FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 208787. July 30, 2019.]
JOSE LUIS G. YULO, petitioner, vs.ARSENIA JAVIER CELO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 30, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 208787 (Jose Luis G. Yulo v. Arsenia Javier Celo). — We reiterate the rule that acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability. 1
Respondent accused Arsenia Javier Celo (Celo) was charged with two counts of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) under a criminal complaint filed by petitioner Jose Luis Yulo (Yulo). 2
Yulo, as the prosecution's lone witness, alleged that sometime in March 1996, he was approached by Celo who presented herself as the authorized broker/agent of the owners of three parcels of land located in Barrio Kay Anlog, Calamba City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-329118 (in the name of Honorio Javier), and T-118082 and T-118083 (in the name of Spouses Santiago Evangelista and Catalina Javier). Celo claimed that the lots were for sale and free from any liens or encumbrances. Having dealt with Celo in the past, and on the basis of her assurances that she was authorized by the registered owners to negotiate and transact with buyers, Yulo agreed to purchase the properties. 3
Three deeds of absolute sale were then executed in Yulo's favor for a total purchase price of P2,498,960.00, which was paid on installment by the following Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) checks: (1) Check No. 47959 dated April 2, 1996 in the amount of P1,250,000.00, with Catalina Javier as payee; (2) Check No. 47960 dated April 30, 1996 in the amount of P200,000.00, with Catalina Javier and/or Arsenia Javier as payee; (3) Check No. 47961 dated May 30, 1996 in the amount of P200,000.00, with Catalina Javier and/or Arsenia Javier as payee; (4) Check No. 47962 dated June 30, 1996 in the amount of P200,000.00, with Catalina Javier and/or Arsenia Javier as payee; (5) Check No. 47963 dated July 30, 1996 in the amount of P200,000.00, with Catalina Javier and/or Arsenia Javier as payee; (6) Check No. 47964 dated August 30, 1996 in the amount of P200,000.00, with Catalina Javier and/or Arsenia Javier as payee; and (7) Check No. 47965 dated September 30, 1996 in the amount of P188,960.00, with Catalina Javier and/or Arsenia Javier as payee. These seven checks are the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 8915-01-C. 4 CAIHTE
Yulo also issued BPI Check No. 47976 dated June 26, 1996 in the amount of P60,000.00, with Celo as payee, to cover the additional cost of the transfer of titles of the properties. This check is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 7310-00-C. 5
Several months after the issuance and encashment of the checks, Celo failed to comply with her representations and undertakings. An inquiry with the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna revealed that the lands were still in the name of the vendors. Moreover, the land covered by TCT No. T-118082 was mortgaged to Express Savings Bank, contrary to Celo's representation that it was free from liens and encumbrances. Thus, Yulo made a final demand upon Celo to comply with her undertakings, particularly her commitment to pay the taxes and facilitate the transfer of the titles in his name. Celo, however, refused to heed the demand and failed to return the monies she received after the encashment of the checks. 6
Yulo prayed in his complaint that Spouses Javier and Celo immediately effect the transfer of titles and possession of the properties in his name, and to deliver the same free from liens and encumbrances, or in the alternative, to rescind the deeds of absolute sale and return the amount of P2,498,960.00, plus legal interest. He also prayed for damages, attorney's fees and other litigation expenses. 7
Celo, on the other hand, raised as a special affirmative defense that she was the broker in the sale, together with a certain Romana Villarete (Villarete). Villarete, who served as the trustee of Yulo, allegedly made the assurances to Yulo and facilitated the sale. All the documents including the titles were entrusted to Villarete and were returned to Celo only in the middle of 1996 without the P60,000.00. Celo argued that Yulo had no cause of action against her for being a mere broker who had no hand in the transfer of title of the properties. She also accused Yulo of acting in bad faith for reneging on their agreement to settle their differences extrajudicially. As counterclaim, Celo prayed for damages, attorney's fees and other litigation expenses. 8
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its Consolidated Decision 9 dated December 28, 2009. The RTC convicted Celo in Criminal Case No. 7310-00-C and ordered her to pay Yulo the amount of P60,000.00 representing the face value of the check, with interest at the legal rate of 12% reckoned from the date of demand until full payment. The RTC acquitted Celo in Criminal Case No. 8915-01-C for insufficiency of evidence. 10
