SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225269. September 14, 2016.]
OCEAN PROSPERITY MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION AND/OR TRADEMAR PTE. LTD./ZALDY VILLAFLOR, petitioners, vs. REYNALDO P. SILVA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 14 September 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 225269 — Ocean Prosperity Manning and Management Corporation and/or Trademar Pte. Ltd./Zaldy Villaflor vs. Reynaldo P. Silva
After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolved to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari for failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132160 committed any reversible error in affirming the March 5, 2013 Decision of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators awarding respondent Reynaldo P. Silva (respondent) permanent and total disability benefits, sickness allowance, reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses, and attorney's fees.
The Court finds no compelling reason to doubt the common findings of the Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) and the CA that respondent is entitled to a total and permanent disability compensation under the Trademar Singapore Maritime Officers' Agreement 2010, which is the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), for an injury sustained while in the performance of his duty.
It is to be noted that there is no dispute that 240 days from respondent's repatriation had already lapsed with no medical report on respondent's fitness or non-fitness to work having been issued by the company-designated physician. In CF. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok, 1 it was held that a seafarer is entitled to total and permanent disability benefit if 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician. The CA is thus correct in holding that respondent's disability is already deemed permanent and total.
Petitioners, however, claim that the CA erred in its award since under the new amendments in the 2010 POEA-SEC (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract), the declaration of disability should no longer be based on the number of days the seafarer was treated or paid his sickness allowance but rather on the disability grading received from the company-designated physician or from the third independent physician, if the medical findings of the physician chosen by the seafarer conflicts with that of the company-designated physician.
The contention is without merit.
Recently, amendments were placed in the POEA-SEC in that Section 20 (A) (6) of the 2010 POEA-SEC now provides that "[t]he disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid." Nevertheless, in the case of Olimpio O. Olidana v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., 2 the Court opined that before the disability gradings under Section 32 should be considered, these disability ratings should be properly established and contained in a valid and timely medical report of a company-designated physician. In the case at bench, there was no timely medical report issued by the company-designated physician.
It must be remembered that the POEA-SEC merely provides the minimum acceptable terms in a seafarer's employment contract, and that in the assessment of whether a seafarer's injury is partial and permanent, the same must be so characterized not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA SEC, but also under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. Thus, although Section 20 (A) (6) of the 2010 POEA-SEC instructs that disability shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment, the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is still subject to the periods prescribed by law. 3
Lastly, CA's award of attorney's fees is likewise justified in accordance with Article 2208 (2) 4 and (8) 5 of the Civil Code since respondent was compelled to litigate to satisfy his claims for disability benefits. DHIcET
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to AFFIRM the assailed August 12, 2015 Decision and June 17, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 132160.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. 691 Phil. 521 (2012).
2. G.R. No. 215313, October 21, 2015.
3. Id.
4. Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: . . . (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
5. (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws.