Mauricio v. Career Phils. Shipmanagement, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239486. December 6, 2021.]

NOEL A. MAURICIO, petitioner,vs. CAREER PHILS. SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. and/or COLUMBIA SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD. and/or SAMPAGUITA D. MARAVE, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 239486 (NOEL A. MAURICIO, petitioner, v. CAREER PHILS. SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. and/or COLUMBIA SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD. and/or SAMPAGUITA D. MARAVE, respondents). — A seafarer is entitled to compensation if they are unable to earn due to an injury that prevents them from working. Total disability refers to an employee's inability to work as they normally would, whereas permanent disability refers to their inability to work for more than 120 days, or 240 days if required. If total disability lasts beyond 120 days, it becomes permanent.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Noel A. Mauricio (Mauricio) assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 and Resolution 2 which held Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. (Career) and Columbia Shipmanagement Ltd. (Columbia) solidarily liable to Mauricio for US$10,075.00 as partial permanent disability benefits, and US$1,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Career, for and on behalf of its principal Columbia, hired Mauricio as Engine Fitter for six months on board the vessel Conti Guinea, with a basic monthly wage of US$823.00 and under a Seaman's Employment Contract approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on April 30, 2013. 3 It is undisputed that Mauricio underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was found fit for sea duty before starting his work on board the vessel on May 26, 2013. 4

On November 23, 2013, Mauricio's right knee hit the hard box he was pushing while performing his duties, leading to a severe knee injury. 5 Mauricio's superior officer then brought him to a clinic in Turkey where he received first aid. 6 On November 25, 2013, Mauricio received medical attention again in a hospital in Turkey and was found unfit to work. 7

On December 2, 2013, a doctor examined Mauricio again and recommended his repatriation. 8 He was then repatriated the next day and arrived in Manila on December 5, 2013. 9 Career immediately referred Mauricio to the company-designated doctors at the NGC Medical Specialist Clinic, Inc. for treatment. 10 The company-designated doctor found: (1) "swelling of the right knee"; and (2) "tenderness on palpation at the medial and lateral aspects[.]" 11 The same doctor also prescribed medications and recommended Mauricio to undergo a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for his knee, 12 which showed:

l. Partial tear of anterior cruciate ligament associated with buckling of the posterior cruciate ligament.

2. Complex tear with horizontal and oblique components of the medial meniscus associated with tears of the medial meniscofemoral, medial meniscotibial and medial collateral ligaments.

3. Oblique tear of the posterior horn of the lateral meniscus.

4. Medial and lateral mebiscal intrasubstance myxoid degeneration.

5. Tricompartmental degenerative osteoarthritis involving the patellofemoral as well as lateral and medical tibiofemoral joints with nonspecific synovitis and minimal joint effusion.

6. Grade 11 chondromalacia of the patellar and femoral articular cartilages.

7. Mild bone con[tus]ion at mid femoral metaphysis. 13

Petitioner underwent surgery and thereafter received treatment as an out-patient. 14 CAIHTE

On January 3, 2014, Mauricio followed up with the company-designated doctor due to his right knee pain. 15 The physician noted that Mauricio was using crutches, had residual swelling, and limited range of motion. 16 As per to company-designated doctor's recommendation, Mauricio underwent physical therapy from January 3, 2014 to July 4, 2014. 17

On July 4, 2014, the company-designated doctor reported Mauricio's condition to Career, stating that "the final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities is Grade 10[:] stretching leg of the ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the joint." 18

On July 17, 2014, Mauricio filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for: (1) permanent disability compensation and sick wages for 130 days under the Collective Bargaining Agreement; 19 (2) moral and exemplary damages; (3) attorney's fees; and (4) other benefits provided by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 20

In a March 31, 2015 Decision, the Labor Arbiter found Mauricio entitled to only partial permanent disability benefits in accordant with the company-designated doctor's medical assessment. 21 The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents jointly and severally, to pay complainant the amount of TEN THOUSAND SEVENTY FIVE US DOLLARS (US$10,075.00) or its Philippine peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing partial permanent disability benefits.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit. 22

Unsatisfied, Mauricio then filed a Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission. 23

In a July 31, 2015 Decision, the National Labor Relations Commission held that Career, Columbia, and Career's president Sampaguita Marave (Marave) were solidarily liable to Mauricio for total and permanent disability benefits and attorney's fees. 24 In finding that Mauricio was entitled to permanent total disability benefits, the National Labor Relations Commission applied the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 25 The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by complainant is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero dated 31 March 2015 is MODIFIED.

Respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay complainant the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$125,000.00) or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing permanent total usability benefits under the "Total Crew Cost Fleet Agreement for German Beneficially Owned Flag of Convenience Ships" (CBA), plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's fees.

The dismissal of other claims for lack of merit is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 26

Career, Marave, and Columbia moved for the reconsideration of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision, but the motion was denied in a September 21, 2015 Resolution. 27 Thus, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling. 28

During the pendency of the Court of Appeals proceedings, Career and Columbia paid Mauricio 29 by way of deposit with the National Labor Relations Commission's Cashier. 30 The Court of Appeals then issued a July 19, 2016 Resolution requiring Mauricio and his counsel to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect contempt for making it appear that the payment was a compromise settlement and not due to the execution of the labor tribunals' judgment award. 31 Mauricio explained that he and his counsel fully believed that the payment was a "conditional settlement" that effectively terminated the case. 32

In the assailed November 29, 2017 Decision, 33 the Court of Appeals found that the company-designated physician came up with a definitive finding of partial permanent disability within the 240-day period in accordance with the rules under the Labor Code, POEA Standard Employment Contract, and Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. It also found that the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement to award Mauricio total and permanent disability benefits. 34

The Court of Appeals refrained from citing Mauricio and his counsel for indirect contempt, but sternly reminded them to be updated on the pertinent rules and jurisprudence to avoid repeating the same error. 35 The Court of Appeals also absolved Marave from personal liability due to the absence of any allegation or proof that she acted with malice or beyond the scope of her authority as Career's president. 36

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

ON THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitioners Career Phils., Shipmanagement, Inc. and Columbia Shipmanagement, Ltd. are ordered to pay solidarily to private respondent Noel Alcantara Mauricio the amount of TEN THOUSAND SEVENTY FIVE UNITED STATES DOLLARS (US$10,075.00) or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing partial permanent disability benefits, and ONE THOUSAND UNITED STATES DOLLARS (US$1,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees. The complaint as to petitioner Ms. Sampaguita D. Marave is dismissed.

The assailed July 31, 2015 Decision and September 21, 2015 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are thus modified accordingly.

The citation for contempt against private respondent and his counsel are dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 37

Mauricio then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 38 In its May 10, 2018 Resolution, 39 the Court of Appeals denied Mauricio's motion upon finding that the arguments offered by Mauricio were already discussed and resolved in its earlier Decision. 40 DETACa

Thereafter, Mauricio filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. 41 Pursuant to this Court's October 3, 2018 Resolution, respondents filed their Comment on December 7, 2018. 42 In a March 4, 2019 Resolution, this Court directed petitioner to file his reply. 43 Petitioner then filed his Reply on July 23, 2019. 44

Petitioner now argues that he and respondents had a conditional settlement, effectively rendering the proceedings before the Court of Appeals moot and academic. 45 He posits that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, the Collective Bargaining Agreement — not the POEA Standard Employment Contract — should be used to determine his disability benefits, since his injury was the result of an accident. 46

Further, petitioner asserts that the company-designated physician was clearly biased in favor of respondents, and that the medical evaluation made by his chosen physician should be given more weight in determining the proper disability benefits. 47 Lastly, he claims that the National Labor Relations Commission properly granted him full disability compensation under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, since he is permanently disqualified and totally unfit to resume his seafaring duties abroad. 48

