ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 191488. July 27, 2016.]
CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ATTY. MONINA CATOLICO-PINEDA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 27, 2016, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 191488 — CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. MONINA CATOLICO-PINEDA, Respondent.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2009 and March 4, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 106713, 3 which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed therein for lack of merit as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. In the assailed decision and resolution, the appellate court affirmed the part of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioner Clark Development Corporation (CDC) to pay respondent Atty. Monina Catolico-Pineda (Atty. Pineda) her salaries, allowances and other benefits withheld during her nineteen-day suspension.
The facts of the case as synthesized by the Court of Appeals are:
The present case involves a complaint for illegal suspension filed by private respondent Monina Catolico-Pineda against petitioner Clark Development Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation. Private respondent was hired on March 1, 1994 as Assistant Manager of petitioner's Legal Department. She rose to become the Head/Manager of the Corporate and Legal Services Department which she held at the time of her filing of the complaint for illegal suspension on April 19, 2000.
According to private respondent, petitioner ordered the withdrawal of her benefits and her suspension from work starting April 19, 2000 because she, together with other managers and officers of petitioner corporation, formed an association to counter the alleged abuses of petitioner's management. Private respondent's suspension was recalled by petitioner on May 9, 2000. Subsequently, her services were terminated effective January 1, 2001. Private respondent claims that she was separated pursuant to the company's redundancy program and it was petitioner's scheme to ease her out of the company. On the other hand, petitioner claims that private respondent voluntarily availed of its early retirement plan.
Thus, two separate complaints for illegal suspension and for illegal dismissal were successively filed by private respondent. The subject of the present petition is only with respect to the case for illegal suspension.
xxx xxx xxx
On April 19, 2000, private respondent filed with the labor arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension/dismissal 4(sic), docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-04-1151-00. Private respondent filed her position paper, while petitioner sent the labor arbiter a letter dated May 16, 2000 manifesting the submission of the case for resolution without need of a position paper in view of private respondent's acceptance of the order recalling her suspension and her actual reporting back to work. 5 cSaATC
The complaint for illegal suspension was accompanied with complaints for unfair labor practice, nonpayment of salaries, and moral and exemplary damages, including attorney's fees.
Labor Arbiter Decision
In a Decision dated December 22, 2004, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon (LA Abdon) decided the case in favor of petitioner CDC, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. 6
LA Abdon dismissed the complaint on the argument that "Preventive suspension is a management prerogative . . . whatever the outcome of the charges against [Atty. Pineda], respondent CDC has the right to suspend her pending the outcome of the administrative investigation"; that "It is undisputed that complainant was holding a very sensitive managerial position of Manager of Corporate and Legal Services Department and at the same time the Corporate Secretary of respondent CDC"; and thus, held that "preventively suspending her because of the charges is within the bounds of the law, she, being a managerial employee." LA Abdon concluded that "the preventive suspension for a period of 19 days is in accordance with law."7
NLRC Decision
On appeal to the NLRC, the latter dismissed the same in a Decision promulgated on March 28, 2008, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents to pay complainant her salaries, allowances and benefits withheld from the time of her illegal suspension up to the time of her re-assumption on May 9, 2000;
2. Ordering respondent Clark Development Corporation to reinstate complainant's benefits relating to the use of staff house, cellular phones and American Express Card and to pay her the monetary equivalent of said benefits computed from the time they were withheld up to actual reinstatement of the same;
3. Pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the total award.
4. All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. 8
Although the NLRC found no sufficient basis for the claim that then CDC President Sergio T. Naguiat interfered with her right to self-organization, nonetheless, it declared Atty. Pineda's suspension as illegal and that there was diminution of her work benefits, viz.: cHDAIS
On the issue of illegal suspension, We find for complainant. While the order of suspension was supposedly issued by and under the authority of the Ombudsman, We note the fact that the person issuing the same was not duly deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman. This is clear from the letter of Atty. Romeo I. Tan, Assistant Ombudsman, dated May 9, 2000. Being the case, the supposed 'Resident Ombudsman' is actually a usurper whose acts cannot be given a semblance of legality. It, therefore, follows that the suspension order he issued, as well as the suspension of complainant, is illegal.
