FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 213042. March 24, 2021.]
VIRGINIA DELA CRUZ, joined by her husband PRUDENCIO FERIDO, petitioners,vs. SPS. PAULINO and DELIA FRONDARINA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 24, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 213042 — VIRGINIA DELA CRUZ, joined by her husband PRUDENCIO FERIDO,petitioners, versus SPS. PAULINO and DELIA FRONDARINA,respondents.
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court resolves to AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision 1 dated November 18, 2013 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 97039, and DENY the present petition 2 for its failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in upholding the lower courts' finding of civil liability against herein petitioners.
As correctly found by the CA, respondents' counterclaim is a permissible direct attack to assail the validity of the certificate of title under petitioners' name. To recall, a collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. Petitioners here raised the issue of invalidity of the certificates of title as a defense in a counterclaim for reconveyance.
It is true that in land cases, the certificate of title serves as a piece of evidence on the indefeasibility of title of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It serves as notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 3
However, it has also been settled that in some instances, the Court did away with the irrevocability of the Torrens title. In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 4 the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title was disregarded when the transferee who took it had notice of the flaws in the transferor's title. 5 In the case of Claudel v. Court of Appeals, 6 the Court held that the Torrens System of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud, and that in the registration of a property, good faith must concur with registration, otherwise the same became an exercise in futility. 7
Still, in Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga Sr., 8 the Court also held that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title may not be invoked when said title was obtained by means of fraud, and the same indefeasibility of title does not apply to a patent grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation. 9 Finally, in Amerol v. Bagumbaran, 10 in the event of a void certificate of title or one wrongfully registered in another person's name, an implied trust is deemed, and the trustee is compelled by law to reconvey the property fraudulently acquired notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. 11
Considering that the counterclaim for reconveyance as prayed for by herein respondents is a valid direct attack, the primary issue now is whether or not the same is a successful scheme assailing of petitioners' title over the subject property in this case.
The central legal provision around which the issue at bar turns is Section 1 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 730, 12 which provides:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections sixty-one and sixty-seven of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-three, any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for the public service, shall be given preference to purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him not more than one thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this sale that the occupants has constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein. Ten per cent of the purchase price shall be paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal annual installments. (Emphasis supplied)
In particular, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-3243 cited Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSP) No. 11819, which provides for the predicate requirements that triggered the issuance of said MSP, to wit:
"Whereas, an investigation has shown that the purchaser has actually occupied the said land and introduced the required improvements thereon and has fully paid the purchase price thereof x x x." 13
After careful consideration of all the submissions of petitioners, the Court finds that they failed to establish that they were able to comply with the requirements under Section 1 of R.A. 730.
First, when the issue of required Filipino citizenship was assailed, petitioners were unable to adduce evidence to establish that they were not yet naturalized American citizens when they applied for the MSP and obtained the same. Petitioners neither contested the challenge on their Filipino citizenship at the time of their application for an MSP over the subject property nor otherwise presented to the court any evidence that would demonstrate the date of their naturalization as American citizens vis-à-vis their time of application for the pertinent MSP.
To be sure, as provided under Section 3 of R.A. 9225, 14 natural Filipino citizens who acquire foreign citizenship retain or otherwise reacquire their Filipino citizenship after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, however, nothing in the records show that petitioners submitted proof of having taken this oath as prescribed under the law. 15
Second, the Court finds that petitioners also failed to prove that they fulfilled the requisite which Section 1 of R.A. 730 provides and calls "essential" — purchaser's physical occupation of the subject property, including the construction of a house and actual residence therein. On the contrary, what the body of evidence shows is that it was respondents who occupied, introduced improvements and resided in the property. It is crucial to note that respondents' allegation of occupying and residing in the property was never refuted by petitioners. Evidently, therefore, if respondents were the ones who constructed and resided in the property, that excluded petitioners from constructing and residing in the same property, as required by Section 1 of R.A. 730.
To recall, the Court has not hesitated to declare an MSP void once it was ascertained that a misrepresentation or other form of omission was committed in the application for the same. Acutely instructive is the case of Heirs of Ibardaloza v. Republic, 16 which involved the voiding of an MSP for the applicant's omission to disclose another occupant on a portion of the property applied for. Here, the Court held:
The relevance of actual occupancy and residency in the application for miscellaneous sales patent under the aforementioned laws and presidential issuances is thus not difficult to comprehend. Accordingly, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in holding that there was fraud and misrepresentation in the omission to declare in his sales patent application the occupancy by another person of a portion of the subject lot. Even if it was established by petitioners that Diaz was a mere lessee, such did not change the fact that there was misrepresentation in the statements made by Ibardaloza in his application. Ibardaloza could not have pre-empted the administrative determination of whether Diaz, as actual occupant and resident of the subject lot, is qualified to avail of the land distribution program under Proc. 518. As to the decision in the ejectment case he filed against Diaz, it bears to stress that the only issue in unlawful detainer cases is the right to physical possession, and does not involve the defendant's qualifications under various laws to avail of public land distribution program, such as in this case.
Ibardaloza was found guilty of making false statements in his application for a sales patent, thus justifying the annulment of his title, pursuant to Sec. 91 of C.A. No. 141. The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation x x x. 17
Petitioners' reliance on R.A. 5972 18 is likewise inadequate, and does not help their cause. Section 2 of said statute provides:
Section 2. The same Act is further amended by inserting Section seven-A between sections seven and eight thereof to read as follows:
"Sec. 7-A. Lands exempted from public auction. — All commercial and residential lands within the City shall be exempted from the requirement of sale by public auction and the actual and/or legal possessor thereof, shall be given priority in acquiring the lands they occupy notwithstanding the provision of any law to the contrary." (Emphasis supplied)
Demonstrably, Section 7-A 19 of R.A. 4645, 20 as amended by R.A. 5972, similarly requires actual or legal possession of the subject property, neither of which petitioners were able to establish in their favor.