The RTC explained in Criminal Case No. 8915-01-C that there was variance between the allegations in the information and the proof presented in court since what was alleged in the information constituted estafa through abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC, while the evidence adduced merely points to the crime of estafa by deceit under paragraph 2 (a) of the same provision. What was done by Celo was to make representations that she has the power and capacity to effect the transfer of titles in the name of the private complainant. These representations are what induced Yulo to part with his money through the issuance of various checks in the name of Celo and Catalina Javier (Catalina) as joint payees. Thus, the cause of fraud was the use of false pretenses rather than abuse of confidence. Such variance was fatal to the cause of the prosecution. 11
The RTC also found no evidence on record that Celo did not remit to the supposed vendors the purchase price that Yulo delivered to her through the checks he issued. The RTC noted that on one occasion, Catalina, who was accompanied by Celo, was even able to encash a check as partial payment. There was no evidence that Celo and Catalina were not at the bank together when the other checks were presented for payment. While it might be true that Catalina allowed Celo to present the checks for payment, this does not prove that the accused did not deliver the purchase price to the vendors. 12
Yulo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) on the civil aspect of the case. The CA, 13 however, found the appeal devoid of merit. 14 The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in ruling that Celo is not civilly liable to Yulo for actual damages in the amount of P2,498,960.00 in Criminal Case No. 8915-01-C. The CA stressed that Celo was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence and not on reasonable doubt, a ruling tantamount to the fact that she did not commit the crime charged. 15
The CA also affirmed the RTC ruling that the variance between the information in Criminal Case No. 8915-01-C and the evidence adduced by the prosecution was fatal to the prosecution's case. 16 DETACa
Also, while Yulo admitted that he was damaged in the amount of P2,498,960.00, he testified that only the amount of P1,188,960.00 had been encashed by Celo. Further, one check was issued directly in the name of and encashed by vendor Catalina, which negates the allegation that Celo failed and refused to deliver the proceeds of the sale. 17
The CA also denied the award of damages and attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition which raises the argument that Celo remains civilly liable to Yulo despite her acquittal.
Yulo argues that respondent's acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt which does not extinguish Celo's civil liability. 18 There was no finding at all that the act or omission from which the civil liability of Celo may arise did not exist. 19 In fact, the CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that while not all the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the totality of the evidence established estafa through deceit. 20
Yulo argues that the RTC expressly found that "[t]here may have been indications of an intent to defraud private complainant such as when the accused submitted and presented to the former an Absolute Deed of Sale purportedly signed by one Honorio Javier and allegedly notarized on March 04, 1997." 21 Honorio Javier could not have signed nor executed the said deed of absolute sale because he already passed away almost nine months before its supposed execution.
Yulo also maintains that Celo received the amount of P2,498,960.00 from him, with the specific obligation to effect the transfer of the properties from the names of the vendors to his name. 22
Yulo points out that Celo also admitted, through her lawyer, that it was she who encashed all the checks, except for BPI Check No. 047959 in the amount of P1,250,000.00 which was encashed by Catalina. 23 Celo herself also admitted that there was no proof that the purported vendors ever received the purchase price, especially considering that one of them was already dead when the deed of sale was allegedly executed. 24 Since Yulo entrusted the money to Celo, and considering that the alleged vendors never received said money, there is no doubt that Celo misappropriated the money for her own personal use. Thus, she is liable to reimburse Yulo in the amount of P2,438,960.00, representing the checks she encashed. 25
Lastly, Yulo argues that the CA erred in not holding that Celo is liable to Yulo for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Yulo prays for an award of: (1) P500,000.00 as moral damages for the humiliation and ridicule he allegedly suffered among his family and peers as a result of having been defrauded by Celo; (2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent and by way of example; and (3) P100,000.00 attorney's fees for Celo's wanton and malicious acts. 26
We partially grant the petition.
As a general rule, this Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, save for some exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the RTC and the CA misapprehended the facts and their findings are contradicted by the evidence on record, as is true in this case when both did not find Celo civilly liable despite her acquittal.
