49 and the Petition against the Order was dismissed in the Court of Appeals July 29, 2011 Decision. It adds that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is still pending before the Court of Appeals, which petitioner failed to mention in its Petition. 50 Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to present concrete proof that the school can still be rehabilitated. It points out that the Final Rehabilitation Plan was based on an assumption that petitioner will attract new students, which was not backed by any proof. 51 Moreover, its terms were unjust and inequitable. 52 Respondent also denies petitioner's claim that the Rehabilitation Receiver or petitioner attempted to coordinate with it to remit the alleged monthly payments which, it further points out, were made only for one (1) year, in 2004. 53

Petitioner filed its Reply, 54 maintaining its argument that the Final Rehabilitation Plan was viable.

In compliance with the Court's January 28, 2013 Resolution, 55 the parties submitted their respective memoranda. 56

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the Petition for Review on Certiorari raises a factual question; and

Second, whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the Rehabilitation Court's order approving the Rehabilitation Plan.

The Petition is denied.

I

The Rehabilitation Court, in its December 5, 2003 Order, approved petitioner's Final Rehabilitation Plan:

Only creditor-oppositor BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. submitted its Comments. Said comment appears to suffer from a major flaw. It says that the cash flow projection indicated a principal repayment starting on the 5th year. A careful scrutiny of the cash flow projection shows start of principal repayment on the third (3rd) year. The other oppositors did not file any opposition to said rehabilitation plan filed with petitioner's Submission of October 30, 2003.

In his report of August 27, 2003, the Receiver has adopted a property appraisal done by Valencia Appraisal Corp. on November 6, 2001 which placed the value of petitioner's property as of said date as follows:

 

Land — 5,000 [sq. m.]	PHP25,000,000.00
Improvements	20,479,000.00
	–––––––––––––––
Total fair market value	PHP45,479,000.00

 

as against the outstanding balance of debts and liabilities net of the advances from officers which as of July 31, 2003 were as follows:

 

a) Center for Educational Measurement	PHP41,460.00
b) SSS Premium and Salary Loans	1,202,099.00
c) Pag-Ibig Fund	508,446.02
d) BPI	15,645,133.68
	––––––––––––
	PHP17,448,857.58

 

In his comments on rehabilitation contained in the same report, the Rehabilitation Receiver stressed that: ETHIDa

"The Petitioner's audited financial statements show assets are far greater than the liabilities, and therefore rehabilitation could be considered by the Court. Actually, the liabilities as shown on Exhibit 'E' are 2.6 times covered only by the value of the land and improvements."

xxx xxx xxx

This Court acts pursuant to the provisions of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation in the consideration of instant petition. Aforesaid rules provide that "the Court may approve a rehabilitation even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor, if in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable."

In this case, the Court takes into account that petitioner is not insolvent nor bankrupt but has total assets of PHP48.360 million as shown in its audited financial statements a[s] of March 31, 2003 to fully cover its liabilities of PHP17,448,857.58 to all of its creditors. There are, therefore, enough assets to pay for all petitioner's liabilities in any case.

This Court likewise gives weight to the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Receiver to rehabilitate petitioner and his observation that the cash flow shows that petitioner can afford to pay its amortization on the Pag-Ibig Fund, SSS premium[,] and the BPI loan. The work experience of the Rehabilitation Receiver clearly shows his expertise in overseeing the operations of a corporation so that his findings and recommendations must be accorded great weight in the consideration of instant petition.

Creditor-oppositor BPI Family Savings Bank is understandably relentless in pursuing the foreclosure of petitioner's mortgage with said bank. This Court, thus, has to determine whether the bank's claim can be satisfied if rehabilitation of petitioner is allowed. As against the bank's desire to foreclose, this Court is inclined to believe that the business of petitioner should be allowed to continue without in any way endangering the interests of its creditors. The exposure of BPI Family [B]ank is fully secured by a mortgage on petitioner's properties. The rehabilitation plan projects the interests of all the creditors. Not only its creditors but also its employees will benefit from the continued operations of herein petitioner. In the light of the foregoing, opposition posed by BPI Family Savings Bank to the rehabilitation of OLPMC becomes clearly unreasonable.

