THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233371. June 21, 2021.]
MIRANIE ACOSTA, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 21, 2021, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 233371 (Miranie Acosta v. People of the Philippines). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated November 3, 2016 and the Resolution 2 dated August 2, 2017 of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36001, both affirming the Decision dated August 27, 2013 of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City (RTC), in Crim. Case No. 14731-16, finding Miranie Acosta (Miranie) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Miranie was charged with the crime of estafa, in an Information filed before the RTC of Laoag City, as follows:
That on or about January 4, 2010, in the Municipality of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from FREDESMINDA MAMUAD pieces of jewelries (sic) worth Php470,000.00, with the obligation to deliver the proceeds or return the said items if unable to sell, but accused far from complying with her obligation, with intent to gain and to defraud the herein complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the same, to the damage and prejudice of said FREDESMINDA MAMUAD, in the aforementioned amount of Php470,000.00, Philippine Currency. 3
Version of the Prosecution
In establishing the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Fredesminda Mamuad (Fredesminda), the private complainant; and Angelita Acosta (Angelita). The prosecution's documentary evidence consisted of a Receipt, Demand Letter, and a Return Card pertinent to the mailing of the Demand Letter. 4
Initially, Miranie, accompanied by Angelita, went to Fredesminda's house to borrow money, but the latter had none to lend. Seeing pieces of jewelry around Fredesminda's house, Miranie offered instead to sell these pieces of jewelry, with an additional price margin for her commission. Thus, Fredesminda issued Miranie the Receipt, itemizing the jewelries handed over, namely: one set of juego ribbon design with diamond, valued at P220,000.00; and one set of juego pearl, valued at P250,000.00, totalling P470,000.00. Miranie signed the Receipt, undertaking that, within one (1) month from receipt of the jewelries, she would either turnover the proceeds if sold, or the jewelries if unsold. Angelita was privy to the foregoing talks, even signing as witness to the Receipt. No news was heard from Miranie after one (1) month, so Fredesminda sent the Demand Letter to Miranie's address, as evidenced by the Return Card. DHITCc
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the sole testimony of Miranie. 5 She testified that, in order to expand her carinderia business and general merchandising store, a certain Gloria Tomas encouraged her to obtain a loan from Fredesminda. Miranie then borrowed P450,000.00, for which Miranie prepared a document evidencing the same. There was, however, only one (1) copy of such document, which Miranie had lost. When shown the Receipt issued by Fredesminda, Miranie claimed no knowledge of such document, but that she had signed four (4) blank template receipts as security for the loan. In the course of her testimony, Miranie also presented her 2010 calendar, indicating the dates she had allegedly made installment payments to Fredesminda, and a separate summary of such payments.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered a Decision 6 dated August 27, 2013, convicting Miranie of estafa, and ordering her to pay Fredesminda actual and moral damages, as well as costs, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced that the accused MIRANIE ACOSTA is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
She is hereby sentenced to the penalty of, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify the private complainant FREDESMINDA MAMUAD Four Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (Php470,000.00) as actual damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages and the costs.
Regarding the true nature of the transaction, the RTC resolved Miranie's and Fredesminda's conflicting versions by looking into the terms of the Receipt, and concluding that it evinced a sale of jewelry on commission basis. Despite Miranie's claims that she had, in fact, made payments on their transaction, the RTC faulted her for failing to present the corresponding receipts therefor. Thus, her failure to account for the proceeds, or return the jewelry, constituted circumstantial evidence that she had misappropriated such valuables.
Miranie appealed the RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in her Appellant's Brief dated May 28, 2014 that the RTC had overlooked some inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence, and that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of estafa with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Appellee's Brief dated September 25, 2014, countered that the prosecution had established Miranie's guilt for estafa with proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that Miranie had not presented any iota of evidence to substantiate her defense.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision 7 dated November 3, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification Miranie's conviction, deleting the award of moral damages, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, Branch 16 dated August 27, 2013 in Criminal Case No. 14731-16 which found accused-appellant Miranie Acosta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is deleted. Accused-appellant Miranie Acosta is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify Fredesminda Mamuad Four Hundred Thousand [sic] Seventy Thousand Pesos (P470,000.00) as actual damages.
