SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 203259. January 7, 2013.]
ENRIQUE ZALAMEDA y VILLARUEL @ KZ KILLA, KZ GUMALA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 07 January 2013which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 203259 — Enrique Zalameda y Villaruel @ KZ Killa, KZ Gumala v. People of the Philippines.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision finding Enrique Zalameda y Villaruel @ "KZ Killa" or "KZ Gumala" (Enrique) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence can support a conviction if: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." In this case, the CA found that the chain of circumstances led to the logical conclusion that it was Enrique who killed Charity. First, "the person who killed Charity was someone familiar [to her] because there were no signs of forcible entry in the condominium." Second, "Charity was last seen alive with" Enrique. Third, "Charity's cellular phone, ATM card and other personal belongings that were missing from the condominium when her dead body was discovered, were recovered from" Enrique's house. Fourth, Enrique "did not show up after Charity was found dead. He went into hiding and was arrested only months after Charity's death." "In addition, when Charity was still alive, she expressed concern about her safety because of appellant's [Enrique's] violent behavior. She would tell her friends and relatives about . . . how appellant [Enrique] would physically hurt her and threaten to harm her and her family." The CA thus correctly held that the confluence of the circumstantial bits of evidence inexorably led to the conclusion that Enrique is the perpetrator of Charity's death.
The Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that the person found guilty of homicide shall be punished by reclusion temporal. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the penalty one degree lower is prision mayor. Considering the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in the medium period — 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Thus, in this case, the MINIMUM term of the indeterminate sentence should be modified from 8 years to 8 years and 1 day. TIHDAa
On the other hand, the MAXIMUM term of the indeterminate sentence should be reclusion temporal as provided for under the RPC. The medium period of reclusion temporal is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Hence, the courts below properly imposed 16 years of reclusion temporal as the MAXIMUM term of the penalty.
The CA correctly modified the award of civil indemnity of P50,000, temperate damages of P25,000 and moral damages of P50,000 in accord with Rimano v. People. 1 In addition, in People v. Malinao, 2 this Court held that the heirs of the victim are "entitled to damages for the loss of the latter's earning capacity. In fixing the indemnity, account is taken of the victim's actual income at the time of his death and his probable life expectancy." Thus, considering that at the time of her death, Charity, 21 years old, was earning P10,500/month (P126,000/year), the CA correctly computed her lost earnings as 2/3 x [80-21 years] x 1/2 of P126,000 = P2,477,490.00.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 3 damages awarded shall earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA Decision of June 6, 2012 and the Resolution of August 24, 2012 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of imprisonment should be 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 16 years of reclusion temporal and that interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on the damages awarded from date of finality of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.462 Phil. 272 (2003).
2.467 Phil. 432 (2004).
3.People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012.