Yuseco, Jr. v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 217899. September 28, 2016.]

FRANCIS YUSECO, JR., ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. (PDIC) as Statutory Liquidator of the Unitrust Development Bank (UDB), respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 28 September 2016 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 217899 (FRANCIS YUSECO, JR., ET AL., petitioners v. THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. (PDIC) as Statutory Liquidator of the Unitrust Development Bank (UDB), respondent.) — We resolve the Motion to Reopen the Case and Refer the Matter to the Court en banc of 2 November 2015 (with an unsigned Motion for Reconsideration attached) 1 filed by petitioner Francisco Yuseco, Jr.(Yuseco). The pleading is dated 28 October 2015.

For a fuller appreciation of this motion in light of the allegations raised in the letter of Yuseco, we summarize the developments significant to the present motion.

BACKGROUND

The present motion traces its roots to the petition for review on certiorari challenging the 28 November 2014 decision and 6 April 2015 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128241. 2 The CA granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), and nullified the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) 19 June 2012 and 17 December 2012 resolutions in SPL. PRO. M-6069. 3 The nullified RTC resolutions prohibited the PDIC from liquidating the assets of the Unitrust Development Bank (UDB).

The UDB is a domestic banking corporation operating since 8 July 1980 as a thrift bank. On 21 September 2001, Yuseco, Leopoldo Valcarcel, Pedro Montañez, and two Japanese firms — Minamoto Saiken Kaishu Co., Ltd. and petitioner G. Universal Co., Ltd. — acquired ownership of the UDB.

On 4 January 2002, the UDB declared a bank holiday. Consequently, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 19 on the same date prohibiting the UDB from doing business and placing it under the receivership of the PDIC. Meanwhile, petitioner Tooru Nagasawa (Nagasawa) was appointed trustee of the two Japanese firms which had been declared bankrupt in Japan.

On 31 July 2002, the owners of the UDB (the Yuseco Group) filed a class suit against the PDIC for injunction with damages before the RTC of Makati. The PDIC denied the allegations while the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) moved to dismiss the suit.

On 5 November 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The PDIC moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion. Thus, the PDIC challenged the granted writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76801.

On 19 January 2004, the CA granted the PDIC's petition and annulled the RTC orders. 4 The CA likewise directed the RTC to resolve the BSP's motion to dismiss without further delay. Yuseco moved for reconsideration but the CA denied his motion on 19 March 2004.

The PDIC then filed with the CA a Motion for Leave of Court to Dispose of the UDB's Depreciating/Deteriorating Assets. The CA instead directed the PDIC to file the proper motion with the trial court for appropriate action.

On 20 January 2005, the MB issued Resolution No. 64 directing the PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of the UDB pursuant to Sec. 30 of the New Central Bank Act.

On 25 April 2005, the PDIC filed a petition for the liquidation of the UDB before the RTC of Makati. The petition was raffled to Branch 59 and docketed as SP Pro. No. M-6069 under Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

The RTC gave due course to the petition and constituted itself as a liquidation court. Yuseco opposed the petition and moved to dismiss the liquidation proceedings on 10 November 2005. CAIHTE

The PDIC moved for approval of the Partial Distribution Plan of the UDB's distributable assets (with estimated realizable value of P299,437,957.78; P146,250,408 is in cash) on 5 February 2007. The RTC approved the motion on 19 March 2007.

The Yuseco Group moved for reconsideration of the approval which the RTC denied on 20 July 2011. Due to the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the PDIC only paid P29,715,010 (as of 31 March 2012) to the trust claimants, depositors, and creditors.

On 22 August 2008, the Yuseco Group moved to revert the UDB to receivership. The RTC denied this motion on 3 May 2011.

On 14 September 2009, Yuseco filed a supplemental pleading to his 10 November 2005 Motion to Dismiss the Liquidation Proceedings.

On 16 May 2011, the RTC denied Yuseco's motion to dismiss, reasoning: (1) that the issue on the propriety of the UDB's liquidation already attained finality after the Yuseco Group's failure to appeal the CA's lifting of the preliminary injunction; (2) that according to Sec. 30 of the New Central Bank Act, the MB's actions regarding the liquidation of banks (i.e., MB Resolution No. 64) are final and executory and may only be set aside through a petition for certiorari within 10 days from receipt; (3) that as a liquidation court, the RTC's task is to implement and assist in the liquidation of the UDB; and (4) that the RTC, as a liquidation court, does not have jurisdiction to dismiss the petition based on alleged fraud/misrepresentation/violation of the law.

