THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209500. October 13, 2021.]
J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 209500 (J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA, petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.) — If there is no finding that an inferior court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot be availed.
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions 1 denying J.R. Nereus O. Acosta's (Representative Acosta) Urgent Motion to Quash. 2
In a separate case (the Anti-Graft and Corruption case), the Bukidnon Crusade Against Graft and Corruption members filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 6713 against Representative Acosta, who was then Bukidnon's First Legislative District Representative, and Mayor Soccoro Acosta (Mayor Acosta). The complaint questioned the supposed anomalous and illegal release of funds from Representative Acosta's Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) through the Municipality of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, to private entities such as the Bukidnon Integrated Network of Home Industries and the Bukidnon Vegatable Producers Cooperative (Cooperative). 3
Acting on the complaint, the Mindanao Office of the Ombudsman ordered the Commission on Audit to conduct a financial audit of the PDAF's release. 4 A Special Audit Team was then created to conduct an audit on the release, disbursement, and utilization of Representative Acosta's PDAF. 5
State Auditors Carlito C. Matias (Matias) and Dante P. Quiblat (Quiblat) issued an audit report stating that no concurrence was made by the Manolo Fortich Sangguniang Bayan as to the release of P5.5 million to the Cooperative. 6
The Office of the Ombudsman Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau then directed Representative Acosta and Mayor Acosta to file their respective Counter-Affidavits in the Anti-Graft and Corruption case, which they did. 7
On November 9, 2006, Fr. Venancio Balansag, Jr. (Fr. Balansag) filed a separate complaint for Perjury (the Perjury case) before the Office of the Ombudsman. In his Affidavit of Complaint, Fr. Balansag alleged that Representative Acosta stated in his counter-affidavit that the P5.5 million funding support from his PDAF was concurred in by the Manolo Fortich Sangguniang Bayan on July 2, 2002. 8 Mayor Acosta, on the other hand, was alleged to have adopted "by incorporation and reference" the contents of Representative Acosta's counter-affidavit in her own counter-affidavit. 9
Representative Acosta and Mayor Acosta then filed their Counter-Affidavit in the Perjury case. 10
Finding probable cause to indict the two for Perjury, Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer I Richard E. Buban recommended the filing of the Information against them. 11
Thereafter, Fr. Balansag executed an Affidavit of Desistance in the Perjury case. 12
However, when the Perjury case reached Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales, she stated that "[t]he evidence consists of documents which can establish, independent of the testimony of the complainant, respondent's guilt." 13
Thus, two Informations 14 for Perjury were filed against Representative Acosta and Mayor Acosta, alleging that no resolution was issued by the Manolo Fortich Sangguniang Bayan giving its concurrence to the release of the funding support to the Cooperative. 15 These Informations read:
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0239
That on or about 04 September 2006, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused J.R. Nereus Olaivar Acosta, a high ranking public officer (Salary Grade 31), being a Representative, First Legislative District, Bukidnon, while in the performance of his official functions and committing the offense in relation to duty, having been earlier charged with violation of Republic Act [Nos.] 3019 and 6713 before the Office of the Ombudsman, relative to the alleged illegal channeling of the sum of Php5.5 million from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to the Bukidnon Vegetable Producers' Cooperative (BVPC), his family controlled private entity, and being required to answer the charges, did then and there deliberately, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously executed his Counter-Affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, an officer authorized to administer oaths, materially stating, affirming and swearing that such channeling of his Php5.5 million PDAF to BVPC was concurred with by the Sangguniang Bayan of Manolo Fortich, which was false, as the accused fully well knew that no such concurrence was given by the said Sangguniang Rayan of Manolo Fortich.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0240
That on or about September 5, 2006, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Socorro Olaivar Acosta, a high ranking public officer (Salary Grade 27). being a Mayor of the Municipality of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, while in the performance of her official functions and committing the offense in relation to duty, having been earlier charged with violation of Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 6713 before the Office of the Ombudsman, relative to the alleged illegal channeling of the sum of Php5.5 million from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of her Representative son J.R. Nereus Olaivar Acosta to the Bukidnon Vegetable Producers' Cooperative (BVPC), her family controlled private entity, and being required to answer the charges, did then and there deliberately, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously executed her Counter-Affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, an officer authorized to administer oaths, materially stating, affirming and swearing that such channeling of his Php5.5 million PDAF to BVPC was concurred with by the Sangguniang Bayan of Manolo Fortich, which was false, as the accused fully well knew that no such concurrence was given by the said Sangguniang Bayan of Manolo Fortich.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 16
