FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233599. June 23, 2021.]
LAMBERTO CAGINGIN, petitioner,vs. CELSO E. AMON, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 23, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233599 (Lamberto Cagingin v. Celso E. Amon). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Resolutions dated April 20, 2017 2 and August 4, 2017 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 149637, which denied petitioner Lamberto Cagingin's (Cagingin) petition for annulment of judgment and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Facts of the Case
On June 5, 2002, a complaint for Specific Performance, Sum of Money and Damages 4 was filed by Cagingin against respondent Celso Amon (Amon) before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite (MCTC). It appears that Amon conveyed his 1/5 share in the inheritance to Cagingin, which covers an area of 2,617 square meters (sq.m.) located in Barangay Lalaan I, Silang, Cavite, at P350.00/sq.m., or a total cost price of P915,950.00, evidenced by a Contract to Sell. The parties stipulated therein the following: Amon shall hire the services of a licensed geodetic engineer to survey and determine the correct area of the subject land and deliver to Cagingin the approved land plan by the Land Management Services Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Cagingin will make a P70,000.00 down payment to be specifically used in paying the professional fee of the engineer; if the result of the approved plan will show that there is either an increase or decrease in the area, the total cost price shall be adjusted at P350.00/sq.m.; and Cagingin will make the full payment of the balance upon delivery of the approved plan by Amon on or before March 27, 1993. 5
Cagingin paid the amount of P70,000.00 as down payment but Amon has not yet delivered the approved plan. Amon requested for several advances and as per their joint computation, Cagingin had fully paid the land. Hence, they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the land area increased by 1,185.85 sq.m. in addition to the 2,617 sq.m. as appearing in the Contract to Sell. Cagingin issued two post-dated checks as payment of the increased area. 6
However, Cagingin learned that the land he bought from Amon had a lesser area (i.e., 2,067 sq.m.), having a deficit of 550 sq.m. Thus, Cagingin filed this complaint asking the court to order Amon to deliver to him the approved plan; an additional land of 550 sq.m.; another 70 sq.m. to replace the area that Amon sold to BFBC Development Corporation; to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale to correct the area sold; the amount of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00 as exemplary and moral damages, among others. 7
Amon filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 and a Motion to Admit Responsive Pleading, 9 both of which were denied by the MCTC in its Order 10 dated October 8, 2002. On motion of Cagingin, Amon was declared in default in the Order 11 dated February 18, 2003. Cagingin presented his evidence ex-parte.
On July 29, 2003, the MCTC rendered a Decision 12 in favor of Cagingin, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of plaintiff Lamberto V. Cagingin and against defendant Celso Amon, ordering the latter to perform the following acts, to wit:
1. To deliver the Approved Plan No. Ccs-4-003999-D (Exhs. "U" and "U-1") that was surveyed by Engr. Antonio Galang, which was duly approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) DENR; said property has an area of 2,067 square meters;
2. To deliver a parcel of land with an area of 550 square meters that is located within the vicinity of the subject land, which was sold by defendant [Amon] to plaintiff [Cagingin], in order to complete the discrepancy of the 2,617 square meters, as stated in the Contract to Sell;
3. To deliver another parcel of land with an area of 70 square meters that is also within the vicinity of the subject property, to replace the area that defendant [Amon] sold to BFBC Development Corporation, also to complete the discrepancy of the 2,617 square meters, as stated in the Contract to Sell;
4. In lieu of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 18, 1994, defendant is ordered to execute another Deed of Sale, covering an exact area of 2,067 square meters pursuant to the Approved Plan No. Ccs-4-003999-D that was prepared by Engr. Antonio Galang;
5. To pay plaintiff [Cagingin] the following sums, to wit:
a) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,200.00 for appearance fee;
c) Cost of suit and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis in the original)
On September 26, 2003, Cagingin filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment 14 alleging that the period to appeal has already expired without Amon having perfected an appeal. Hence, Cagingin claimed that the Decision dated July 29, 2003 is now final and executory. 15
On October 20, 2003, Amon filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order 16 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MCTC to try and decide Cagingin's complaint for specific performance, sum of money and damages. He argued that the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. Amon claimed that the MCTC decision must be declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. 17 A hearing was conducted on the prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. 18
Amon's petition for certiorari was denied in the Order 19 dated June 20, 2013 stating that the decision promulgated by Judge Tesorero "had its natural way in its procedure and this Court finds no abuse on her part in drafting up to promulgation of its decision." 20 The prayer for the issuance of permanent injunction was denied. The preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved. 21
Amon moved for reconsideration.