The Yuseco Group moved for reconsideration which the RTC granted on 25 August 2011. The RTC ordered the PDIC to cease and desist from liquidating the UDB.

It was PDIC's turn to move for reconsideration, this time of the 25 August 2011 order which the RTC also granted; it set aside its 25 August 2011 order on 5 December 2011.

The Yuseco Group did not accept the ruling and moved for reconsideration of the 5 December 2011 order; the RTC again reconsidered its order after finding that the UDB was not insolvent. The RTC noted that the PDIC's counsel admitted (supported by the June 2002 Bank Statement of Affairs) that the UDB's combined capital assets are more than sufficient to answer for its liabilities. It thus concluded that the UDB should not be liquidated.

When the PDIC challenged this latest RTC order, the RTC stood by its ruling and denied the motion. The PDIC thus elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because: (1) it essentially set aside the MB Resolution No. 64 beyond the 10-day reglementary period; (2) the MB's resolution placing the UDB under liquidation can only be reviewed by the CA in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) the RTC committed grave errors in its orders hinting at gross ignorance of basic banking laws. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 128241.

On 8 November 2014, the CA annulled the dismissal of the liquidation proceedings and directed the RTC to proceed with the UDB's liquidation. The CA held: (1) that the actions of a liquidation court are limited to the adjudication of claims; (2) that pursuant to the Central Bank Act, determining the propriety of a liquidation proceeding falls within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the MB; and (3) that the remedy against the MB's decision is a petition for certiorari against the MB filed within the 10-day reglementary period.

The Yuseco Group moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the Justices. The CA denied the motion on 6 April 2015 for lack of merit. Our examination of the Court of Appeals records shows that Yuseco, through counsel (Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr.), received his copy of the denial of the motion on 28 April 2015. DETACa

THE PRESENT PETITION

On 15 May 2015, Yuseco, Nagasawa, and G. Universal Ltd. (petitioners) filed the present petition for review on certiorari. Signatories, as counsels of record, to the petition were Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. (as counsel for Francis Yuseco, Jr.) and Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. (as counsel for Toruu Nagasawa).

Named as respondent was the PDIC as Statutory Liquidator of the UDB.

The petition was a "Petition for Review" filed under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court of the "Decision of the Court of Appeals 11th Division denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Recusation of Petitioners to set aside its Decision dated 28 November 2014 setting aside and annulling the 19 January 2012 Order and 17 December 2012 Omnibus Order of the Honorable Judge Winlove Dumayas. . .".

The petitioners alleged: (1) that the UDB has always had sufficient realizable assets to cover its liabilities; (2) that the UDB was never insolvent but was merely illiquid; (3) that the MB cannot violate its own charter by liquidating a perfectly healthy and solvent bank; and (4) that the PDIC was estopped from changing its legal position from claiming that the UDB was insolvent to claiming that it was merely illiquid in its petition for liquidation.

PROCEEDINGS AND INCIDENTS SUBSEQUENT

Court resolutions and the parties' pleadings

The petition, as originally filed:

a. Failed to include copies of both the CA's challenged decision and resolution;

b. Failed to implead the MB although what it essentially questioned was the liquidation of the UDB, a matter within the jurisdiction of the MB;

c. Failed to include a complete statement of material dates indicating the date of receipt of the assailed decision and the date of the filing of the motion for reconsideration. 5

On 18 May 2015, the case was raffled to Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion. The Office of the Clerk of Court of the Second Division received the records of the case on22 May 2015.

On 10 June 2015, the petitioners filed an Addendum6 (dated 8 June 2015) to its petition to augment its arguments on whether the PDIC can suddenly change its legal theory on appeal (that it was liquidating the UDB — not because of insolvency — but because of illiquidity).

