THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249699. June 20, 2022.]
CARMENCITA GUANZON-ARAMBULO, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS SUBSTITUTE OF DRA. EUFROCINA LLANES-GUANZON, petitioner,vs. MA. SOCORRO E. GUANZON-YUCHANGCO, MARIO M. GUANZON, and ARTURO M. GUANZON, JR., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 20, 2022, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249699 (Carmencita Guanzon-Arambulo, in her personal capacity and as substitute of Dra. Eufrocina Llanes-Guanzon v. Ma. Socorro E. Guanzon-Yuchangco, Mario M. Guanzon, and Arturo M. Guanzon, Jr.). — Impugned in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated 01 October 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 150407, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari3 filed by petitioner Carmencita Guanzon-Arambulo (petitioner), which sought to set aside the Omnibus Order 4 dated 10 January 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 152.
ANTECEDENTS
Petitioner is the legitimate child of Arturo A. Guanzon (Arturo), who died on 29 July 2001. She substituted her mother, Dra. Eufrocina Llanes-Guanzon, the legitimate spouse of Arturo, as a party to this case. On the other hand, private respondents Ma. Socorro E. Guanzon-Yuchangco (Socorro), Mario M. Guanzon (Mario), and Arturo M. Guanzon, Jr. (Arturo, Jr.) are the illegitimate children of Arturo. 5
After Arturo's death, petitioner instituted a case 6 for the probate of her father's holographic will. The RTC of Pasig City, Branch 268, acting as the probate court, subsequently appointed petitioner as executrix of her father's Estate. 7 Pending settlement, the RTC granted the prayer for allowance pendente lite of both petitioner and private respondents. 8 To receive their allowances, private respondents moved for the execution of the final and executory Order granting their support pendente lite. The RTC granted their prayer in the Order 9 dated 21 November 2011.
At the interstice, on 15 September 2010, petitioner entered into a seven-year lease contract with FRD Food and Spices, Inc. (FRD Food), covering the Tomas Morato property of the Estate, for a consideration of P200,000.00 per month, inclusive of the Value-Added Tax (VAT). 10
To implement the writ for the execution of private respondents' allowance pendente lite, the RTC ordered the garnishment of the remaining rents from FRD Food, which would be used to satisfy the unexecuted support pendente lite of private respondents. 11
Skeptical of its obligations as lessee under the notice of garnishment, FRD Food sought clarification from the RTC. 12 Accordingly, on 16 May 2014, the RTC issued an Order 13 directing FRD to: (1) cancel the postdated checks issued to petitioner or the Estate until the termination of the lease contract on the Tomas Morato property; (2) in lieu of the cancelled postdated checks, issue certified checks monthly under the name of either Mario or Socorro; and (3) issue to the sheriff receipts of the rental payments for accounting. 14
Disgruntled with the RTC's directive, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, bemoaning that the probate court erringly awarded to private respondents the whole P200,000.00 monthly rent for the Tomas Morato property as allowance pendente lite. She further bewailed that part of the rental should be reserved for the payment of VAT and the necessary maintenance of the property, which the Estate is obliged to assume. 15
In the Order 16 dated 28 September 2015, the RTC adjudged that the payment of taxes is the responsibility and duty of petitioner as the court-appointed executrix. 17
Unperturbed, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion 18 for: (1) clarification of the Order dated 28 September 2015, and (2) reconsideration of the Order dated 1 October 2015, claiming that the RTC did not resolve the issue regarding payment of the taxes due from the proceeds of the monthly rental of the Tomas Morato property. Petitioner insisted that the RTC should direct private respondents to remit the 12% VAT to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, as they fall due, because this was included in the P200,000.00 monthly rent of the said property. CAIHTE
The RTC issued on 10 January 2017, the Omnibus Order 19 ruling that petitioner, as the executrix, should consider tapping other sources or assets of the Estate to cover the cost of the VAT for the Tomas Morato property, rather than passing the burden to private respondents, who were still deprived of their support pendente lite.
Unfazed, petitioner filed a certiorari petition 20 with the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC for refusing to order the retention of the 12% VAT from the proceeds of the Tomas Morato property rental.
In the assailed Decision, 21 the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, declaring that the 28 September 2015 Order of the RTC had become final and executory when petitioner merely filed an Omnibus Motion to clarify it. The CA noted that a motion for clarification is just an "unadulterated query" which will merely make the ruling understandable. Withal, the Omnibus Motion for clarification did not toll the reglementary period to file a certiorari petition.
