FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 188413. April 23, 2018.]
ANNIE FERMIN,petitioner, vs. MARIANO TANENGLIAN, SHERIFF EDGARDO ANCHETA, MELCHOR BALANCE, FERDINAND SIMEON, "ATTYS. JOHN DOES AND RICHARD DOES", respondents.
[G.R. No. 188719. April 23, 2018.]
AURELIO KIGIS, petitioner,vs. MARIANO TANENGLIAN, SHERIFF EDGARDO ANCHETA, MELCHOR BALANCE, FERDINAND SIMEON, "ATTYS. JOHN DOES" AND "RICHARD DOES", respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 23, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 188413 (Annie Fermin v. Mariano Tanenglian, Sheriff Edgardo Ancheta, Melchor Balance, Ferdinand Simeon, "Attys. John Does and Richard Does") and G.R. No. 188719 (Aurelio Kigis v. Mariano Tanenglian, Sheriff Edgardo Ancheta, Melchor Balance, Ferdinand Simeon, "Attys. John Does" and "Richard Does"). — These are consolidated petitions for indirect contempt in G.R. No. 188413 1 and G.R. No. 188719 2 for respondents' alleged non-compliance with our Decision in G.R. No. 147977 entitled Fermin v. Esteves. 3
In its Decision dated June 28, 1991 in Civil Case No. 925-R, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, as upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) and this Court, declared respondent Mariano Tanenglian (Tanenglian) the owner of two parcels of land subject of that case. The defendants 4 were ordered to remove their houses, structures, constructions, and improvements from the subject parcels of land, and surrender possession of the premises they are respectively occupying to Tanenglian. After judgment became final and executory, Tanenglian moved for its execution. The RTC granted Tanenglian's motion and a writ of execution was issued. Due to the resistance of the defendants, the RTC Decision was not implemented. This prompted Tanenglian to move for the issuance of a special order of demolition, which the RTC granted. 5
While petitioners Annie Fermin (Fermin) and Aurelio Kigis (Kigis) were never made defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R, the properties they were respectively occupying (subject properties) were in danger of being subjected to the execution of the RTC Decision as well. Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA denied their petition, hence, petitioners brought the matter before us in Fermin v. Esteves. 6 EATCcI
Clarifying that they did not derive their right to occupy the subject properties from defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R, petitioners claim they possessed the subject properties "as members of an indigenous cultural community on the honest perception and belief that these form part of their ancestral lands." 7 In response, Tanenglian claimed that to the best of his knowledge, petitioners were named as original defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R, or voluntarily appeared in said case, or are privies to and/or successors-in-interest of either the original defendants or those who voluntarily appeared in said case. 8
We granted petitioners' prayer for a TRO, to wit:
Acting on the prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order, the Court Resolves to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the special order of demolition dated April 30, 1998 in Civil Case No. 925-R entitled "Mariano Tanenglian vs. Maximino Lapid, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 5," for quieting of title with damages upon the petitioners' filing of a bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) within a period of five (5) days from notice hereof otherwise this resolution shall be deemed to be of no force and effect. Said bond shall answer for the payment to private respondent of any damages which he may incur by reason of the issuance of the temporary restraining order sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said petitioner were not entitled thereto, effective upon approval by this Court of the bond to be posted. 9
Subsequently, in our Decision dated March 26, 2008, we ruled:
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 28 April 2000 Decision and 24 April 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373. We make permanent the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 25 June 2001 enjoining the enforcement of the Special Order of Demolition dated 30 April 1998 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. 10
Since no motion for reconsideration was filed, our Decision in Fermin v. Esteves became final and executory on May 8, 2008. 11
Despite this, Tanenglian, on April 30, 2008, filed a reiteratory motion for the implementation of the special order of demolition before the court. The RTC granted Tanenglian's motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition. 12 Pursuant to the order of the RTC, a special order of demolition 13 was issued on April 7, 2009. The deputy sheriff, respondent Sheriff Edgardo Ancheta (Sheriff Ancheta), was tasked to implement the special order of demolition, which reads: DHITCc
SPECIAL ORDER OF DEMOLITION
