FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 239981. November 11, 2021.]
JEFFERSON GO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME GOPOISON LOGISTICS, petitioner, vs. ERIC GANTALAO AND ROCHEL CAÑETE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 239981 (Jefferson Go, doing business under the name Gopoison Logistics v. Eric Gantalao and Rochel Cañete)
The petition must fail.
At the outset, the issue of whether respondents Eric Gantalao and Rochel Cañete voluntarily resigned or were illegally dismissed by petitioner Jefferson Go involves a question of fact which the Court does not generally pass upon. For it generally accords great weight to the factual findings of labor officials. 1 Even then, the Court is not precluded from making its own factual determination when the factual findings of the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, as here. 2
On one hand, petitioner insists that respondents were not his employees, hence, they could not have been illegally dismissed. Even assuming they were, respondents themselves informally and voluntarily terminated their employment because of their reduced rate of compensation.
On the other, respondents assert they were the employees of petitioners in accordance with the four-fold test applied in this jurisdiction.
We find for respondents.
Respondents were employees
First. Petitioner's allegation that he did not select or engage respondents as employees is devoid of merit. Petitioner himself admitted that he would call respondents each time he had a contract to do hauling services for Coca-Cola purposely to ask if they were available to do the task. This indubitably equates to selection and engagement.
Second. That respondents were paid on per task or pakyaw basis is merely the method of computing the proper compensation due to respondents. 3 It is still a form of payment of wages.
Third. Petitioner's power to select and engage necessarily included the power to withhold work and even dismiss employees. Respondents sufficiently proved that it was petitioner's manager who called them to a meeting, during which, they were ordered not to report for work anymore after they protested the reduced rate of compensation petitioner wanted to implement.
Fourth. Most important, petitioner wielded the power of control. During the August 2, 2011 meeting with respondents, petitioner's general manager discussed with them Coca-Cola's memorandum on several broken bottles hauled back into the company's premises. Undoubtedly, the memorandum, no less, triggered petitioner to call for that meeting and direct respondents how to properly handle their loading and unloading tasks with the end in view of minimizing, if not totally eliminating incidents of breakages. The Court of Appeals keenly noted:
Here, private respondent, as employer and owner, clearly possesses the right to control and supervise petitioners while performing the loading and unloading activities. Private respondent has the power to advise petitioners and other loaders on the means and methods on how to go about their work in order to minimize breakage of soda bottles. 4
On this score, the presence or absence of a supervisor during the actual loading or unloading is immaterial to the issue of control. The power of control refers merely to the existence of the power and not its direct and actual exercise. 5
Respondents were illegally
Without admitting that respondents were his employees, petitioner still asserts that they were not illegally dismissed. He insists that it was respondents themselves who, because of the reduced rates of compensation, separated themselves from the company through their own act of "informal voluntary termination of employment." This is known as voluntary resignation.
We are not persuaded.
Resignation is relinquishment of an office and must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied by the act of relinquishment or abandonment. A resignation must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such. 6 To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish his or her employment, the act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered. 7 More, the rule is when an employer raises the defense of resignation, the burden to establish the voluntariness of such resignation rests on the employer. 8
Here, respondents were working as usual before they filed the complaint mere weeks after the meeting where they were supposedly told not to report to work anymore. Clearly, they did not intend to relinquish their positions nor perform an unequivocal act of abandonment. In any event, the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with any intention of voluntary resignation. 9
Petitioner's claim that he repeatedly offered the jobs back to respondents and that the latter already found new jobs is pure lip service. If it were true, why did respondents still file the illegal dismissal case against petitioners? In any event, the so-called affidavits of respondents' co-workers on the alleged voluntary resignation of respondents and the supposed lack of employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents do not inspire credence. These affiants were naturally beholden to petitioner as their continuous employment depended on him. They would have done anything he asked of them just so they could keep their employment with him
All told, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed and properly awarded them backwages, separation pay, and attorney's fees. In addition, respondents are entitled to six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on the total monetary award. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision 11 dated June 30, 2015, and Resolution 12 dated July 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07199, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Respondents ERIC GANTALAO and ROCHEL CAÑETE are declared ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. Petitioner JEFFERSON GO, doing business under the name GOPOISON LOGISTICS, is ORDERED to PAY them the following:
1. BACKWAGES computed from their dismissal on August 2, 2011, until finality of this Resolution,
2. SEPARATION PAY equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service computed from June 27, 2010 for Eric Gantalao and November 5, 2010 for Rochel Cañete until finality of this Resolution; and
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their total monetary awards.
These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED." Lopez, J., J., no part; Inting, J., designated as additional Member per Raffle dated October 6, 2021.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, 571 Phil. 281, 300-301 (2008).
2. In New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005), citing Insular life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, 472 Phil. 11 (2004), the Supreme Court recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: "(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."
3.Expedition Construction Corporation v. Africa, et al., 822 Phil. 1044, 1056 (2017), citing Chavez v. NLRC, 489 Phil. 444, 457 (2005).
4.Rollo, p. 46.
5.Corporal v. NLRC, 395 Phil. 890 (2000).
6.Grande v. Philippines Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 601, 614 (2017), citing Fortuny Garments/Johnny Co v. Castro, 514 Phil. 317, 323 (2005).
7.Id. at 612.
8.Panasonic Manufacturing Corporation v. Peckson, G.R. No. 206316, March 20, 2019.
9.Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin, 811 Phil. 784, 796 (2017).
10. Central Bank Circular No. 799, s. 2013; Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 283 (2013).
11. Penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino with Associate Justices Jhosep Y. Lopez (Now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 3854.
12.Rollo, pp. 55-58.