FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161819. November 9, 2015.]
CAMPO ASSETS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ALMA ARAMBULO AND LEE BONG SUN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 9, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 161819 — CAMPO ASSETS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ALMA ARAMBULO AND LEE BONG SUN, Respondents.
This appeal assails the decision promulgated on January 27, 2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 220, in Quezon City of the petitioner's complaint for collection against the respondents. 2
Antecedents
On January 15, 1991, the petitioner, the owner of a building in Pasay City, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 3 with Lee Bong Sun who undertook to operate a food-and-entertainment business in the building of the petitioner, and to pay to the petitioner a guaranteed monthly income of P80,000.00 as rental. Lee operated the business under the name "Hand-in-Hand Disco Club," which was managed by Chan York Gui (also known as Allan). 4 On August 3, 1993, the petitioner entered into a second MOA 5 with Alma Arambulo who substituted her husband Lee. The second MOA contained a similar stipulation for the payment of a guaranteed monthly income of P88,000.00, and stated in its paragraph II (B) that:
II. In consideration of the above, the SECOND PARTY agrees to undertake the following:
A.) . . .
B.) Upon signing of this contract, the SECOND PARTY will pay to the FIRST PARTY:
1. — Its (SECOND PARTY) accumulated unpaid account in the amount of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P270,000.00) plus the advanced guaranteed income of EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND (P88,000.00) PESOS for the month of July, 1993.
2. — Ten post-dated checks to cover the guaranteed income from August 5, 1993 to May 5, 1994 in the amount of EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND (P88,000.00) PESOS each.
NOTE: Checks matured and are deposited but dishonored for any reason whatsoever, then the SECOND PARTY will pay an additional monthly penalty of Ten percent (10%) on the amount specified on the check until the same has been make good or paid. 6
In June 1994, the business of the respondents came to be known as "Club X.O.," with Allan and Arambulo as partners. 7
On September 12, 1994, the petitioner sent a demand letter, 8 addressed to Alma Arambulo, Lee and Allan, demanding the payment of P411,192.49 representing the unpaid accounts from June 15, 1994 until September 15, 1994, inclusive of the 10% monthly penalty for non-payment. On September 23, 1994, the petitioner sent its final demand letter. 9 Upon failure of the respondents to settle their obligations, the petitioner sued Lee, 10 but later amended the complaint to implead Arambulo. 11 The petitioner applied for a writ of preliminary attachment, 12 which the RTC granted. 13 ISHCcT
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendants the amount of P30,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The Writ of Preliminary Attachment is DISSOLVED. The other claims and counterclaims for moral damages are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 14
The RTC found that the respondents had no outstanding obligations in view of the previous payments they had made, viz.:
In its demand letter dated Sept. 12, 1994 . . ., plaintiff claims that the unpaid account of defendant ALMA ARAMBULO amounted to P411,192.49. However, in the demand letter dated August 1, 1994 . . ., plaintiff stated that the unpaid account of defendants amounted to P263,000.00 excluding the discount of P44,381.29.
On August 9, 1994, plaintiff received eleven (11) postdated checks totaling P1,080,000.00 covering the guaranteed profit shares for the period covering June 16, 1994 to June 30, 1995 . . . .
On August 18, 1994, plaintiff sent another demand letter dated August 18, 1994 . . . stating that defendants partially paid, through Chan York Gui (Allan), the amount of P200,000.00 and demanding the remittance of the balance of P38,040.00.
It appears that Club X.O., where defendant Arambulo Lee is one of the partners, paid the amount of P196,000.00 for the month of December 1993 and January 1996 . . . . Further, Club X.O. also paid the amount of P98,000.00 for the month of November 1995. Plaintiff admitted that it took possession of the subject premises on January 1996.
After the takeover of the premises by the plaintiff, the defendants are no longer liable to pay the former of the guaranteed income since they are no longer in control of the business operations of the establishment.
Since there is a disputable presumption that prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced (Sec. 3(I), Rule 131, Rules of Court), the production of the receipts for the payment of the November, December 1995 and January, 1996 means that the obligation for the previous monthly [sic] had been paid.
This presumption becomes conclusive with the admission of the plaintiff that it continuously received payments from Chan York Gui from August 1994 to January 1996 in representation of Alma Arambulo . . . .
The Court, after considering the evidence presented, finds that the defendants are not liable to the plaintiff. There is no outstanding obligation on the part of the defendants in favor of the plaintiff. 15
As earlier stated, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on January 27, 2004, 16 affirming the judgment of the RTC, to wit:
In the case at bench, the appellant failed to preponderantly prove the existence of the appellee's indebtedness. We painstakingly evaluated the evidence and found as follows:
1. Under II-B-1 of MOA dated August 3, 1993, the parties agreed that upon its signing, the appellee will pay the appellant-corporation the accumulated unpaid account in the amount of P270,000.00.