WHEREAS, a Decision dated June 28, 1991 was rendered in the above-entitled case the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Ordering the defendants to respect and recognize plaintiff's ownership of the two (2) parcels of land in question;
(b) Ordering defendants to remove their houses/structures/constructions/improvements from the subject parcels of land and surrender the possession of the premises they are respectively occupying to the plaintiff; and
(c) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, the aforecited Decision was appealed by the defendants, and in its Decision promulgated on February 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed intoto the decision of the court aquo;
WHEREAS, the said decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari which was denied per Resolution dated August 2, 1995;
WHEREAS, upon motion for reconsideration filed by defendants, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution dated January 15, 2009 denying the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent court has committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment;
WHEREAS, upon second motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated March 4, 1996 denied the motion with finality;
WHEREAS, the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 15, 1996, has become final and executory on April 8, 1996, as per Entry of Judgment issued by the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a Motion for Execution, dated September 9, 1996, which was granted by the Court in its Order, dated December 16, 1996;
WHEREAS, the writ of execution was returned to the Honorable Court as per Sheriff's return dated January 31, 1997 as the defendants did not voluntary vacate their structures or vacate the premises;
WHEREAS, plaintiff's through counsel filed a motion for issuance of a special order of demolition dated February 7, 1997 which the Court granted in its Order dated April 30, 1998;
WHEREAS, an Urgent Motion for Clarification of Order of Demolition and to Hold the Enforcement of the Order of Demolition dated [M]ay 13, 1998 was filed by defendants['] counsel and an Opposition dated June 22, 1998 was filed by plaintiff['s] counsel;
WHEREAS, an Urgent Motion for Inhibition was filed by defendants['] counsel on July 18, 1998 which was granted by the Court on July 21, 1998;
WHEREAS, a Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution and Special Order of Demolition and Motion for Reconsideration of the Order date[d] April 30, 1998, dated July 22, 1998 was filed by defendants['] counsel;
WHEREAS, a verified supplemental urgent motion to quash writ of execution and set aside special order of demolition dated August 4, 1998 was filed by defendants['] counsel;
WHEREAS, an opposition dated August 27, 1998 was filed by plaintiff['s] counsel;
WHEREAS, an Order dated September 23, 1998 was issued by the Court which reads to wit:
"Plaintiff's motion for early resolution dated September 16, 1998 is held in abeyance until further notice by this Court given the resolution dated July 24, 1998 by the Honorable Court of Appeals, 11th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373 entitled "Annie Fermin, et[] al. vs. Hon. Antonio M. Esteves, et al.," temporarily restraining this Court from enforcing the special order of demolition in this case. cEaSHC
IT IS SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, a Decision promulgated on April 28, 2000 was rendered by the Court of Appeals the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Special Order of Demolition is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed and in its April 24, 2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion;
WHEREAS, the said decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review and a Decision was promulgated on March 26, 2008 the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 28 April 2000 Decision and 24 April 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373. We make permanent the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on June 25, 2001 enjoining the enforcement of the Special Order of Demolition dated 30 April 1998 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, the Decision of the Supreme Court dated March 26, 2008, has become final and executory on May 8, 2008, as per Entry of Judgment issued by the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, a Reiteratory Motion for Implementation of the Special Order of Demolition dated April 30, 2008 was filed by plaintiff['s] counsel;
WHEREAS, an Order dated January 5, 2009 was issued by the Court which reads to wit:
"There being no pleading filed by the defendants and considering the pending incident will be submitted for resolution after said pleading and considering further the final and executory decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, this Court resolves to Grant the Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Let a Writ of Execution be issued in this case.
SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, a Manifestation and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition dated March 7, 2009 was filed by plaintiff's counsel and a Vigorous Opposition was filed by defendants['] counsel;
WHEREAS, an Order dated March 31, 2009 was issued by the Court which reads to wit:
"After hearing the oral arguments of the parties, and considering the non-compliance of the defendants with the writ of execution including the notice to vacate, this Court finds merit in the motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
Let a Writ of Demolition be issued in this case pursuant to the Honorable Supreme Court Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
WHEREAS, defendants, their agents, assigns, representatives and/or successors-in-interest are hereby given a period of five (5) days within which to remove their improvements from the premises subject of this case;
The Deputy Sheriff assigned to this Court is likewise hereby ordered to cause the demolition of all improvements which he may find within the premises immediately after the expiration of the above said period with the survey report of the committee to be made as a parameter in compliance with this Order; and to simultaneously place plaintiff in possession thereof.
Expenses of the demolition shall be borne by plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
On June 15, 2009, the special order of demolition was set to be implemented. 14 Petitioners and respondents have different accounts of the events that transpired that day and the days that followed. CTIEac
On one hand, petitioners allege that Sheriff Ancheta, Tanenglian, and their co-respondents, demolition crew leaders Melchor Balance (Balance) and Ferdinand Simeon (Simeon), two "Attys. John Does," and members of the demolition crew referred to as "Richard Does," placed yellow plastic tape and barbed wires around the subject properties on June 15, 2009. 15 They add that respondents also placed around the subject properties several tarpaulin signs, which state:
NOTICE TO THE PUBLIC
DEMOLITION ON-GOING UNDER SPECIAL ORDER OF DEMOLITION PURSUANT TO THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 925-R ENTITLED MARIANO TANENGLIAN VS. ANSELMO ARISO, ET AL., CAUTION: DO NOT ENTER 16
Petitioners further allege that respondents "restricted [their] ingress and egress to [the subject properties], blocked her access road[,] and put up guards on its entry point." 17 Consequently, petitioners, as well as members of their household and guests, were forced to secure the permission of respondents and their subordinates assigned to the premises to go in and out of the subject properties. Petitioners claim that they protested the acts of respondents. They even showed them this Court's Decision in Fermin v. Esteves. However, petitioners' protest fell on deaf ears as respondents ignored them. 18
On June 23, 2009, Fermin avers that respondents, except for Tanenglian who nonetheless purportedly conspired with his co-respondents, tore down and demolished the concrete perimeter fence of one of the subject properties that she occupies. Fermin claims that she resorted to begging the respondents to stop the demolition. She also asked for the respective names of the "Attys. John Does." Both her pleas, however, were rejected. The demolition continued. As for the "Attys. John Does," they only introduced themselves as associates of Atty. Raymond Rolland Rojas (Rojas), counsel of Tanenglian. Nevertheless, Fermin persisted and positioned herself between her fence and Balance, Simeon, and several "Richard Does." The latter allegedly ganged up on Fermin and threatened to kill her. Fermin further alleges that her house was spared from the demolition only because of the timely intervention of the police and her neighbors. Fermin then reported the acts of respondents to the police. 19
As for Kigis, he alleges that on July 16, 2009, respondents made "steep excavations and massive earthmoving works around [his house] without the required permits and clearances." 20 Two days after, respondents destroyed Kigis' concrete driveway, thus rendering the house he occupies virtually inaccessible. 21 Outraged by the acts of respondents, petitioners filed the consolidated petitions for contempt.
