THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 246271. July 10, 2019.]
DANNY "BOY" CALOG y ACIBRON, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 10, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 246271 (Danny "Boy" Calog y Acibron vs. People of the Philippines). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the March 26, 2018 2 and February 26, 2019 3 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu in CA-G.R. CR No. 00375.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Danny "Boy" Calog y Acibron (petitioner) was charged with Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2001, in the Municipality of Mabinay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and armed with a deadly weapon, a folding knife, with which the accused was then armed and provided, did then and there willfully and feloniously attack and stab one Bonifacio Gantalao, inflicting upon the victim, the following wounds, to wit:
1. Stabbed wound 1 inch in length, slanting in position besides the sternum 1 inch below the right nipple as base line;
2. Stabbed wound 1/2 inch in length mid axillary line at the level of the left nipple, slanting in position;
3. Stabbed wound 1 inch in length, 1 1/2 inch in length just below the wound number 2, vertical in position;
4. Incised wound 2 inches in length just above the left elbow joint;
5. Incised wound 2 inches in length just above the right knee joint, inner aspect;
6. Chopped wound 3 inches in length, 2 inches below the scapular region slanting in position.
Which injuries caused the direct and instantaneous death of the said Bonifacio Gantalao.
Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 4
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." At pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:
1. [Petitioner] admitted that whenever his name is mentioned in this case he is the same accused in this case;
2. that the incident happened at about 4:30 in the afternoon of June 4, 2001 near the store of Gerson Bacornay at Barangay Paniabonan, Mabinay;
3. that at the time of the incident the victim Bonifacio Gantalao was holding two (2) pieces of chopped wood; and
4. that the [petitioner] admits authorship of the injuries sustained by the victim during the incident. 5
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Prosecution presented the testimonies of Arnel Gantalao (Arnel), the victim's 11-year-old son, and Bobby Pepito (Bobby). The testimony Arnel was summarized by the trial court as follows:
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 4, 2001, he was sent for an errand to buy brown sugar in a store near their house in Barangay Paniabonan, Mabinay, Negros Oriental. While on the way to the store to buy sugar, he passed by the house of one Chuchi where he saw his father and the accused, together with other people playing "hantak" (cara y cruz). After having bought sugar, and while on the way home passing through another route, he heard a quarrel in the place where the hantak was played. Thereupon, he saw his father who was inside the fence of Chuchi's house shouting at the accused who was situated outside the fence. Momentarily, his father went outside the fence, carrying two pieces of chopped wood held in each of his hands. When his father reached the road, accused approached his father, and stabbed the latter with a hunting knife. His father was not hit with accused's first stab, and the former retaliated with a blow using the wood. Accused was hit in the right arm. Accused delivered a second thrust, and hit his father on the left arm. His father struck a second blow with the wood, hitting the accused on the neck. His father stepped back, but on the process, fell into the canal. When his father fell and was lying in the canal face down, accused stabbed his father at the back. After his father was stabbed at the back, he was able to turn around, and faced (sic) the accused. But, the accused continued stabbing his father, and his father told accused "that is enough Boy," with his hands raised. After having stabbed his father many times, accused got out of the canal, boarded his motorcycle, and sped away. His father staggered from the canal, and walked towards the house of Lising. He and his cousin tried to help his father walked (sic) and stand, but after holding to a table, his father fell down. His father tried to stand up again, but fell again. He wanted to bring his father to the hospital, but there was no vehicle available to carry his father. 6
The testimony of witness Bobby, a 52-year-old farmer of a neighboring barangay, corroborated the testimony of Arnel, viz.:
[T]hat on June 4, 2001, he went to the house of his aunt. At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, while he was on the road, he saw the victim and the accused, at distance of about 8 to 10 meters from where he was situated. He saw accused armed with a knife, and thrusting his knife to the victim and the former was advancing towards the latter. The victim who was carrying two pieces of wood kept on parrying the accused's stabbing thrust, and at the same time hitting the accused with the wood. In the process of retreating, the victim fell into a waist-deep canal, and the accused stabbed the victim several times when the latter was in a squatting position. After stabbing the victim, accused went away. After which, plenty of people were milling around the place of incident. 7
The Necropsy Report 8 submitted by Dr. Carmencita T. Uy, the Municipal Health Officer who conducted a post-mortem examination on the victim coupled with her testimony, shows that the latter sustained six (6) wounds 9 some of which were mortal having penetrated the heart and the lungs. 10
