SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 251402. September 16, 2020.]
BELEN AGUILAR-MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RENATO P. MENDOZA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 16 September 2020 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 251402 (Belen Aguilar-Mendoza v. Renato P. Mendoza). — The instant petition is denied for being filed out of time and for failure to state the material dates as required by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
As borne by the records, petitioner Belen Aguilar-Mendoza (Belen), through counsel, received the Resolution 1 dated January 10, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying her Motion for Reconsideration on January 27, 2020. Under the Rules, Belen had 15 days from receipt of the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration or until February 11, 2020 within which to file a petition for review. Belen requested for an additional period of 30 days or until March 12, 2020 to file the same, which the Court granted in a Resolution 2 dated February 24, 2020. Belen, through counsel, then filed her petition via a private courier LBC, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, it is established jurisprudence that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court; instead, the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. 3 Records show that the instant petition was received by the court on March 13, 2020 4 or one day beyond the granted period to file the same. Thus, the present petition is filed out of time. Further, the fact that the delay in the filing of the petition was only one day is not a legal justification for non-compliance with the rule requiring that it be filed within the reglementary period. 5
The petition likewise failed to state the material dates when Belen received the assailed CA Decision and when the motion for reconsideration thereto was filed in violation of Section 4 (b), 6 of the Rules which is a ground for the dismissal as provided under Section 57 of the same Rule.
Even if the Court, in the interest of justice, gives due course to the appeal despite its late filing and failure to state the material dates as required by the Rules, the same would still be denied for lack of merit. Belen failed to show that the CA committed any reversible error in affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and declaring the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-88781 (352897) PR 37348 as co-owned by Belen and respondent Renato Mendoza (Renato) in equal shares and ordering for its partition without prejudice to the vested rights of creditors.
It must be stressed that Belen and Renato's marriage is not bigamous because the said second marriage was null and void from the beginning due to the absence of marriage license at the time it was celebrated. There is, therefore, no valid second or subsequent marriage to speak of so as to constitute the same as bigamous. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Belen and Renato were not capacitated to marry each other because Renato was validly married to Angelina Capistrano at the time of his cohabitation with Belen. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 8 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, proof of actual contribution is required. 9
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 10
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, although the cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1981, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 11
The Court also affirms the CA in ruling that the subject lot is co-owned in equal shares by Belen and Renato. The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the CA and the RTC that both parties contributed to the acquisition of the subject lot and there is no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective contributions therein or that Belen contributed more than what Renato gave for the acquisition of the same. The determination of the exact contribution of the said parties to the acquisition of the subject property is clearly a question of fact which is beyond the Court's jurisdiction under the present petition for review on certiorari. Questions of fact, which would require a re-evaluation of the evidence, are inappropriate under the Rules. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 1 of the Rules is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of facts. While the Rule is not absolute, none of the recognized exceptions, which allow the Court to review factual issues, exists in the instant case. 12
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of Belen and Renato's respective contributions, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 13 In addition, since Renato is validly married to Angelina Capistrano, his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. Contrary to the position of Belen, Renato's share shall only be forfeited in favor of their common children if he (Renato) is not validly married to another, 14 which is not the case here.
Finally, the Court observes that after finding the existence of co-ownership in equal shares by Belen and Renato over the subject lot covered by TCT No. RT-88781 (352897) PR 37348, the RTC and the CA merely declared that partition is proper without making an actual partition thereof as required by the Rules.
After a judgment is rendered in an action for partition declaring that the property in question shall be divided among the parties thereto, the procedure provided by law thereafter is that, if the parties can agree among themselves, then the partition can be made by them through the proper instruments of conveyance which shall be submitted for approval of the court, and such partition with the court order confirming the same shall be recorded in the office of the proper registry of deeds. But, if the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall by order appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court in such order shall direct. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the Decision dated July 24, 2019 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 110992.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 is DIRECTED to order the parties to submit for its confirmation a mutually agreed project of partition of the lot covered by TCT No. RT-88781 (352897) PR 37348. If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the RTC shall by order appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners who shall expeditiously effect the partition of the aforesaid property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules.
Further, the share of respondent Renato Mendoza in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute or conjugal partnership in his marriage with Angelina Capistrano.
The rest of the assailed Decision stands.
SO ORDERED." (Baltazar-Padilla, J., no part; Lopez, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated September 7, 2020.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a Member of the Court), with Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, concurring; rollo, pp. 14-15.
2.Id. at 18-19.
3.Heirs of Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, 713 Phil. 541, 550 (2013).
4.Rollo, p. 21.
5.Tolentino-Prieto v. Elvas, 799 Phil. 97, 109 (2016).
6. Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. (2a)
7. Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
8. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under [Article 147], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
9. See Atienza v. De Castro, 538 Phil. 440, 446-447 (2006).
10.Id., citing Article 148 of the Family Code and Adriano v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 474, 484-485 (2000).
11.Id., citing Saguid v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 825, 836 (2003) and Tumlos v. Fernandez, 386 Phil. 936, 951 (2000).
12. See Gatan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257, 265-266 (2017).
13.Supra note 10.
14. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under [Article 147], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
15.De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, 301 Phil. 783, 792-793 (1994).