On the other hand, respondents deny committing any contemptuous act. According to Sheriff Ancheta, yellow tape and barbed wire were placed in the areas subject of the special order of demolition, within which the subject properties are located, in order to demarcate it. Sheriff Ancheta admits that signs were also placed in the subject properties but adds that similar signs were placed around other areas in order to apprise any passers-by of the on-going demolition. Sheriff Ancheta also avers that he informed the demolition team that the houses occupied by petitioners were excluded from the demolition. 22
On June 23, 2009, Sheriff Ancheta claims to have left the demolition site before noon to have lunch. After doing so, he spoke with the Ex-Officio City Sheriff, Atty. Remedios Balderas-Reyes (Reyes), in her office. While conversing with Reyes, he received a phone call from the Station Commander of the Baguio Police Station 10 notifying him of the on-going demolition at the site. Sheriff Ancheta immediately went back to the demolition site and upon his arrival, ordered the discontinuation of the demolition of the concrete perimeter fence. Sheriff Ancheta explains that it was a certain Ferdie, the head of the demolition team, who ordered the demolition. Notably, Sheriff Ancheta avers that Ferdie came to the site only a day after the demolition started. 23
For his part, Tanenglian disavows any participation in the acts subject of the petitions. He denies performing any other act after the special order of demolition was issued. He further asserts that whatever happened was beyond his control. As far as Tanenglian is concerned, Sheriff Ancheta was merely performing his duties under the law in implementing the special order of demolition. 24 He neither confirmed nor denied the allegation that he hired the demolition team although it must be noted that the special order of demolition provides that the expenses of the demolition shall be borne by Tanenglian. 25 SaCIDT
One of the respondents "Attys. John Does" identified himself as Atty. Ernest Ian S. Buenviaje (Buenviaje), an associate of Rojas. According to Buenviaje, the other "Atty. John Doe" is neither known nor connected to him or to their law firm, Reyes Cabrera Rojas & Associates (RCRA). Buenviaje adds that he and said law firm are uncertain as to whether "Atty. John Doe" is in fact a lawyer. However, he also admits that this "Atty. John Doe" introduced himself as "Erwin" or "Darwin" during a meeting at Mario's restaurant with Tanenglian's representatives. 26
Buenviaje points out that RCRA only entered its appearance for Tanenglian in Civil Case No. 925-R on June 19, 2009, or four days after the scheduled implementation of the special order of demolition. 27 This is in refutation of petitioners' claim that Buenviaje participated in the placing of the yellow tape and barbed wire around the subject properties. Buenviaje adds that such act was under the direction and control of Sheriff Ancheta. In any case, Buenviaje opines that the placing of yellow tape and barbed wires do not constitute demolition. Buenviaje also denies that notices were placed on the subject properties. 28
According to Buenviaje, on the same day of RCRA's entry of appearance, he was instructed to monitor the on-going demolition in relation to Civil Case No. 925-R. Together with his parents, he arrived in Baguio on the evening of June 21, 2009. The following day, Buenviaje, Rojas, and Tanenglian's representatives held a conference concerning the demolition. The day after, Buenviaje proceeded to the demolition site where he discovered that no demolition activities were taking place as per the decision of Sheriff Ancheta. Consequently, Buenviaje left the demolition site at 12:30 p.m. and thereafter proceeded to Camp John Hay to have lunch with his parents. Buenviaje and his parents parted ways at 3:15 p.m. He later met with Tanenglian's representatives at Mario's restaurant. As previously stated, it was during this meeting that Buenviaje met "Erwin/Darwin." 29
At 3:45 p.m., Buenviaje was called by the members of the demolition team who reported that a commotion was taking place at the demolition site. Upon Buenviaje's arrival at the site together with "Erwin/Darwin," they were approached by members of the demolition team who reported that one of the residents, who turned out to be Fermin, was hysterical. Buenviaje and "Erwin/Darwin" spoke with Fermin in an attempt to pacify her. Upon Buenviaje's request, Fermin showed him this Court's Decision in Fermin v. Esteves. After reading said Decision, both Sheriff Ancheta and Buenviaje confirmed that Fermin's house cannot be demolished. 30
Several days later, Buenviaje relays that Sheriff Ancheta turned over the properties subject of the special order of demolition to Tanenglian via a Turnover Receipt. Sheriff Ancheta also executed a Sheriff's Return. However, he was thereafter required by this Court to comment on the petitions for contempt against him and his co-respondents. 31
As for Balance, Simeon, and the "Richard Does," this Court dispensed with their comments. 32
The sole issue is whether respondents committed acts constituting indirect contempt in relation to our Decision in Fermin v. Esteves. cHECAS
The petition is partly meritorious.