For his part, while petitioner admitted authorship of the crime, he claimed that it was done in self-defense. He testified that at or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 4, 2001, he went to the house of Julie Gantalao in Paniabonan where the game of hantak (cara y cruz) was being played and the victim was serving as the referee. Petitioner handed his P50.00 to the victim to be changed to smaller denominations. During the game, the victim only handed petitioner P20.00. Later on, when petitioner demanded from the victim the balance of P30.00, the latter refused and instead engaged him in a squabble. The victim finally gave him the P30.00 by throwing the money to the ground and after uttering nasty remarks. To avoid trouble, petitioner went outside. The victim, armed with two (2) pieces of wood, followed him and attacked him from behind. As the victim kept hitting him with the pieces of wood, petitioner pulled out his knife and stabbed the victim. Petitioner averred that he felt pain and dizziness because the victim continued to hit him with the wood, thus, he delivered more stabbing thrusts against the victim. When he noticed that the victim became weak, he left and voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. 11
After trial, the RTC, Branch 45 of Bais City rendered a Decision 12 dated November 18, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 2001-1-151 MY, and found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In rejecting self-defense, the trial court found credible the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Arnel Gantalao and Bobby Pepito when they recalled the petitioner continued to stab the victim even when he already fell into the canal. This fact was corroborated by the testimony of defense witness Edwin Velasco. It added that assuming arguendo that the victim initiated unlawful aggression, such unlawful aggression ceased upon the victim's falling into the canal. The subsequent attack by the petitioner against the victim, resulting to his death, became unjustified. The RTC further noted the post-mortem examination on the victim showing that the latter sustained six (6) wounds some of which were mortal. To the trial court, this indicated intent to kill and negated the claim of self-defense. However, in imposing the penalty, it appreciated voluntary surrender and sufficient provocation or threat on the offended party as mitigating circumstances. 13
The trial court then decreed, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds [petitioner] DANNY "BOY" CALOG Y ACIBRON, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide as penalized under article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in his favor two (2) ordinary mitigating circumstances namely: voluntary surrender and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded the act, and thus lowering the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal by one degree to prision mayor and affording him the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is thereby imposed the indeterminate prison term of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim in the following amounts:
1. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for actual damages;
2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for civil indemnity;
3. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages,
and to pay costs.
[Petitioner] is thereby credited in full for the period he has undergone preventive imprisonment provided he abides with the rules prescribed for convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.14
The petitioner elevated the case to the CA on appeal, but the CA dismissed the same pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3, Rule 1 thereof, which purportedly sanctions the dismissal of a case due to appellant's failure to comply with court's order. 15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 16 but was denied in a Resolution dated February 26, 2019.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner, through counsel, basically imputes error on the CA in not treating petitioner's memorandum and appellant's that brief have substantially complied with the rules. He argues that jurisprudence provides that parties must be given opportunity to ventilate his case in court given that the trial court erred in not appreciating his claim of self-defense. He likewise posits that the trial court should have pegged the sentence of the petitioner at six (6) years maximum given the mitigating circumstance of voluntarily surrender. 17
Issue
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal for failure of the petitioner to comply with the rules on appeal.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. We affirm the dismissal of the appeal by the CA albeit based on a different provision of the rules.
The first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. — The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
In relation thereto, Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Failure of the appellant x x x to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable cause; and
xxx xxx xxx
At the outset, it must be stated that the appeal before the CA was dismissible for petitioner's failure to file his brief within the time prescribed by the rules. Petitioner, represented by a counsel de parte, filed a Memorandum for the Accused 18 instead of an appellant's brief as required by the CA in its Notice dated March 14, 2017. The Memorandum for the Accused 19 also does not contain (i) a subject index, (ii) table of cases, and (iii) authorities cited, with reference to the pages where they are cited.
