THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202757. March 2, 2022.]
HEIRS OF SPOUSES EUSTAQUIO ORIJOLA and MARIA C. GESMUNDO, petitioners,vs. ELISAN CREDIT CORPORATION, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 2, 2022, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 202757 (HEIRS OF SPOUSES EUSTAQUIO ORIJOLA and MARIA C. GESMUNDO, petitioners v. ELISAN CREDIT CORPORATION, respondent). — Litigants are generally bound by their counsel's negligence and omission, unless their counsel's negligence is reckless or gross such that it deprives the client of due process of law. In this regard, a litigant has a duty to be vigilant and be informed on the status of the case. In case the litigant fails to fulfill this duty, they will be bound by any adverse judgment rendered due to their counsel's negligence. 1
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals' Resolutions denying 3 spouses Eustaquio Orijola's and Maria C. Gesmundo's (the Orijola Spouses) appeal, and dismissing 4 their Joint Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Appellants' Brief. 5
This Petition arose from a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure 6 filed by Elisan Credit Corporation (Elisan) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against the Orijola Spouses.
Before the Regional Trial Court, Elisan alleged that spouses Reynaldo G. Orijola (Reynaldo) and Marilyn A. Orijola (Marilyn) obtained a loan from its corporation, the payment of which was secured by a mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-11912. 7 Reynaldo is one of the children of the Orijola Spouses. 8
The loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note, 9 a Voucher, 10 and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 11 (collectively, the Loan Documents). The loan agreement contained an escalation clause, that is, failure to pay any due installment shall make all subsequent installments due and payable without need of demand. 12 Furthermore, should Reynaldo and Marilyn fail to fully pay their loan to Elisan, the mortgage may be foreclosed. 13 This mortgage was duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela. 14
When the loan matured, and despite Elisan's demands, Reynaldo and Marilyn did not fully pay their loan. Thus, in accordance with the loan agreement, Elisan prayed that Reynaldo and Marilyn be ordered to pay the balance of their loan, with interest. Additionally, if they fail to do so, their mortgaged property will be foreclosed so that the proceeds of the sale can be applied to the payment of the debts in Elisan's favor. 15
The Heirs of the Orijola Spouses (Heirs) questioned the due execution of the Loan Documents. They contended that the Orijola Spouses, given their health condition and old age, supposedly did not have the "physical, mental, and financial capacity to comply" 16 with the terms of the loan. 17 Therefore, the Heirs contended that the Orijola Spouses could not have known about the loan and could never have met any one of Elisan's officers or representatives. 18
However, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Heirs' unsubstantiated and uncorroborated allegations and suppositions, particularly about the inauthenticity of the Orijola Spouses' signatures on the Loan Documents. 19 Thus, the trial court issued its December 1, 2010 Decision 20 holding that Elisan was able to establish the allegations contained in the Complaint. 21 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: CAIHTE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff ELISAN CREDIT CORPORATION and against the defendants Heirs of SPOUSES EUSTAQUIO ORIJOLA & MARIA C. GESMUNDO.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the said defendants to pay plaintiff within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of this Judgment, the following:
The amount of P884,860.00, Philippine Currency, representing the balance of defendants' principal obligation, plus the interest and penalties due thereon at the rate of 26% per annum and 2.5% per month respectively, from May 24, 1996 until fully paid; and
The sum of P50,000.00, Philippine Currency, as reasonable Attorney's Fees.
In default of such payment, the subject mortgaged property covered by TCT No. V-11914 shall be sold at public auction to satisfy this Judgment in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and other regulations governing sales of real estate under execution.
