Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Pilar

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 227569. September 5, 2022.]

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs.RAYMUNDO B. PILAR and CHARITO N. PILAR, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 5, 2022, which reads as follows: aScITE

"G.R. No. 227569 — BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,v.RAYMUNDO B. PILAR and CHARITO N. PILAR, Respondents.

The Court resolves to DENY the present Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for failure of the petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed reversible error in the assailed Decision, dated 3 October 2016, in CA-G.R. CV No. 104913.

At the outset, the Court notes the several notices it has issued requiring the respondents Spouses Raymundo and Charito Pilar (Spouses Pilar or the respondents) to file their Comment, but they have failed to do so. The Court notes further the most recent compliance of BPI through its Manifestation and Motion, 2 stating that it has already personally delivered the Resolution, 3 dated 9 January 2017, at the respondents' official address on record requiring them to file their Comment. Unfortunately, a tenant at the said address informed the BPI counsel's messenger that they do not know the respondents and that the place was already demolished and is now an apartment. 4 Considering the foregoing, the respondents are now deemed to have waived their right to file their Comment.

In its Petition, BPI assails these two errors: (1) that the RTC erred when it declared that the finance charge and late payment charge totaling 9.25% monthly is unconscionable and excessive, and, therefore, null and void for being contrary to law, morals and public policy; and (2) that the RTC cannot determine accurately based on the evidence presented (monthly statements/billings) the exact principal obligation of the respondents, exclusive of the unconscionable interest and penalty charges. 5

The second assailed error is outside the scope of the Court's review under Section 1, 6 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which limits the appeal to questions of law that BPI must distinctly set forth. There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what law applies on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact arises when the inquiry centers on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. 7 The resolution of a question of law should not entail an examination of the probative value of the evidence offered by the parties, but should rely exclusively on what the law states on the given set of facts. 8 When a party is obviously asking the Court to provide its own review and appreciation of the evidence presented, the question is clearly one of fact. 9 Finally, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not dependent upon a party's denomination of what he or she thinks she is alleging, but on whether the issue raised could be resolved without evaluating the evidence on record, in which case, it is a question of law. 10

In its second assailed error, BPI raises a factual issue, that is, generally, beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari as the Court is not a trier of facts. 11 BPI challenges the RTC's and CA's appreciation of the evidence presented to establish the principal obligation, as well as the propriety of the interest and penalty charges imposed. In doing so, BPI is asking the Court to make its own factual determination and appreciation of the evidence on record.

Again, the Court will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence. 12 These findings may only be revisited for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion, or when there is a misappreciation of facts, among others. 13

Further, parties praying for the Court's review of factual findings of the CA must demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule. They have the burden of proving to this Court that a review of the factual findings is necessary. Mere assertion and claim that the case falls under the exceptions do not suffice. 14 However, before a party could even attempt to discharge this burden, there must first be a recognition and acknowledgment that what they raised was a factual issue. BPI failed miserably in this regard. It should also be noted that BPI did not even acknowledge, whether intentionally or not, that its second assigned error raised a question of fact. Neither did it allege nor prove any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.

Considering the foregoing, the Court treats with finality the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that BPI failed to establish by preponderance of evidence the principal amount owed by the respondents.

Anent the proper amount of interest and late payment charges, the CA correctly found that the interest rate of 3% per month and higher as unconscionable when the application thereof would result to the imposition of an exorbitant interest rate per annum on the debtor. 15 The ruling of the Court in Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands16 is clear and no longer needs to be re-visited. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

We find for petitioner. We are of the opinion that the interest rate and penalty charge of 3% per month should be equitably reduced to 2% per month or 24% per annum.

Indeed, in the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, there was a stipulation on the 3% interest rate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not the first time that this Court has considered the interest rate of 36% per annum as excessive and unconscionable. We held in Chua vs. Timan:

The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents' loans must be equitably reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum. We need not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. x x x (emphasis not ours)

It is true that the Court held in Macalinao that it must consider the circumstances of each case in determining what is iniquitous and unconscionable since what may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one may be totally just and equitable in another. 17 BPI, however, must also not ignore that the Court unequivocally held in Macalinao that the stipulated penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per annum, in addition to regular interests, is indeed iniquitous and unconscionable. 18 By all intents and purposes, Macalinao provided an effective yardstick by which interest rates are measured with respect to their reasonableness and justness.

The Court deems that there is no need to disturb the settled principle wherein it has affirmed in a number of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% percent per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. 19 In the present case, records reveal that BPI imposed a monthly finance charge of 3.25% and late payment charge of 6% per month, or a total equivalent rate of 9.25% per month. Annually, the total interest rate imposed against the respondents' account is already 111%. This is, without a doubt, iniquitous and unconscionable thus, rendering the same void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. 20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision, dated 3 October 2016, in CA-G.R. CV No. 104913 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 13-49.

2. Id. at 218-221.

3. Id. at 143.

4. Supra note 2, at 220.

5. Rollo, p. 33.

6. Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

7. Republic v. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, 6 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338, 345.

8. Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 170618, 20 November 2013, 710 SCRA 358, 365.

9. Leoncio v. De Vera, G.R. No. 176842, 18 February 2008, 546 SCRA 180, 184; citations omitted.

10. Id.

11. Unitrans International Forwarders, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 203865, 13 March 2019, 896 SCRA 595, 605.

12. Cu v. Ventura, G.R. No. 224567, 26 September 2018, 881 SCRA 118, 124-125.

13. Soliva v. Tanggol, G.R. No. 223429, January 29, 2020, 930 SCRA 446, 460 x x x (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

14. Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, 11 January 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 207.

15. Rollo, pp. 117-118.

16. G.R. No. 175490, 17 September 2009, 600 SCRA 67, 76-77.

17. Id. at 77.

18. Id. at 78.

19. Uysipuo v. RCBC Bankard Services Corp., G.R. No. 248898, 7 September 2020, accessed at <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/15315/>; MCMP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 201001, 10 November 2014, 739 SCRA 432; De la Paz v. L & J Development Co., 742 Phil. 420-433 (2014); Spouses Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 710 Phil. 82-93 (2013).

20. Fausto v. Multi Agri-Forest and Community Development Cooperative, G.R. No. 213939, 12 October 2016, 806 SCRA 50, 70; Marquez v. Elisan Credit Corp., G.R. No. 194642, 06 April 2015, 755 SCRA 31, 49.