Leonidas v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 223812. September 29, 2021.]

EDUARDO V. LEONIDAS, petitioner,vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., AND CARLOS C. SALINAS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 224376. September 29, 2021.]

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., AND CARLOS C. SALINAS, petitioners,vs. EDUARDO V. LEONIDAS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 223812 (Eduardo V. Leonidas v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., and Carlos C. Salinas.); and G.R. No. 224376 (Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., and Carlos C. Salinas v. Eduardo V. Leonidas). — Before this Court are the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 respectively filed by petitioner Eduardo V. Leonidas (Leonidas) against respondents Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI), Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (RCCL), and PTCI's owner/manager/president Carlos C. Salinas (collectively, respondents) in G.R. No. 223812 and by respondents against Leonidas in G.R. No. 224376. Both petitions assail the Decision 2 dated December 15, 2015 and Resolution 3 dated March 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 126197. The CA set aside the Decision 4 dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution 5 dated May 31, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC (OFW-M) 09-000857-11. The NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision 6 dated July 20, 2011 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC OFW Case No. (M) 12-17544-10.

Facts of the Case

Leonidas was first employed by PTCI, on behalf of RCCL, on October 15, 2000 as a cleaner. He was to serve on board the vessel MS Voyager of the Seas for eight months. 7 After his contract ended, PTCI and RCCL continued to engage the services of Leonidas under the following contracts:

 

Date	Position	Duration
July 18, 2001	Cleaner	8 months 8
May 13, 2002	Cleaner	8 months 9
March 7, 2003	Room Service Attendant	8 months 10
January 27, 2004	Bell Attendant	8 months 11
September 3, 2004	Cabin Attendant	6 months 12
April 5, 2005	Stateroom Attendant	6 months 13
November 2, 2005	Stateroom Attendant	6 months 14

 

Sometime in March 2006, Leonidas felt dizzy and very weak in his extremities and shoulders while performing his duties as a Stateroom attendant. He suffered from palpitations, fainting, and chest pains. Leonidas consulted the ship's physician who advised him to take a rest and consult a cardiologist upon his disembarkation. 15

In August 2006, Leonidas returned to the Philippines after completing his tour of duty. He consulted cardiologist Dr. Maria Luz Joana Soria (Dr. Soria). After examining him and conducting tests, Dr. Soria diagnosed Leonidas with chronic atrial fibrillation in controlled ventricular response. Leonidas underwent an electrocardiogram at the Manila Doctors Hospital in September 11, 2006. Based on the results, he was found to be suffering from atrial fibrillation in controlled ventricular response with runs of atrial flutter. Leonidas also performed treadmill exercise tests on October 5, 2006 but these were terminated because of fatigue and rapid ventricular response. Dr. Soria prescribed the anti-coagulant Coumadin to Leonidas in her September 11, 2006 and November 8, 2006 prescriptions. 16

PTCI and RCCL still entered into a Contract of Employment with Leonidas on September 4, 2006. He was to serve as a stateroom attendant for six months. 17 They also entered into Contracts of Employment on June 25, 2007, 18 March 25, 2008, 19 November 17, 2008, 20 and September 8, 2009. 21 The Contracts of Employment all provided that Leonidas was to serve as a stateroom attendant for six months. 22

On April 14, 2010, RCCL issued a Letter of Employment to Leonidas. 23 The Letter states that Leonidas was to report to the port of Fort Lauderdale on July 17, 2010 and serve as a stateroom attendant aboard the vessel M/V Oasis of the Seas. 24 Leonidas arrived in the Philippines on April 19, 2010. 25

On June 23, 2010, Leonidas received an email from a certain Michal Vincent S. Enriquez, addressed to respondents, stating that Leonidas could be declared unfit for sea duty under the RCCL guidelines because he was on anti-coagulants. Respondents replied that it did not accept crew as fit for work at sea if the worker was on Coumadin. Leonidas asked Dr. Soria to prescribe him a different drug so that he could return to work. Thus, Dr. Soria issued a new prescription on July 2, 2010. Leonidas asked respondents to reinstate him or pay him disability benefits. He sent two letters dated July 15, 2010 and July 26, 2010 to respondents pleading that he be reinstated to his former position. 26 Since his pleas were disregarded, Leonidas filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits, unpaid salaries, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondents on December 13, 2010 before the NLRC. 27

