THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212899. January 24, 2018.]
WELZCHILYN C. JUMAWAN, for and in behalf of the HEIRS OF LEMUEL L. JUMAWAN, petitioner,vs. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., and/or A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE., LTD., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 24, 2018, which reads as follows: SaCIDT
"G.R. No. 212899 (WELZCHILYN C. JUMAWAN, for and in behalf of the HEIRS OF LEMUEL L. JUMAWAN, Petitioner, v. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., and/or A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE., LTD., Respondents.) — Under review is the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petition for certiorari brought by the respondents to set aside and nullify the decision rendered on May 22, 2013 by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 2 affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter dated December 28, 2012 dismissing the claim of the petitioner on the ground of res judicata, and granting additional benefits to the two minor children of the seafarer.
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents, thus:
On September 8, 2011, Welzchilyn C. Jumawan, wife of Lemuel, filed a complaint against petitioners for the payment of benefits accruing from the death of Lemuel. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR OFW (M) 09-13832-11 and was assigned to Labor Arbiter Cheryl Ampil. Subsequently, Welzchilyn and Maersk were able to forge a settlement, entitled Release of All Claims. The pertinent portion reads, to wit:
I, WELZCHILYN C. JUMAWAN, x x x for and in behalf of my minor children namely, MC PRINCE GUY C. JUMAWAN and QUEEN GARNETT C. JUMAWAN x x x in exchange for FORTY ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$41,000.00) which I have received, do hereby RELEASE x x x [MAERSK] AND/OR A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LTD., x x x from each and every right and claim which I now have, or may hereafter have, x x x on account of the injury/illness/death suffered by LEMUEL R. JUMAWAN as follows: Pulmonary Edema (Swelling in the Lungs), and in addition to that, I RELEASE them from each and every right and claim which I now have or may hereafter have because of any matter or thing which happened before the signing of this paper, x x x. I agree not to file any claims against the owners and its successors-in-interest based on tort or on any other ground, x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
I hereby warrant and affirm that all persons, including (but not limited to) any minor children and dependents, entitled to assert a claim by reason of the injury/illness/death of LEMUEL R. JUMAWAN have been properly provided for under the terms of this release.
The parties appeared before Labor Arbiter Ampil for its approval. Welzchilyn signed the agreement and the accompanying receipt of payment, which stated in part, to wit:
Received from DEL ROSARIO PANDIPHIL, INC. Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) with Check No. 0000200635 dated 6th September 2011, in the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE DOLLARS AND 90/100 (US$35,291.90) payable to WELZCHILYN C. JUMAWAN as full and complete settlement of all claims, demands and actions for death compensation and burial allowance, and all other claims, demands and actions for death compensation and burial allowance, and all other losses and claims arising from the death of Abe Seaman LEMUEL R. JUMAWAN x x x.
That I already received the amount of US$5,708.10 from MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. as Cash Advances.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the settlement, petitioners and Welzchilyn jointly moved to dismiss the case. Before acting on the motion, Labor Ampil ordered the parties to submit the following documents:
1. Release of All Rights;
2. Pagpapaubaya ng Lahat ng Karapatan;
3. Affidavit of Claimant; and
4. Receipt of Payment cHECAS
However, after conferring with her relatives, Welzchilyn realized that the payment she received from Maersk was not sufficient. Thus, Welzchilyn filed another complaint against Maersk to recover the full death benefits due her. The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Jonalyn S. Gutierrez and was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. (M) NCR 02-12193-12.
Meanwhile, the case under compromise was dismissed by Labor Arbiter Ampil for failure of the parties to submit the required documents, with prejudice against Welzchilyn, but without prejudice to the right of other heirs of Lemuel.
Maersk then filed a motion to consolidate the cases filed by Welzchilyn. During the clarificatory hearing before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, Maersk intimated that the case is similar to that previously filed with Labor Arbiter Ampil, which was the subject of an amicable settlement. Maersk then moved to dismiss the case. 3
After due consideration of the contentions of the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision dated December 28, 2012 dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata, explaining that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the validity of the compromise agreement that she had entered into, and observing that there was no fraud, force or duress that would invalidate said agreement, viz.: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered the complaint is hereby DISMISSED on [the] ground of res judicata.