It should be stressed that petitioner is an educational institution. The educational institutions perform a more vital function than the ordinary public utilities. The institution of learning feeds and nurtures the human mind and spirit to insure a robust, healthy[,] and educated citizenry on whom national survival and national greatness depend. 57

In reversing the Rehabilitation Court's December 5, 2003 Order, the Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the Final Rehabilitation Plan was not viable. It held that while the total number of school enrollees rose from 327 to 348 in school year 2003 to 2004, it dropped in the next two (2) school years to 339 and 332, respectively. 58 It found that the Final Rehabilitation Plan, premised mainly on the student increase, was not feasible. 59

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that while petitioner's assets are greater than its liabilities, that alone is not enough to order the petitioner's rehabilitation. 60 It found that the petitioner's projected net incomes were insufficient to settle its outstanding obligation with BPI Family, and its arrears with the Social Security System and PAG-IBIG. 61 Hence, approving the Final Rehabilitation Plan would be futile: 62

According to the Proposed Schedule of Payment, appellee's first payment to [BPI Family] will commence on SY 2003-2004 and the initial payment amounting to Three Hundred Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Php325,000.00) will be applied to the interest. However, the Projected Net Income submitted by the appellee shows that the net income for the SY 2003-2004 is only One Hundred Thirty[-]Eight Thousand One Hundred Fifty[-]Seven Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (Php138,157.16) and therefore not even sufficient to cover the initial payment on the interest. Even if you add the income for SY 2002-2003, it would still not be enough since the total income for these two years amounted only to Two Hundred Sixty[-]Two Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty[-]One Pesos and Eighty[-]Eight Centavos (Php262,961.88) while the first payment is Three Hundred Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Php325,000.00). Moreover, the inadequacy of the projected net income is not only for the school years 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 but extends towards the entire fifteen [15] years of the rehabilitation. Considering that the records show the inability of the appellee to settle its outstanding obligation with [BPI Family], let alone its arrears with [Social Security System] and PAG[-]IBIG, approving appellee's rehabilitation would only be futile. 63 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner calls the conclusion of the Court of Appeals "flawed," 64 saying it erroneously assessed petitioner's capacity to meet the target payments based on its projected net income instead of the cash flow. 65 Petitioner argues that the depreciation expense had already been deducted to reach its net income. 66 It further claims that the implementation of the Final Rehabilitation Plan was successful as shown by the increase in the number of school enrollees to: (1) 340 for school year 2009 to 2010; (2) 396 for school year 2010 to 2011; and (3) 503 for school year 2011 to 2012. 67 cSEDTC

Respondent counters that petitioner raises a factual question improper in a petition for review on certiorari, 68 and that there is no showing that the case falls within the exceptions to justify this Court's consideration of the factual matters. 69

This Court agrees with respondent.

Petitioner's arguments ultimately involve a determination of the viability of its Final Rehabilitation Plan. This is a question of fact. The resolution of this issue requires a review of the sufficiency and weight of the evidence presented by the parties, including a thorough examination and analysis of the various financial documents for the rehabilitation.

This Court has distinguished between a question of law and fact:

A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can resolve the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law. Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. 70 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

A review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." 71 An appeal is given due course only when there are special and important reasons for it. 72 Further, the Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. 73

Pascual v. Burgos, et al., 74 emphasized this rule:

The Rules of Court require[s] that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. This [C]ourt is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [C]ourt" when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this [C]ourt.

However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises[,] or conjectures; (2) [w]hen the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd[,] or impossible; (3) [w]here there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) [w]hen the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) [w]hen the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) [w]hen the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) [t]he findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) [w]hen the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) [w]hen the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) [t]he finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this [C]ourt involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal cases.

A question of fact requires this [C]ourt to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties. This review includes assessment of the "probative value of the evidence presented." There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this [C]ourt is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties. 75 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) SDAaTC

This Court further stressed in Pascual that before a review of factual findings may be allowed, the petitioner must allege, substantiate, and prove the existence of any exception to the rule. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are conflicting, there must be a showing of "gross or extraordinary misperception or manifest bias" 76 in the Court of Appeals' reading of the evidence to warrant this Court's intervention. 77

In this case, petitioner indeed raises factual matters which this Court may not look into under a petition for review on certiorari. It has not presented a compelling reason for this Court to review the Court of Appeals' findings of fact. A perusal of the Projected Income 78 attached to the Petition would show that even if the depreciation expense is added to the projected net income for each year in the Final Rehabilitation Plan, this will not yield sufficient amounts to cover the targeted payments to respondent, the Social Security System, and PAG-IBIG.

II

Another ground for the denial of the Petition is its mootness.