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused depend on the kind of acquittal ruled by the trial court. 27 We discussed this in Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, 28 thus:
x x x [We explained] in Manantan v. CA in this wise:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is 'for the same act or omission.' x x x
In Salazar v. People, the Court further expounded thus:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) aDSIHc
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, 30 We ruled that the dismissal of the criminal cases of estafa against the accused did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. Moreover, an accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. 31
In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 32 We ruled that while the accused was acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide due to insufficiency of evidence, the Court awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as civil liability, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to recognize the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties as a doctor. 33
Here, Celo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 8915-01-C due to insufficiency of evidence. There was no pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or that Celo did not commit the acts imputed on her. While the prosecution failed to prove the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC, this does not mean that Celo did not receive the proceeds of the checks and that she is not liable to return them to Yulo. Her civil liability may therefore still be proven and it would only require preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. 34
Celo is one of the payees of the checks, the other being Catalina. 35 Celo, through counsel, admitted that it was she who encashed seven checks out of the eight checks issued to her and/or Catalina. Celo received a total of P1,248,960.00. 36
We find erroneous the RTC's finding that there was no evidence to prove that Celo did not give to the supposed vendors the amounts representing the purchase price. It is a rule that the party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of fact is not the evidence of it. 37 The party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. 38
We explained in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Chante39 that in civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. 40
Since Celo admitted having received the proceeds of the seven checks amounting to a total of P1,188,960.00 as payment for the purchase price of the properties, she had the burden to prove her affirmative defense that she gave these proceeds to Catalina. 41 There is nothing in the records, however, to prove this. The only proceeds Catalina received was in the amount of P1,250,000.00, the value of BPI Check No. 047959 check which she encashed herself. 42
There is also nothing in the records to show that the supposed vendors/owners of the properties duly authorized Celo to receive the checks and encash them. The only reason that Yulo named Celo as co-payee and gave her the checks was due to her representation that she is the authorized broker/agent of the owners. Clearly, Celo had no authority to receive the proceeds of the checks as payment for the purported sale of the lands and should return the amount of the checks which she encashed. The principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]f something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises." It applies where (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause. 43
While We cannot, at the moment, decide on the validity of the deeds of the absolute sale or the existence of the sales as they should be properly resolved in another proceeding where the purported vendors or their representatives or heirs may litigate their claims, what remains clear is that Yulo acted on the mistaken belief that Celo was duly authorized by the owners of the lands to receive the payment on their behalf. For encashing the seven checks and receiving their proceeds, therefore, Celo is liable to return the amount of P1,188,960.00. With respect, however, to the amount of P1,250,000.00, We cannot hold Celo liable to return the same, as the evidence of both parties show that Catalina received said amount through BPI Check No. 047959 she encashed herself. ETHIDa
With regard to damages and attorney's fees, we hold that Yulo is also entitled to these awards, albeit in reduced amounts than what he prayed for.
Celo is also liable to Yulo for moral damages, it appearing in the record that Celo acted in evident bad faith and succeeded in defrauding Yulo. To reiterate, Yulo purchased the properties from Celo because of her very misrepresentation that she was duly authorized to act on behalf of the registered owners of the properties. Further, Yulo was induced to part with his money on the undertaking of Celo that she will cause the transfer of the title over the properties under his name and without any liens or encumbrances. However, the promise of Celo never came into fruition. The titles of the properties were never transferred to Yulo and worse, he learned that one of the properties was mortgaged to a bank. Despite receiving the proceeds of the sale, Celo did not turn them over to the alleged owners. Fraud and bad faith of Celo having been proved by the prosecution, Celo is liable to Yulo for moral damages in a fair, just, and reasonable amount of P50,000.00. 44
Furthermore, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." Thus, in addition to the award of compensatory or actual damages in favor of Yulo, we also impose the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. The award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees is likewise warranted. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2013 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused Arsenia Javier Celo is ORDERED to pay petitioner Jose Luis G. Yulo: (1) P1,188,960.00 as actual damages with interest at 6% per annum reckoned from the date of demand, i.e., July 30, 1999 until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The awards of damages and attorney's fees shall each earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Lim v. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, G.R. No. 175851, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 628, 629.
2.Rollo, p. 324.
3.Id. at 325.
4.Id. at 325-326.
5.Id. at 326.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Rollo, p. 327.
9.Id. at 188-205.
10.Id. at 327-328.
11.Id. at 199-202.
12.Id.
13.Rollo, pp. 323-335; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Manuel M. Barrios.
14.Id. at 328.
15.Id. at 328-329.
16.Id. at 330-332.
17.Id. at 333.
18.Id. at 14-16, citing Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 97, 114 and Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370, 378.
19.Id. at 16.
20.Id. at 16-17.
21.Id. at 200.
22.Id. at 18.
23.Id. at 20, 192.
24.Id. at 20.
25.Id. at 21.
26.Id. at 24-27.
27.Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 97, 114, citing Manantan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001, 250 SCRA 387, 397-398.
28.Supra.
29.Id. at 114-115.
30.G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370.
31.Id. at 378.
32.G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 188.
33.Id. at 210.
34.Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Chante, G.R. No. 170598, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 149, 163.
35.Rollo, p. 90.
36.Id. at 20.
37.Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Chante, supra note 34 at 162.
38.Id., citing Martin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82248, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 591, 596; Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 315, 327.
39.Supra note 34.
40.Id. at 162-163.
41.Rollo, p. 112.
42.Id.
43.Abella v. Abella, G.R. No. 195166, July 8, 2015, 762 SCRA 221, 247.
44.Naya v. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 364. See also Coco-Cola Bottler Phils., Inc. v. Roque, G.R. No. 118985, June 14, 1999, 308 SCRA 215.
45.Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
xxx xxx xxx