Since petitioners here failed to show that they were either the actual or legal possessors of the subject property, the issuance of MSP No. 11819, upon which OCT No. P-3243 was predicated, is void. To be sure, the registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's title, but it does not vest title where there is none because registration under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 21
With respect to respondents' claim that they were legally entitled to the ownership of the property through open, continuous, and adverse possession of the property, the Court finds that this claim did not ripen for respondents a right of ownership. They continuously occupied the property for over 20 years though they were aware that the same was registered under the name of petitioners. Since respondents did not occupy the subject property in the concept of an owner, they may not be considered to have acquired ownership over the same by possessing it over a long period of time. 22 To be sure, as the CA correctly ruled, the subject property could only be acquired through an application for a sales patent under R.A. 730, and since respondents also failed to adduce evidence to show that they, for their part, complied with the requirements under said law, they also may not acquire ownership over the subject property.
Even granting in arguendo that the ownership of the subject property could be acquired by acquisitive prescription, the Court still find that respondents were unable to acquire the same. Since respondents' possession of the subject property was without title or good faith, they could only acquire the same through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription as provided for under Article 1137 23 of the Civil Code, a person's uninterrupted adverse possession of unregistered patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. In the case at bar, by respondent Delia's own admission in open court, they were in possession of the subject property for only over 20 years. This period of possession is around 10 years short of the period required for extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Respondents may also not be considered builders in good faith as defined by Article 448 of the Civil Code, 24 precisely due to the same prior awareness of an existing title over it. As the Court ruled in Dinglasan-Delos Santos, et al. v. Abejon: 25
The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. "The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another." On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.26
Clearly, under this definition, by respondents' own admission, they can only be considered builders in bad faith.
Finally, having adjudged that neither of the parties were able to substantiate their claim over the subject property, a reversion of the same into the public domain is in order.
However, reversion is a remedy provided for under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. (C.A.) 141 27 or the Public Land Act, to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. 28 Contrary to the CA's ruling, as a general rule, the Court has held in the cases of Villacorta v. Ulanday29 and Ortega v. Tan, 30 that save for reversion as contemplated in Section 29 31 of the Public Land Act, reversion is a remedy that does not operate automatically, but requires the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as the proper party to file an action for reversion. 32 This is because an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the State, and it is only proper that the action be filed by the OSG, being the real party-in-interest. 33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 18, 2013 and Resolution dated June 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97039 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that reversion of the subject property to the public domain shall be upon the institution of the appropriate case for reversion by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for its appropriate action with respect to the reversion of the land in question.
The petitioners' compliance with the Move in the Premises Resolution dated January 8, 2020 is DISPENSED WITH.
SO ORDERED." Zalameda, J., no part; Lopez, J., designated as Additional Member per Raffle dated March 3, 2021.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 19-28. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (a Member of this Court) and Rodil V. Zalameda (now Member of this Court).
2.Id. at 9-15.
3.Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117971, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 12, 23.
4. G.R. No. 75336, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 519.
5.Id. at 525.
6. G.R. No. 85240, July 12, 1991, 199 SCRA 113.
7.Id. at 123.
8. G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 361.
9.Id. at 373. See Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic, G.R. No. 131667, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 280, 291.
10. G.R. No. L-33261, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 396.
11.Id. at 403-404.
12. Entitled, "AN ACT TO PERMIT THE SALE WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS," June 19, 1952.
13.Rollo, p. 32. Emphasis supplied.
14. Otherwise known as the "CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," July 28, 2003.
15. Sec. 3 thereof provides:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
16. G.R. No. 243157, April 10, 2019.
17.Id.
18. Entitled, "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FORTY-FIVE, KNOWN AS THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF OLONGAPO," approved on June 21, 1969.
19. Sec. 7-A of R.A. 4645 provides:
Sec. 7-A.Lands exempted from public auction. — All commercial and residential lands within the City shall be exempted from the requirement of sale by public auction and the actual and/or legal possessor thereof, shall be given priority in acquiring the lands they occupy notwithstanding the provision of any law to the contrary.
20. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CHARTER OF THE CITY OF OLONGAPO," approved on June 1, 1966.
21.Baguio v. Republic, et al., G.R. No. 119682, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 450, 457.
22. See Lubos v. Galupo, G.R. No. 139136, January 16, 2002, 301 SCRA 450, 457 where the Court explained:
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Thus, possession with a juridical title, such as by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.
23. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1137 provides:
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)
24. CIVIL CODE, Article 448 states:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
25. G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017, 821 SCRA 132.
26.Id. at 144. Emphasis supplied.
27. Entitled, "AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAN," approved on December 1, 1936.
28.Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513, 527.
29. 73 Phil. 655 (1942).
30. G.R. No. L-44617, January 23, 1990, 191 SCRA 356.
31. Section 29 of C.A. 141 provides:
SECTION 29. After title has been granted, the purchaser may not, within a period of ten years from such cultivation or grant, convey or encumber or dispose said lands or rights thereon to any person, corporation or association, without prejudice to any right or interest of the Government in the land: Provided, That any sale and encumbrance made in violation of the provisions of this section, shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited.
32.Maltos v. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015, 770 SCRA 397, 423.
33.Id. at 426.