Young v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211251. November 18, 2021.]

STENIEL YOUNG, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 18, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 211251 (Steniel Young v. People of the Philippines). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the October 25, 2012 Decision 2 and January 24, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the November 11, 2005 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City in Criminal Case No. 1250-C convicting Steniel Young (petitioner) of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539 or the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972" (Anti-Carnapping Act).

At the onset, We note that this is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA. Consistent with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, "as a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised." However, there are recognized exceptions to this general, to wit:

1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3) Where there is grave abuse of discretion;

4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9) When the findings set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and,

10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 5

We maintain the basic procedural standards of a Rule 45 petition in a criminal case on appeal to the Supreme Court. In this case, the petition essentially raises a question of fact, i.e., the identification of the perpetrator by a witness. Petitioner questions the credibility of Joelito Fernandez (Joelito) based on the latter's delay in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the offense. This is a common factual issue in criminal that usually falls outside the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. However, there is great temptation on the part of lower courts to summarily dismiss such claims by invoking the well-established doctrine that "delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness." 6 In this case, about two years intervened between the occurrence of the incident and the testimony of the witness on trial. In the interim, whether before or during the preliminary investigation, there was nothing in the acts and utterances of the witness that would convey the impression that he identified petitioner as one of the perpetrators during the carnapping incident. It was only during trial that Joelito positively and affirmatively identified petitioner as one of the perpetrators. CAIHTE

Cases of mistaken identity in criminal cases are a reality, and We take it as judicial notice that human memory is fallible. A summary invocation of the afore-mentioned doctrine will hardly do justice to the case, especially one that involves imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty (20) years as maximum, including the accessory penalty provided for by law. We thus deem it necessary to supplement the CA's appreciation of facts so as to clarify the wisdom behind this doctrine.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 provides:

Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping.

Section 2 of the same law defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicles" as follows:

"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.

Essentially, the elements of carnapping are as follows:

1. That there is an actual taking of the motor vehicle;

2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;

3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 7

There is no doubt that in the evening of July 18, 1992, a ten-wheeler Isuzu V-10 truck was forcibly seized from Prospero Henoguin (Prospero) and Joelito in Barangay Caduha-an, Cadiz City. There is also no doubt that the engine parts of this motor vehicle were discovered in the bodega of George Uy, who in turn claimed that the engine pieces were owned by petitioner who is his son-in-law. Upon further investigation, the chassis of the motor vehicle was also found in the rice mill of petitioner. These facts alone, which remain undisputed, are not sufficient in themselves to positively identify petitioner as the person who pointed a gun at Joelito during the carnapping incident. Fortunately, the prosecution offered the testimony of Joelito, who positively identified petitioner as the fourth man in the carnapping incident.

Petitioner assails the credibility of Joelito's testimony on the ground that it is unreliable and highly questionable. 8 Specifically, Young points out the following circumstances, which, according to him should lead one to doubt the positive identification made by Joelito: first, when Prospero and Joelito were in the police station, Joelito did not offer to narrate his own experience of carnapping and did not immediately describe the identity of the fourth man as "insik-insikon" (Chinese-looking); 9second, Joelito did not execute an affidavit identifying or describing the Chinese-looking man even if he knew that Prospero failed to identify the three suspects, including the said Chinese-looking man; 10third, when Prospero and Joelito went to their employers to report the incident, and met the son of the owner of the truck, Ray Gaurana (Ray), Joelito did not offer to describe or identify the three suspects, particularly the Chinese-looking man; 11 and, fourth, for two long years, Joelito failed to execute a sworn statement of his harrowing experience despite the fact that there was no threat to Joelito's life. 12 This silence or delay in executing a sworn statement was allegedly due to the fact that he was not investigated, or that he never went to Bacolod. 13

Petitioner also argues that he is the owner of the V-10 Isuzu engine found at his bodega in Jovita Avenue, Bacolod City that the bodega stored engines and surplus spare parts are for display or sale at his store, "Hunter Motors." He adds that Ray came to his store to inquire about big engines but denied that there was a transaction between them at that time. 14 He stated that he bought the engine on the last week of July 1992 from a certain Cesar Talabor (Cesar) who offered it as junk or scrap. He then left the engine at the bodega because he planned to have a mechanic take a look at it. He also claimed that he bought the chassis from Cesar who allegedly promised to give him the registration papers, but the latter never delivered the documents. 15

Petitioner further claims that the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference that "the accused who actually took at gun point the vehicle involved in this case are John Doe, Peter Doe and William Doe only." 16 Finally, he denied that he went to the residence of Romeo Gaurana sometime in August of 1992. 17 DETACa

The other facts are undisputed by petitioner. As Joelito was the sole witness who positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime, the testimony of Joelito, if found to be incredible, would introduce reasonable doubt to convict petitioner of carnapping.

