SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231940. June 27, 2022.]
ALFREDO YBIOSA AND FREDESWINDA YBIOSA, petitioners, vs.CRISTITA ALEGRIA, JERRY B. DRILON, ESTERLORE DRILON, DEMETRIO OYOS, EUFEMIA OYOS, APOLONIO MANSING, ARITA MANSING, PRAXEDES BANQUERIGO, TEODOSIA BANQUERIGO, GAVINA OLLENA, ROLANDO CABUNILAS, EVELIA CABUNILAS, EFRIN DRILON, BERNADETH DRILON, EDGARDO DRILON, TURTILLANA DRILON, NARCISO MANSING, JR., ROWENA D. MANSING, NOEL FORASTEROS, FEDELIZA FORASTEROS, ERLINDA SINANGOTE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 27, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 231940 (Alfredo Ybiosa and Fredeswinda Ybiosa v. Cristita Alegria, Jerry B. Drilon, Esterlore Drilon, Demetrio Oyos, Eufemia Oyos, Apolonio Mansing, Arita Mansing, Praxedes Banquerigo, Teodosia Banquerigo, Gavina Ollena, Rolando Cabunilas, Evelia Cabunilas, Efrin Drilon, Bernadeth Drilon, Edgardo Drilon, Turtillana Drilon, Narciso Mansing, Jr., Rowena D. Mansing, Noel Forasteros, Fedeliza Forasteros, Erlinda Sinangote). — This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Alfredo Ybiosa (Alfredo) and Fredeswinda Ybiosa (Fredeswinda), assailing the Decision 2 dated July 28, 2016 and the Resolution 3 dated April 7, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 08686. The CA dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents Cristita Alegria, Jerry B. Drilon, Esterlore Drilon, Demetrio Oyos, Eufemia Oyos, Apolonio Mansing, Arita Mansing, Praxedes Banquerigo, 4 Teodosia Banquerigo, Gavina Ollena, Rolando Cabunilas, Evelia Cabunilas, Efrin Drilon, 5 Bernadeth Drilon, Edgardo Drilon, Turtillana Drilon, Narciso Mansing, Jr., Rowena D. Mansing, Noel Forasteros, Fedeliza Forasteros, and Erlinda Sinangote (collectively, Alegria, et al.) and overturned the rulings of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Dumaguete City (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan (MTC).
The Antecedents
Alfredo and Fredeswinda purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 3660 and Lot No. 3658, both situated in Barangay Ajong, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, covered by a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. FV-36315 and Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. FV-36316, respectively, from the registered owner Gabriel Drilon (Gabriel), married to Eustaquia Drilon (Eustaquia) (collectively Spouses Drilon), evidenced by Deeds of Absolute Sale dated October 8, 1993. 6 On March 9, 2001, Eustaquia executed a Confirmation of Sale which acknowledged that the first Deed of Sale was executed within five years from the issuance of the title to them. 7
Alfredo and Fredeswinda alleged in their Complaint 8 that Florencia Abol, Felixberta Abol, Jerry and Esterlore Drilon, and Cristita Alegria were permitted to stay on Lot No. 3660 by Gabriel during his lifetime. As for Lot No. 3658, petitioners alleged that Evilia and Rolando Cabunilas, Edgardo and Turtillana Drilon, Efrin Drilon, Rowena Drilon, Noel Forasteros, and Erlinda Sinangote were likewise permitted to stay thereon by Gabriel. After Alfredo and Fredeswinda bought the subject properties from Gabriel and Eustaquia on October 8, 1993, they allegedly allowed respondents Demetrio Oyos and Eufemia Oyos to build a shanty on Lot No. 3660. 9
Eventually, Alegria, et al., allowed other persons to stay in their houses without permission from Alfredo and Fredeswinda. Alegria, et al., were asked to vacate the subject parcels of land, but they refused to do so. The matter was brought to the barangay where no settlement was reached by the parties, prompting the petitioners to file a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC on April 2, 2012. 10
On their part, Alegria, et al., asserted that they were the actual, prior and public occupants, possessors, and tillers of the subject properties. They contended that Gabriel was never in possession of the subject lots. 11
In the Answer 12 by Alegria, et al., before the MTC, and as detailed in their Comment to the Petition for Review (Comment), 13 Alegria, et al., claimed that they occupied and possessed the subject property for years not based on Alfredo and Fredeswinda's tolerance.