The petition was included in the Supplemental Agenda of 22 June 2015, as Item No. 260. The recommended action was to deny the petition outright for failure to reflect any reversible error and per the Note of the Clerk of Court reflecting the above-listed technical deficiencies. 7 Because Justice Brion was on leave due to complications from his knee replacement operation, the case was rescheduled to be called again on 29 June 2015.

The petition was included in the Supplemental Agenda of 29 June 2015 as item No. 430. However, Justice Brion was still on medical leave so the case was set to be called again on 6 July 2015.

On 6 July 2015, the Petition and the Addendum (of 8 June 2015) were included in the Supplemental Agenda (as item Nos. 344 and 373, respectively) but Justice Brion requested the Court En Banc for the continuation of his Medical Leave until 21 July 2015. He thus asked for the deferment of all his cases scheduled on July 6 and July 13. The Yuseco petition was specifically requested to be called again on 29 July 2015.

On 7 July 2015, the petitioners filed a Manifestation8(dated 29 June 2015) submitting certified true copies of the CA's decision and resolution and apologizing for their oversight. [Notably, the office of Justice Brion did not receive the Manifestation until it was scheduled for Agenda in August.]

On29 July 2015, the petition and the Addendum were included as Item No. 15 of the Agenda, as requested. The recommended action was to deny the petition per the Clerk of Court's Note. 9 aDSIHc

On the same date (29 July 2015), the Second Division issued its Resolution 10NOTING the Addendum dated 8 June 2015. The Second Division also DENIED the petition for lack of:

(1) duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution;

(2) a verified statement of the material dates of receipt of the assailed decision and filing of the motion for reconsideration; and

(3) a valid affidavit of service because the attached affidavit of service was notarized the day before the actual posting of the copies.

Notably, the Manifestation (of 29 June 2015 which submitted the certified true copies of the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and Recusation) was not included in the 29 July Agenda (or in any subsequent Agenda until the Agenda of 14 August despite having been filed as early as 7 July 2015) and was not considered in the 2nd Division's 29 July 2015 Resolution.

On 10 August 2015, the PDIC submitted a Counter-Manifestation with a Motion to Dismiss dated 5 August 2015. 11 The PDIC argued that the petition is dismissible outright because: (1) the petition is the wrong mode of appeal because it was filed under Rule 42 instead of Rule 45; (2) the petition failed to indicate which portions of the decision of the CA was being assailed; (3) the petition was not accompanied by duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution; and (4) that the Addendum and Manifestation that the petitioner filed to cure the defects are not authorized by the Rules of Court.

The Manifestation and the Counter-Manifestation were included in the 24 August 2015 Agenda as Item Nos. 37 and 96, respectively. The recommendation for the Manifestation was to note the submission and to treat it as a motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2015 Resolution; to deny the motion for lack of compelling reason for its grant;direct that no further pleadings shall be filed; and to enter judgment in due course. ATICcS

Notably, the belatedly recognized Manifestation, treated as a motion/submission to cure the defects of the Petition, failed to cure these defects as it merely addressed the first but not the second and the third defects. The Counter-Manifestation which properly raised the propriety of the Rule 42 the petitioners availed of, was merely "noted" in light of the finality that the recommended action recognized.

As Justice Brion was again on medical leave on this date (24 August 2015), the Minutes of the Second Division Meeting indicated that the case would be called again on 2 September 2015.

The Manifestation and the Counter-Manifestation were included in the 2 September 2015 Agenda as Item No. 177, with the same notations as the previous Agenda. The Second Division this time issued a Resolution reflecting the 24 August 2015 recommendation, while apologizing for the oversight with respect to the Manifestation. Thus the Manifestation/motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, together with an order for the final entry of the Court's judgment.

In the Minutes of the 2 September 2015 Second Division Meeting, there was a query below the Court's resolution which reads:

QUERY: To conform to the action "NFP EJIDC," may the draft treating petitioners' manifestation dated 29 June 2015 as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 29 July 2015 and denying the same with finality on ground "NCR," be approved?

Next to the query was a handwritten note that "It was the action in the RA (yes to query)."

On 23 September 2015, the petitioners filed a Joint Opposition 12 to the PDIC's 5 August 2015 Counter-Manifestation with a Motion to Dismiss.

On 17 October 2015, the petitioners filed a Motion to Reopen the Case and Refer the Matter to the Court en banc with a Motion for Reconsideration.