As pointed out by respondent in its Memorandum, the rehabilitation proceedings were terminated through the February 11, 2010 Order issued by the Rehabilitation Court, on the ground of petitioner's failure to perform its duties and obligations under the Final Rehabilitation Plan. Petitioner assailed the Order in a petition for certiorari, but this was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. This Court denied petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration through its July 25, 2012 79 and December 5, 2012 80 Minute Resolutions. Petitioner curiously omitted these developments in its Memorandum.

The Rehabilitation Court's termination of the rehabilitation proceedings, affirmed by this Court with finality, has rendered moot the resolution of whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the Rehabilitation Court's December 5, 2003 Order. This effectively disapproves the Final Rehabilitation Plan.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution requires an actual controversy before judicial power may be exercised:

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis in the original)

An actual case or controversy exists "when the case presents conflicting or opposite legal rights that may be resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding." 81 There must be "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief" 82 before courts decide a case.

A case becomes moot when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." 83 Generally, courts decline taking moot cases. 84 In Rep. of the Phils. v. Moldex Realty, Inc.: 85

A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy that may be resolved by the court. This [C]ourt refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness." 86 (Citations omitted)

There are recognized exceptions to the rule of mootness:

(1) [T]here was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar[,] and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. 87 (Citation omitted) acEHCD

None of the foregoing exceptions, however, applies to this case.

Ultimately, petitioner wants this Court to uphold the Final Rehabilitation Plan. However, with the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings due to petitioner's failure to comply with its obligations under the Final Rehabilitation Plan, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled. The resolution of this Petition has become unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED." (Gesmundo and Reyes, J, Jr., JJ., on wellness leave.)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 11-32.

2.Id. at 40-55. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 37-39.

4.Id. at 180-185. The Order, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-03-0003, was penned by Presiding Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City.

5.Id. at 41.

6.Id. at 180.

7.Id. at 180.

8.Id. at 41-42.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 42-43.

11.Id. at 43.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 75-91.

14.Id. at 83.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 84.

17.Id. at 136-148.

18.Id. at 43-44.

19.Id. at 44.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 88-90.

22. Id. at 44.

23. Id. at 265-269.

24. Id. at 282.

25. Id. at 45 and 284-285.

26. Id. at 170.

27. Id. at 429-431.

28. Id. at 430.

29. Id. at 45-46.

30. Id. at 46.

31. Id. at 171-177.

32. Id. at 46.

33. Id. at 46-47.

34. Id. at 47.

35. Id.

36. Id. at 180-185.

37. Id. at 47.

38. Id. at 16.

39. Id. at 40-55.

40. Id. at 54.

41. Id. at 51.

42. Id. at 52.

43. Id. at 37-39.

44. Id. at 23.

45. Id. at 24.

46. Id. at 28.

47. Id. at 437-439.

48. Id. at 453-464.

49. Id. at 465-467. The Order, docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. LP-03-0003, was penned by Presiding Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr. of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.

50. Id. at 454-455.

51. Id. at 455-456.

52. Id. at 462.

53. Id. at 457-458.

54. Id. at 482-489.

55. Id. at 494-495.

56. Id. at 499-514, Petitioner's Memorandum dated April 18, 2013; and 518-532, Respondent's Memorandum.

57. Id. at 183-184.

58. Id. at 51.

59. Id.

60. Id. at 51.

61. Id. at 52.

62. Id.

63. Id.

64. Id. at 510.

65. Id.

66. Id.

67. Id. at 511.

68. Id. at 523.

69. Id. at 525.

70. General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, et al., 753 Phil. 353, 359 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

71. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 6.

72. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 6.

73. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

74. 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

75. Id. at 182-183.

76. Id. at 188 citing Fernan v. Court of Appeals, 260 Phil. 594, 598-599 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

77. Id.

78. Rollo, pp. 356-357.

79. Id. at 534.

80. Id. at 535.

81. Rep. of the Phils. v. Moldex Realty, Inc., 780 Phil. 553, 560 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

82. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206150, August 9, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/august2017/206150.pdt> 17 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 753 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

83. Id. at 16, citing Timbol v. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

84. Deutsche Bank AG v. Court of Appeals, et al., 683 Phil. 80 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

85. 780 Phil. 553 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

86. Id. at 560.

87. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206150, August 9, 2017, http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/august2017/206150.pdf 17-18 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Timbol v. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].