FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 250105. October 5, 2022.]
JEVELYN S. BELTRAN, petitioner,vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 5, 2022, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 250105 (Jevelyn S. Beltran v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.). — After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition 1 for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the Decision 2 dated March 29, 2019 and the Resolution 3 dated October 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105543 for failure of petitioner Jevelyn S. Beltran (petitioner) to show any reversible error in the assailed decision or resolution.
At the outset, it would be sufficient to state that the matter surrounding the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage 4 (PNCM) had already been considered by the trial court and the CA. Likewise, it is an issue of fact that is not a proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 5 An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation. The Court is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew evidence which lower courts have passed upon. 6
The Court gives credence to the appellate court's finding that petitioner never contested the authenticity and due execution of the PNCM, and as a matter of fact, has admitted in her Answer that she executed the PNCM. 7 Thus, it is clear and undisputed that petitioner obtained a car loan and executed the PNCM, which expressly stipulated, among others, that: a) monthly installments shall be paid on due date without prior notice or demand; b) in case of default, the total unpaid principal sum plus the agreed charges shall become immediately due and payable; and c) the mortgagor's default will allow the mortgagee to exercise the remedies available to it under the law. 8 Verily, the court a quo is correct in finding that respondent BPI Family Savings Bank (respondent) is justified in filing the Complaint 9 subject of the case.
Petitioner bewails that she cannot be considered to have defaulted in payment for lack of competent proof that she received the demand letter. However, a careful scrutiny of the records shows that evidence of both verbal and written demands were duly presented before the trial court. Even so, assuming arguendo that no demands were made by respondent, there is no need for such as petitioner legally waived the necessity of notice or demand in the PNCM. CAIHTE
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court recognized the legality and validity of provisions on waiver of notice or demand, to wit:
The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence, since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand was unnecessary for them to be in default. 11
The Court is not convinced by petitioner's contention that the stipulation on waiver of demand is invalid on the ground that the PNCM is a contract of adhesion. It is a time-honored rule that a contract of adhesion, wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other, is not strictly against the law. A contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. Contrary to petitioner's contention, not every contract of adhesion is an invalid agreement. 12 The validity or enforceability of the impugned document will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in such case and the situation of the parties concerned. 13 Article 24 of the Civil Code protects the party who is at a disadvantage of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
To the mind of the Court, there is no proof whatsoever that petitioner is a party who is at a disadvantage due to her moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap. Thus, it stands to reason that she who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, 14 and on this regard, petitioner has failed miserably.
Lastly, petitioner cannot seek refuge in this Court's decision in Ting v. Court of Appeals15(Ting) in putting forth the stringent requirements for service done by registered mail. The present case is a civil case which requires preponderance of evidence as a quantum of proof, whereas Ting pertains to a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 16 or the Bouncing Checks Law. As a higher quantum of proof — that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt — is required in view of the criminal nature of the case, We find insufficient the mere presentation of a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent through registered mail and its corresponding registry receipt as proof of receiving the notice of dishonor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 29, 2019 and the Resolution dated October 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105543 are AFFIRMED.
SOORDERED."Marquez, J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 16-29.
2.Id. at 39-51. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.
3.Id. at 30-34. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.
4. Not attached to the petition.
5.Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., 594 Phil. 73, 83 (2008).
6.Spouses Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 710 Phil. 82, 85 (2013).
7.Rollo, p. 46.
8.Id. at 47; underscoring supplied.
9. Not attached to the petition.
10. 523 Phil. 548 (2006).
11.Id. at 560.
12.Cabanting v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 781 Phil. 164, 169 (2016).
13.Id.
14.Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., supra note 5, at 85.
15. 398 Phil. 481 (2000).
16. Entitled "AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: April 3, 1979.