FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 228207. January 22, 2018.]
SPO1 MARCELO CHAVEZ, JR., petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 22, 2018which reads as follows: SDAaTC
"G.R. No. 228207 (SPO1 Marcelo Chavez, Jr. v. People of the Philippines). — The Motion for Extension of Time 1 filed by Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Marcelo Chavez, Jr. (petitioner) seeking an additional 15 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
Nevertheless, after a judicious consideration of the case, the Petition for Review 2 filed by petitioner is DENIED for lack of merit. The petition has failed to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed a reversible error in issuing the assailed Decision 3 and Resolution 4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34936.
Petitioner claims that conspiracy between him and his co-accused (SPO2 Samaco) was not proven. He asserts that there was no direct evidence to prove that he received the alleged bribe money from Felina Dasig (private complainant). Citing jurisprudence, he insists that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. 5
These arguments are unmeritorious. Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the incident is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to hold a person liable as a conspirator. However, a conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, when taken together, indicate that they are parts of the scheme to commit the crime. 6
While there is no direct evidence showing that petitioner participated in the encashment of the check, his complicity in the crime was established by the following pieces of circumstantial evidence: 1) he and SPO2 Samaco arrested the employees of Dasig; 2) he drove the impounded car to her house, with her employees and SPO2 Samaco on board; 3) he was present when SPO2 Samaco proposed to Dasig the return of her car in exchange for P20,000; 4) he drove her car to the bank to collect the payment; and 5) he was initially handed the check, but he did not accept it because he had no identification documents at the time. 7
These circumstances overwhelmingly show that petitioner and his co-accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution, leading to the conclusion that conspiracy existed between them in the commission of the crime. 8
Moreover, even assuming that petitioner was merely present during the commission of the crime, his actions did not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. 9 This, petitioner failed to do. acEHCD
In fine, we agree with the CA's ruling that although petitioner did not personally encash the check, his presence all throughout the commission of direct bribery and his failure to prevent its commission were more than sufficient to support the RTC's finding of conspiracy. 10
As regards the penalty, petitioner questions its modification by the CA. He claims that it violated his right to due process when it applied the first paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) instead of the second paragraph on the basis of which he was originally charged. 11 We disagree.
Article 210 of the RPC provides:
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift. x x x 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the CA did in fact apply the second paragraph of Art. 210. In its Decision, it ruled that "[s]ince the accused-appellants executed the purpose for which the gift was given, the proper penalty should be that provided under the first part of the second paragraph of Article 210 of the RPC, not the last part as erroneously applied by the RTC." 13
We see no error in the modification of the penalty by the court a quo. We quote with approval its pronouncement on this matter:
[T]he proper penalty should be prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than three (3) times the value of the gift in addition to the special temporary disqualification. However, We note that the accused-appellants were not apprehended by virtue of an arrest warrant and they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in their favor.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law and there being a mitigating circumstance but no aggravating circumstance, accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, plus the penalty of special temporary disqualification. Pursuant to the second paragraph in relation to the first paragraph of Article 210 of the RPC, the imposed fine is also increased to P60,000.00 which is equivalent to three (3) times the value of the consideration received by accused-appellants. 14 SDHTEC
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Court resolves to AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision dated 27 August 2015 and Resolution dated 7 November 2016 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34936.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-4, dated 1 December 2016.
2.Id. at 10-26.
3.Id. at 32-47, dated 27 August 2015, penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodil V. Zalameda.
4.Id. at 61-62, dated 7 November 2016.
5.Id. at 18-21.
6.People v. Campos, 668 Phil. 315 (2011); People v. Villanueva, 611 Phil. 152 (2009).
7.Rollo pp. 43-44.
8. See People v. Pilola, 453 Phil. 1 (2003).
9.People vs. Luminda, G.R. No. 200954 (Notice), 14 October 2015.
10.Rollo p. 44.
11.Id. at 24-25.
12. As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 871 (1985).
13. Rollo p. 45; Emphasis supplied.
14. Id. at 45-46.