Respondents argued that Leonidas' contract ended in April 2010. He did not submit himself to a company-designated physician for medical examination within three days after he returned. There is also no record that he complained of any health problems while he was on board the vessel Oasis of the Seas. Accordingly, Leonidas' illness was not contracted due to the risks of his employment. With respect to the emails, respondents averred that these are not evidence of Leonidas' incapacity. He was disallowed from returning because of the medication he was taking and not because of his heart condition. This is pursuant to the guidelines of Bahamas, the Flag State. Moreover, Leonidas misrepresented and concealed his condition in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination. Respondents insisted that Leonidas is not entitled to any salary because they have not entered into a new contract of employment with him. 28

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On July 20, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered his Decision 29 with the following fallo:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and/or Royal Caribbean Cruise, Ltd. to pay, jointly and severally, complainant Eduardo V. Leonidas the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of SIXTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$60,000.00) representing total permanent disability benefits plus ten percent (10%) thereof as and for attorney's fees.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.30 (Emphasis in the original)

The LA ruled that the Letter of Employment is an employment contract that binds respondents. It is undisputed that Leonidas has been re-contracted by respondents several times. Respondents cannot deny that they offered re-employment to him while he was serving his last contract. The absence of Leonidas' signature and the non-submission of the contract to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) does not make it ineffective. Nonetheless, the LA held that Leonidas was not entitled to his salary under the Letter of Employment because his failure to board the vessel was due to his medical disqualification. 31

The LA found respondents' argument that Leonidas' disqualification was due to the medicine he was taking and not because he was physically unfit specious. Leonidas would not be taking the medicine if he was physically fit. Further, the LA held that respondents were aware of Leonidas' condition based on the letters sent by the latter. In addition, it is undisputed that Leonidas is suffering from an illness. He was diagnosed in 2006 while he was still in a contract with respondents. Despite being aware of his condition, respondents repeatedly hired him. They are estopped from claiming that Leonidas did not contract his illness during the period of their contract and that his condition is work-related. 32

Under Section 20 (B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC), the employer is liable to pay disability compensation for work-related illness or injury sustained during the term of the seafarer's contract. Respondents were held liable by the LA for disability compensation to Leonidas because they declared him unfit for deployment. The LA ruled that Leonidas' failure to submit to a post-deployment medical examination will not absolve respondents from their liability. Leonidas contracted his illness during the period of his last employment because there was only less than two (2) months from the time that he was repatriated until he was disqualified due to his illness. 33

According to the LA, the disability compensation shall be based on the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) because the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) submitted by Leonidas requires that the disability must result from an accident. The LA denied Leonidas' prayer for moral and exemplary damages for lack of substantiation. Nonetheless, he is entitled to attorney's fees for having secured the services of counsel to pursue his legitimate claims. 34 Both parties appealed to the NLRC.

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

The NLRC rendered its March 30, 2012 Decision, 35 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, respondents' appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Labor Arbiter's Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Complainant's claim for disability compensation and his partial appeal are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.36 (Emphasis in the original)

First, the NLRC held that the CBA is inapplicable because Article 37 thereof provides that it is effective from September 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007. Leonidas was last deployed from October 2009 to April 14, 2010. Hence, the CBA was no longer subsisting and cannot be the source of Leonidas' rights. In any case, the CBA provides that disability benefits may only be recovered thereunder if the disability resulted from an accident. There is no accident to speak of in this case. Consequently, Leonidas' claims must be resolved based on the POEA-SEC. 37

Second, Leonidas is not entitled to disability compensation. He was not medically repatriated and he did not report any illness or injury during his tour of duty. Leonidas was even issued a Letter of Employment dated April 14, 2010 prior to his disembarkation. His own physician and respondents' physician did not assess him with any disability. Leonidas admitted that he is fit to work despite taking anti-coagulants. This was confirmed by his doctor. Accordingly, there is no illness or injury that must be compensated, much less a disability whether total or partial. 38

Third, the NLRC stressed that Leonidas is a contractual employee whose employment was terminated when he was repatriated. It is to be expected that he would be without a job until he is hired again under another contract. Respondents' refusal to rehire him is not sufficient basis to sustain Leonidas' claims for disability benefits under the POEA-SEC. 39

Leonidas filed a motion for reconsideration. When the NLRC denied it, 40 he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 15, 2015, the CA rendered its Decision 41 as follows:

We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 30 March 2012, and the Resolution dated 31 May 2012 of the NLRC. Instead, we REINSTATE and MODIFY the Decision of Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno dated 20 July 2011, as follows: we order respondents to pay actual damages in the amount of US$2,882.00 (subject to 6% legal interest from the finality of this Decision until full payment) representing the salary for six (6) months as stated in the last contract, and attorney's fees at the reasonable rate of 10% of the recoverable amount.