The records of the petition for certiorari were transmitted to the MCTC of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite. 22
Cagingin thereafter filed a Reiterative Motion for Execution 23 before the MCTC reiterating his prayer for the execution of its final and executory decision. Amon filed his Comment 24 thereto. An Entry of Final Judgment 25 was issued on June 19, 2014 by the MCTC's Clerk of Court.
As requested by one Shirley Aristorenas, a Certificate of Finality (i.e., as to the Order dated June 20, 2013 of the RTC) was also issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the RTC of Tagaytay City on November 13, 2014. 26
Thereafter, Amon filed a Motion to Recall and Cancel the Certificate of Finality of the Order dated June 20, 2013. This motion allegedly stirred the curiosity and suspicion of RTC Judge Jaime B. Santiago (Judge Santiago) that there is something "fishy" going on. He went over the records of the petition and found the following pleadings: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 20, 2013 filed by Amon on October 22, 2013; (2) Comment/Opposition by Cagingin on November 5, 2013; and (3) Manifestation filed by Amon. Hence, the RTC set a clarificatory hearing and recalled the Certificate of Finality issued on November 13, 2014. The respective counsels of both parties appeared at the clarificatory hearings on March 17 and 19, 2015. 27
On March 23, 2015, the RTC issued the assailed Order 28 which recalled and set aside the RTC Order dated June 20, 2013 in accordance with Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; granted the petition for certiorari; and declared null and void the July 29, 2003 Decision of the MCTC of Silang-Amadeo. The RTC ruled that the case for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should have been filed with the RTC. The MCTC of Silang-Amadeo has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint. Since a decision without jurisdiction is null and void, it would never become final and executory. 29
On February 20, 2017, Cagingin filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment 30 under Rule 47 claiming that he was denied due process of law. He averred that Judge Santiago issued the Order in question on the basis of his "curiosity and suspicion that something fishy was going on" 31 and that the specific performance case was "littered with loopholes and suspected irregularities." 32 He further averred that it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court, in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. 33 Cagingin prayed that the Order of the RTC be nullified and that the MCTC Decision dated July 29, 2003 be reinstated and a writ of execution be issued to implement said Decision. 34
In the Resolution 35 dated April 20, 2017, the CA dismissed outright the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the petition is not based on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction which are the only grounds for annulment by the CA of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTCs. The CA held that Cagingin merely prayed in his petition that the subject Order be annulled because it does not conform with the form and substance required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution in rendering a decision. Also, Cagingin failed to state the reason why he was not able to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies and that his failure to avail of said remedies was not through his fault. 36
Cagingin moved for reconsideration 37 but it was denied in the Resolution 38 dated August 4, 2017.
Hence, Cagingin filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner's Arguments
Cagingin contends that the CA erred when it failed to rule that he was denied due process of law when the RTC issued the Order dated March 23, 2015 considering that it did not state pertinent facts that led Judge Santiago to conclude that the previous Order issued by Judge Young was null and void. Judge Santiago did not elaborate that something "fishy," or those so-called "loopholes" and "irregularities." 39 Further, he explained that his counsel is newly hired and had no recourse but to avail the extraordinary remedy of filing a petition for annulment of judgment, his former counsels having failed to avail of ordinary remedies. He implores substantial justice in stating that the negligence of his former counsel should not bind him. 40
Respondent's Arguments
Amon claims that Cagingin was not denied due process of law. The Order of Judge Santiago fully complies with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution since it contains findings of fact and the applicable law and jurisprudence. He avers that the courts are not required to follow a standard or rigid formula in order to comply with the constitutional mandate. 41
Issue
The pivotal issue for resolution is whether the CA properly denied Cagingin's petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
The CA denied Cagingin's petition for annulment of judgment not being based on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction which are the only grounds for annulment by the CA of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTCs.
While under Section 2, 42 Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, a petition for annulment of judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. 43 This is the ground being raised by Cagingin in his petition before the CA which the latter failed to specifically rule upon.
