Spouses Malazarte v. Spouses Frondarina

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189872. February 15, 2017.]

SPOUSES LAURA and NAPOLEON MALAZARTE, petitioners,vs. SPOUSES ESPERANZA and PEDRO FRONDARINA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 15, 2017, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 189872 — SPOUSES LAURA and NAPOLEON MALAZARTE, petitioners, v. SPOUSES ESPERANZA and PEDRO FRONDARINA, respondents.

This case concerns the propriety of executing the final and executory judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry against the defendants therein who were awarded title to the property in dispute subsequent to the finality of the judgment.

Antecedents

On May 20, 1988, the respondents brought a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City, Branch 5, docketed as Civil Case No. 2853. The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, to wit:

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1. ordering the defendants and all and any other persons claiming under them to vacate the parcel of land located at No. 5 Latires Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, also identified as Lot 5, Block 15-B, Gordon Heights Subdivision, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, with an area of 450 square meters, declared in the name of plaintiff Esperanza G. Frondarina under Tax Declaration No. 004-3574 and more particularly described under paragraph 2 of the complaint, and to deliver its possession to the plaintiffs; HSAcaE

2. ordering the defendants to remove from the subject premises all constructions that they built thereat;

3. ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of P3,000.00 and reasonable rentals of P500.00 every month from the time of forcible entry on March 18, 1988 until the time defendants have vacated the premises and delivered possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and

4. ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally, unto the plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs. 1

The petitioners appealed the adverse judgment all the way to this Court, which ultimately upheld the MTCC in G.R. No. 148423. Accordingly, the entry of judgment was made on April 24, 2007. 2

On June 13, 2007, the petitioners were awarded Miscellaneous Sales Patent Blg. 037107 involving the disputed property, and were subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13894 in their own names. 3

Meanwhile, the respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in the MTCC, which granted their motion on November 16, 2007. The petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration, but the MTCC denied the same. Undaunted, the petitioners assailed the grant of the motion for the writ of execution in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Olongapo City by petition for certiorari and prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC. 4 HESIcT

On September 29, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

The petitioners then appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

In the decision promulgated on September 25, 2009, 5 the CA denied the appeal and upheld the decision of the RTC, observing:

The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.

The ruling in G.R. No. 148423 is that possession of spouses Frondarina was earlier and superior compared to that of spouses Malazarte. A study on the "chain of transfers" of lot possession from the original owner revealed that spouses Frondarina started possession on July 22, 1970; whereas, spouses Malazarte started occupancy only on March 1, 1988. Spouses Frondarina presented tax declarations and tax receipts dated 1970. Spouses Malazarte's were dated 1985. G.R. No. 148423, thus, reinstated the MTCC decision.

However, spouses Malazarte seek to enjoin the execution of the MTCC judgment on the assertion that the subsequent titling of the property in their name made them better entitled to possession.

Jurisprudence recognizes that not even the subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person of the property in dispute will bar execution of judgment in an action for ejectment. Hence, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of one's possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. caITAC

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Therefore, even with the subsequent acquisition of ownership by the spouses Malazarte over the subject property, the same will not bar execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 2853. Well-entrenched is the rule that in forcible entry cases, the only issue for resolution is material possession or possession de facto of the properties involved. Forcible entry cases are summary in nature as to provide an expeditious means of protecting the right to possession of the property. x x x [citations omitted] 6

Not satisfied, the petitioners are now before the Court contending that the issuance of OCT No. P-13894 in their names constituted a supervening event that created a substantial change in the rights of the parties, rendering it unjust, impossible, unconscionable or inequitable to execute the judgment of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 2853.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.

There is no question that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2853 had attained finality. By such finality, the judgment may not be varied from, or modified, or altered. Verily, once the judgment becomes final, its execution follows as a matter of course. 7

There are several exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. 8 The petitioners insist that their situation came within the fourth exception.

The petitioners cannot be upheld. In Oblea v. Court of Appeals, 9 a case where the party evicted from the controverted premises subsequently acquired ownership of the lot, we ruled that such acquisition is not a supervening event that would bar the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case. 10 ICHDca

The main issue in ejectment cases is possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership by either of the parties. 11 The plaintiff just needs to prove physical possession of the premises prior to deprivation thereof by the defendant. A plaintiff who has in his favor priority in time has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected through accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria commenced by another having a better right. 12

Still, the petitioners argue that their right to possess is one of the attributes of their ownership. However, the right to possess is not one that cannot be detached from ownership, for a party other than the owner may, indeed, have a better right to the possession than the owner.

The petitioners have cited rulings in which the Court has held to be unjust the execution of the judgments in the ejectment cases against the owners. 13 This case does not come under such rulings, however, because the issue of ownership in the cited rulings had been passed upon by the courts or by an administrative agency in a quasi-judicial capacity. In contrast, the petitioners' claim of ownership by virtue of their OCT did not conclusively extend to the physical possession of the property. Surely, the right to the physical possession could not have been definitively resolved in the proceedings leading to the issuance of the OCT.

It is also relevant to note that the OCT was the subject of the protest lodged by the respondents in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 14 Although the Court does not hereby cast doubt on the validity of the OCT issued in favor of the petitioners, it is timely to underscore that the mere grant of the OCT did not of itself resolve the issue of physical possession of the disputed property.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 25, 2009; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. TCAScE

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 33-34.

2.Id. at 35.

3.Id.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 33-39; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr.

6.Id. at 36-37.

7.Balaan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 102876, March 4, 1997, 269 SCRA 199, 207.

8.University of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54, 84.

9. G.R. No. 117389, May 11, 1995, 244 SCRA 101.

10.Id. at 105.

11.Alvir v. Vera, G.R. No. L-39338, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 357, 361.

12.Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014, 741 SCRA 423, 441-442.

13.Rallon v. Ruiz, G.R. Nos. L-23315 to L-23318, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 331; Bustos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120784-85, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 155.

14.Rollo, p. 35.