The Court of Appeals ruled that, through the Receipt, along with Fredesminda's and Angelita's unrebutted testimonies, the prosecution established that Miranie had received the jewelries on commission basis. In response to Miranie's denial of the receipt of the Demand Letter, the Court of Appeals cited Ceniza-Manantan v. People, 8 which instructs that demand is unnecessary for a conviction of estafa when a period was agreed upon for the turnover of proceeds or return of goods, and the accused failed to comply within such period. Despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to reconsider its Decision dated November 3, 2016, and denied such motion.
Hence, Miranie filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari9 dated September 13, 2017, arguing that the Court of Appeals gave undeserved weight to the prosecution's evidence, and scant consideration to the defense's, considering that Angelita was not a credible witness. In its Comment 10 dated March 20, 2018, the OSG argued that the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated September 13, 2017 merited dismissal as the prosecution had established Miranie's guilt with proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue
The Petition for Review on Certiorari raises the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding Miranie's conviction of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC. cEaSHC
The Court's Ruling
This Court shall not disturb the Court of Appeals' Decision dated November 3, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 2, 2017. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution established Miranie's guilt for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, with proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The facts of this case resemble several others 11 where this Court convicted an accused of estafa for failure to return consigned jewelry (or to be sold "on commission basis"), or to return the proceeds from the sale thereof.
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are: (1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received. 12
By virtue of a Receipt, along with private complainant Fredesminda's and appellant's acquaintance Angelita's testimonies, the prosecution established that Miranie had received for sale on commission one set of juego ribbon design with diamond, valued at P220,000.00, and one set of juego pearl, valued at P250,000.00, totalling P470,000.00, with the undertaking to return the jewelries if unsold, or remit the proceeds if sold, in one (1) month. Miranie had failed to return the pieces of jewelry or remit any proceeds for the sale thereof, thereby inflicting prejudice upon Fredesminda corresponding to the total value of the pieces of jewelry at P470,000.00. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, demand is unnecessary where a period was agreed upon within which the consignee should return the goods or remit the proceeds. 13 As Miranie was given one (1) month from receipt of the jewelry to return the same if unsold, or remit the proceeds if sold, and she had not done so, then the fourth element of estafa obtains.
Miranie over-emphasizes supposed discrepancies in Fredesminda's and Angelita's testimonies, particularly on details concerning who prepared the Receipt, its formatting, and interactions among the parties prior to the preparation of the Receipt. 14 Yet, this Court has unwaveringly ruled that "[i]nconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor and collateral matters and not touching upon the basic elements of the crime, do not impair the credibility of a witness." 15
Finally, on top of the value of the misappropriated jewelry, Miranie is ordered to pay legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this ruling until fully paid. 16
With respect to the penalty to be imposed upon Miranie, Republic Act No. 10195 (R.A. 10195), which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code outlines the penalty imposable for the crime of estafa as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000); but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000).
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000): Provided, That in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
xxx xxx xxx
As the amount involved in this case is P470,000.00, the penalty to be imposed upon Miranie shall be taken from the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period. In view of the circumstances surrounding the case, this Court finds it apt to impose the penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prisión correccional as maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which this Court sets at four (4) months of arresto mayor.
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated September 13, 2017 is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated November 3, 2016 and Resolution dated August 2, 2017 of the Court of Appeals Third Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 36001 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Miranie Acosta is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prisión correccional as maximum, and is ordered to pay Fredesminda Mamuad the amount of Four Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P470,000.00) as actual damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum imposed on the actual damages from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. CTIEac
SO ORDERED.(Leonen, J., Chairperson, on wellness leave; Hernando, J., Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2828 dated June 21, 2021).
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Mario V. Lopez, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-45.
2.Id. at 47-48.
3.Id. at 67.
4.Id. at 69-70.
5.Id. at 74-83.
6.Id. at 67-91.
7.Id. at 31-45.
8. 558 Phil. 104, 118 (2007).
9.Rollo, pp. 11-29.
10.Id. at 346-365.
11.See Arrivas v. Bacotoc, G.R. No. 228704, December 2, 2020; Rivac v. People, 824 Phil. 156 (2018); Tria v. People, 743 Phil. 441 (2014); Degaños v. People, 719 Phil. 487 (2013); Brokmann v. People, 681 Phil. 84 (2012); U.S. v. Sotelo, G.R. No. 9791, October 3, 1914.
12.Arrivas v. Bacotoc, G.R. No. 228704, December 2, 2020.
13.Ceniza-Manantan v. People, supra note 8.
14.Rollo, pp. 20-24.
15.People v. Drew, 422 Phil. 614, 622-623 (2001).
16.Rivac v. People, supra note 11, at 172.