Unyielding, petitioner is now before this Court through the present recourse, asseverating that: first, the motion for clarificatory judgment tolls the prescriptive period for the filing of a petition for certiorari; and second, the VAT should be taken from the P200,000.00 monthly rental of the Tomas Morato property. 22
Private respondents retort that the instant Petition is a subterfuge to alter or modify previous RTC Orders which have long become final and executory. 23 The CA erred not in holding that petitioner's Motion for Clarification of the RTC's Order dated 28 September 2015 did not toll the reglementary period to file a certiorari petition. 24
Petitioner's Reply (To Comment of Private Respondents dated 23 December 2019) 25 is a mere refluence of her Petition.
RULING OF THE COURT
Petitioner's asseveration carries no weight and conviction.
We agree with the CA that petitioner's Omnibus Motion to clarify the 28 September 2015 Order of the RTC did not toll the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari. In Spouses Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., 26 the Court characterized a motion for clarificatory judgment in this prose —
It should be borne in mind that a Motion for Clarificatory Judgment not being in the character of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the reglementary period for filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Its filing will not bar the judgment from attaining finality, nor will its resolution amend the decision to be reviewed. Thus, when respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, there was already a final judgment that could properly be the subject of a petition for review. 27
Ineluctably, the 28 September 2015 RTC Order has become final and executory. It is primal that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is already immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. 28
Even assuming that the Omnibus Motion to clarify the said 28 September 2015 Order partakes the nature of a motion for reconsideration, petitioner's claim will still hold no water given that the Omnibus Motion for clarification is already a second motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited under the present procedural set-up. 29
In retrospect, FRD Food sought clarification from the RTC of its obligations as lessee under the notice of garnishment. Acting thereon, the RTC issued its Order dated 16 May 2014, directing FRD Food on how to comply with the garnishment order. Upon receipt of the RTC's directive to FRD Food, petitioner filed her own motion for reconsideration, i.e., the first motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in the Order dated 28 September 2015. The RTC stressed that payment of taxes is petitioner's responsibility and duty as the court-appointed executrix. Thereafter, she filed the Omnibus Motion to clarify the Order dated 28 September 2015. Clear as day, this Omnibus Motion is already a second motion for reconsideration. DETACa
A motion for reconsideration, even if it was not designated as a second motion for reconsideration, is a disguised second motion for reconsideration if it is merely a reiteration of the movant's earlier arguments. 30 A juxtaposition of petitioner's motion for reconsideration questioning the RTC order dated 16 May 2014 and her Omnibus Motion to clarify the Order dated 28 September 2015 divulges identical arguments and reliefs sought. Thus, the filing of the Omnibus Motion to clarify is a disguised second motion for reconsideration that does not toll the reglementary period of filing a petition for certiorari.
Still and all, a perspicacious review of the factual milieu of the case evinces no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the RTC in issuing the questioned orders. The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning — an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." 31
Here, the pronouncement of the RTC in the Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2017 that petitioner, as the executrix, should consider other sources or assets of the Estate to pay the VAT for the Tomas Morato property, rather than passing such burden to private respondents who were continuously being deprived of their support pendente lite, is far from being considered as an act done with "grave abuse of discretion." As the administratrix, petitioner is laden with the obligation to oversee and manage the Estate, which includes the payment of proper taxes.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING DISQUISITION, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 1 October 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150407 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-25.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes concurring. Id. at 29-36-A.
3.Id. at 161-176.
4.Id. at 177-180.
5.Id. at 30.
6.Id. at 37-42 and 181-186.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 5-6.
9.Id. at 6.
10.Id. at 31.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 95-97.
13.Id. at 256-262.
14.Id. at 261-262.
15.Id. at 8.
16.Id. at 288-292.
17.Id. at 292.
18.Id. at 293-302.
19.Id. at 177-180.
20.Supra note 3.
21.Supra note 2.
22.Id. at 13-14.
23.Id. at 433.
24.Id. at 440.
25.Id. at 467-478.
26. 394 Phil. 877-890 (2000).
27.Id. at 888.
28. See Mauleon v. Porter, 739 Phil. 203-214 (2014).
29. Section 5 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Section 5. Second motion for new trial. — A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made, may be filed within the time herein provided excluding the time during which the first motion had been pending.
No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
30. See Heirs of Gamaliel Albano, et al. v. Sps. Ravanes, 790 Phil. 557-581 (2016).
31. See Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 236686, 5 February 2020; See also Chua v. People, 821 Phil. 271-286 (2017); Pascual v. Burgos, et al., 776 Phil. 167-191 (2016).