This case therefore rises and falls on the credibility of Joelito's testimony.

In the first place, the environmental circumstances surrounding that carnapping incident made it physically possible for Joelito to visually recognize the countenance of the fourth man while the latter was aiming his gun at Joelito. The evidence shows that Prospero was driving the truck while the second and third men pointed their guns at him. The second man then ordered Prospero to drive back to Bacolod City. He also instructed Joelito to transfer to the backseat so he could sit in front of the truck. Meanwhile, the fourth man, who was at the backseat the entire time, aimed his gun at Joelito. 18

Petitioner did not raise any objection to the narration that during the carnapping incident, the witnesses Prospero and Joelito were in a well-lighted place and the carnappers wore no masks and made no effort to conceal their faces. Notwithstanding, petitioner still maintains that there was a significant delay in the positive identification made by Joelito. The petition reads thus: 19

62. Further, a perusal of the testimonies of Joelito Fernandez and Prospero Henoguin on the incident itself portrays an almost continuous supply of illumination at the service of their recognition of the perpetrators. The places they went to were always well lighted, with mercury lamps no less; the lights of the oncoming vehicles always shone on the faces of the three (3) men in spite of their different places in the vehicle; the driver could even put on the light inside the vehicle and take a good look at the faces of the culprits; the offenders wore no masks or disguises; it seemed they were generous in giving the driver and his helper [i.e., Joelito] a more than ordinary chance to be identified. This is not the case with ordinary fugitives who take so much effort to conceal their identities.

We uphold the version of the prosecution. Joelito testified that: (i) he had a good look at the fourth man at the gas station and he described him as insik-insekon or Chinese-looking; (ii) this man pointed his gun at Joelito at the transloading station in Solatorio; and (iii) there were ample lights coming from the panel lights of the truck and the on-coming vehicles. 20 Prospero also testified that: (i) the gasoline station at the time of the incident was well-lighted and the fourth man boarded the truck; (ii) the transloading station in Caduha-an, Cadiz City where the fourth man and his cohorts seized the truck was lighted by mercury lamps; (iii) the fourth man aimed his gun at Joelito; (iv) he saw his reflection from the panel light of the truck; (v) illumination was provided by on-coming vehicles; (vi) when they stopped at Bago City, he was able to switch on the light inside the truck and it remained on when they were ordered to alight from it; and (vii) the fourth man drove away leaving him, Joelito and his cohorts. 21 These testimonies are corroborating.

Joelito clearly and positively identified petitioner as the fourth man. The transcript of his testimony states:

Q: What are your basis, if any, in trying to point the accused Steniel Young to be that man whom you said was fair complexioned and "insek-insekon" which you further said was the one who pointed a gun at you from the transloading station at Solatorio at Caduha-an, this City up to Km. 11, Taloc, Bago City?

A: The basis why I pointed to this man is that because at the gasoline station I have taken a very good look at him and while we were at the transloading station at Solatorio he was pointing his gun at me and as a matter of fact he was the one who drove the truck from Taloc and I easily recognized his face on the lights reflected by the panel lights of the truck and because of the on-coming vehicles which was shown on the truck.

Q: What else if any are your basis to point that accused Steniel Young as that man whom you pointed a while ago?

A: Because he was the one who pointed the gun at me[,] and he was the one who drove the truck in going to the south. 22

In fact, Joelito even described an identifying mark on the face of petitioner: a mole on the bridge of his nose near the left eye. 23

Essentially, petitioner wants this Court to believe that Joelito's delay in identifying him as the fourth man who pointed a gun at the latter during the carnapping incident taints Joelito's testimony. Petitioner points out that Joelito had several missed opportunities to describe the identity of the fourth man, such as: (i) when Prospero and Joelito reported the crime at the police station; (ii) when they reported the crime to their employer; and (iii) during preliminary investigation. It was only after two (2) years, or during the trial, when Joelito positively identified him as the fourth man in the carnapping incident.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrator of the crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness as long as the delay is sufficiently explained. In People v. Arpon n 24 and People v. Berondo, 25 We stated that:

Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given. No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay. 26 aDSIHc