We also uphold complainant's contention that there was diminution of benefits. It appears that the use by complainant and other corporate managers and officers of the staff house with free electricity, telephone and water services, the use of cellular phones as well as an American Express Card for official purchases, had long been granted. They have been deliberately and consistently granted. As such, they are deemed to have ripened into a company practice or policy which cannot be peremptorily with drawn . . . . To withdraw the same would be to violate the Non-Diminution of Benefits Rule enunciated under Article 100 of the Labor Code. 9
The May 9, 2000 letter of Atty. Romeo I. Tan, Assistant Ombudsman, referred to in the aforequoted NLRC Decision reads:
Dear Atty. Pineda,
Pertinent to your letter query dated 25 April 2000 on the supposed deputized Resident Ombudsman at Clark Development Corporation (CDC), we wish to inform you that as of date of receipt of letter, no one has been deputized.
We further inform you that we are still awaiting for nominees of at least three, from where the Resident Ombudsman to be deputized will be chosen as per our letter dated 11 April 2000 addressed to Sergio T. Naguiat, President & CEO, Clark Development Corporation (CDC). Copy is hereto attached.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ROMEO I. TAN [Sgd.]10
CDC's motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 28, 2008.
Court of Appeals Decision
CDC went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 106713.
In a Decision promulgated on November 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed CDC's petition for lack of merit. It no longer looked into the propriety of the NLRC's finding that Atty. Pineda was illegally suspended "since [CDC's] petition [did] not question public respondent NLRC's finding of illegal suspension and its basis."11 Instead, the appellate court focused its attention on CDC's argument that the monetary award granted by the NLRC to Atty. Pineda on the occasion of her illegal suspension should be disregarded in view of CDC's satisfaction of the monetary award due to Atty. Pineda relative to a separate case for illegal dismissal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no overlapping of monetary awards or duplication of the reliefs granted to Atty. Pineda in the two cases, i.e., illegal suspension and illegal dismissal, to wit:
To stress, private respondent's suspension started on April 19, 2000 and it was recalled on May 9, 2000, while her separation from employment took effect on January 1, 2001. The reliefs awarded to private respondent in the illegal suspension case cover only the period of her suspension, while the reliefs awarded to her in the illegal dismissal case do not cover the period of her suspension. 12
CDC's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration to the above-quoted Decision was denied in a Resolution dated March 4, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition praying for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner respectfully prays for this Honorable Court to:
1. Give due course to the Petition;
2. Immediately upon receipt hereof, and to be made effective during the pendency of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the NLRC, Labor Arbiter and other entities from enforcing in any manner, the questioned Decision and Resolution; and
3. After due proceedings, render judgment declaring the questioned Decision and Resolution as null and void, making permanent the restraining order and ordering the dismissal of the complaint of Respondent Atty. Monina Catolico-Pineda for lack of merit. 13
CDC anchors its recourse to this Court on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT A DECISION ON THE MONETARY CLAIM HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED, ALBEIT STILL UNDER APPEAL, BEFORE ANOTHER CASE. DHITCc
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT ILLEGALLY SUSPENDED.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE. 14
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is a mode of appeal where the issues allowed to be raised are limited to questions of law. In labor cases where the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is one rendered in a petition for certiorari, a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 before the Court is limited to reviewing the propriety of the Court of Appeals decision on the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion and other jurisdictional errors of the NLRC. 15
In this case, however, CDC merely calls for a factual review of the case, and nothing regarding the interpretation of relevant laws and rules that would point to the impropriety of the appellate court's finding that CDC failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (NLRC) ordered CDC to pay Atty. Pineda her salaries, allowances and benefits withheld during her 19-day suspension. The Court neither re-examines conflicting evidence, re-evaluates the credibility of witnesses, substitutes the findings of fact of the NLRC that has expertise in its specialized field, nor substitutes its own judgment for that of the NLRC in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally conclusive on the Court unless the factual findings complained of are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts. 16
Here, the Court sees no reason to disturb the factual findings of the NLRC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In its first assignment of error, CDC insists that the monetary award given to Atty. Pineda arising out of her illegal suspension should already be disregarded in view of its (CDC) satisfaction of the monetary awards granted in the illegal dismissal case.