On 28 October 2015, the Court received letters from Yuseco addressed to Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno with the heading "Subject: Shameless and Unprecedented Denial of Due Process."

The petitioners' Joint Opposition, Yuseco's letters, and the Motion to Reopen with a Motion for Reconsideration were included in the Second Division's Supplemental Agenda of 9 November 2015, as Item Nos. 365 and 420; Supplemental Agenda of 9 December 2015, as Item No. 222; and the Agenda of 13 January 2016, as Item No. 87. The Second Division in the meanwhile communicated with the Court of Appeals to secure the Rollo of the case underlying the petition for a more complete and thorough examination of the case.

On 10 February 2016, the Court resolved to:

1. NOTE: (a) petitioners' joint opposition with leave of Court (to respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation's [PDIC] counter manifestation and motion to dismiss) dated 1 September 2015, (b) petitioner Francis Yuseco, Jr.'s letters with lines "Subject: Shameless and Unprecedented Denial of Due Process," and "Subject: Shameless and Absurd Denial of Due Process," both dated 26 October 2015, addressed to Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, respectively, (c) petitioners' motion to re-open and refer the matter to the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc with motion for reconsideration (incorporated therein) of the Resolution dated 29 July 2015, dated 17 October 2015, (d) respondent PDIC's motion to declare petitioners in contempt dated 9 November 2015 on the ground that despite the explicit directive of the Court in its Resolution dated 2 September 2015 that no further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case, petitioners filed a motion to re-open and defer the matter to the Court En Banc in direct defiance of the aforesaid Resolution dated 2 September 2015, and (e) petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 29 July 2015 with compliance, dated 17 October 2015; and TIADCc

2. AWAIT the compliance by Francis Yuseco and/or Atty. Nelson Clemente to the Court's directive requiring them to disclose the name of the person who allegedly solicited a bribe from them."

The Yuseco Letter.

Yuseco claims that they were shockingly and absurdly denied due process when the Second Division treated their Manifestation as a motion for reconsideration and denied their petition with finality. He points out that the Manifestation was filed 30 days before this Court's initial denial of the petition.

He also claims that two months prior, 13 a person claiming to be the nephew of Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo approached their counsel, Atty. Nelson Clemente, soliciting a bribe. This person allegedly claimed that their petition is meritorious but could be dismissed based on a mere procedural lapse if the "kalakaran" is not respected. He directed their counsel to ignore the person, but true enough, their petition was dismissed with finality.

Yuseco expressed his willingness to disclose the name of the person who approached them and prayed that the Court grant their motion to reopen their case.

On 23 March 2016, Yuseco complied 14 with the Court's 10 February 2016 directive. He essentially explained his version of the events that led to his 26 and 28 October 2016 letters; and extended his apologies to Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo with the claim that Atty. Clemente referred to Mr. Jun Peralta, the nephew of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and not to the nephew of Justice del Castillo. He clarified that Mr. Jun Peralta never promised anything except the latter's "genuine and sincere belief that the Supreme Court always defer to the age-old tradition of resolving cases based on merits and not on mere technical lapses." 15

Yuseco added that "[a]s it is highly illogical to conclude that Mr. Peralta had anything to do with the sudden reversal of Judge Dumayas to his final and executory Orders or the Decision of the Appellate Court to allow the PDIC to change its legal theory and categorically state that CC 02-897 has been resolved with finality allowing for the liquidation of the UDB; it is also illogical to conclude that Mr. Peralta has anything to do with the Honorable Court denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration before even such Motion had any chance of being filed at all." Likewise, he clarified that "no bribery could also have taken place as any monetary rewards if at all, were never even discussed due to the swiftness of how the events rapidly transpired." 16

Atty. Nelson A. Clemente, for his part, complied 17 with the Court's directive on 7 April 2016. He denied knowing the name of the person that allegedly solicited bribe from them. 18