SO ORDERED. 22
After receipt of the trial court's Decision and before the expiration of the 45-day reglementary period to file the Appellants' Brief, the Heirs filed a Motion for Extension of Time, praying for an additional period within which to file their Appellants' Brief before the Court of Appeals. 23 The Court of Appeals granted this motion through its November 22, 2011 Resolution, giving the Heirs until December 19, 2011 within which to file their Appellants' Brief. 24
On December 19, 2011, the last day of the extended period, the Heirs filed a second Motion for Extension of Time asking that they be given until January 3, 2012 to file their brief. 25
Through its March 5, 2012 Resolution, 26 the Court of Appeals dismissed the Heirs' appeal for failure to file their Appellants' Brief. 27 The March 3, 2012 Resolution reads:
For failure of the defendant-appellants to file [their] [appellants'] brief within the second extended period granted by this Court which expired on January 3, 2021, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. 28
Aggrieved, the Heirs filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Appellants' Brief (Joint Motion). 29 In the Joint Motion, the Heirs' counsel admitted that he "completely overlooked the deadline for the submission of the Appellants' Brief as he was engrossed with other cases." 30 Nonetheless, the Heirs' counsel insisted that his failure to file his client's Appellants' Brief within the second extended period was an "honest mistake." 31
In its July 3, 2012 Resolution, 32 the Court of Appeals denied the Joint Motion. 33 The Court of Appeals lamented over how the Heirs' counsel was remiss in his duty to keep track of deadlines of the cases he handles. 34 The dispositive portion of the July 3, 2012 Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, defendants-appellants' Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 5, 2012 and Motion to Admit Appellants' Brief is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 35
Hence, the Heirs filed this Petition for Certiorari before this Court, praying that this Court exercise its equitable jurisdiction and suspend the rule on the submission of Appellants' brief. 36
This Court now resolves the issue of whether or not petitioners' appeal may be given due course despite their failure to file an Appellants' Brief.
We dismiss the Petition. We cannot ascribe any reversible error on the Court of Appeals' part in denying petitioners' Joint Motion, which was filed after the expiration of the twice-extended reglementary period to file their Appellants' Brief.
Petitioners "accept the legality of the Court of Appeals' Resolutions dated March 5, 2012 and July 3, 2012" 37 and admit to their failure to file their Appellants' Brief for six months. 38 Nonetheless, petitioners attribute their predicament to their previous counsel's negligence, and further contend that the transactions were "not their parents' own doing." 39
This Court cannot and will not allow petitioners' unjustified failure to observe the reglementary period to file their Appellants' Brief. DETACa
It bears noting that petitioners cannot adopt inconsistent positions. They cannot accept the legality of the assailed resolutions while also seeking their reversal. Moreover, they have already been granted multiple extensions of time to file their Appellants' Brief.
Under Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, the appellant has the duty to file their appellant's brief with the court, "within [45] days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record. 40
In turn, Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee," on the ground that the appellant fails to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
In Lagua v. Court of Appeals, 41 this Court dismissed an appeal based on an appellant's repeated disregard for procedural rules:
The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the procedural rules, which are in dispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. Otherwise[,] these rules would be rendered useless. In Polintan v. People, the Court of Appeals gave the petitioner therein a total of 75 days to submit his Appellant's Brief, but he failed to do so. In that case, the accused Polintan filed a 'Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellant's Brief.' This Court affirmed the [Court of Appeals] Resolution declaring his appeal abandoned, after finding his excuses too flimsy to warrant reversal.
In the present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to file his Appellant's Brief, but also to secure new counsel to adequately prepare the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause Orders and two Resolutions declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these issuances, his second Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days after his receipt of the second and final CA Resolution. To our mind, this delay is indicative of sheer laxity and indifference on his part, for which he has lost the statutory right of appeal. Even during the intervening period after counsel has withdrawn, litigants are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status of their cases[.] 42 (Emphasis supplied)
In Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of Appeals, 43 this Court summarized the rules concerning the failure to file an appellant's brief, as follows:
(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant's brief is filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the rules;
(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory;
(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal;
(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the court's leniency it is imperative that:
(a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court's liberality;
(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice;
(c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;
(d) there is no contention that the appellees' cause was prejudiced;
(e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.
(5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and
(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court's indulgence except:
(a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or
(c) where the interests of justice so require. 44
Absent the existence of any exempting circumstance, this Court will not digress from the foregoing rulings. An extension of time is a privilege, not a right that petitioners should have valued appropriately, especially since they were given the opportunity to file their Appellants' Brief not once, but three times.