I
At the outset, we address petitioners' contention that the Decision in Civil Case No. 925-R cannot be enforced by a mere motion. First, petitioners are in no position to question whether a motion would suffice for purposes of the execution of the Decision since they are not parties to Civil Case No. 925-R. Second, we also note that this issue was dealt with by the CA in the case entitled Dapnisan v. Pamintuan. 33 Since said CA Decision is not the subject of this case, we will not entertain any arguments assailing its ruling.
Contempt is defined as the "disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body." 34 Contempt involves a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court." 35
All courts are inherently empowered to punish contemptuous acts for it is indispensable to their right to self-preservation, to the execution of their powers, and for the maintenance of their authority, with the ultimate end of due administration of justice. 36 In exercising the power to punish for contempt, this Court has consistently held that it must be on the preservative principle, rather than vindictive. 37 Such power is drastic and extraordinary in nature. Therefore, it must only be exercised when necessary in the interest of justice. 38
Under the Rules of Court, there are two kinds of contempt, namely, direct and indirect. 39 Direct contempt covers acts which are committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; while indirect contempt pertains to willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. 40 Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifies the acts constituting indirect contempt as follows:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
Contempt may also be classified as civil or criminal in nature. Civil contempt, on the one hand, is failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. 41 Its purpose, which is to preserve the right of private persons, is remedial in nature. 42
Criminal contempt, on the other hand, refers to a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. 43 Thus, it is considered an offense against organized society and public justice. 44 AHDacC
In determining whether contempt is civil or criminal in nature, the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought in the case where the contemptuous act arose are immaterial. What is important is the purpose of the contempt proceedings. 45 If the purpose is penal, then it is criminal contempt, but if it is compensatory or remedial, then it is civil contempt. 46 Our discussion in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines is apropos:
Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights. 47
It is important to determine whether contempt is civil or criminal because the latter requires proof of intent to commit the act while the former does not. 48 Consequently, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order may not be raised as a defense in civil contempt. 49
The contempt involved here is civil in nature since the acts complained of were alleged to be in disregard of our Decision in Fermin v. Esteves. 50 Petitioners seek to penalize respondents for their failure or refusal to comply with said Decision and to compel them to abide by it. If petitioners are to be believed, respondents committed acts constituting indirect contempt, under subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71. These acts are: 1) placing of yellow tape, barbed wire, and signs around the subject properties; 2) demolition of Fermin's concrete perimeter fence; 3) making steep excavations and massive earthmoving works around the house occupied by Kigis; and 4) destruction of Kigis' concrete driveway. 51
Since our Decision in Fermin is already final and executory, respondent Sheriff Ancheta had the legal duty to comply with the same and respect it. Respondent Sheriff Ancheta, as the officer tasked to implement the final judgment of courts, must discharge his duties with due care and utmost diligence. 52 What must be settled is if respondents complied with our Decision.
II
A
Sheriff Ancheta admits that yellow tape and barbed wire crossed the subject properties. But he explains that the purpose of placing yellow tape and barbed wire was to demarcate the area covered by the special order of demolition. It was never intended to prevent petitioners from going in and out of the subject properties. Furthermore, the barbed wire was placed above the roofs of the houses. This claim, however, is belied by the pictures 53 provided by Fermin.
While Buenviaje denies that signs were placed in the subject properties, the person he claims to have control over the same, namely Sheriff Ancheta, admits that signs were indeed placed on the subject properties. As between the person who is responsible for the signs and one who disowns any accountability for it, we are more inclined to believe the former.
There is no sufficient justification for placing the signs on the subject properties. The signs would still have served their purpose of informing passers-by of the on-going demolition even if they were placed only on the areas covered by the special order of demolition, instead of on the subject properties. Thus, it was unnecessary, if not unwarranted, to place it on the subject properties which are not covered by the special order of demolition.
Buenviaje is correct that placing the yellow tape, barbed wire, and signs on the subject properties is not tantamount to demolishing it. This, however, still disregards our Decision in Fermin, which excludes the subject properties from the enforcement of the special order of demolition. The mere act of placing yellow tape, barbed wire, and signs on the subject properties, as if they were covered by the special order of demolition, is a violation of the permanent restraining order we issued in Fermin.