Considering that the MOA of August 3, 1993 is a renewal of the MOA executed on January 15, 1991, obviously, the "accumulated unpaid account" referred to in the MOA dated August 3, 1993 pertains to any accumulated unpaid account in the MOA of January 15, 1991. In fact, Trinidad herself admitted that when the second MOA was signed it was agreed that whatever unpaid obligations in the first MOA were consolidated with the second MOA. The records also show that the appellee complied with the aforesaid condition by paying the amount of P300,000.00 on July 7, 1993, the receipt of which was in fact admitted by the appellant. The said amount was even in excess of the agreed P270,000.00. Thus, when the business venture continued between the appellant and the appellee under the second MOA, there remained no unpaid and outstanding account due from defendant Lee Bong Sun. CAacTH
2. In compliance with her undertaking under II-B-2 of the MOA dated August 3, 1993, the appellee through defendant Lee Bong Sun paid in full the guaranteed income from August 5, 1993 to May 5, 1994 as shown by the cash voucher no. 1724 in the amount of P800,000.00 dated August 16, 1993. The said receipt states:
"Received the amount of Eight Hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) in full payment of Mr. Lee Bong Sun's accounts. Note: Issued ten (10) cheques @ P80,000.00 each for ten (10) months starting August 17, 1993 until May 17, 1994."
3. The guaranteed monthly income of P88,000.00 for the months of June 1993 and July 1993 as stipulated under II-A and II-B-1 of the MOA dated August 3, 1993 appears to have also been paid. Although no receipt of payment therefor was presented, the same may be presumed to have been paid as the receipts of payment for the later months have been produced. As shown by the records, eleven (11) postdated checks were issued to cover the guaranteed income for the period of June 16, 1994 to June 30, 1995 in the total amount of P1,080,000.00, and the same was acknowledged to have been received by the appellant through its authorized representative Tomas Meneses.
The amount due for the months of August 1995 to October are likewise presumed to have been paid by the appellee and received by the appellant, it appearing that the receipts of payment for the months of November in the sum of P98,000.00, and for the months of December 1995 and January 1996 in the amount of P196,000.00 have been produced.
Under Sec. 3(i) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is presumed that prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the latter ones is produced. The appellant has not presented any evidence to contradict the same; hence, the presumption becomes satisfactory and conclusive. cEaSHC
In sum, at the time the appellant took possession of the subject property in January 1996, the appellee had no outstanding obligation to the appellant.
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner submits that the sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondents owed P411,129.49 to the petitioner, which argues that the presumption of payment was inapplicable because Arambulo had requested the petitioner to just hold on to the 10 postdated checks issued by the respondents under the second MOA when the checks started to bounce, and to accept in the meantime her payments for the current month. 17
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
In this appeal, the petitioner wants us to review the findings of fact of both the CA and the RTC. We cannot oblige because this recourse is limited to questions of law. The Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and review the evidence adduced during the trial. As such, any appeal brought to the Court must bow to the settled rule that the findings of fact of the CA, especially if the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the RTC, are final and conclusive. This Court will review the findings of fact only when: (1) the inference made by the CA is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA; (3) the findings of fact of the CA are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact of the CA and the RTC are conflicting; (6) the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the findings of fact are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence, and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 18
The petitioner did not demonstrate that any of the foregoing exceptions applied to its appeal.
Nonetheless, we have reviewed the records to determine whether or not there was substance in the petitioner's cause, but we still reach the same outcome of affirming the CA's decision.
The petitioner could not validly insist that the respondents should have established the amount they had owed as the means to dispute its claim of P411,129.49 as the amount of their obligation. It thereby seemed to lose sight of the fact that as the plaintiff it was the party that carried the burden of proof to establish its allegations in this case. 19 In civil cases, indeed, the burden of proof is discharged only upon the plaintiff proving its case by preponderance of evidence. 20
There is no question that the respondents, as the lessees in the contract with the petitioner, had the burden of proving their defense of payment of the rentals. They would discharge the burden only by showing with certainty that they had duly paid their rentals. But once they established their allegation of payment, the petitioner should assume the duty to produce contrary evidence by itself showing their non-payment. 21 In short, after they adduced evidence to prove their payment consisting of receipts and vouchers, 22 the petitioner had to controvert by proof to the contrary. It did not; hence, the CA correctly upheld the ruling of the RTC.
The petitioner's objection to the propriety of applying in the respondents' favor the presumption of payment established under Section 3 (i), 23 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court based on its claim that it had only issued the receipts in accommodation did not overcome the presumption. For one, it tendered no showing that the rentals corresponding to the periods from June 1993 and July 1993, and from August 1995 to October 1995 had not yet been paid. Also, its issuance of the receipts signified that it had received payment as reflected therein. As a consequence, the CA justifiably presumed from the presentation of the receipts issued for the later rentals that the prior rentals had been duly paid. 24 CTIEac
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 27, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." SERENO,C.J., on official business; CARPIO, J., acting member per S.O. No. 2261 dated October 28, 2015.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 23-32; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired), with Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid (retired) concurring.
2. Id. at 33-39.
3. Id. at 56-59.
4. Id. at 26.
5. Id. at 52-55.
6. Id. at 52-53.
7. Id. at 27.
8. Id. at 60-61.
9. Id. at 62.
10. RTC records, pp. 1-11.
11. Id. at 89-96.
12. Id. at 133-136.
13. Id. at 153.
14. Supra note 2.
15. Id. at 38-39.
16. Supra note 1.
17. Rollo, p. 15.
18. Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr., G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 787, 797; Republic v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 175021, June 15, 2011, 651 SCRA 101, 114.
19. Ogawa v. Menigishi, G.R. No. 193089, July 9, 2012, 676 SCRA 14, 21.
20. Gaw v. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 505, 516.
21. Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., G.R. No. 156821, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 414, 422-423.
22. RTC records, Exhibit Folder, pp. 18-20, 32-34.
23. Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
xxx xxx xxx
24. Perez v. Garcia, 7 Phil. 162 (1906).