Atty. Clemente claimed: that he is only a collaborating counsel in this case; that he never signed any material pleadings regarding the case; that his participation is limited to advising and helping Yuseco on the financial and accounting aspects, particularly on the "financial statements of the cases of . . . Yuseco" against the PDIC in the CA and the RTC; that the legal and CPA services he rendered for Yuseco is on a pro bono basis because of Yuseco's financial difficulties, hence, he would never advise the latter to give any bribe or arrange any form of bribery to any party; and that he is never involved in any bribery case in the Judiciary and he never advised Yuseco to do so as he firmly believes in his oath of office as a lawyer. 19

Finally, he manifested that he "will be withdrawing his appearances in the instant case and other cases." 20

OUR RULING

We DENY the petitioners' Motion to Re-open and to Refer the Matter to the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc, 21 and reiterate that our 29 July 2015 ruling denying the petition outright and our 2 September 2015 ruling denying the motion for reconsideration and recognizing that this denial has lapsed to finality.

The petition's numerous procedural defects

We emphasize that in the 29 July 2015 resolution, 22 the Court denied the petition for review for lack of:

1. Clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution in accordance with Sections 4 (d) and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (d), Rule 56 of the Rules;

2. A verified statement of material dates of receipt of the assailed decision and filing of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Sections 4 (b) and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (d), Rule 56 of the Rules; and AIDSTE

3. A valid affidavit of service in accordance with Section 13, Rule 13 in relation to Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45, and Section 5 (d), Rule 56 of the Rules.

In other words, Yuseco, et al.'s petition before this Court contained several procedural defects that, whether individually or collectively considered, justified the Court in denying outright the petition following the cited sections of Rule 45 in relation with Rules 56 and 13 of the Rules of Court. 23

Belatedly, we note that Yuseco's petition challenging the Court of Appeals' ruling was filed out of time; hence, we did not even have the jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the CA ruling in so far as Yuseco is concerned.

The CA records show24that the Verano Law Firm (counsel of Yuseco, Jr.) received its copy of the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution on April 28, 2015 (4-28-15); hence, the present petition filed with this Court in behalf of Yuseco, required to be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the challenged ruling, was filed out time as it was filed only on May 15, 2015.

With respect to Nagasawa, his counsel Atty. J.C. Yreverre Law Firm, received the CA ruling of April 6, 2015, on April 30, 2015. Hence, the petition was not filed out of time. The defects of the petition, however, were not fully cured by the subsequent submission of the certified copies of the CA rulings made through the Manifestation of June 29, 2015; the petition still lacked a valid verified statement of material dates of receipt of the assailed rulings, and a valid affidavit of service. Hence, the outright dismissal of the petition with respect to Nagasawa is justified, considering particularly the petition's lack of merit as discussed below.

In any case, the petition failed to show any

In considering the outright dismissal of a petition for technical deficiencies, we generally take into account the substantive merits of the petition to ensure that meritorious cases are not defeated solely by technical and procedural deficiencies. In the present case, we noted that the present petition stemmed from the "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Unitrust Development Bank" the PDIC filed with the RTC. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the liquidation case, arguing that the UDB's liquidation was improper since the UDB is not insolvent.

The RTC granted the petitioners' motion and ordered the PDIC to cease and desist from liquidating the UDB. The CA, in its November 28, 2014 and April 6, 2015 resolution, set aside on grave abuse of discretion the assailed RTC orders, ruling that: the PDIC cannot be enjoined in performing its duties as the UDB's receiver and subsequently its liquidator, based on MB Resolution Nos. 19 and 64, except in a petition for certiorari, which petition should be filed against the MB, not the PDIC, assailing the propriety and validity of the liquidation.

Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act (NCBA), as footnoted in full below, categorically provides that: 25

First, the determination of the propriety of instituting receivership or liquidation proceedings is an exclusive prerogative of the Monetary Board. The law designated the MB as the sole body with the wisdom and expertise to make such a call.

The RTC, acting as a liquidation court, has no power to overrule the findings of the MB. In fact, the liquidation court's authority is limited to adjudicating disputed claims against the institution, assisting the enforcement of individual liabilities of the stockholders, directors and officers, and deciding on other issues as may be material to implement the liquidation plan adopted.

