FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 10403. March 24, 2021.][Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4632]
LOMA B. AGUIMAN, complainant, vs.ATTY. CLAUDIE M. MENDOZA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 24, 2021which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 10403 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4632] (LomaB. Aguiman, Complainant, v. Atty. Claudie M. Mendoza, Respondent). — For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Claudie M. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) by Loma B. Aguiman (Aguiman), as President of Status Maritime Corporation (Status Maritime), for violating Canons 2, 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) docketed as CBD Case No. 14-4632. Aguiman alleged that Atty. Mendoza neglected his duties in handling the labor cases filed against Status Maritime. 1 On 22 February 2018, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Resolution recommending that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from practicing law for a period of one (1) month, and to admonish him to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients. 2
Antecedents
The allegations and defenses of the parties were summarized by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) as follows:
Complainant's [Aguiman] Affidavit-Complaint states that Complainant entered into an employment consultancy contract (referred to as a consultancy retainer agreement) with the Respondent [Atty. Mendoza] for legal and consultation services. The Complainant alleges that Respondent was negligent in his handling of certain labor cases wherein the Complainant Corporation was the respondent. The Complainant specified four particular labor cases wherein the Respondent was remiss in his duties to wit: (1) Patrick Quilos vs. Status Marine, (2) Caday vs. Status Marine, (3) Ocio vs. Status Marine and (4) Leonen v. Status Marine. With regard to the Quilos case, Complainant alleges that despite the fact that the case was settled amicably, the Respondent failed to terminate the case properly and secure clearance from the NLRC thus the Complainant was sanctioned with $40,000 fine that paralyzed operations and lead to huge financial losses for the Corporation. With regard to the Caday case, the case was lost by default and this lead to the Complainant Corporation's bank accounts to be frozen and garnished. The Ocio case was also lost by default because the Complainant alleges that no position paper was filed and no appeal was taken. The Leonen case was similarly lost for failure to file a position paper.
Respondent, in his comment, strongly denied all the allegations of wrongdoing imputed against him that would constitute violations of Canons 2, 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As per Respondent's comment, he was hired on 27 May 2013, he tendered his resignation on 10 September 2013 and his resignation took effect on 15 October 2013. Respondent alleged that upon the start of his engagement, he discovered the position he was tasked to handle and the consultancy services he was required to render were completely different from what was agreed upon in the retainer agreement. He further alleged that the Complainant Corporation could not provide him with the complete records of the labor cases he was assigned to and that the decision-making within the Status Maritime Corporation was not actually handled by the Filipino officers of the corporation but by Greek nationals who supervised even the minor management decisions within the company. Furthermore, with regard to the Quilos case, Respondent stressed that the case was instituted sometime in 2011 and that he never had the opportunity to handle the case. Respondent alleges that he was only informed about the case by the Complainant Corporation after his resignation from the corporation. Nevertheless [sic] Respondent claims that he still filed the necessary pleadings in order to rectify the situation and that the penalty on the Complainant Corporation was thus lifted. With regard to the Caday case, Respondent pointed out that the case was decided on 21 May 2013 or before he assumed his position as the company's legal counsel. With regard to the Ocio case, Respondent pointed out that the writ of execution shows that the pre-execution conference was held on 21 October 2013 which was after Respondent's resignation from the company and that this particular case was never endorsed to him and that he never saw any pleadings regarding this case. Finally, with regard to the Leonen labor case, Respondent alleges that he was able to enter into an agreement with the complainant Leonen in another case in the POEA to settle for a lower amount and to dismiss both cases with the NLRC and POEA filed against the corporation however the Greek bosses of the Complainant Corporation did not release the amount necessary for the settlement and thus Complainant Corporation lost the case in the NLRC. 3 CAIHTE
After the disciplinary proceedings, the IBP-CBD submitted its report and recommendation finding Atty. Mendoza liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the CPR. 4 While it observed that Aguiman failed to substantiate its claim that respondent negligently handled the Quilos case, the IBP-CBD found that Atty. Mendoza failed to diligently perform its obligations as regards the Caday, Ocio, and Leonen cases. 5
In particular, Atty. Mendoza failed to attend the pre-execution conferences in the Caday and Ocio cases while he was still engaged by Status Maritime and still had the duty to do so. 6 Nevertheless, the damages allegedly suffered by Status Maritime cannot be attributed to Atty. Mendoza because the company adduced no proof that the latter handled these cases before a final and executory decision was rendered. 7 As regards the Leonen case, the IBP-CBD found that Atty. Mendoza, during his tenure with Status Maritime, neglected to file a position paper for the company before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Despite Atty. Mendoza's infractions, the IBP-CBD, nevertheless, viewed them as insufficient to disbar the erring lawyer. 8 Thus, it was recommended that Atty. Mendoza be sanctioned by: (a) suspending him from the practice of law for the period of one (1) month, (b) admonishing him to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients; and (c) giving him a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 9 As mentioned, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. 10
Issue
The Court is confronted with the task of determining whether or not Atty. Mendoza is indeed guilty of violating the CPR.
Ruling of the Court
We agree in part with the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
Well-settled in disbarment proceedings that the complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations of his complaint through substantial evidence. In order to invoke the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers, the records of the case must disclose the dubious character of the act done, and the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. 11
Corollary to this is the established rule that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it for mere allegation is not evidence. In the present case, it is the complainant that has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. 12
We agree with the IBP-CBD's findings that complainant failed to substantiate its claim that Atty. Mendoza neglected the Quilos case. Indeed, it escapes Us how the order and notice issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) 13 in the case entitled, Patrick Quilos v. Status Maritime Corporation and Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., could prove how Atty. Mendozafailed to terminate properly the case before the NLRC involving thesame employee, and to secure clearance from the said tribunal.