Despite the multiple extensions granted, petitioners showed wanton disregard of the Court of Appeals' generous concession as they repeatedly failed to file the required brief. Indeed, petitioners only filed their brief on July 3, 2012, when they sought for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's Resolution dismissing their appeal. At that time, they have been in delay for 183 days since the expiration of the second extended period.
It is an established rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. 45 In Redeña v. Court of Appeals, 46 where the petitioner prayed that he be exempted from the strict application of the Rules, this Court emphasized that the counsel's negligence is insufficient to justify the petitioner's failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period: aDSIHc
He cannot lay the blame solely on his former lawyer. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. While, exceptionally, a client may be excused from the failure of his counsel, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not convince the Court to take exception.
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared and filed his appellant's brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the [Court of Appeals] and remand the main case to the court of origin for new trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel's negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. Here, petitioner's counsel failed to file the appellant's brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceedings below. 47 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Bejarasco v. People48 explained the rationale behind this rule and a party's duty to be vigilant and to apprise themselves of the status of the case:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself. A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. 49 (Citations omitted)
Here, the circumstances do not convince this Court to take exception from the rule on the binding effects of a negligent counsel. To emphasize, petitioners' counsel expressly admitted that he "completely overlooked the deadline for the submission of the Appellants' Brief as he was engrossed with other cases." 50 This cannot be considered an honest mistake. 51
Petitioners also cannot entirely blame their counsel, since they were also negligent in keeping themselves informed about the status of their case while it was pending before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners are clearly bound by the inaction and negligence of their former counsel.
It also bears emphasizing that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that the scope of this Court's judicial review of Court of Appeals decisions through a petition for review on certiorari is generally limited to errors of law. Questions of fact are not entertained. 52
This Court's judicial review does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence on which a tribunal has made a decision. 53 Consequently, the review of appeals filed before this Court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. 54
Here, petitioners vehemently assert that the Orijola Spouses could not have validly consented to the mortgage contract because of their poor health condition and advanced age. They also assail the appreciation of evidence by the Regional Trial Court. 55
The issues raised by petitioners are questions of fact. While the general rule on judicial review is not absolute, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions. 56 As such, this Court is duty-bound to respect the lower court's consistent prior findings, which previously weighed the parties' claims and personally perused the evidence. 57 On this ground, the Petition may already be dismissed.
Even if this Court exercises liberality and proceeds with a review of the records, considering its duty to be vigilant to protect parties who are at a disadvantage due to their "mental weakness, tender age[,] or other handicap[,]" 58 nonetheless, this Court still finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, finds no reason to overturn the assailed Resolutions.
Contracts enjoy the presumption of validity, and a person is not incapacitated to contract merely by reason of old age and physical or mental weakness. 59 A person is incapacitated only when their old age or infirmities impair their mental faculties to the point where they are unable to properly, intelligently, and fairly protect their property rights. 60
In Almeda v. Heirs of Almeda, 61 there was no evidence establishing that a person's mental state was so impaired that it effectively deprived them from exercising their own will or understanding the contract's provisions; thus, this Court upheld the presumption of competence of a person to enter a contract: ETHIDa
The law presumes that every person is fully competent to enter into a contract until satisfactory proof to the contrary is presented." The party claiming absence of capacity to contract has the burden of proof and discharging this burden requires that clear and convincing evidence be adduced.
Petitioners have not satisfactorily shown that their parents' mental faculties were impaired as to deprive them of reason or hinder them from freely exercising their own will or from comprehending the provisions of the sale in favor of Ponciano.
Petitioners assert that their parents were "uliyanin" or forgetful, of advanced age and "at times" sickly during the time of the execution of the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.
Mere forgetfulness, however, without evidence that the same has removed from a person the ability to intelligently and firmly protect his property rights, will not by itself incapacitate a person from entering into contracts.