Respondents counter that there was never any conditional settlement between the parties because they made a deposit pursuant to the writ of execution and notice of garnishment issued in accordance with the judgment awards of the labor tribunals. 49 They maintain that the company-designated physician's Grade 10 disability assessment was undisputed since petitioner failed to present his chosen physician's medical opinion. 50

Further, respondents contend that the Grade 10 disability assessment was properly issued within the 240-day period and duly supported by timely progress reports and that the imputation of bias was unsupported by any evidence. 51 They argue that the POEA Standard Employment Contract is the appropriate basis for resolving petitioner's claim in the absence of any evidence to establish that petitioner suffered from an accident. 52

In his Reply, petitioner reiterates that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the evidence on record when it modified the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which has primary jurisdiction over the case. 53 He reiterates that the Collective Bargaining Agreement is the applicable contract, since it provided higher benefits, and that the medical assessment by the company-designated physician is inaccurate and downgraded. 54 Further, petitioner insists that this case is already terminated since it is already fully settled by respondents. 55

The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Noel A. Mauricio's injury is caused by an accident entitling him to total and permanent disability benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

We grant the Petition.

I

At the onset, petitioner insists that the payment deposited by respondents with the Cashier of the National Labor Relations Commission was in the nature of a conditional settlement, which terminated the case and rendered the proceedings before the Court of Appeals moot and academic. 56

It is well-settled that a petition for certiorari will not prevent the execution of labor arbiters' or the National Labor Relations Commission's assailed judgment or order, unless a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is issued by the court where the same petition is pending. 57 Rule XI, Section 4 of the 2011 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission explicitly states:

SECTION 4. Effect of Petition for Certiorari on Execution. — A petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by said courts.

Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure concomitantly provides:

SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.

Here, it is undisputed that respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which sought to set aside the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling; and that the Court of Appeals did not issue a restraining order. 58 Thus, as aptly found by the Court of Appeals, the respondents' deposit was not made as an amicable settlement between the parties, but was pursuant to the writ of execution to enforce the award by the National Labor Relations Commission. 59 Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that respondents voluntarily acceded to the disposition of the case. On the other hand, respondents consistently disputed petitioner's allegations, even up to its Comment filed before this Court.

Notwithstanding the absence of any conditional settlement, this Court finds that petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

II

Petitioner maintains that his injury was an accident warranting the grant of total and permanent disability benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 60 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no accident because the injury happened in performance of his work as an Engine Fitter, and because he pushed the heavy box with his knees; hence, it was very likely that he would get hurt. 61

In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. Illescas, 62 an accident has been defined as "[a] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens." 63

Here, despite the Court of Appeals' findings, we find that pushing a heavy box with one's knees seems contrary to human experience. Besides, petitioner stated that he was pushing the heavy box when he skidded, fell, and hit his right knee on the box. Based on the description, it can be assumed that petitioner used his arms to push the box when he slipped and banged his right knee. Thus, in relation to the definition provided in NFD International, this can be construed as an accident, since pushing a box does not usually involve falling and hitting a part of your body. Petitioner could not have expected to hit and injure his knee in pushing the heavy box with his arms.

This Court similarly awarded total and permanent disability benefits to the seafarers in Fair Shipping Corp. v. Medel; 64 Apines v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc.; 65 and Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. v. Atraje66 upon finding that they suffered from accidental injuries.

In Fair Shipping Corp., the lifeboat's handle struck the seafarer's forehead, leading to a fractured skull and rendering him unable to pursue the same occupation. Apines involved a seafarer whose knee accidentally hit the steel railings of a ladder, causing him to slip and fall. The medical records showing the seafarer's meniscal tear supported the findings that he sustained an accidental injury. In Magsaysay, the respondent-seafarer experienced a sudden fall while on duty, which resulted in neck and wrist injuries and an epileptic seizure. Magsaysay held that in determining compensation, "reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is sufficient." 67 This is because "probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings." 68