However, We disagree with the IBP-CBD that Atty. Mendoza neglected the Caday case. Indeed, while it was Atty. Mendoza who actually volunteered the information about his failure to attend the pre-execution conference held on 01 October 2013, he nevertheless, disavowed knowledge of the status of the case. He also added that complainant failed to adduce proof that he was informed of the date of the conference. DETACa
If complainant did notify Atty. Mendoza about the status of the Caday case, it would not have been difficult for it to prove the same. Electronic mail correspondences, text messages, affidavit of individuals having personal knowledge, orders and notices of the NLRC addressed to Atty. Mendoza or a combination of these pieces of evidence would have been enough to belie Atty. Mendoza's disavowal. Instead, mere empty allegations bereft of any evidentiary weight were offered, along a writ of execution that only showed the name of the NLRC's sheriff. 14 Given complainant's failure to provide substantial evidence to its claim that Atty. Mendoza mishandled its case, the same must be denied.
The same observation applies to the Ocio case. The IBP-CBD's finding that Atty. Mendoza neglected the pre-execution conferences that happened on 30 September 2013 and 07 October 2013 is not supported by the records of the case. There is no evidence offered to prove that Atty. Mendoza failed to attend the conference on said dates or that he was notified that he should attend. These facts cannot be inferred from the writ of execution that merely mentioned said dates. In fact, the writ of execution only states that "the parties were called for pre-execution conferences held on 30 September 2013, 07 and 21 October 2013, but parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement of their dispute." 15
Nevertheless, We find Atty. Mendoza violated Rule 18.03 of the CPR when he failed to prepare and submit Status Maritime's position paper in the Leonen case. Once a lawyer decides to take up the cause of his client, he or she has the duty to serve such client with competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. 16 Atty. Mendoza's agreement to handle Status Maritime's cases, as shown by his decision to be the latter's legal counsel and consultant, is an assurance and representation that he would be diligent and competent in handling its cases. This includes the timely filing of the necessary pleadings required by tribunals such as the NLRC. Failing to do so violates Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which states:
Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
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Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In construing this Rule, We have consistently ruled that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to theclient is consideredper sea violation. 17 Further, in Solidon v.Macalalad, 18 We held that failure to file position paper is a clear of violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR. Thus:
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan, we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant's case and, subsequently, in failing to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We made the same conclusion inCanoy v. Ortizwhere we emphatically stated that the lawyer's failure to file the position paper wasper se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer's duty to his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The IBP-CBD found evidence that belies Atty. Mendoza's claim that Status Maritime already lost its right to file its position paper with the NLRC even before he joined the company. As noted by the IBP-CBD, the NLRC's decision 19 in the Leonen case categorically stated that Status Maritime was required to submit its position paper on 04 July 2013, or after Atty. Mendoza entered his appearance on 23 April 2013. 20 The deadline given to Status Maritime was also well-within Atty. Mendoza's tenure with the company. Further, Atty. Mendoza cannot feign ignorance of the status of this case. The NLRC's decision mentioned his name 21 and the transmittal of the decision was specifically addressed to him. 22 Also, in his Position Paper before the IBP-CBD, he admitted that he knew about the case even before he signed his consultancy agreement with Status Maritime. 23
As to the proper penalty to be meted upon Atty. Mendoza, the Court is guided by the well-entrenched principle that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer's failure to file the necessary pleading, or to attend a required hearing. 24 Nevertheless, the Court in Canoy v.Ortiz, 25 suspended the erring lawyer from practicing the profession for one (1) month for failing to prepare the position paper of his client. The Court also imposed one (1) month suspension upon the negligent lawyers in Spouses Regulto v. Teoxon26 and Fernandez v. Lupeba. 27 These cases also involved violations of Rule 18.03 of the CPR. Considering these cases as Our guide, We hereby adopt the IBP Board of Governor's recommendation to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Claudie M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) MONTH for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall give a cause for his disbarment. aDSIHc
This Resolution shall take effect immediately upon Atty. Claudie M. Mendoza's receipt of a copy of this Resolution. He shall inform this Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he received a copy of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to his personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this Resolution to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 227.
2.Id. at 226.
3.Id. at 267-269.
4.Id. at 271.
5.Id. at 271-273.
6.Id. at 275.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 271.
9.Id. at 277.
10.Supra at note 2.
11.Vega v. Jurado, A.C. No. 12247, 14 October 2020 [Per J. Inting].
12.Dimayuga v. Rubia, A.C. No. 8854, 03 July 2018 [Per J. Tijam].
13.Rollo, pp. 24-29.
14.Id. at 40-42.
15.Id. at 37.
16.Aguilar-Dyquiangco v. Arellano, 789 Phil. 600 (2016), A.C. No. 10541, 12 July 2016 [Per J. Caguioa].
17.Solidon v. Macalalad, 627 Phil. 284 (2010), A.C. No. 8158, 24 February 2010 [Per J. Brion].
18.Id.
19.Rollo, pp. 46-52.
20.Id. at 48.
21.Id.
22.Id. at 43.
23.Id. at 202.
24.Aboy, Sr. v. Diocos, A.C. No. 9176, 05 December 2019 [Per C.J. Peralta].
25. 493 Phil. 553 (2005), A.C. No. 5485, 16 March 2005 [Per J. Tinga].
26. A.C. No. 10301, 03 April 2019 [Notice].
27. A.C. No. 7674, 11 September 2019 [Notice].