The exclusivity of the MB's power is highlighted by the statutory absence of an appeal from its actions under Section 30. The MB's actions are final and executory and can only be set aside by filing a petition for certiorari with the CA within 10 days from receipt by the bank's board of directors of the MB's order directing receivership, liquidation, or conservatorship. The stockholders representing a majority of the capital stock may file the petition for certiorari which must be before the CA pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 26

In the present case, the petitioners precisely assail the propriety of the MB action liquidating the UDB. Obviously, this propriety could only be assailed via certiorari petition, not a motion to dismiss the liquidation proceeding. The RTC, acting as the liquidation court, did not have jurisdiction to decide on the propriety and validity of the proceeding. The RTC failed to consider that it has no jurisdiction to set aside the MB's actions in liquidation proceedings based on Section 30 of the NCBA. 27 Thus, in ordering the PDIC to cease and desist in liquidating the UDB, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion that justified the CA in reversing and setting aside the assailed RTC orders. AaCTcI

Second, the petition for liquidation may be filed ex parte by the PDIC without the requirement of prior notice or any other action. The MB, on the other hand, is empowered under the NCBA to take over banks without need for prior hearing. 28 This is a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. 29

Third, the PDIC is not required to send notice of its petition before the RTC for the UDB's liquidation or of the liquidation proceedings to the latter's majority or controlling stockholders.

Section 30 (1), as cited above, categorically requires the MB to notify in writing the bank's board of directors of its findings. Nowhere does it require the MB to notify the majority stockholders of the bank as Yuseco argues. Hence, the lack of notice to the stockholders does not make the petition illegal.

Fourth, Section 30 of the NCBA does not limit the MB's basis in liquidating a bank to insolvency. 30

Under Section 30, the MB is empowered to close or place a bank under receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the continuance in business would probably result in loss to the depositors or creditors. 31 Thus, contrary to the petitioners' claim, the MB did not err when it ordered the UDB's liquidation sans the BSP examination report to prove that the UDB is insolvent. 32

Lastly, the MB Resolution Nos. 19 and 64 placing the UDB under receivership and subsequently under liquidation had already become final and executory for the petitioners' failure to file the petition for certiorari before the CA within the 10-day reglementary period per Section 30 (2) of the NCBA.

In sum, the petitioners' arguments lack merit. The CA correctly annulled the RTC's dismissal of the liquidation proceedings. The RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it substituted the MB's findings with its own; the petitioners, because they failed to avail of the proper remedy, must bear the consequences of their negligence/error.

On the matter of referring the case to the Court.

In light of all the above, no reason whatsoever exists to refer the present matter to the Court en banc.

As things currently stand, the Court has already spent an undue amount of time examining the records of this case, given Yuseco's allegations in his letter of October 26, 2015 to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio. While his explanation is not fully satisfactory given the rash allegations he made, we are aware that he himself had been more of a victim in this case given the manner the petition was handled by the attending counsels. Separately from the way the petition was handled, we are also aware that an unusual confluence of events transpired in this case that led to the confusion that drove Yuseco to write his letter, as he explained in his Compliance. Thus, on the whole, the Court feels it best to simply advise Yuseco and the attending counsels, in the strongest terms, regarding the good faith required in the handling of cases and in their relations with the Court. Let the Yuseco letter of October 26, 2015 rest under these terms.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners' Motion to Re-open Case and to Refer the Matter to the Court en banc, for lack of merit, and hereby CONFIRM the finality of the dismissal of the petition as decreed in our Resolutions of July 29, 2016 and September 2, 2016.

The parties, particularly their counsels, are advised in the strongest terms to deal in the future with this Court in utmost good faith.

SO ORDERED." EcTCAD

Carpio, J., on official leave; Brion, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per SO No. 2374 dated September 14, 2016.

Very truly yours,

 

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.  Rollo, p. 179.

2.  Both penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

3.  Both rendered by Presiding Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

4.  Through Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.

5.  Rollo, p. 1. On the Timeliness of the Petition, the Petition simply stated that "The Petition is filed within the reglementary period as the Denial of its Motion for Reconsideration was received last April 30, 2015."

6.  Id. at 144.

7.  Because the motion for reconsideration was claimed to have been received on April 30, 2015, the Clerk of Court noted that the petition was timely filed. But it was noted that the petition lacked (a) clearly legible duplicate original of the assailed decision and resolution; (b) a verified statement of the material dates of receipt of the assailed decision and the filing of the motion for reconsideration; and that the affidavit of service was notarized on 14 May 2015 prior to actual posting of copies on 15 May 2015, id. at 35-36 and 39-40.