IT IS SO ORDERED.42 (Emphasis in the original)

The CA held that the Letter of Employment was a valid employment contract. Article 1315 of the Civil Code provides that a contract is perfected by mere consent. An employment contract is perfected once the parties agree on its terms and concur in its essential elements, namely: (1) consent; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation. According to the CA, all the elements are present in this case. First, Leonidas has been working as a seafarer for respondents for about 10 years. Prior to disembarking, he was given a Letter of Employment stating that his sign-on date was July 17, 2010. The Letter of Employment was based on the contract dated September 8, 2009 that Leonidas had fully served. Respondents' acts proved that they impliedly consented to Leonidas' re-employment. Second, the object of the contract was the service to be rendered by Leonidas on board the vessel. Third, the cause of the contract was the monthly compensation to be paid by respondents to Leonidas. Respondents did not deny the due execution of the Letter of Employment and the genuineness of the signature thereon. They admitted issuing it in their Comment. Hence, the CA ruled that there was a perfected contract of employment. 43

The CA was not persuaded by respondents' argument that Leonidas was unfit for sea duty. PTCI's physician, Dr. Barillos, examined Leonidas on July 20, 2007 and indicated in the Medical Examination Record that the latter's history of atrial fibrillation had been resolved. Dr. Barillos declared him fit for employment. Further, the last contract of employment entered into by the parties would not have been executed and approved by the POEA if Leonidas was not fit to work. Accordingly, respondents' act of preventing Leonidas from complying with the contract of employment is a breach thereof. Respondents failed to present a plausible reason why they failed to comply with their obligation. For their breach of contract, respondents are liable for actual damages to Leonidas pursuant to Article 2199 of the Civil Code. Respondents must pay Leonidas the six months' worth of salary that he was supposed to receive. The CA also held that Leonidas is entitled to attorney's fees because he was forced to file this case due to respondents' unjustified failure to deploy him. He is likewise entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the CA's Decision until it is fully paid. However, Leonidas cannot be awarded moral damages because respondents' acts were not tainted with bad faith or done deliberately to defeat Leonidas' rights. 44

Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. Both motions were denied. 45 Subsequently, Leonidas and respondents filed their respective petitions before this Court. Each party filed a Comment 46 to the petition filed by the other party. Respondents filed a Reply 47 to Leonidas' comment to their petition. On July 5, 2017, the Court resolved to consolidate both cases. 48

Leonidas first criticized the Decision and Resolution of the CA for failing to address the issue regarding his entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits. He averred that he would have brought the matter before the Regional Trial Court if what he really wanted was to seek redress for breach of contract. Further, the CA failed to address the substantive issues raised by Leonidas in his motion for reconsideration. 49

Second, Leonidas argued that he was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits, as ruled by the LA. Leonidas was supposed to report for work on July 17, 2010 but was informed through an email on June 23, 2010 that he could no longer do so due to his medical condition. He was declared unfit for sea duty. From July 17, 2010 until December 13, 2010, which is the date when he filed his complaint, Leonidas has been unemployed for more than 120 days. Respondents did not deny this. In fact, Leonidas was still unemployed when he filed his petition and comment to respondents' petition before this Court. Total disability does not require that the employee is absolutely disabled or paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. Thus, Leonidas is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and not merely actual damages because of respondents' failure to deploy him. 50

