Yuhanon y Salipot v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 238265. December 2, 2021.]

RANDY YUHANON y SALIPOT, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 2, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 238265 (Randy Yuhanon y Salipot v. People of the Philippines). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 15, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 37550. The CA denied the appeal filed by Randy Yuhanon y Salipot (petitioner) against the Decision 3 dated April 20, 2015 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila City (RTC). In its Decision, the RTC held petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, paragraph 3, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Antecedents

In an Information 4 dated December 26, 2011, Yuhanon was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 3, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or "Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs," R.A. No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about December 21, 2011, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "D-FG" containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO THREE (0.023) gram; "D1-FG" containing ZERO POINT ZERO FOUR SEVEN (0.047) gram; "D2-FG" containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO SIX (0.026) gram; and "D3-FG" containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO (0.22) gram or with a total net weight of ZERO POINT ONE ONE EIGHT (0.118) gram of white crystalline substance commonly known as "shabu" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.

On January 31, 2012, Yuhanon was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. 5

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Senior Police Officer 3 Francisco Guevarra (SPO3 Guevarra), the poseur buyer, who testified 6 that on December 21, 2011, at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening, police officers were conducting a surveillance operation along Laurel Street in Tondo, Manila. Around an hour later, he noticed a man, later identified as Yuhanon, walking while examining a plastic sachet. SPO3 Guevarra decided to follow Yuhanon who began to act apprehensively. Seeing Yuhanon's reaction, SPO3 Guevarra grabbed him, introduced himself as a police officer, and took the plastic sachet that Yuhanon was holding on the ground that it looked like it contained white crystalline substance. He then asked Yuhanon where he got the plastic sachet, but the latter did not respond. This prompted SPO3 Guevarra to order Yuhanon to empty his pockets and show its contents. This yielded three more plastic sachets which all contained white crystalline substance. SPO3 Guevarra then arrested petitioner. After that, SPO3 Guevarra put the first plastic sachet in his left pocket and held the three other plastic sachets with his right hand. ICHDca

After apprehending Yuhanon, SPO3 Guevarra and the other police officers led Yuhanon to their parked vehicle where they conducted the marking, inventory and photographing of the three seized plastic sachets. SPO3 Guevarra marked the first plastic sachet with the marking "D-FG," and the three other plastic sachets with the markings "D1-FG," "D2-FG," and "D3-FG." When SPO3 Guevarra and the other police officers were about to conduct the inventory, Yuhanon's wife, Lover Jane Galiposo (Galiposo), started cursing and shouting at the police officers, which prompted Senior Police Officer 2 Emmanuel Bautista (SPO2 Bautista) to arrest her. Due to the commotion caused by Galiposo, they were not able to secure the presence of a representative from the barangay. Thereafter, SPO3 Guevarra and the other police officers proceeded to their office at the Manila Police District Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit in UN Avenue, Manila, where SPO3 Guevarra continued with the inventory. SPO3 Guevarra also prepared the Chain of Custody form and the request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachets. The seized plastic sachets were then turned over to Police Officer 3 Elmer Revita (PO3 Revita), who in turn, brought them to the crime laboratory, and were received by Police Chief Inspector Elisa G. Reyes (PCI Reyes) for examination.

Upon examination, the seized plastic sachets were tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."7

On the other hand, the defense's version of the facts summarized as follows:

Denying the charge against him, Yuhanon testified 8 that on the said date, he was with Galiposo in their rented house located at Laurel n corner Pacheco Streets, Tondo, Manila. Suddenly, several armed men wearing civilian attire barged in and introduced themselves as police officers. They accused him of being engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, placed handcuffs on him and ordered him to board their vehicle. Yuhanon's wife became hysterical and, as a result, was also arrested.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 9 dated April 20, 2015 finding Yuhanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11 (3) or "Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs," Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) days to fifteen (15) years, and to pay a fine of P350,000.

Yuhanon appealed the RTC decision to the CA, but the said decision was affirmed by the CA in the assailed Decision 10 dated February 15, 2017.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues

I.