Representative Acosta and Mayor Acosta filed a Motion 17 asking the Sandiganbayan for a judicial determination of probable cause. 18 They pointed out that despite Fr. Balansag's Affidavit of Desistance citing his misappreciation of facts, the Ombudsman still adopted the allegations in the complaint. They also argued that the evidence presented were insufficient to show the elements of the crime of Perjury. 19
The prosecution, on the other hand, maintained that the Ombudsman has full discretion to file the Informations before the Sandiganbayan. 20 It pointed out that the Ombudsman concluded the existence of probable cause, relying on documents and affidavits apart from Fr. Balansag's Information. 21 These documents include affidavits executed by material witnesses, such as State Auditors Matias and Quiblat, and Vice Mayor Hilario B. Pausanos's Certification as to the non-existence of a Sangguniang Bayan resolution concurring to the release of the P5.5 million PDAF to the Cooperative. 22 Finally, the prosecution argued that the alleged Affidavit of Desistance was not yet properly identified, and remained as hearsay evidence. 23
In its Resolution, 24 the Sandiganbayan denied Representative Acosta and Mayor Acosta's Motion, finding the existence of probable cause against them. 25 It found that the investigating prosecutor was able to submit documents, specifically attachments to the Affidavit of Complaint, which enabled the determination of probable cause in the case. 26 It also ruled that the investigating prosecutor followed the proper procedure in determining the existence of probable cause, and that without any evidence to the contrary, the Ombudsman's findings cannot be reversed. 27 A Warrant of Arrest 28 was then issued by the Sandiganbayan.
Only Representative Acosta moved for reconsideration. He alleged that the finding of probable cause against him was not an independent assessment by the Sandiganbayan. 29
The Sandiganbayan then issued a Resolution 30 denying Representative Acosta's Motion for Reconsideration. It ruled that its finding of probable cause was based on the witnesses' affidavits and the state auditors' findings, in addition to the Office of the Ombudsman's resolution. 31 It reiterated its issuance of the warrant of arrest. 32
Representative Acosta filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the warrant of arrest issued by Sandiganbayan. 33 He argued that there was no probable cause, and asserted that the determination as to the existence of the Sangguniang Bayan's concurrence to the PDAF's disbursement was still premature. 34 He also argued that the elements of perjury were not present, 35 emphasizing that the Sangguniang Bayan's concurrence was not a material matter to the main case regarding the violation of Republic Act 3019, 36 and that there was no "willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood" 37 in his Counter-Affidavit as it did not specifically pertain to a written resolution issued by the Sangguniang Bayan. 38
Representative Acosta agreed to a provisional arraignment as a prerequisite for his authority to travel, 39 due to a hold departure order issued against him. 40 He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 41 Mayor Acosta was also arraigned, where she likewise pleaded not guilty. 42
On July 23, 2013, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 43 denying Representative Acosta's Urgent Motion to Quash, declaring the relief being sought as moot given that the Sandiganbayan had already recalled the warrant of arrest after Representative Acosta posted his cash bail bond on April 17, 2013. 44 The Sandiganbayan also pointed out that Representative Acosta merely rehashed his arguments in his Motion for Determination for Probable Cause, which it had already denied. 45
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan's Resolution, arguing that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for "unreasonably depriving [him] of [his] liberty without due process of law." 46 He contends that his Urgent Motion to Quash was not rendered moot by his posting of bail. 47 He also claims that his conduct does not, in any way, show that he is no longer questioning the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him, arguing that he filed his cash bail bond so he may continue fulfilling his obligations with the Laguna Lake Development Authority. 48 Moreover, he points out that he was compelled to enter a plea of not guilty as a requisite for the issuance of a permit to travel in his favor, considering the Hold Departure Order issued against him. 49
Furthermore, petitioner contends that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against him. 50 He asserts that "the determination of the issue of whether there was indeed concurrence, of any kind, by the Sangguniang Bayan with the disbursement to the [Cooperative] is premature at this time[,]" 51 and that the elements of the crime of perjury are not present in this case. 52