Cagingin argues that he was denied due process of law when the RTC issued the Order dated March 23, 2015 without stating pertinent facts that led Judge Santiago to conclude that the previous Order issued by Judge Young was null and void, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
A reading of the Order dated March 23, 2015 shows that the RTC expressed therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Contrary to Cagingin's contention, Judge Santiago stated in detail the circumstances why he became curious and suspect that there is something "fishy" going on and the so-called "loopholes" and "irregularities" attached to the case. The RTC made mention that Amon's petition for certiorari raising lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MCTC was resolved on June 20, 2013, or after seven years by Acting Presiding Judge Emma S. Young who, allegedly, had been relieved of her duties as acting presiding judge by the Supreme Court as of June 4, 2013. Also, the RTC noted that the record of the petition for certiorari was transmitted to the MCTC by the Branch Clerk of Court, knowing fully well that said petition is an original case filed with the RTC. Lastly, the RTC discovered the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 20, 2013 filed by Amon on October 22, 2013 and the Comment/Opposition thereto filed by Cagingin, which remained unresolved. Be it noted that both parties appeared during the clarificatory hearings set by the RTC on March 17 and 19, 2015. 44
In granting the petition for certiorari and declaring the Order dated July 29, 2003 of the MCTC as null and void, the RTC clearly stated therein the facts and the law on which it is based. The Court agrees with the RTC that a complaint for specific performance is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; hence, it should have been filed with the RTC pursuant to Section 19 (1) 45 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 46 Considering that the MCTC Silang-Amadeo had no jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 690 for Specific Performance, Sum of Money and Damages, the decision is null and void and would never become final and executory.
Further, the Court notes that from the Order of the RTC granting the petition for certiorari, Cagingin should have appealed the ruling to the CA. A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 47 Cagingin failed to provide sufficient justification why he failed to appeal the Order of the RTC. In this petition, he explains that his counsel is newly-hired and had no recourse but to avail the extraordinary remedy of filing a petition for annulment of judgment since his former counsels failed to avail of ordinary remedies. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence, and omission of their counsel. Relief cannot be granted on the flimsy excuse that the failure to appeal was due to the neglect of petitioner's counsel. 48 There is no reason, therefore, to depart from the oft-repeated rule that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
In sum, Cagingin was not denied due process of law. He was informed of how the case was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the RTC, in compliance with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lamberto Cagingin before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149637 is DENIED, there being no denial of due process of law.
SO ORDERED." Gaerlan, J., no part; Lazaro-Javier, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated February 3, 2021.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-32.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of this Court) with the concurrence of Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this Court); id. at 128-129.
3.Id. at 135-137.
4.Id. at 35-42.
5.Id. at 35-37.
6.Id. at 37-38.
7.Id. at 38-41.
8.Id. at 46-49.
9.Id. at 43-44.
10. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero; id. at 53-55.
11.Id. at 58.
12.Id. at 59-71.
13.Id. at 71.
14.Id. at 72.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 73-82.
17.Id. at 76-79.
18.Id. at 105.
19. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Emma S. Young; id. at 85.
20.Id.
21.Id.
22.Id. at 106.
23.Id. at 86.
24.Id. at 88-89.
25.Id. at 103-104.
26.Id. at 107.
27.Id. at 107-108.
28.Id. at 105-108.
29.Id. at 108.
30.Id. at 111-123.
31.Id. at 120.
32.Id.
33.Id. at 119.
34.Id. at 123.
35.Supra note 2.
36.Rollo, pp. 128-129.
37.Id. at 130-132.
38.Supra note 3.
39.Rollo, pp. 21-22, 28.
40.Id. at 29-31.
41.Id. at 152-153.
42. Section 2. Grounds for Annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
43.Diona v. Balangue, 701 Phil. 19, 30-31 (2013).
44.Rollo, pp. 105-108.
45. Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation[.]
46. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
47.Oribello v. Court of Appeals (Special Former Tenth Div.), 765 Phil. 576, 586 (2015 ), citing Dare Adventure Farm Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 695 Phil. 681, 688-689 (2012).
48.Insular Life Savings & Trust Co. v. Spouses Runes, 479 Phil. 995, 1008 (2004).