Ynares III v. Natividad

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 246722. February 15, 2022.]

CASIMIRO A. YNARES III, M.D., petitioner, vs. AUGUSTO D.G. NATIVIDAD, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 15, 2022 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 246722 (Casimiro A. Ynares III, M.D., Petitioner vs. Augusto D.G. Natividad, Respondent).

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the October 3, 2018 Decision 1 and April 12, 2019 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 151400. The CA reversed the ruling of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in the administrative case against respondent Augusto D.G. Natividad (Augusto).

Antecedents

On December 18, 2013, a certain Jake Tapar (Jake) submitted a handwritten letter-complaint to the Office of the Public Safety and Security (OPSS) of the City Government of Antipolo. He narrated that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 15, 2013, while he was driving his tricycle, he was apprehended by Augusto, who was then on duty as a traffic enforcer. Augusto asked for his driver's license. Jake inquired as to the nature of his violation; Augusto replied that he had committed a counterflow violation. Jake tried to reason out but Augusto got upset, shouted obscenities, and choked Jake with his bare hands. Jake went to the Antipolo Community Hospital for treatment. According to the certificate issued by the medical officer, Jake suffered abrasions on the neck and was advised to take 2-3 days rest. 3

Jake's mother Natividad Tapar (Natividad) and Fe Lampayan (Fe), likewise submitted their respective handwritten statements. According to them, sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on December 15, 2013, they were riding in Jake's tricycle when they chanced upon Augusto. Jake told his mother that Augusto was the enforcer who had apprehended him earlier. Natividad went up to Augusto to ask for his full name, but the latter showed disrespect, shouted at her, and called her a liar. She stated that Augusto even accused Jake of being a drug user. 4

On December 27, 2013, Wenceslao Ornido (Ornido), Head of the OPSS, recommended to the City Human Resource and Management Office (CHRMO) of Antipolo that disciplinary action be instituted against Augusto. 5

Augusto wrote an Explanation Letter dated March 19, 2014, confirming that he apprehended Jake for counterflow driving through a one-way street. He explained that when he asked for Jake's driver's license, the latter began to hurl expletives at him. Jake only surrendered his license after bystanders convinced him to do so to avoid further conflict. Augusto further claimed that it was impossible for him to strangle Jake as the latter had relatives and neighbors who lived nearby. 6

The CHRMO ordered the Legal Office of the City Government of Antipolo to investigate the matter. The City Legal Office (CLO) issued a notice to Augusto to attend a clarificatory hearing, and a subsequent notice giving him an opportunity to file a supplemental answer to the allegations against him. The CLO issued its investigation report with recommendation on February 9, 2016, finding probable cause for the issuance of a formal charge of discourtesy in the course of official duties and grave misconduct under Rule 10, Section 46 (D) and Rule 10, Sec. 46 (A), respectively, of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). Casimiro A. Ynares III (petitioner), then Mayor of Antipolo City, issued a Formal Charge with Order of Preventive Suspension dated February 11, 2016, against Augusto. 7

In its Formal Investigation Report and Decision dated June 28, 2016, the CLO considered the allegations against Augusto as unrebutted, as the latter did not submit any answer to the formal charge. It ruled that the complaint against Augusto was supported by substantial evidence. It found that Augusto had a short temper, and showed bad manners and rudeness of behavior when he hurled expletives at Jake and choked him. The act of inflicting injury upon another while exercising his functions as a traffic enforcer was considered a flagrant disregard of established rules. Finding Augusto guilty of discourtesy and grave misconduct, the CLO recommended his dismissal. 8

In an Order dated July 4, 2016, petitioner affirmed the findings of the CLO and ordered Augusto dismissed from the service, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations. Augusto moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. 9

Ruling of the CSC

Augusto elevated the case to the CSC. The CSC set aside petitioner's order of dismissal in its March 13, 2017 Decision, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal of Augusto D.G. Natividad, Traffic Aide II, City Government of Antipolo, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated July 4, 2016 of Mayor Casimiro A. Ynares III, City Government of Antipolo, finding Natividad guilty of Grave Misconduct and Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations, is SET ASIDE. The City Government of Antipolo is directed to reinstate Natividad to his former position with payment of back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. 11