He maintains that he did not make any false statements in his Counter-Affidavit, as he was not referring to an "actual or explicit resolution issued by the Sangguniang Bayan," 53 and that the Sangguniang Bayan in fact acquiesced to the PDAF's transfer through its "actions or inactions." 54 Finally, petitioner reiterates that even assuming he committed a falsehood, it was neither deliberate nor willful. 55 He prays for the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution, and a finding of lack of probable cause for Perjury against him. 56 He also prays for the dismissal of the Perjury case. 57
For its part, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues in its Comment that the petition is procedurally flawed. It claims that petitioner failed to demonstrate all the facts essential to establish his right to the writ of certiorari. 58 Further, it points out that petitioner's allegations do not show that the Sandiganbayan was "capricious, vexatious, or even whimsical," so much so that it lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. 59 Respondent also emphasizes that the petition has been rendered moot with the recall of the warrant of arrest. 60 Finally, it maintains that there was an existence of probable cause in charging petitioner with perjury. 61
In his Reply, petitioner submits that he "cannot and should not be faulted for exercising his rights and availing of all the legal remedies available." 62 He reiterates that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Urgent Motion to Quash, because probable cause was not established. 63
The issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Urgent Motion to Quash the warrant of arrest issued against him.
The Petition must be dismissed.
This Petition for Certiorari assails an interlocutory order rendered by the lower court. The Sandiganbayan July 23, 2013 Resolution, which denied the Urgent Motion to Quash, was an interlocutory — not a final — order, and should not be the subject of appeal.
An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters before trial on the merits is held and judgment is rendered. In contrast, a final order either disposes of the subject matter entirely or terminates a proceeding in that the only action left is to enforce by execution the decision of the court. 64 The test to ascertain whether an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is if "the order or judgment leave[s] something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case[,]" then "the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final." 65
This Court has previously discussed the rationale behind disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order:
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. 66
The remedy against an interlocutory order is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, with a showing that the order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. 67
As correctly noted by respondent, a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to question the issuance of a warrant of arrest based on a court's determination of probable cause. 68
The determination of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor and the trial court are separate and independent. Each require different standards of determination from different persons for different purposes. In Ho v. People, 69 this Court differentiated judicial determination of probable cause from executive determination of probable cause:
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the Prosecutor. 70
Thus, it is clear that the goal of a prosecution's determination of probable cause is to determine whether or not to indict the accused. If indictment is warranted, an information is then filed in court. 71 This function is executive in nature and as such, cannot be interfered in with the courts absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. 72
Once the information is filed in court, the judge must make their separate determination of probable cause, a function that is judicial in nature. 73 The goal of this function is to determine the propriety of issuing a warrant of arrest, so that the person may stand trial. 74 Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest has been defined as "the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." 75
Moreover, Crespo v. Mogul76 states that "once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court." 77
In determining probable cause after an information has been filed in Court, a judge exercises their judicial discretion. During this stage, the Rules of Court give the judge three options after their personal evaluation of the complainant and the witnesses. First, the judge may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. Second, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if they find probable cause, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested. Third, in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. 78
The Rules also lay down the requirements for a judge to properly exercise their judicial discretion. The judge must examine the documents supporting the complaint, including the parties' and witnesses' affidavits and counter affidavits, along with other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. 79
In petitioner's Urgent Motion to Quash, he assails the Sandiganbayan's issuance of a warrant of arrest after its determination of probable cause via a Rule 65 petition. A Rule 65 petition is limited to the determination of whether the inferior court, tribunal, hoard, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without, in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 80
This Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Urgent Motion to Quash.