Whether the dangerous drugs seized from Petitioner is admissible in evidence to prove his guilt for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

II.

Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Our Ruling

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the dangerous drugs seized from petitioner are admissible in evidence. On the one hand, petitioner contends that the dangerous drugs were seized from him through an invalid warrantless search. He states that since there was no valid warrantless arrest, then the subsequent warrantless search effected on him was likewise unlawful. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the CA correctly ruled that the dangerous drugs seized from petitioner were products of either a valid search incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest or a search under plain view.

The rule on unreasonable search and seizure was elucidated by this Court in Miguel v. People, 11 in this wise:

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 12

Thus, the rule is that a judicial warrant must first be obtained before the authorities may be allowed to conduct a search. However, there are instances when a warrantless search may be considered valid. Among the recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches are: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search[es]; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 13

In this case, the CA ruled that the warrantless search was valid because it falls under the exception of a search incidental to a lawful arrest or a search under plain view. 14

After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the warrantless search effected on petitioner was not valid. TCAScE

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made. The process cannot be reversed. 15 Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a warrantless arrest may be made under the following circumstances:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

The arrest contemplated in this case is the first kind of warrantless arrest, known as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 5 (a). In warrantless arrest made pursuant to Section 5 (a), two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 16

The Court finds that petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. SPO3 Guevarra testified 17 that he and other police officers conducted a surveillance operation along Laurel Street, Tondo, Manila. While conducting the surveillance operation, SPO3 Guevarra noticed a man, herein petitioner, walking towards his post and examining a plastic sachet. According to SPO3 Guevarra, he immediately followed petitioner but the latter started to act apprehensively. Hence, SPO3 Guevarra immediately grabbed him and introduced himself as a police officer. SPO3 Guevarra then recovered from petitioner a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. According to SPO3 Guevarra, when he asked petitioner where he got the plastic sachet, the latter did not respond. Thus, SPO3 Guevarra told petitioner to empty his pockets and show its contents. After petitioner heeded his request, SPO3 Guevara recovered three more plastic sachets, which also contained white crystalline substance. SPO3 Guevarra then arrested petitioner and handcuffed him.

The factual milieu of the present case is similar to the case of Dominguez v. People, 18 where the Court ruled that the warrantless arrest of the accused therein was unlawful. According to the Court in the said case, the acts of accused standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Thus:

The prosecution and the defense presented different versions of the events. However, even if the Court were to believe the version of the prosecution, the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Dominguez. SPO 1 Parchaso's testimony on direct examination discloses as follows:

[Fiscal Rodriguez:]

Q Where in particular did your group go?

A We proceeded immediately to the place where there was report, sir at Purok Tres, Barangay Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.

Q At approximately what time did you reach that Purok Tres at Barangay Poblacion?

A 2:00 in the morning, sir.

Q Upon reaching that place, what happened?

A We separated at the area where we conducted monitoring and observation, and I entered this one small alley, sir.

Q What is the name of this alley, if you know?

A It is near Argana Street, sir, Barangay Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.

Q While in the alley, what happened?

A When I was entering or approaching the said alley, I saw a man standing at the said alley, sir.

Q And what was this man doing?

A He is not far from me, about one (I) meter, sir, and I saw him holding maliit na plastic sachet.

Q Can you describe to this Honorable Court the alley where you found this person?

A It is a small alley, sir.

Q Is this alley lighted?

A Opo.

Q What was this man doing with the plastic sachet?

A When I saw him, sir, he was wearing a red t-shirt and white short. And he was holding the transparent plastic sachet on his left hand.

Q Upon seeing this, what did you do?

A I immediately grabbed him, held him and arrested him on the same time, sir.

In People v. Racho, the Court ruled that the determination of validity of the warrantless arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was incident to the arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an arrest should therefore be determined first, thus:

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dominguez was in possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO 1 Parchaso would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO 1 Parchaso's testimony reveals that before the arrest was made, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a small plastic sachet. He was unable to describe what said plastic sachet contained, if any. He only mentioned that the plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu" after he had already arrested Dominguez and subsequently confiscated said plastic sachet:

[Fiscal Rodriguez:]

Q What happened after you arrested him?