Undoubtedly, Sheriff Ancheta is responsible for the placement of the yellow tape, barbed wire, and signs. Aside from Sheriff Ancheta's admission of the placement of the objects, such act also falls under the scope of his responsibility as a sheriff.
However, the same cannot be said for Buenviaje and Tanenglian. Buenviaje was not yet Tanenglian's counsel when the yellow tape, barbed wire, and signs were placed on the subject properties on June 15, 2009. Buenviaje and his law firm only entered their appearance on June 19, 2009. There being no evidence that Buenviaje participated in the acts even prior to becoming Tanenglian's counsel in Civil Case No. 925-R, we cannot hold him liable for it. As for Tanenglian, there is also a dearth of evidence showing that he had a direct hand in such acts. Even admitting that he hired the demolition team, petitioners failed to prove that Tanenglian ordered the placing of signs, yellow tape, barbed wire, and the excavations. We also emphasize that it was Sheriff Ancheta who was enjoined to supervise the demolition. Tanenglian did not have any authority to control the proceedings simply because he shouldered the expenses for the demolition. HCaDIS
As for petitioners' contention that their ingress and egress were restricted by respondents' acts, we cannot give it credence since there is nothing on record to support their bare allegation. Based on the pictures submitted by Fermin, it does not appear that the yellow tape and barbed wire were placed around the entire subject properties. As for Kigis, it is unclear from the pictures he submitted where the subject property that is supposedly being cordoned off is located. On their faces, the pictures just show that there is a yellow tape across a road. He also failed to adduce any other evidence to prove such allegation. Hence, it cannot be said that petitioners' ingress to and egress from the subject properties were restricted by respondents.
B
Respondents do not deny that Fermin's concrete perimeter fence was partially destroyed. However, they all wash their hands off any responsibility for it. With respect to Kigis, Sheriff Ancheta did not bother responding to his petition. As for Buenviaje and Tanenglian, they both deny any participation in the acts complained of by Kigis. After poring over the records, we find that petitioners failed to sufficiently prove that Sheriff Ancheta, Buenviaje, and Tanenglian ordered, much less took part in, the destruction of the subject properties.
It is elementary that he who alleges must prove. 54 Here, Fermin's allegations against respondents are unsupported by any evidence. While she tried to submit in evidence pictures allegedly taken at the demolition site, the time as to when these pictures were taken are unknown. More importantly, Buenviaje is simply shown standing in the pictures. It does not show that he is in the act of demolishing the fence or directing the "Richard Does", or any other person for that matter, to demolish Fermin's concrete fence. There is also no one else on record corroborating Fermin's contention. Even the police blotter 55 cannot bolster Fermin's claim. As we have opined in Magtira v. People, 56 "we cannot give much credence to the police blotter whose contents were mainly based on the statements made by the petitioner to the police. If at all, it is evidence of what was entered, not of the truth or falsity of the entry made." 57
With respect to the excavations around the house occupied by Kigis and his driveway, Buenviaje posits that the permanent restraining order only covers the house itself and not the surrounding areas. 58 Therefore, the demolition thereof is only proper as it is covered by the 1998 special order of demolition. The 1998 special order of demolition reads in part:
WHEREFORE, Defendants, their agents, assigns, representatives and/or successors-in-interest are hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice within which to remove their improvements from the premises subject of this case.
The Deputy Sheriff assigned to this Court is likewise hereby ordered to cause the demolition of all improvements which he may find within the premises immediately after the expiration of the abovesaid period with the survey report of the committee to be made as a parameter in compliance with this Order; and to simultaneously place Plaintiff in possession thereof. 59
As can be seen above, the special order of demolition does not direct the excavation of the premises concerned. Neither does the special order of demolition issued in 2009 direct the same. In any event, our Decision in Fermin belies Buenviaje's claims. We stated that "[i]It was not even established that petitioners are in possession of the property of Arizo, et al. [defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R]." 60 Clearly, it is not the residential structures alone that were excluded in Civil Case No. 925-R. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the land around the house occupied by Kigis and the driveway are covered by the special order of demolition. As we have stated in Fermin, we cannot countenance the enforcement of a decision against persons who were not even made parties to the case. Nonetheless, and apart from his allegations, there is still no basis in ruling that respondents caused the acts complained of by Kigis.