The CSC ruled that the allegations against Augusto were not proven by substantial evidence. It observed that the supporting documents submitted in connection with the complaint were not sufficient to corroborate Jake's claims, as neither Natividad nor Fe was present during the incident. Likewise, the letter of Ornido only admits the existence of a complaint filed against Augusto. Finally, the medical certificate which states that Jake suffered an abrasion on his neck is not conclusive that it was Augusto who inflicted the injury. CAIHTE

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its May 30, 2017 Resolution. 12

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed the CSC decision before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed October 3, 2018 Decision, the CA found substantial evidence to hold Augusto accountable for simple misconduct. It held that petitioner correctly considered Jake's written statement and his medical certificate as basis for the charge of misconduct. Augusto failed to show any ill motive on the part of the complainant to concoct such charge against him, and failed to adequately rebut the latter's allegations against him. The CA noted that while Natividad and Fe did not have personal knowledge of the incident between Jake and Augusto, Augusto's attitude towards Natividad when she asked for his name constituted a separate offense of Discourtesy under Sec. 46 (D) of the RRACCS. Moreover, Ornido's report further corroborates respondent's arrogant and disrespectful attitude. According to the CA, the medical certificate submitted by Jake substantially corroborates his statements. Augusto's argument that the certificate failed to show that he was the one responsible for the injuries is illogical, as the same cannot be inferred by a medical officer merely from treating the wounds or injuries. 13

Even so, the CA found that Augusto's improper behavior should be characterized merely as simple misconduct in view of the absence of the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule which must be manifest. 14

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

FOR THE STATED REASONS, the Petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. The March 13, 2017 Decision and May 30, 2017 Resolution of the Civil Service Commission in CSC Case No. D-2016-10003 are SETASIDE. The Decision dated June 28, 2016 and Order dated July 4, 2016 of the City Government of Antipolo are MODIFIED to the effect that respondent Augusto D.G. Natividad is found guilty of Simple Misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration praying that the offense be classified as grave misconduct and that respondent be dismissed from the service. The CA denied the motion via its April 12, 2019 Resolution.

Unfazed, petitioner filed the present petition assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the CA.

Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF SIMPLE MISCONDUCT ONLY;

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PENALIZING RESPONDENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF DISCOURTESY IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES UNDER SECTION 46(D) OF THE RRACCS. 16

Arguments of the Petitioner

The act of strangling another person over a simple traffic violation is clearly an unlawful behavior, which implies a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. Respondent, thus, undoubtedly committed misconduct. However, petitioner opines that said misconduct should be classified as grave misconduct. Petitioner maintains that infliction of bodily harm constitutes grave misconduct. Respondent deliberately disregarded the Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees as provided under Republic Act No. 6713, ignoring the principle that government employees are "bound by the rules of proper and ethical behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence." 17 In addition, the act of choking complainant constitutes a violation of Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Petitioner further points out that while the CA decision held that Augusto's attitude towards Natividad amounts to discourtesy under the RRACCS, the same was not reflected in the dispositive portion of the subject decision. Petitioner theorizes that the omission was a mere mistake, and the findings of the CA in the body of its decision should prevail over the dispositive portion thereof. Thus, petitioner prays that Augusto be held additionally liable for serious discourtesy in the course of official duties.

Arguments of the Respondent

In his comment, Augusto harps on the fact that this appeal was brought to the Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, he points out that only questions of law may be raised, and prays that the CA decision be affirmed in toto.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. DETACa

The ruling of the CA holding respondent administratively liable, hinges on the factual finding that there was substantial evidence to establish that Augusto had indeed put his hands on Jake and choked him. In an appeal by certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that only questions of law may be raised. While offhandedly maintaining that there is no evidence to prove the acts imputed to him, it is respondent himself who stubbornly insists that the instant petition can no longer deal with questions of fact.