A I was able x x x [to recover] from him, in his possession a transparent plastic sachet with pinaghihinalaang shabu, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set forth in Section 5 (a), Rule 11362 of the Rules of Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. As already discussed, standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in one's hands cannot in any way be considered as criminal acts. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 19

Similarly, in this case, it cannot be said that the act of petitioner in examining a plastic sachet while walking towards SPO3 Guevarra would already rouse suspicion in the latter's mind that petitioner had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Likewise, there was no showing that petitioner exhibited an overt act within the plain view of SPO3 Guevarra suggesting that he was in possession of a dangerous drug at the time he was apprehended. cTDaEH

The fact that petitioner allegedly started to act apprehensively when SPO3 Guevarra followed him was not enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that something is amiss or that petitioner was engaged in an illegal activity. On this score, the ruling of this Court in People v. Villareal20 is instructive:

Furthermore, appellant's act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant's attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence. 21

Thus, absent any overt act that could be attributed to petitioner that would rouse suspicion in the mind of the police officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the warrantless arrest is unlawful. Accordingly, the subsequent warrantless search effected on petitioner is likewise unlawful.

It bears emphasis that the failure of petitioner to timely object to the illegality of his arrest does not preclude him from questioning the admissibility of the evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest. 22

There was likewise no valid warrantless search in plain view. The requisites of the plain view doctrine are: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 23

Again, the ruling of the Court in Dominguez is instructive, to wit:

In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO 1 Parchaso saw Dominguez, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the Court's mind, a very small plastic sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It could even be just that — a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more. Although laboratory results later showed that the plastic sachet taken from Dominguez indeed contained shabu, this cannot justify the seizure of the plastic sachet from Dominguez because at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily apparent to SPO 1 Parchaso that the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. Thus, the circumstances of this case do not justify a seizure based on the plain view doctrine. 24

In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 25 the Court laid down the test to determine when the incriminating character of a seized item may be considered as immediately apparent for purposes of applying the plain view doctrine:

The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.

Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person.

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law enforcement. 26

This Court finds it highly implausible that SPO3 Guevarra, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy the miniscule amount of white crystalline substance weighing 0.023 gram inside a plastic sachet specially from a distance of around 3 to 4 meters. From afar, the plastic sachet in the hand of petitioner could contain just about anything considering that there are products readily available in the market that looks very similar to shabu. Clearly, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the incriminating character of the plastic sachet is immediately apparent to SPO3 Guevarra. cSaATC

Accordingly, there being no valid warrantless search either under a search incidental to a lawful arrest or plain view search, the dangerous drugs seized from petitioner are rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the seized dangerous drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioner must be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 37550 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Randy Yuhanon y Salipot is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. He is DIRECTED to REPORT to this Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.

Let an entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 13-30.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring; id. at 30-48.

3. Penned by Judge Emilio Rodolfo Y. Legaspi; records, pp. 133-139.

4.Id. at 1.

5.Id. at 65.

6. TSN, November 14, 2014, pp. 4-20.

7. Chemistry Report No. D-1258-11, Prosecution's Exhibits, p. 2.

8. TSN, February 12, 2015.

9. Records, pp. 133-139.

10.Rollo, pp. 30-48.

11. 814 Phil. 1073 (2017).

12.Id. at 1084.

13.Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 656 (2017).

14.Rollo, pp. 43-45.

15.Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019.

16.Villamor v. People, 807 Phil. 894, 904 (2017).

17. TSN, November 14, 2014, pp. 4-7.

18. G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019. (Citations omitted)

19.Id.

20. 706 Phil. 511 (2013).

21.Id. at 521.

22.Veridiano v. People, supra note 33, at 654.

23.People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, 28 January 2019; citing People v. Lagman, 593 Phil. 617, 628 (2008).

24.Supra note 38. (Emphasis supplied)

25. 500 Phil. 342 (2005).

26.Id. at 363.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Laure" in the official document.