III
However, while petitioners failed to sufficiently prove that Sheriff Ancheta ordered the destruction or actually destroyed the subject properties, he is not free from any liability. At the outset, we note that he did not even bother to rebut Kigis' claims. With respect to Fermin's concrete perimeter fence, Sheriff Ancheta passes the responsibility on to a certain Ferdie. We remind Sheriff Ancheta that he was the one entrusted with ensuring the enforcement of the special order of demolition. Simply put, the special order of demolition was addressed to him, not Ferdie.
Sheriffs have the duty to execute the order of the court strictly to its letter. 61 They are expected to perform their duty with prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. 62 Sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of administration of justice. 63 Considering the foregoing, good faith cannot be raised as a defense by sheriffs in failing to properly execute their mandate since they are expected to know that nothing less than their due compliance is acceptable. 64 AHCETa
That being said, it is immaterial whether Sheriff Ancheta ordered or participated in the partial destruction of Fermin's concrete perimeter fence, the excavation around Kigis' house, and the destruction of Kigis' driveway. He was supposed to ensure that the foregoing would not happen. Clearly, he failed in that aspect.
We are not unmindful of the vast scope of the special order of demolition, thus making its execution difficult. This should have called for more vigilance on the part of Sheriff Ancheta. Instead, he was not even present at the demolition site when the acts complained of occurred. Granting that it was "Ferdie" who ordered the demolition of Fermin's fence, it baffles the Court why Sheriff Ancheta did not ensure that Ferdie, the leader of the demolition team, should know the parameters of the special order of demolition. If only Sheriff Ancheta made certain that the demolition team knew what the scope of the special order of demolition was, and that they will strictly observe it, this unfortunate incident would not have happened. It is very clear that Sheriff Ancheta failed in his duty to ensure that it did not. As such, we find Sheriff Ancheta's conduct improper, the effect of which is that it impeded, obstructed, and degraded the administration of justice.
IV
In a contempt charge, a respondent cannot be declared in default. 65 Hence, we cannot declare Balance, Simeon, the other "Atty. John Doe," and several "Richard Does" guilty of contempt solely because they did not file a comment on both petitions. Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, we find that it was not proven that Balance and Simeon committed contemptuous acts. Their participation in the acts complained of are supported solely by petitioners' allegations and pictures which do not, by themselves, establish their commission of the acts alleged. Sheriff Ancheta himself exculpated Balance and Simeon when he stated that it was Ferdie who ordered the demolition of Fermin's fence.
With respect to the other "Atty. John Doe" and several "Richard Does" who allegedly effected the demolition of the concrete perimeter fence, excavation, and destruction of the driveway, they were not sufficiently identified by any party to this case. If a person cannot be found guilty of contempt by default, all the more that we cannot issue a ruling of guilt on persons whose identities are unknown.
In all, we find that the imposition of a fine against Sheriff Ancheta will suffice. Imprisonment is only imposed by this Court in order to compel compliance with its lawful order. 66 Since the special order of demolition has already been executed, there is nothing left to compel the parties to do. Thus, imprisonment is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for contempt in G.R. Nos. 188413 and 188719 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court finds Sheriff Edgardo Ancheta GUILTY of indirect contempt. We hereby impose on him a fine of P10,000.00 payable to this Court's cashier within ten days from notice. He is also directed to give a certified copy of the official receipt to the Division Clerk of this Court as proof of his compliance. ScHADI
SO ORDERED."Sereno, C.J., on leave; De Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo (G.R. No. 188413), pp. 3-11.
2.Rollo (G.R. No. 188719), pp. 3-11.