However, despite the OSG's motion for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the CA directed petitioner in a Minute Resolution dated January 2018, to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. 20 In response, a Motion for Extension with Manifestation of Counsel was filed by petitioner's counsel averring that "(i) the handling counsel of the case had died a year ago, and that (ii) he — already old and sickly and residing outside Cebu City — is asking the Court, in the interest of substantial justice, to grant him an extension of time to comply with the Court's directive contained in the September 18, 2017 Minute Resolution, within 30 days from February 1, 2018 [or] until March 2, 2018." 21 No compliance was filed by the petitioner. Thus, the CA issued its March 26, 2018 Resolution which dismissed the appeal based on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court. 22
Unperturbed, petitioner, through counsel de parte, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 23 on June 18, 2018, alleging that counsel was admitted to the hospital on May 28, 2018 to June 10, 2018 and has undergone operation for severe cellulites. He implored for compassion, asked the CA to decide the case on the merits rather than technicality, and prayed for a last chance to submit this memorandum up to June 30, 2018.
On July 2, 2018, petitioner filed a three-paged motion to admit with the appellant's brief already incorporated therein. The three-paged motion to admit and appellant's brief still lacked the required (i) subject index, (ii) table of cases, and (iii) authorities cited, with reference to the pages where they are cited in violation of Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The CA, likewise, took note of the lack of effort on the part of petitioner's counsel to comply with the prescribed rules which is apparent in his failure to file a brief that conforms substantially to the prescribed form as required by the rules. The motion for reconsideration 24 was therefore denied in a Resolution 25 dated February 26, 2019.
Petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed.
Herein petitioner cannot take the rules of procedure lightly under the guise that his life and liberty are at stake. In Dimarucot v. People of the Philippines, 26 the Court pronounced that:
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. The Rules must be followed, otherwise, they will become meaningless and useless. 27
While there are instances where the rules is relaxed, like (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or (3) where the interests of justice so require, the petitioner failed to establish that these exceptions are applicable here. 28
Nevertheless, even if We apply the rules liberally and review petitioner's case on the merits, his appeal would still fail.
Petitioner, through counsel, harps on the purported error of the trial court in not appreciating his claim of self-defense. However, the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. This is clear from the provision of Section 1, Rule 45 which provides that only questions of law shall be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Since the petition is anchored on the claim of self-defense which is a factual allegation already rejected by the trial court, the petition can be denied outright. 29
His claim that the trial court should have pegged the sentence at six (6) years maximum given the mitigating circumstance of voluntarily surrender 30 also deserves no merit.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal. In this case, the trial court appreciated two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, thus, imposed the penalty next lower than reclusion temporal which is prision mayor pursuant to Article 64 (5), RPC. The trial court further afforded petitioner the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 31 which provides that the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional in its medium period, or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months and whose maximum term should be the proper period of prision mayor in its medium period, or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
In this case, the RTC imposed the indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Considering that the penalty imposed by the RTC is within the range, We find no reason to modify the same.
To conform with jurisprudence, however, there is a need to modify the amount of damages. Emmalinda Gantalao, wife of the victim, testified 32 that she spent P5,000.00 for funeral services, P3,500.00 for the tomb, and P1,500.00 during the wake or, a total of P10,000.00. Based on this, the trial court awarded P10,000.00 as actual damages. Considering that the actual damages awarded is less than the prescribed P50,000.00 temperate damages in People v. Jugueta, 33 the award of P50,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of the actual damages awarded by the trial court, is justified. 34
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall also be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this resolution until fully paid. 35
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The award for damages is MODIFIED in that temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded in lieu of the lesser amount of actual damages. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 14-23.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos, Jr. and Louis P. Acosta; id. at 31-33.
3.Id. at 25-27.
4.Id. at 45.
5.Id. at 36-37.
6.Id. at 37.
7.Id. at 38.
8.Id. at 54.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 42.
11.Id. at 38-39.
12.Id. at 36-44.
13.Id. at 39-44.
14.Id. at 43-44.
15.Id. at 31-33.
16.Id. at 34-35.
17.Id. at 16-19.
18.Id. at 64-66.
19.Id.
20.Id. at 32.
21.Id.
22.Id. at 31-33.
23.Id. at 34-35.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 25-27.
26. 645 Phil. 218 (2010).
27.Id. at 229.
28.Supra note 26, at 227.
29. Garong v. People, 538 Phil. 296, 305 (2006).
30. Rollo, pp. 16-19.
31. SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.
32. Rollo, p. 43.
33. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
34. People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Advincula y Mondano, G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018, citing PO1 Crispin Ocampo y Santos v. People of the Philippines, 759 Phil. 423, 435 (2015).
35. Supra note 33.