8.  Id. at 104.

9.  Supra note 7.

10.  Rollo, p. 102.

11.  Id. at 137.

12.  Id. at 160.

13.  Counted from the date of the letter that would be sometime in August.

14.  Compliance and Manifestation dated March 23, 2016.

15.  Page 5 of Yuseco's Compliance.

16.  Id. at 6.

17.  Compliance with Notice of Change of Address dated April 7, 2016.

18.  Page 1 of Atty. Clemente's Compliance.

19.  Id. at 2.

20.  Id.

21.  Dated October 28, 2015; filed on November 2, 2015.

22.  Rollo, pp. 102-103.

23.  See Section 5 of Rule 45 and Section 5 of Rule 56, both of the Rules of Court. Section 5 of Rule 45 specifically provides:

  SEC. 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

  The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. (3a)

 Section 5 of Rule 56, on the other hand, states:

  SEC. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:

  (a) Failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period;

  (b) Lack of merit of the petition;

  (c) Failure to pay the requisite docket fee and other lawful fees or to make a deposit for costs;

  (d) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition;

  (e) Failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of the Supreme Court without justifiable cause;

  (f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal; and

  (g) The fact that the case is not appealable to the Supreme Court. (n)

24.  CA rollo, CA-G.R. 128241, p. 952.

25.  SEC. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. — Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:

   (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;

   (b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or

   (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or

   (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

   For a quasi-bank, any person of recognized competence in banking or finance may be designated as receiver.

   The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court but shall not, with the exception of administrative expenditures, pay or commit any act that will involve the transfer or disposition of any asset of the institution: Provided, That the receiver may deposit or place the funds of the institution in nonspeculative investments. The receiver shall determine as soon as possible, but not later than ninety (90) days from take-over, whether the institution may be rehabilitated or otherwise placed in such a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public: Provided, That any determination for the resumption of business of the institution shall be subject to prior approval of the Monetary Board.

  If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in accordance with the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board of directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution. The receiver shall:

   (1) file ex parte with the proper regional trial court, and without requirement of prior notice or any other action, a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the institution pursuant to a liquidation plan adopted by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation for general application to all closed banks. In case of quasi-banks, the liquidation plan shall be adopted by the Monetary Board. Upon acquiring jurisdiction, the court shall, upon motion by the receiver after due notice, adjudicate disputed claims against the institution, assist the enforcement of individual liabilities of the stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on other issues as may be material to implement the liquidation plan adopted. The receiver shall pay the cost of the proceedings from the assets of the institution.

  (2) convert the assets of the institution to money, dispose of the same to creditors and other parties, for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution in accordance with the rules on concurrence and preference of credit under the Civil Code of the Philippines and he may, in the name of the institution, and with the assistance of counsel as he may retain, institute such actions as may be necessary to collect and recover accounts and assets of, or defend any action against, the institution. The assets of an institution under receivership or liquidation shall be deemed in custodia legis in the hands of the receiver and shall, from the moment the institution was placed under such receivership or liquidation, be exempt from any order of garnishment, levy, attachment, or execution.

   The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation, or conservatorship.

  The designation of a conservator under Section 29 of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. Furthermore, the designation of a conservator is not a precondition to the designation of a receiver.

26.  . . . If it involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

  In Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 521, citing United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc., G.R. No. 168859, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 321, the Court noted that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, through its Monetary Bank, exercises quasi-judicial functions.

27.  Pursuant to Section 30 of the NCBA, the petition filed before the RTC is for assistance in a bank's liquidation. It has jurisdiction only to adjudicate claims against the bank and assist in implementing the liquidation plan; it has no jurisdiction to restrain or reverse the Monetary Board's resolution to liquidate the Bank.

28.  Id.

29.  Id.

30.  Section 30 of the NCBA: "Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank: (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community; (b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without involving probably losses to its depositors or creditors; or (d) has willfully violated cease and desist order . . . ."

31.  716 Phil. 132, 150-151 (2013).

32.  See rollo, Addendum, p. 4.