First, respondents claimed that there was no breach of contract. Section 2 of the POEA-SEC states that "The employment contract between the employer and the seafarer shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and with a POEA approved contract." Section 3, Rule IV of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers (2003 POEA Rules) likewise provides that "An agency shall deploy its hired seafarers within 60 days from the date of issuance of the overseas employment certificate." Accordingly, the employer's obligation to deploy a seafarer commences only upon the approval of the POEA and the issuance of the overseas employment certificate. The Letter of Employment in this case is not the contract contemplated by the POEA-SEC and the 2003 POEA Rules. Before the contract is processed and approved by the POEA, a Fit to Work assessment must be made during the Pre-Employment Medical Examination. The 2003 POEA Rules notably provides that the agency is obligated to ensure that the medical examination is conducted in accordance with the prescribed and acceptable international standard as well as the requirements of the employer/principal. Pursuant to this requirement, Leonidas was advised that he may be declared unfit for sea duty based on RCCL's guidelines regarding the taking of anti-coagulants. Respondents were acting in good faith when they refused to proceed with the employment contract because of Leonidas' heart condition and medication. It was done to ensure his safety. Accordingly, the NLRC did not err in dismissing his complaint. 51

Second, respondents stress that Leonidas' non-engagement was not due to an ailment he contracted but because the guidelines of RCCL state that a seafarer under medication (i.e., anticoagulant) cannot work at sea. Leonidas himself stated in his position paper that his cardiologist declared him fit for work while the result of the test conducted by PTCI's doctor showed that he had a good response. Clearly then, Leonidas is fit to work. He could work for principals who do not have the same policy as RCCL. 52

Third, Leonidas did not comply with the requirement under the POEA-SEC that he must submit himself to a company-designated physician within three working days from his repatriation. It took him nearly nine (9) months to file his complaint against respondents. Leonidas' illness could have become graver during this period and respondents could not do anything about it because of his failure to present himself to their designated physician. In addition, Leonidas made a misrepresentation in his Medical Examination Form when he checked no to item no. 22 regarding heart attack/angina/irregular heartbeat before crossing it out and checking yes. He checked no on the same item in his January 12, 2009 Medical Examination despite being aware of his existing illness. Under Section 20 (B) (E) of the POEA-SEC, a seafarer's willful concealment of his past medical condition constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. It is also a valid ground for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate sanctions. Moreover, Leonidas failed to prove the existence of the conditions under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC regarding cardiovascular diseases. Leonidas' mere failure to work for 120 days does not mean he is automatically entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. He must still establish his right thereto by substantial evidence. 53Fourth, Leonidas is not entitled to attorney's fees and actual damages based on the foregoing. 54

Issue

The issue before this Court is whether the CA erred in granting actual damages and attorney's fees to Leonidas because of respondents' breach of contract.

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the petitions.

Leonidas is not entitled to

Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC requires the satisfaction of the following conditions in order for an occupational disease and the resulting death or disability to be compensable: (1) The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. The specific conditions for cardiovascular diseases under Section 32-A (11) are:

1. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.

2. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.

3. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.

Leonidas failed to prove that his condition is work-related. He did not establish how his working conditions caused or contributed to his chronic atrial fibrillation. He did not show that he exhibited symptoms evincing that his condition worsened when he last served as a stateroom attendant on board the vessel Oasis of the Seas. Leonidas also failed to prove that any of the conditions for cardiovascular diseases under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC are present in this case. The Court cannot assume that Leonidas' condition is work-related simply because he was diagnosed with it after working for respondents. Leonidas was behooved to prove, at the very least, the correlation of his condition to the work he performed. This he failed to do.

Further, Leonidas did not prove that he is totally and permanently disabled. The crux of his argument rests on the fact that he was not employed from the time that he was supposed to embark on July 17, 2010 until he filed his complaint before the NLRC on December 13, 2010. The period during which he was unemployed is more than 120 days. In fact, he was still unemployed when he filed his comment to respondents' petition before this Court. But the period of 120 days under the POEA-SEC does not pertain to the period during which a seafarer is unemployed. Under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, a company-designated physician must render an assessment as to the seafarer's fitness to work or degree of disability within 120 days from the time that he or she signed-off from the vessel for medical treatment. The period may be extended to a maximum of 240 days if the seafarer requires further medical attention. 55 Leonidas did not allege that he received treatment from respondents' designated physician. Hence, the 120-day period under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC does not apply. Leonidas mistakenly used it as a benchmark for his unemployment.