Here, that the injury happened while petitioner was performing his duties does not take away, but rather bolsters, his entitlement to permanent disability compensation. It is precisely work-related injuries that are sought to be compensated by the Collective Bargaining Agreement and by law under the Labor Code 69 through the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

Given that petitioner's injury was caused by an accident, the applicability of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is evident. Article 19 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in question states:

DISABILITY

7. A seafarer who suffers an injury as a result of an accident from any cause whatsoever while in the employment of the Managers/Owners, including accidents occurring whilst traveling to or from the ship or as a result of marine or other similar peril, and whose ability to work is reduced as a result thereof shall receive from the Managers/Owners in addition to her/sick pay (g14 and g15 above), a compensation as stated below:

Compensation:

a) Masters and Officers and ratings above AB = USS250,000

b) All ratings, AB and below = USS125,000

Loss of profession caused by disability (accident) shall be secured by 100% of the compensation

8. The disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed mutually by the Owners/Managers and the ITF, and the Owners/Managers shall provide disability compensation to the Seafarer in accordance with the percentage specified in the table below which is appropriate to this ability. With any difference, including less than 10% disability, to be pro rata:

DEGREE OF DISABILITY RATE OF COMPENSATION

 

	RATINGS AB & BELOW	OFFICERS & RATINGS above AB
%	USD	USD
50-	125,000	250,000
100
49	62,500	125,000
40	50,000	100,000
30	37,500	75,000
20	25,000	50,000
10	12,500	25,000

 

The compensation provided under this paragraph for 100% disability shall not exceed USD250,000 for Officers (and ratings above AB) AND USD125,000 for Ratings (AB and Below), with lesser degrees of disability compensated for pro-rata. ETHIDa

9. Permanent Medical Unfitness — A Seafarer those disability in accordance with g19 (1) is assessed at 50% or more under the attached Annex 3 shall for the purpose of this paragraph be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and be entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., USD250,000 for Officers and Ratings above AB and USD125,000 for Ratings and below. Furthermore, any Seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the attached Annex 3, but certified as permanent unfit for further sea service in any capacity by a doctor appointed mutually by the Owner/Managers and the ITF, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation. 70

From the stipulations cited above, a seafarer who suffers an accidental injury from any cause whatsoever in the course of employment entitles the seafarer to the benefits stated. Loss of profession due to the disability is secured by the 100% compensation. The provisions also mention a rate of compensation which corresponds to the specified degree of disability. However, this is subject to the condition that a seafarer found permanently unfit, even with a disability rating below 50%, is still entitled to 100% compensation.

Here, petitioner evidently lost his profession because respondent refused to redeploy him due to his disability, and neither can he find any gainful employment because of the injury. 71 This already entitles him to 100% compensation within the plain meaning of the terms in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. When the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its terms must be applied. 72 Therefore, the National Labor Relations Commission's award of US$125,000.00, or its Philippine peso equivalent, was proper.

Even if petitioner's benefits were not determined through the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but in accordance with the POEA Standard Employment Contract, he would still be entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 73 citing Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 74 explained the rules for determining a seafarer's disability under the POEA Standard Employment Contract:

[T]he seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires farther medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

xxx xxx xxx

[A] temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. . . .

Consequently, if after the lapse of the stated periods, the seafarer is still incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and the company-designated physician had not yet declared him fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total or permanent, the conclusive presumption that the latter is totally and permanently disabled arises. 75 (Citation omitted)

Kestrel further elaborates that regardless of the disability grading under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, the seafarer may be legally deemed totally and permanently disabled if the injury incapacitates him or her for more than 120 or 240 days:

Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities are that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. . . . [I]f his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. 76 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

It bears noting that in granting compensation for a seafarer's disability, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather, the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity." 77 Total disability does not necessitate "total paralysis or complete helplessness," but only requires that an employee be "unable to perform his or her usual work." 78 Meanwhile, permanent disability is a worker's inability to perform his or her job for more than 120 days, or 240 days if the seafarer required further medical attention extending the temporary total disability period, regardless of whether or not he or she loses the use of any part of his or her body. 79 Total disability becomes permanent if it continues beyond 120 days. 80