After the harrowing incident, Prospero and Joelito immediately went to the police station and to their employer. It is natural to expect that any gaps in Joelito's narration at that point resulted from the spontaneous and natural reactions of a person who has yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event. "The workings of the human mind are unpredictable. People react differently to emotional stress." 27 Moreover, it is clear in Joelito's testimony that when they were in the police station, only Prospero was interrogated by the police. 28 With respect to the fact that Joelito's affidavit was not submitted during the preliminary investigation, the same does not raise doubts on the credibility of his positive identification of petitioner during trial. The complainants are not precluded from submitting other pieces of evidence on trial. The preliminary investigation is limited to the specific purpose of establishing the probable cause of the commission of a crime. Here, despite the delay in reporting the identity of the fourth man, Joelito testified in a categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous manner during trial. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.

We cannot give weight to the August 4, 1992 Sworn Statement of Romeo Gaurana (Romeo), the employer of Prospero and Joelito, who stated that Prospero and Joelito were not able to identify the suspects, because Romeo was not present in the carnapping incident. Moreover, this statement is ambivalent because he does not say, for instance, that Joelito denied having a good look at the suspects. All that Romeo said was that Prospero and Joelito did not identify the suspects, and this could have various meanings, i.e., they did not know the suspects by name, or that they were strangers. At the time Prospero and Joelito reported the crime to their employer, they were under tremendous emotional stress and thus could not organize an impeccable narrative of the incident. This ambivalent statement of Romeo therefore cannot override the positive identification of petitioner by Joelito during the trial of the case.

Belatedly, petitioner raised the issue on the irregularity of the implementation of the search warrants in his reply to the comment on his petition. We cannot give due consideration to this claim. A review of the records reveal that this contention is more of an afterthought on the part of the petitioner, rather than a serious claim on the alleged violation of his constitutional right. It baffles the Court why the issue of the integrity of the engine and the chassis that were seized during the implementation of the search warrants was raised only in the reply and not in the petition itself. Moreover, petitioner did not substantiate how the integrity of the engine and chassis the seized during the implementation of the search warrants was compromised. Petitioner could have, but did not, dispute the physical and macro etching examination by the forensic chemist, which reveals that the engine and chassis seized during the search were parts of the carnapped motor vehicle. We therefore find no reversible error in the findings of the RTC and CA on this matter.

Accordingly, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of violating the Anti-Carnapping Act.

Anent the award of damages of P35,000.00 per month starting from July 18, 1992 up to the present, representing the unrealized income of the carnapped vehicle, We modify the same to P50,000.00 29 representing temperate damages. While the amount of unrealized income lacks convincing proof, the Court is authorized to impose temperate damages pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, which states that "[t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty."

We affirm the award of moral damages to compensate the victim of the carnapping for manifold injuries, such as mental anguish and serious anxiety, pursuant to Article 2220 of the Civil Code, which states that "[w]illful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due." However, We modify the amount of moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in view of prevailing jurisprudence. 30

WHEREFORE, the October 25, 2012 Decision and January 24, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Steniel Young is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972), and he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay Romeo Gaurana P580,000.00 by way of reparation for the cost of the truck, P50,000.00 as temperate damages for the unrealized income of the cargo truck, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P60,000.00 for attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED." LOPEZ, M., J., on official leave. ETHIDa

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 10-33.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos (ret.) and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy; id. at 38-60.

3.Id. at 62-63.

4. Penned by Executive Judge Renato D. Muñez; id. at 92-122.

5.Macayan v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 215-216 (2015).

6.People v. Arpon, G.R. No. 229859, June 10, 2019.

7.People v. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, 236 [2003].

8.Rollo, p. 16.

9.Id. at 17-19.

10.Id. at 19-21.

11.Id. at 21-22.

12.Id. at 22-23.

13.Id. at 23.

14.Id. at 47.

15.Id. at 48-49.

16.Id. at 47-48.

17.Id. at 48.

18.Id. at 213.

19.Id. at 32.

20.Id. at 223.

21.Id. at 227.

22.Id. at 226, citing TSN, August 30, 1994, pp. 25-41.

23.Id. at 248.

24. G.R. No. 229859, June 10, 2019.

25. 601 Phil. 538 (2009).

26.Id. at 544-545.

27.People v. Dulanas, 522 Phil. 604, 622 (2006).

28.Rollo, p. 18.

29.People v. Macaranas, 811 Phil. 610, 625 (2017).

30.People v. Bayang, 403 Phil. 917, 925 (2001).

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "v. Arpon" in the official document.