Leonidas is correct that total and permanent disability does not refer to an absolute incapacity on the part of the seafarer. Nonetheless, total and permanent disability does not exist simply because a seafarer is unemployed. In this case, Leonidas' own physician did not issue a certification that he is totally and permanently disabled from performing his work because of his condition. In fact, he was not medically repatriated and was able to finish his contract. He did not file a claim for total and permanent disability benefits after he was repatriated. Several months lapsed before he finally filed a complaint against respondents, and only after they refused to deploy him. All told, Leonidas failed to prove that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits from respondents.

Respondents are liable

Though Leonidas claimed that he did not seek redress for breach of contract, he specifically argued in his Position Paper before the LA that he is entitled to the payment of his salary for the unexpired/unserved portion of his contract. 56 In effect, what is involved here is the unlawful termination of a valid contract that entitles a seafarer to payment for the unserved contract. In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., 57 the Court held that labor tribunals have jurisdiction over this matter because what is involved is an employment contract for overseas employment. 58 This is pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R.A. 10022, which provides:

Section 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry. x x x

The essential requisites of a contract under Article 1318 of R.A. 386 or the Civil Code are: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established. Article 1315 of the Civil Code states that "[c]ontracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law." It is undisputed that respondents issued a Letter of Employment to Leonidas stating that he is to return to work on July 17, 2010. The Court agrees with the CA that the Letter of Employment is proof that there was a perfected contract of employment. First, the object of the contract is the re-employment of Leonidas as a stateroom attendant for respondents' vessel Oasis of the Seas. The Letter of Employment clearly shows that Leonidas is being re-employed and does not state any conditions for his re-employment. It includes Leonidas' position, the vessel that he will board, the port where he must report, and his sign-on date. Second, the cause of the contract is the compensation that Leonidas will receive. Though his salary is not expressly stated in the Letter of Employment, it is indicated that he is being re-employed. Leonidas' re-employment implies that he is being hired under the same terms provided for in his previous contract which clearly specified Leonidas' salary. Third, both parties consented to Leonidas' re-employment. Respondents admitted that they issued the Letter of Employment and gave it to Leonidas. 59 Leonidas has consistently claimed that he wanted to return to work but it was respondents who prevented him from doing so.

However, respondents averred that the contract was not approved by the POEA. They cited Section 2 of the POEA-SEC which states that the commencement of the employment contract shall be "upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and with a POEA approved contract." They also referred to Section 3, Rule IV of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers which provides that an agency shall deploy its hired seafarers within 60 days from the date of the issuance of the overseas employment certificate. Based on the foregoing provisions, respondents argued that they have no obligation to deploy Leonidas because the contract of employment has not been approved by the POEA. But the approval of the POEA is not an essential requisite of a contract. As previously discussed, these essential requisites are the consent of the parties, object certain, and cause. Once these requisites are met, the contract is perfected. The perfected contract then gives rise to rights and obligations, one of which is respondents' obligation to submit the contract of employment to the POEA for approval.

Further, the Court has already distinguished the perfection of an employment contract of a seafarer from the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. On one hand, the contract is perfected once the parties agree on its cause, object, and terms. Once the contract is perfected, the parties have rights and obligations and may be held liable for breaching it. On the other hand, the employer-employee relationship would commence upon the deployment of the seafarer at the point of hire. 60 Consequently, the failure to deploy a seafarer without valid reason would make the manning agent and its principal liable for breach of contract even if the employer-employee relationship has not yet commenced. 61

Respondents justified their refusal to the deploy Leonidas on the ground that RCCL's guidelines provide that a seafarer who is taking anti-coagulants is unfit for sea duty. Respondents did not submit a copy of the guidelines of the RCCL as proof of its claim. Notably, respondents alleged in their Reply before the Labor Arbiter that the guidelines which disallow seafarers who take anti-coagulants from serving on board is that of the "Flagstate (Bahamas)" and not the RCCL's. 62 It is therefore suspect if such guidelines truly exist. Moreover, respondents cannot feign ignorance of Leonidas' condition. The Employment Medical Examination Form for New Hires and Returning Crewmembers dated September 24, 2009 shows that the physician noted that Leonidas has "chronic atrial fibrillation (2006)" and is taking warfarin, 63 an anti-coagulant medication. 64 It is therefore suspicious that respondents would suddenly refuse to deploy Leonidas for taking anti-coagulant medication despite previously deploying him while knowing that he took such medication. Respondents did not state when the alleged guidelines of the RCCL or Bahamas were promulgated so as to explain why it was not observed with respect to Leonidas' previous contracts. All told, the Court is not persuaded that respondents gave sufficient basis for their refusal to deploy Leonidas in 2010.

