Maristela v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 254268. June 23, 2021.]

NORMITA O. MARISTELA, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 23, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 254268 (Normita O. Maristela v. People of the Philippines). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) assailing the Decision 2 dated October 23, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 44048.

Facts of the Case

Petitioner Normita O. Maristela (Maristela) was charged for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) in seven separate Information when she issued the following checks:

 

Criminal Case No.	Check No.	Maturity Date	Amount
448868-CR	0268819	February 26, 2008	P6,459.00
452311-CR	0268812	April 26, 2008	P6,459.00
452312-CR	0268813	May 26, 2008	P6,459.00
453676-CR	0268818	October 26, 2008	P6,459.00
452313-CR	0268816	August 26, 2008	P6,459.00
452314-CR	0268817	September 26, 2008	P6,459.00
452338-CR	0268810	August 2, 2008	P5,167.00

 

It was alleged in seven separate Information that Maristela issued the checks to Megatrust Finance Company, Inc. (Megatrust) knowing that at the time of issue, she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank East West Bank to fund the checks. When the checks were presented for payment within 90 days from the stated date, these were dishonored by the drawee bank as the account was closed. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor, Maristela failed to pay Megatrust the amount of the check nor make arrangements for full payment within five banking days from receipt of the notice. 3

On October 14, 2011, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) partially granted Maristela's Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 454113-CR and 454114-CR and dismissed the criminal aspect of both cases for non-submission of the original demand letters for checks subject of said cases. The civil aspect of said cases proceeded to trial. 4

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On September 5, 2012, the MeTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused NORMITA O. MARISTELA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (5 Counts), judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 448868-CR, accused is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of Six Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P6,459.00);

2) In Criminal Case No. 452311-CR, accused is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of Six Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P6,459.00) for each case;

3) In Criminal Case No. 453676-CR, accused is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of Six Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P6,459.00);

4) In Criminal Case No. 454238-CR, accused is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of Five Thousand One Hundred Sixty Seven Pesos (P5,167.00);

Accused, is likewise, held civilly liable for the face value of the five (5) checks in the above-mentioned cases, all in the total amount of Thirty One Thousand Three Pesos (P31,003.00).

Accused, is also civilly liable of the two (2) checks subject in Criminal Case Nos. 454113-14-CR in the total amount of Twelve Thousand Nine Hundred Eighteen Pesos (P12,918.00). Her total civil obligation (seven (7) checks) amounted to Forty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty One Pesos (43,921.00). However, crediting her payments made to the plaintiff amounting to Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Forty Pesos (P11,340.00), accused total liability is Thirty Two Thousand Five Hundred Eighty One Pesos (P32,581.00) with interest therein at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from the date of the filing of the information until fully paid plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 22, 2019, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila Branch 8 in Criminal Case Nos. 12-293623, 12-293624, 12-293626, 12-293629, 12-293627 and 12-293628 is hereby AFFIRMED, while the Decision in Criminal Case No. 12-293625 is MODIFIED.

Finding the accused NORMITA O. MARISTELA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of B.P. 22 (4 counts) judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 12-293623, accused is hereby ordered [to] PAY A FINE of Six Thousand Four Hundred and Fifty-Nine Pesos (P6,459.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 12-293624, accused is hereby ordered [to] PAY A FINE of Six Thousand Four Hundred and Fifty-Nine Pesos (P6,459.00);

3. In Criminal Case No. 12-293626, accused is hereby ordered [to] PAY A FINE of Six Thousand Four Hundred and Fifty-Nine Pesos (P6,459.00);

4. In Criminal Case No. 12-293629, accused is hereby ordered [to] PAY A FINE of Five Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Seven Pesos (P5,167.00);

The accused is civilly liable for the face value of the four (4) checks in the said cases for the total amount of Twenty-Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Four (P24,544.00)

The accused is also civilly liable in Criminal Case Nos. 12-293625, 12-293627, 12-293628 for the face value of the checks therein for the total amount of Nine Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Seven (P19,377.00).

Crediting the payments that she already made in the amount of Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Forty Pesos (P11,340.00), her total civil liability is Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-One Pesos (P32,581.00) with interest therein at the legal rate of twelve (12%) per annum reckoned from the date of filing the information until fully paid plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On October 23, 2020, the CA rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 22, 2019 and the Order dated September 12, 2019, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, in Criminal Case Nos. 12-293623 to 29 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the total amount of her civil liability shall earn interest at the legal rate of twelve (12%) per annum reckoned from the date of filing the Informations until June 30, 2013, and thereafter at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.

SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original)

The CA held that the elements to establish violation of BP 22 were met. For the CA, the prosecution duly established that Maristela received the demand letters/written notices of dishonor, giving rise to the presumption that she knew that she had insufficient funds. Maristela failed to dispute this presumption. 9

The CA also agreed with the argument of the OSG that the filing of a memorandum of the appellee is merely directory due to the use of the word "may" in Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules. The CA explained that it is the failure of the appellant to file her memorandum which shall be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The appellee's failure to file their memorandum does not delay the proceedings as the RTC may simply consider the appeal submitted for decision despite their failure to do so. 10

The CA also pointed out that Maristela, as the appellant, is tasked to prosecute the appeal because she is presumed to be interested in the review and reversal of the lower court's decision. In the seven years that her appeal was pending before the RTC, the CA found no showing that she called the attention of the court as to the delay in the resolution of her appeal. For the CA, if the appellant does nothing to press his appeal, it may safely be concluded that he believes the judgment of the trial court to be correct and his appeal aims to accomplish nothing more than to delay the execution of the adverse judgment. This is unfair to the appellee who is denied the enjoyment of the fruits of his victory in the case as long as the appeal is not resolved. 11

The CA modified the imposition of interest on the total amount of civil liability in accordance with the Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames12 and Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Services, Inc.13 The CA reduced the legal interest from 12% per annum to 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. 14

In the present petition, Maristela claims that there was inordinate delay in the resolution of her appeal at the RTC where it took seven years from the time it was submitted for resolution before her appeal was decided. 15

Issue

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Maristela's right to speedy trial and right to speedy disposition of the cases against her were violated when it took the RTC seven years to resolve her appeal.

Ruling of the Court

After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to grant the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

As appropriately raised by Maristela, there was inordinate delay in the resolution of her appeal by the RTC as it took seven years from the time the case was submitted for resolution before it was resolved.

Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules provides the period within which a case brought to the RTC on appeal may be resolved, to wit:

Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. —

(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall he a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as filed. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied.)

Based on the foregoing, it is settled that the RTC has 15 days from the receipt of the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. The use of the modal verb "may" is used to express a possibility. 16 It signifies discretion or an option. This means that the appellee may or may not file his memorandum. When Section 7 is read as a whole, it is clear that the absence of the appellee's memorandum will not prevent the case from being considered submitted for decision. A case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the appellee's memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so.

In this case, Maristela's counsel filed her memorandum of appeal on December 11, 2012. The prosecution did not file its memorandum, which is merely optional. Consequently, upon expiration of the period to file the appellee's memorandum, the case is considered submitted for decision before the RTC. Therefore, the 7-year period that it took for the RTC to resolve the appeal of Maristela is clearly beyond the prescribed period in Section 7, Rule 40.

In determining who has the onus of proving that delay is justified, the Court explained in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan17 that:

The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.18 Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. 19If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result.20

[C]ourts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.21

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay. 22

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the prosecution failed to give any plausible explanation as to why it allowed the appeal of Maristela to remain unresolved for seven years. The inaction and failure on the part of the prosecution to perform its duty to move for the prompt resolution of the case is unreasonable and has prejudiced Maristela's constitutional right to speedy disposition of her appeal.

Maristela's failure to call the attention of the RTC as to the delay in the resolution of her appeal does not imply that she acquiesced to the delay. There is no constitutional or legal provision mandating that the accused follow up her case before her right to its speedy disposition may be recognized. As has already been stressed, the duty to move for the prompt resolution of the case lies with the prosecution.

Nevertheless, the ruling of the lower court with respect to the civil liability of Maristela for the face value of the seven checks she issued stands. These checks were issued for value and constitute an indebtedness that Maristela must pay the private complainant.

In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 24 the Court laid down the following guidelines in the imposition of legal interest:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

xxx xxx xxx

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

And in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. 25 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied; citation omitted.)

Pursuant to the Court's ruling in Nacar, the sum of P32,581.00 due to private complainant Megatrust shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the Information until June 30, 2013 and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Resolution. The total amount owing to private complainant as set forth in this Resolution shall further cam legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from its finality until full payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 23, 2020 in CA-G.R. CR No. 44048 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Normita O. Maristela is ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 12-293623 to 29 due to inordinate delay.

The amount of P32,581.00 due to private complainant Megatrust Finance Company, Inc. shall earn interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of Information until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Resolution. The total amount owed to private complainant as set forth in this Resolution shall further earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from its finality until full payment.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 10-17.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz with the concurrence of Associate Justices Perpetua Susana T. Atal-Paño and Carlito B. Calpatura; id. at 21-38.

3.Id. at 23-25.

4.Id. at 28.

5.Id. at 28-29.

6.Id. at 21-22.

7.Supra note 2.

8.Rollo, p. 38.

9.Id. at 36.

10.Id. at 36-37.

11.Id. at 37.

12. 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

13. G.R. No. 225433, August 28, 2019.

14.Rollo, pp. 37-38.

15.Id. at 15-16.

16. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/may.

17. G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018.

18.Id.

19.Id.

20.Id.

21.Id.

22.Id.

23.Id.

24.Supra note 12.

25.Supra note 12 at 283.