Here, petitioner underwent surgery and physical therapy 81 which warrants the allowance of the 240-day extended period. On July 4, 2014, or 211 days from petitioner's repatriation, the company-designated physician rendered the following assessment: "the final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities is Grade 10 — stretching leg of the ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the joint." 82 cSEDTC

However, despite the Grade 10 partial disability assessment, petitioner's disability is already considered permanent and total since his incapacity to work lasted for more than 240 days. Respondents have decided not to redeploy petitioner because of his disability. Respondents also do not deny that petitioner can no longer find gainful employment as a seafarer since the accident. 83

Due to petitioner's loss of the ability to use a knee, considering his line of work as an engine fitter, he is totally and permanently disabled. As found by the National Labor Relations Commission, no profit-oriented company would hire him again as a seafarer as a result of his injury. 84 Hence, under legal contemplation, petitioner is totally and permanently disabled and is, therefore, entitled to the correlative compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29, 2017 Decision and May 10, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 142871 are REVERSED. The July 31, 2015 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. OFW (M) 07-08840-148 85 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 40-57. The November 29, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 142871 was penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court) and Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

2. Id. at 59-60. The May 10, 2018 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP. No. 142871 was penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a member of this court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court) and Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Former First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 41.

4. Id.

5. Id.

6. Id.

7. Id.

8. Id.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id. at 41-42.

12. Id. at 42.

13. Id.

14. Id. at 78.

15. Id. at 42.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Specifically referred to as "Total Crew Cost Fleet Agreement for German Beneficially Owned Flag of Convenience Ships" on rollo, p. 43.

20. Rollo, p. 42.

21. Id. at 43.

22. Id.

23. Id.

24. Id.

25. Id. at 47.

26. Id. at 43.

27. Id.

28. Id.

29. Id. at 55.

30. Id. at 11.

31. Id. at 55.

32. Id.

33. Id. at 40-57.

34. Id. at 47, 50, and 54.

35. Id. at 56.

36. Id. at 55.

37. Id. at 56.

38. Id. at 59.

39. Id. at 59-60.

40. Id. at 59.

41. Id. at 9-34.

42. Id. at 75-101.

43. Id. at 102.

44. Id. at 114-124.

45. Id. at 19.

46. Id. at 20.

47. Id. at 20-23.

48. Id. at 31.

49. Id. at 83-84.

50. Id. at 85-88.

51. Id. at 87.

52. Id. at 92.

53. Id. at 115.

54. Id. at 116 and 118.

55. Id. at 116.

56. Id. at 19.

57. De Ocampo v. RPN-9/Radio Philippines Network, 775 Phil. 169 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

58. Rollo, p. 43.

59. Id. at 55.

60. Rollo, p. 18.

61. Id. at 49.

62. 646 Phil. 244 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

63. Id. at 260, citing F.B. MORENO, THE PHILIPPINE LAW DICTIONARY (Third Edition 1988). See rollo, pp. 48-49.

64. 693 Phil. 516 (2012) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].

65. 799 Phil. 220 (2016) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].

66. 836 Phil. 1061 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

67. Id. at 1076.

68. Magat v. Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., 829 Phil. 570, 581 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

69. LABOR CODE, Arts. 197-199.

70. Id. at 45-46.

71. Id. at 50.

72. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1370.

73. 702 Phil. 717 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

74. Vergara v. Hammonia, 588 Phil. 895 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

75. Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 702 Phil. 717, 734-735 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

76. Id. at 730-731.

77. Chan v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 239055, March 11, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66225> [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].

78. Id.

79. Id.

80. Fit-Star Maritime Corporation v. Rosete, 677 Phil. 262 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

81. Rollo, p. 52.

82. Id. at 52-53.

83. Id. at 50.

84. Id.

85. Id. at 40.