In Mendezona v. Ozamiz, the Court affirmed a vendor's capacity to contract despite a doctor's revelation that the former was afflicted with certain infirmities and was, at times, forgetful, holding that:
The revelation of Dr. Faith Go did not also shed light on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz on the relevant day — April 28, 1989 when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and notarized. At best, she merely revealed that Carmen Ozamiz was suffering from certain infirmities in her body and at times, she was forgetful, but there was no categorical statement that Carmen Ozamiz succumbed to what respondents suggest as her alleged "second childhood" as early as 1987. The petitioners' rebuttal witness, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology, testified that no conclusion of mental incapacity at the time the said deed was executed can be inferred from Dr. Faith Go's clinical notes nor can such fact be deduced from the mere prescription of a medication for episodic memory loss.
In this case, petitioners' claim that Venancio and Leonila were forgetful and at times sickly was not even supported by medical evidence. It was based solely on Emerlina's testimony, which failed to demonstrate that Venancio and Leonila's mental state had prevented them from freely giving their consent to the 1978 Deed or from understanding the nature and effects of their disposition. 62 (Citations omitted)
Here, as in Almeda, the mere fact that the Orijola Spouses were of advanced age could not excuse them from their outstanding obligations as mortgagors of petitioner Reynaldo's debt. Unless there is proof that the Orijola Spouses: (1) lacked the mental capacity to freely and voluntarily give their consent; (2) were victims of fraud; or (3) were at a disadvantage because of their moral dependence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, petitioners' allegations are nothing more than empty, self-serving statements, which would not entitle them to this Court's vigilant protection.
As stated in Heirs of Kim v. Quicho: 63
The law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing. Courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments. 64
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals March 5, 2012 and July 3, 2012 Resolutions in CA-G.R. CV No. 96847 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Redeña v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 358, February 6, 2007 [Per J. Garcia, First Division].
2. Rollo, pp. 8-37.
3. Id. at 39-40. The March 5, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96847 was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Florito S. Macalino of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4. Id. at 42-44. The July 3, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96847 was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Florito S. Macalino of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5. Id. at 45-48.
6. Id. at 96-99.
7. Id. at 96-97.
8. Id. at 108.
9. Id. at 101.
10. Id. at 102.
11. Id. at 103-104.
12. Id. at 209.
13. Id. at 209.
14. Id. at 212-213.
15. Id. at 96-99.
16. Id. at 108.
17. Id. at 108.
18. Id. at 107-111. Answer.
19. Id. at 354-355.
20. Id. at 343-358. The Decision in Civil Case No. Q-99-36813 for Judicial Foreclosure was penned by Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. of Branch 78, Quezon City, National Capital Region.
21. Id. at 353-354.
22. Id. at 95.
23. Id. at 42.
24. Id. at 354-355 and 42-43.
25. Id. at 42-43.
26. Id. at 39-41. The Resolution promulgated on March 5, 2012 was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Florito S. Macalino of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
27. Id. at 43.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 45-48.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id. at 45-46.
32. Id. at 42-44.
33. Id. at 43-44.
34. Id. at 43.
35. Id. at 44.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 8-9.
39. Id. at 8-9.
40. RULES OF COURT, Rule 44, Sec. 7.
41. Lagua v. Court of Appeals, 639 Phil. 452 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
42. Id. at 460.
43. Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of Appeals, 574 Phil. 380 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
44. Id. at 397-398.
45. Id.
46. Redeña v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 358 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, First Division].
47. Id. at 369-370.
48. Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, 656 Phil. 337 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division].
49. Id. at 340.
50. Rollo, p. 46.
51. Id. at 45-46.
52. Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
53. Id. at 415-416.
54. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 6.
55. Rollo, p. 15. Petitioners assail the Regional Trial Court's ruling that gave credence to the testimony of respondent's witness Joselito Mañalac and further posit that respondent was unjustly enriched.
56. See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. In Pascual, this Court has held that it will review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in any of the following instances: (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the Appellate Court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
57. Ehuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 2018 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showsdocs/1/64089> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
58. CIVIL CODE, art. 24.
59. Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
60. Id.
61. Almeda v. Heirs of Almeda, 818 Phil. 239 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
62. Id. at 260.
63. G.R. No. 249247, March 15, 2021 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67339> [Per J. Lopez, J., Third Division].
64. Id.