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the petitioner contended that she was not estopped from assailing the compromise agreement because her consent thereto had been obtained through fraud, misrepresentation and coercion, and because the amount she had received pursuant to the compromise agreement was unconscionably low. 6
Through the decision issued on May 22, 2013, 7 the NLRC, although upholding the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata "particularly on the question or issue of the death benefit claims of the Complainants" considering the lack of any vices of consent sufficient to nullify the compromise agreement, ruled that the same impediment did not apply to the petitioner's minor children; and held that because the respondents did not extend to the minor children the minimum death benefits provided under the POEA Standard contract, the deficiency of US$10,000.00 and US$7,000.00 should be granted to each of the two minor children of the seafarer. 8 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 December 2012 is MODIFIED by granting an additional death benefit of US$10,000.00 to the Complainants and US$7,000.00 each to the two (2) minor children.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.9
The respondents assailed the decision of the NLRC in the CA by petition for certiorari, alleging that the NLRC thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On December 12, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision granting the petition for certiorari, and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 10 The CA deleted the additional benefits awarded to the minor children of the seafarer made by the NLRC; upheld the validity of the compromise agreement and waiver signed by the petitioner; opined that the compromise agreement and waiver had the force of res judicata barring her from filing another suit for the same cause of action; and held that a reading of the waiver revealed that the waiver covered not only her claim but also the claims of her minor children.
The CA later on denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 11
Issue
The petitioners insist on the invalidity of the compromise agreement due to petitioner Welzchilyn C. Jumawan's having been coerced to sign the same. 12 They claim that the terms of the compromise agreement were unconscionable because they thereby received benefits less than what the law granted them; that res judicata should not bar the claims of the minor children considering that when the Labor Arbiter dismissed the first complaint, the dismissal as to the children was expressly made without prejudice; and that the constitutional provision for the protection of labor should weigh in to invalidate the compromise agreement. 13
Did the CA err in upholding the validity of the compromise agreement?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit. AHDacC
First of all, this mode of appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the consideration and determination of questions of law. This is very clear from Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact has been clear-cut. In Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr., 14 the Court stated:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
The petition for review on certiorari would have the Court examine the records of the proceedings below and determine on the basis thereof that vices of consent were attendant in the execution of the compromise agreement. Such examination and determination necessarily require delving into issues of fact. Moreover, the validity of a quitclaim involved a question of fact. 15 But the Court cannot examine and determine issues of fact because it is not a trier of facts. 16 Hence, we deny the present recourse for being outside the ambit of the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Worthy to stress is that the factual findings made by the CA become binding and conclusive upon the Court. 17 Although certain exceptions to this rule may have been laid down by jurisprudence, 18 the petitioners have not discharged their responsibility of showing that their case came within any of the exceptions. Thus, the general rule should still apply to them, especially so that the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter unanimously affirmed the validity of the compromise agreement and quitclaim, thereby removing the need for undoing their unanimous findings thereon.
Secondly, the CA correctly declared that the compromise agreement was binding not only on the petitioner herself but also on her two minor children on the basis of the petitioner's having voluntarily and knowingly accepted the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement for all of them.
Lastly, the petitioners' invocation of the constitutional protection to labor does not save the day for them. It would be the height of unfairness if the Court were now to disregard the well-reasoned findings and explanations made extant by the CA in its assailed decision simply for the reason that this suit was being prosecuted against an employer. The constitutional mandate to protect labor is not an instrument of oppression against the employer or of destruction of the latter. What the Court has pointed out in Solidbank Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission19 is worth reiteration herein, to wit:
Withal, the law, in protecting the rights of the laborers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine. [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, without pronouncement on costs of the suit. IDSEAH
(Martires, J., on wellness leave.)
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 33-40; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., and Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting.
2.Id. at 44-54.
3.Id. at 33-35.
4.Id. at 35-36.
5.Id. at 36.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 44-54.
8.Id. at 53.
9.Id. at 53-54.
10.Supra note 1.
11.Rollo, pp. 41-42.
12.Id. at 24-25.
13. Id. at 27-28.
14. G.R. No. 190994, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 306, 314, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 338, 345.
15. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Aumentado, Jr., G.R. No. 173634, July 22, 2010, 625 SCRA 241, 250.
16. Co v. Vargas, G.R. No. 195167, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 451, 458.
17. Tan v. Andrade, G.R. No. 171904, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 198, 204.
18. In Salcedo v. People, G.R. No. 137143, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 499, 505, the Court enumerated some exceptions, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
19. G.R. No. 165951, March 30, 2010, 617 SCRA 161, 177-178.