FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-19-3968. September 2, 2019.][Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4715-P]
MARIA VICTORIA S. DELOS SANTOS, complainant, vs.ROSALINDA M. MARCOS, COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 18, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 2, 2019which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. P-19-3968 [formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4715-P] (Maria Victoria S. Delos Santos v. Rosalinda M. Marcos, Court Stenographer II, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18)
This administrative case stemmed from a Letter-complaint 1 filed by complainant Maria Victoria S. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), Collection Manager of TJ Lending Investors, Inc. (TLII), against respondent Rosalinda M. Marcos (Marcos), Court Stenographer II, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 18 before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for grave misconduct for non-payment of just debts.
In her Letter-complaint, Delos Santos alleged that on February 8, 2013, Marcos applied for a loan of P15,400.00 with TLII, which was granted on May 14, 2013, secured by a promissory note with her co-employee, Nonita Lorenzo as co-maker. When the loan became due, Marcos failed to pay despite repeated demands from TLII.
On October 31, 2013, Marcos allegedly received cash in the amount of P30,000.00 from Judge Juliet San Gaspar (Judge San Gaspar), former Presiding Judge of MeTC of Manila, Branch 19, thru Annie Teodosia (Teodosia), which was intended as payment for Judge San Gaspar's account with TLII. However, Marcos did not remit the same to TLII and instead issued a China Bank check dated November 21, 2013 in the same amount as payment of Judge San Gaspar's account, evidenced by the receipt 2 issued by TLII.
Delos Santos also alleged that Marcos earlier wrote TLII a promissory note 3 dated October 21, 2013 to pay the amount of P30,000.00 plus interest for the said month on October 31, 2013. In the same promissory note, Marcos also promised to pay the interest of her loan on November 15, 2013 to update her account.
On February 13, 2015, Marcos executed a new promissory note 4 to acknowledge her loan with TLII in the total amount of P50,000.00 to be paid in accordance with the payment scheme mentioned in the said note. However, despite repeated notices, Marcos failed to settle her obligations.
In her Comment 5 dated August 22, 2017, Marcos admitted that she contracted a loan in her personal capacity with TLII to aid the needs of her family. She narrated that she applied for a loan on February 8, 2013 which TLII granted. After paying the full amount of the loan, she was granted another loan on May 14, 2013. She was able to make several payments for the said loan before she started defaulting due to financial constraints, in addition to the fact that she was not able to receive her salary for a year. Nonetheless, she always communicated with TLII and assured the same that she was looking for a way to pay her loan. Regarding the amount of P30,000.00, which TLII claimed to be the amount for Judge San Gaspar's account, Marcos said that she borrowed the said amount from Teodosia with the agreement that she will pay the account of Judge San Gaspar to TLII. Lastly, Marcos denied the allegations that she refused to pay her obligations and said that she and TLII have already executed a new loan agreement for her loan of P50,000.00 and have already agreed on the date and manner of its payment. Marcos also attached several receipts 6 of her payments to prove that she is not running away from her obligations.
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum 7 dated March 11, 2019, the OCA found Marcos guilty of willful failure to pay just debts amounting to conduct unbecoming a court employee. The OCA recommended that the instant administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and Marcos be reprimanded and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or any similar offense shall be dealt with more severity.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the OCA that Marcos should be held administratively liable for willful failure to pay her debt. The recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed on Marcos is, however, inadequate considering that her actions also constitute simple dishonesty.
Chapter 6, Section 46 8 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," provides that a public employee's willful failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Just debts as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 refer to: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Under the same Rules, willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal from the service for the third offense.
In this case, the claims of Delos Santos fall on the second category of just debts because there is no question that Marcos admitted the existence of her loan obligation to TLII, making her administratively liable for her willful failure to pay her just debt, an act which is unbecoming of a public employee and a ground for disciplinary action. Despite the fact that Marcos attached several receipt to show her payments, she failed to adduce proof of the alleged new agreement with TLII on the manner of payment of her loan. Hence, the Court cannot take cognizance of this matter in the resolution of the present administrative case.
Having incurred a just debt, Marcos had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle it when it became due. Marcos' argument that her transactions with TLII had no relation to her position as court stenographer and that they were private in nature cannot be sustained. "Like any member of the Judiciary, the respondent is expected to be a model of fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions." 9 The Court already explained that "[t]he image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the conduct of its personnel whether inside or outside the court." 10 The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at the public employee's private life, but at her actuation unbecoming of a public official. 11
More so, Marcos' act of not remitting the amount given by Judge Gaspar to cover the latter's account with TLII, and then replacing the said money with a check without Judge Gaspar's permission reflect bad faith on her part which amounted to dishonesty.
However, the introduction of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 06-0538, also known as the Rules on the Administrative Offense of Dishonesty, humanized the penalties for acts falling under the general category of dishonesty and categorized the conduct, depending upon its effect, the offender's position, the intent and moral depravity of the offender, and other analogous circumstances. 12 The resolution classifies the offense into Serious Dishonesty, Less Serious Dishonesty, and Simple Dishonesty, depending on the attendant circumstances.
In this case, Marcos' act constitutes the offense of simple dishonesty because of the presence of the following attendant circumstances: a) the dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government; and b) the dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the respondent.
Since Marcos committed dishonesty in her private life and not in the course of performance of her official functions, the Court holds her guilty of only simple dishonesty. Her actuation, despite arising from a private transaction, tarnished the image of the Judiciary.
Following Section 50 (B) (10) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 13 simple dishonesty is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months if committed for the first time, as in the case at bar. Nevertheless, for humanitarian reasons, and taking into consideration the following circumstances: (1) respondent acknowledged her indebtedness to TLII; (2) this is respondent's first offense; and (3) the amount involved is not quite substantial. Hence, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is in order.
Considering that Marcos is administratively liable for two offenses, the penalty to be imposed should correspond to the most serious charge and the rest of the offenses may be considered aggravating circumstances pursuant to Section 55 14 of the 2017 Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Since the most serious offense of which Marcos is found guilty is simple dishonesty, the offense of willful failure to pay her debt should be considered as an aggravating circumstance, which warrants the maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension.
Within the realm of an administrative case, the Court is duty bound to correct whatever is perceived as an improper conduct among court employees by ordering them to do what is proper in the premises. 15 Thus, We direct Marcos to pay the balance of her indebtedness to TLII within a reasonable time from receipt of this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondent Rosalinda M. Marcos, Court Stenographer II, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 is found GUILTY of simple dishonesty and willful failure to pay just debt. She is hereby SUSPENDED for SIX (6) MONTHS, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. She is likewise ORDERED to pay complainant the balance of her indebtedness within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-3.
2.Id. at 4.
3.Id. at 5.
4.Id. at 6.
5.Id. at 11-12.
6.Id. at 13-15.
7.Id. at 16-18.
8. Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. — (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
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(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the government;
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9.In re: Complaint for failure to pay just debts against Esther T. Andres, 493 Phil. 1, 11-13 (2005).
10.Toledo v. Perez, 610 Phil. 410, 418 (2009).
11.Tan v. Sermonia, 612 Phil. 314, 322 (2009).
12.Committee on Security and Safety, Court of Appeals v. Dianco, 760 Phil. 169, 189-190 (2015).
13. CSC Resolution No. 1701077 entitled, "2017 Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service," approved on July 3, 2017.
14. Sec. 55. Penalty for Multiple Offenses. — If the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more different offenses, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious offense and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
15.Almonte v. Daque, 552 Phil. 8, 12 (2007).