That is incorrect. The monetary award granted to Atty. Pineda for her illegal suspension was only for the period of April 19, 2000 until May 9, 2000. On the other hand, the monetary award given to her in connection to her illegal dismissal was computed from the day her employment was terminated on January 1, 2001 until full payment thereof. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that CDC failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Atty. Pineda said monetary award for her illegal suspension notwithstanding the satisfaction of her monetary award in the illegal dismissal case. This is because there will be no duplication or double recovery if Atty. Pineda receives both monetary awards. Each award pertains to backwages and other benefits earned in different and/or distinct periods.
As to the second assignment of error regarding the propriety of the finding of illegal suspension. The Court of Appeals correctly found that "[CDC's] petition [did] not question public respondent NLRC's finding of illegal suspension and its basis." A review of the Petition for Certiorari filed before the appellate court reveals that it raised a single issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT OVERTURNED THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER REYNALDO ABDON. 17
But in support of the issue above-quoted, CDC only pointed out that (i) it should not be made to pay Atty. Pineda the monetary award arising out of her illegal suspension because it had already paid her the monetary award adjudged to her in the separate illegal dismissal case; and (ii) Atty. Pineda was not dismissed, illegally or otherwise, from the corporation because she voluntarily retired therefrom.
Nowhere in the said petition for certiorari did CDC repudiate the finding that (i) Atty. Pineda was illegally suspended; (ii) she is entitled to backwages during the period of her illegal suspension; (iii) the other benefits previously being enjoyed by her were unlawfully diminished; and (iv) she is further entitled to the monetary equivalent of the other benefits withheld from her. More importantly, CDC failed to refute the NLRC's finding that Atty. Pineda's suspension was illegal because the order suspending her for 90 days was issued by a certain Atty. Renato G. Gasmen (Atty. Gasmen) who had no authority to do so as he had not been duly deputized to act as the resident Ombudsman at CDC.
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
the Court of Appeals properly disregarded the issue raised by CDC in its petition. The appellate court could only consider errors that CDC actually and properly argued in its petition, i.e., nonpayment of the monetary award adjudicated in connection with the illegal suspension case in view of its payment of the monetary award arising out of the separate illegal dismissal case.
In the third assignment of error, CDC invokes the finding of the NLRC that it (CDC) was not guilty of unfair labor practice. 18 However, like the second assignment of error, CDC failed to argue this point before the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the NLRC's finding of illegal suspension was premised on another ground — the lack of authority of Atty. Gasmen to place her under preventive suspension — and nothing to do with the acts amounting to unfair labor practice. IAETDc
Though not assigned as an error, CDC also argued that Atty. Pineda was not illegally dismissed from the corporation. However, arguments pertaining to Atty. Pineda's said illegal dismissal from the corporation are surplusages. The illegal dismissal case is the subject of another petition before the Court of Appeals; therefore, the Court will refrain from entertaining the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution dated November 27, 2009 and March 4, 2010, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106713 are AFFIRMED. No cost.
The letter dated July 12, 2016 of Aurora A. Mua, Records Officer III, Officer-in-Charge, Archives Section, Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals, Manila, transmitting the Court of Appeals rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 106713 consisting of 228 pages with attached Supreme Court petition for review on certiorari, and the letter dated July 18, 2016 of Maribeth G. Hernandez, Administrative Officer IV, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, transmitting the entire records of NLRC case RAB-III-04-1151-00, entitled "Atty. Monina Catolico Pineda vs. Clark Development Corporation," consisting of 702 pages, are both NOTED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 27-35; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Ramon R. Garcia concurring.
2. Id. at 37.
3. Entitled "Clark Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission and Atty. Monina Catolico-Pineda."
4. The complaint filed by Atty. Pineda on April 19, 2000 was for illegal suspension. Docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-04-1151-00.
5. Rollo, pp. 28-29.
6. Id. at 86.
7. Id. at 81-82.
8. Id. at 149.
9. Id. at 148-149.
10. CA rollo, p. 118.
11. Rollo, p. 31.
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 19-20.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014, 744 SCRA 31, 63.
16. Meralco Industrial Engineering Services Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 572 Phil. 94, 117 (2008).
17. CA rollo, p. 8.
18. ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization[.]