Respondents' failure to deploy Leonidas constitutes a breach of their contract. Accordingly, they must be held liable for damages to Leonidas. In Bright Maritime Corp. v. Fantonial, 65 the Court awarded actual damages equivalent to the seafarer's one year salary under the employment contract due to the employer's failure to deploy the seafarer without a valid reason. 66 The Court likewise awarded actual damages equivalent to nine months of salary, pursuant to the employment contract, to a seafarer whose non-deployment was without just cause in Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. v. Medequillo, Jr.67 Considering this, the CA was correct in awarding actual damages to Leonidas. But it must be clarified that the amount of actual damages should be equivalent to Leonidas' basic monthly salary of US$487.00 for six months, 68 or US$2,922.00. Leonidas is likewise entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 69 However, he is not entitled to moral damages for failure to show bad faith on the part of respondents. Further, the total amount awarded to Leonidas is subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction in line with the Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames. 70 Respondents are all liable to pay the amounts due to Leonidas in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042 or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," as amended by R.A. 10022. 71

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated December 15, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126197 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., and Carlos C. Salinas are held jointly and severally liable to pay Eduardo V. Leonidas actual damages in the amount of US$2,922.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment, and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded. The total amount due shall be subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED." (Leonen, J., on official leave.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo (G.R. No. 223812), pp. 25-43; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), pp. 27-44.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Jane Aurora C. Lantion; rollo (G.R. No. 223812), pp. 9-19.

3.Id. at 21-22.

4. Penned by Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco, with the concurrence of Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Romeo L. Go; CA rollo, pp. 40-49.

5.Id. at 50-51.

6. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno; id. at 238-247.

7.Id. at 67, 238.

8.Id. at 66.

9.Id. at 65.

10.Id. at 64.

11.Id. at 63.

12.Id. at 62.

13.Id. at 61.

14.Id. at 60.

15.Rollo (G.R. No. 223812), p. 10.

16.Id.

17. CA rollo, p. 59.

18.Id. at 58.

19.Id. at 57.

20.Id. at 56.

21.Id. at 55.

22.Id.

23.Rollo (G.R. No. 223812), p. 11.

24. CA rollo, p. 79.

25.Id. at 52.

26.Rollo (G.R. No. 223812), p. 11.

27. CA rollo, p. 53.

28.Id. at 241-242.

29.Id. at 238-247.

30.Id. at 247.

31.Id. at 243.

32.Id. at 244.

33.Id. at 245-246.

34.Id. at 246.

35.Id. at 40-49.

36.Id. at 48.

37.Id. at 44.

38.Id. at 46-47.

39.Id. at 48.

40.Id. at 50-51.

41.Rollo (G.R. No. 223812), pp. 9-19.

42.Id. at 19.

43.Id. at 15-16.

44.Id. at 17-18.

45.Id. at 21-22.

46.Id. at 47-56; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), pp. 74-82.

47.Id. at 77-81.

48.Id. at 68.

49.Id. at 35, 40; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), p. 77.

50.Id. at 33-39; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), pp. 75-81.

51.Id. at 50-52; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), pp. 34-35.

52.Id. at 52; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), pp. 35-36.

53.Id. at 48-50; 80-81, & rollo (G.R. No. 224376), pp. 36-38.

54.Id. at 58; rollo (G.R. No. 224376), p. 38.

55.Pastor v. Bibby Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 238842, November 19, 2018.

56. CA rollo, p. 141.

57. 554 Phil. 63 (2007).

58.Id.

59.Rollo (G.R. No. 224376), p. 34.

60.Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., 554 Phil. 63, 73 (2007).

61.C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp., 682 Phil. 198 (2012).

62. CA rollo, p. 230.

63.Id. at 77.

64.Id. at 70.

65. 681 Phil. 362 (2012).

66.Id.

67. 679 Phil. 297 (2012).

68. CA rollo, p. 55.

69. Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxx xxx xxx

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

xxx xxx xxx

70. 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

71. Section 10. Money Claims. — x x x The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. x x x