First, the Sandiganbayan found that the Office of the Ombudsman was able to observe the proper procedure in determining the existence of probable cause. 81 It found that the attachments included in the Affidavit of Complaint allowed the determination of the existence of probable cause and no evidence existed showing the contrary. 82
Second, the Sandiganbayan did not merely consider the Office of the Ombudsman's resolution in finding probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against petitioner. It also considered the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor, which include Fr. Balansag's Affidavit of Complaint together with its attachments and annexes, 83 and the audit report submitted by State Auditors Matias and Quiblat. 84
Ho v. People85 is instructive on this matter. It clarifies that "it is not required that the complete and entire record of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge." 86 It is enough that the judge has sufficient supporting documents such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, which he or she may use as basis to independently determine the existence of probable cause. 87
Third, the Sandiganbayan found that the existence of the first, second, and fourth elements of the crime of perjury was undisputed based on the records of the case. 88 The records showed that both petitioner and Mayor Acosta executed their respective Counter-Affidavits in response to the Graft case, and that the Counter-Affidavits were subscribed and sworn before a notary public and were made for a legal purpose. 89 According to the Sandiganbayan, only the third element as to the statement of falsehood contained within the counter-affidavit needed a more elaborate discussion. 90 To find clarity on the matter, it looked into the findings of the state auditors regarding the non-existence of a resolution by the Sangguniang Bayan and contrasted them with the statements made by Representative Acosta in his Counter-Affidavit. 91
Thus, absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, this Court is constrained to dismiss the petition. The other issues that petitioner presents are best threshed out during trial, where there is ample opportunity to test the veracity of his factual claims through direct and cross examinations.
In any case, this petition has been rendered moot with the Sandiganbayan recalling the warrant of arrest after petitioner posted bail. Furthermore, in its January 22, 2016 Decision, 92 the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner and Mayor Acosta. It ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases for Perjury filed against them, citing insufficiency of evidence. 93
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., on official leave; Dimaampao, J., additional Member per Special Order No. 2839 dated September 16, 2021)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 53-58. The July 23, 2013 Resolution in SB-12-CRM-0239 was penned by Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and concurred in by Associate Justices Alexander G. Gesmundo (now Chief Justice of this Court) and Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang of the Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City. The September 5, 2013 Resolution was issued by the same Division.
2. Id. at 170-185. The January 18, 2013 Resolution in SB-12-CRM-0239-0240 was penned by Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and concurred in by Associate Justices Alexander G. Gesmundo (now Chief Justice of this Court) and Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang of the Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City.
3. Id. at 170-171.
4. Id. at 171.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 171-172.
7. Id. at 173.
8. Id. at 315-316.
9. Id. at 316.
10. Id. at 175.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 316-317.
15. Id. at 315.
16. Id. at 316-317.
17. Id. at 151-169.
18. Id. at 170.
19. Id. at 176.
20. Id. at 177.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 170-185.
25. Id. at 185.
26. Id. at 182.
27. Id. at 185.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id. at 188-191.
31. Id. at 190-191.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Id. at 192-222.
34. Id. at 205.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 210.
37. Id. at 217.
38. Id. at 214-215.
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id. at 187.
41. Id. at 317.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 53-58.
44. Id. at 54.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 22.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 29.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id. at 43.
55. Id. at 45.
56. Id. at 48.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 261.
59. Id. at 260.
60. Id. at 261.
61. Id. at 265.
62. Id. at 298.
63. Id.
64. Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 671 Phil. 320, 338 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1: An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx xxx xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
68. Rollo, p. 264.
69. Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], citing People v. Inting, 265 Phil. 817, 821 (1990) [J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
70. Id.
71. Napoles v. De Lima, 790 Phil. 161, 174-175 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Okabe v. Gutierrez, 473 Phil. 758, 780 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
75. Id. citing Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
76. Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
77. Id.
78. RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 6 (a).
79. RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 8 (a).
80. RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 1.
81. Rollo, p. 185.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 182.
84. Id. at 183.
85. Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597, 612 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Rollo, p. 183.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 315-339.
93. Id. at 338.