3. G.R No. 147977, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 424.
4. The defendants include Anselmo Arizo, Fred Balusdan, Gregorio Carreon, Teodita Ceril, Corazon Dapnisan, Mario Dapnisan, Rogel Estrada, Aida Fermin, Marilou Fernandez, Michael Fernandez, Teofilo Fulmana, Andrew Herrero, Simeon Jastan, Rogelio (Rodolfo) Lachica, Naty Lachica, Manuel Lagartera, Juliano Landisen, Maximino Lapid, Silvestre Lorenzo, Timoteo Lubusan (Dapnisan), Helen Matale, Soledad Nabunat, Damian Peñera, Eliseo Pidazo, Pablito Sacpa, Ananao Santos, Esteban Santos, Juanito Santos, and Samson Santos. Id. at 425.
5.Id. at 425-427.
6.Id. at 45-46.
7.Rollo (G.R. No. 147977), p. 5.
8.Id. at 186.
9.Id. at 105-106.
10. Fermin v. Esteves, supra note 3 at 432.
11. Rollo (G.R. No. 147977), p. 341.
12. Rollo (G.R. No. 188413), p. 181.
13. Id. at 28-31.
14. Id. at 113-F.
15. Id. at 4; rollo (G.R. No. 188719), p. 4.
16. Rollo (G.R. No. 188143), pp. 4-5; rollo (G.R. No. 188719), p. 5.
17. Rollo (G.R. No. 188143), p. 5; rollo (G.R. No. 188719), p. 5.
18. Rollo (G.R. No. 188143), pp. 5-6.
19. Id.
20. Rollo (G.R. No. 188719), p. 6.
21. Id.
22. Rollo (G.R. No. 188143), p. 113-G.
23. Id.
24. Rollo (G.R. No. 188143), pp. 184-185, 188.
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id. at 54, 64, 73.
27. Id. at 62-63.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 63-64.
30. Id. at 64-65.
31. Id. at 65.
32. Id at 192.
33. CA-G.R. SP No. 109038. Id. at 55.
34. Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc. (CASCONA) v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 189949, March 25, 2015, 754 SCRA 385, 394.
35. Id.
36. Garcia, Jr. v. Manrique, G.R. No. 186592, October 10, 2012, 683 SCRA 491, 497.
37. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao, G.R. No. 197507, January 14, 2013, 688 SCRA 485, 496.
38. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Calanza, G.R. No. 180699, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 186, 193.
39. RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Secs. 1 and 3.
40. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 331, 344.
41. Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc. (CASCONA) v. Dominguez, supra at 394-395.
42. Fortun v. Quinsayas, G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 623, 637, citing People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 64.
43. Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc. (CASCONA) v. Dominguez, supra.
44. Fortun v. Quinsayas, supra.
45. Id.
46. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, supra note 40 at 347-348.
47. Id. at 348.
48. Fortun v. Quinsayas, supra.
49. Id. at 637-638.
50. Supra note 3.
51. Rollo (G.R. No. 188143), pp. 7-8; rollo (G.R. No. 188719), pp. 7-8.
52. Guerrero-Boylon v. Boyles, A.M. No. P-09-2716, October 11, 2011, 658 SCRA 775, 783. Citation omitted.
53. Rollo (G.R. No. 188413), pp. 23-25.
54. Anderson v. Ho, G.R. No. 172590, January 7, 2013, 688 SCRA 8, 20. Citation omitted.
55. Rollo (G.R. No. 188413), p. 36.
56. G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 607, 617.
57. Id. at 617.
58. Rollo (G.R. No. 188719), p. 504.
59. Rollo (G.R. No. 147977), p. 49.
60. Fermin v. Esteves, supra note 3 at 430.
61. Wenceslao v. Madrazo, A.M. No. P-92-768, August 28, 1995, 247 SCRA 696, 704.
62. Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) v. Funai Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015, 762 SCRA 82, 100.
63. Id.
64. Stilgrove v. Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-2257, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 383, 399.
65. Esperida v. Jurado, Jr., G.R. No. 172538, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 66, 76.
66. See Quinio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113867, July 13, 2000, 335 SCRA 522, 528-529.