We echo with approval the factual findings of the CA that Augusto choked Jake and was later discourteous towards Natividad. Neither party offered any serious legal argument for the Court to review the factual findings of the CA. In any case, the CA correctly ruled that Jake's written statement and his medical certificate form substantial evidence of the allegations against respondent. Substantial evidence refers to "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming." 18

Thus, as regards the charge of misconduct, the only issue is whether the transgression should be considered as grave, or, merely simple misconduct. As an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. 19 The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. It must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. 20 Grave misconduct is qualified by: (a) corruption; (b) clear intent to violate the law; or (c) flagrant disregard of an established rule. If none of these elements are present, the misconduct is only simple. 21

Clear intent to violate the law and flagrant disregard of established rule presuppose that there is an order or regulation defied by the public official. Intent, being a mental state, is often ascertained from the acts or conduct of the person. 22

The incident took place while Augusto was acting in his capacity as traffic aide and, in the occasion of which, he apprehended Jake for a traffic violation. Clearly it relates to respondent's performance of official functions and duties as a public officer. Augusto's act of choking Jake could be considered an offense of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the RPC. While from the records it appears that no criminal charges were filed over the incident, it is a basic rule that the finding of administrative guilt is independent of the results of any criminal charge. 23 In an administrative case, evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary. 24 Since Augusto's act of choking Jake could be treated as a crime in itself, it is a flagrant violation of the law, and thus considered as grave misconduct. 25

Anent the second issue concerning the charge of discourtesy, We again concur with the finding of the CA that Augusto was discourteous to Natividad when she asked for his full name. To be certain, while Natividad's statement could not be used to corroborate Jake's allegations regarding the choking incident which occurred at around 4:00 p.m., the CA treated the encounter between Natividad and Augusto sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. as a second separate incident. The statement of Natividad was sufficiently corroborated by Fe, who was her companion at the time.

As a public officer Augusto is bound, in the performance of his official duties, to observe courtesy, civility, and self-restraint in his dealings with others. 26 Regardless of Natividad's attitude when she confronted him, and whether or not he had the obligation to entertain her queries, Augusto should have kept his composure and maintained a professional demeanor. Instead, he exhibited a belligerent attitude as he shouted at her and even continued to do so when she was already leaving. Augusto's attitude was bared further when Ornido — Augusto's superior — noted that when his office sought for a possible amicable settlement between the parties, Augusto arrogantly challenged the Tapars to file a case against him. 27 Such callous attitude constitutes the offense of discourtesy in the course of official duties.

The CA undoubtedly came to the same conclusion when it said that such attitude "separately amounts to Discourtesy under Sec. 46 (D) of the RRACCS." 28 However, such conclusion was not reflected in the dispositive portion of its decision, nor was any penalty imposed for such violation. Hence, We hereby rectify the oversight.

Grave Misconduct is classified as a grave offense, punishable by dismissal from the service under Sec. 46 (A) of the RRACCS; while discourtesy in the course of official duties is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense under Sec. 46 (D) of the same rules. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. 29

WHEREFORE, the October 3, 2018 Decision and April 12, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151400, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. aDSIHc

Respondent Augusto D.G. Natividad is hereby found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties, and is hereby ORDERED to suffer the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with its accessory penalties, namely, perpetual disqualification from holding public office; forfeiture of retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any; cancellation of Civil Service eligibility; and bar from taking future Civil Service examinations.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 25-33; penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring.

2.Id. at 34-35.

3.Id. at 25-26 and 41.

4.Id. at 26 and 44-45.

5.Id. at 26.

6.Id. at 26-27.

7.Id. at 27.

8.Id. at 72-74.

9.Id. at 28 and 75.

10.Id. at 133-139; penned by Chairperson Alicia dela Rosa-Bala with Commissioner Robert S. Martinez, concurring.

11.Id. at 139.

12.Id. at 29.

13.Id. at 30-31.

14.Id. at 31.

15.Id. at 32.

16.Id. at 12.

17. Citing Dela Cruz v. Zapico, 710 Phil. 501, 517 (2013).

18.Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Dionisio, 813 Phil. 474, 487 (2017).

19.Rodil v. Posadas, A.M. No. CA-20-36-P, August 3, 2021.

20.Commission on Elections v. Mamalinta, 807 Phil. 304, 311 (2017).

21.Neri v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212467, July 5, 2021.

22. See Mahinay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 230355, March 18, 2021.

23. See In re: Salazar, A.M. Nos. 15-05-136-RTC & P-16-3450, December 4, 2018.

24.Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011).

25.In re: Salazar, supra.

26.Sison v. Morales-Malaca, 571 Phil. 566, 575 (2008).

27.Rollo, p. 40.

28.Id. at 30.

29. Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 50.