Alegria, et al., asserted that even if Gabriel was granted title to the subject property, the subsequent sale of the lots to the petitioners was void and cannot be given any effect as it was in violation of Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prohibits the sale of land granted on the basis of free patents within five years from the issuance of the patent. Additionally, they claim that Eustaquia could not have validly sold the entirety of the parcels of land since Gabriel's brothers, nephews, and nieces inherited half of the properties after his death. 14
In a Decision 15 dated July 5, 2013, the MTC ruled in favor of Alfredo and Fredeswinda, finding that they were able to substantiate their claims of ownership over the subject lots with the deed of sale executed by the Spouses Drilon. It stated that from the time they bought the lots, Alfredo and Fredeswinda acquired the right to possess the same since possession is one of the attributes of ownership. The dispositive portion of the MTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendants CRISTITA ALEGRIA, SPOUSES JERRY DRILON and ESTERLORE DRILON, SPOUSES DEMETRIO OYOS and EUFEMIA OYOS, SPOUSES APOLONIO MANSING and ARITA MANSING, SPOUSES PREXEDES BANQUERIGO and TEODICIA BANQUERIGO, GAVINA OLLENA, SPOUSES EVILLA CABUNILAS and ROLANDO CABUNILAS, SPOUSES EFREN DRILON and BERNADETH DRILON, SPOUSES EDGARDO DRILON and TURTILLANA DRILON, SPOUSES ROWENA DRILON and NARCISO MANSING, SPOUSES NOEL FORASTEROS and FEDELIZA FORASTEROS, ERLINDA SINANGOTE and all persons or parties claiming right under them to VACATE Lot 3660 and Lot [3658] of Barangay Ajong, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
2. Ordering defendants CRISTITA ALEGRIA, SPOUSES JERRY DRILON and ESTERLORE DRILON, SPOUSES DEMETRIO OYOS and EUFEMIA OYOS, SPOUSES APOLONIO MANSING and ARITA MANSING, SPOUSES PREXEDES BANQUERIGO and TEODICIA BANQUERIGO, GAVINA OLLENA, SPOUSES EVILLA CABUNILAS and ROLANDO CABUNILAS, SPOUSES EFREN DRILON and BERNADETH DRILON, SPOUSES EDGARDO DRILON and TURTILLANA DRILON, SPOUSES ROWENA DRILON and NARCISO MANSING, SPOUSES NOEL FORASTEROS and FEDELIZA FORASTEROS, ERLINDA SINANGOTE to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally as follows:
a) [T]he amount of [P]20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
b) Rent in the amount of [P]1,500.00 per month to be reckoned from January 14, 2012 until fully paid.
c) [T]he costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 16
The MTC ordered respondents to vacate Lot No. 3660 and Lot No. 3658 of Barangay Ajong, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the petitioners. It also ordered them to pay Alfredo and Fredeswinda, jointly and severally, the amounts of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, rent in the amount of P1,500.00 per month to be reckoned from January 14, 2012 until fully paid, and the costs of suit. 17
The RTC affirmed the MTC's ruling in a Decision 18 dated October 22, 2013. It took into account the ruling in a separate and previous reconveyance case (G.R. No. 161317) that Alegria, et al., filed against Alfredo and Fredeswinda, where the handling court, 19 ruled that Alegria, et al., failed to show any proof of title over properties. The CA and this Court affirmed the said ruling on the ground that although Alegria, et al., may be occupants of the properties, they had no legal personality to question the sale made by Gabriel to petitioners during the five-year prohibitive period under Section 118 of C.A. 141, as it is only the State, being the owner of the property, who can do so. The RTC considered the pronouncements in G.R. No. 161317 to have reinforced petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject properties. It declared that unless the sale made by Gabriel is declared void, it remains valid. The RTC likewise ruled that the confirmation of sale made by Eustaquia was unnecessary, considering that Alfredo and Fredeswinda purchased the lot from Gabriel when he was still alive. The RTC only modified the MTC's decision as to the amount and reckoning date of the adjudged rentals. 20 Its dispositive portion stated thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal of defendants-appellants is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 5, 2013 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental is AFFIRMED, with modification that the amount of Rent be reduced from One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) to One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) reckoned from January 16, 2012 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 21
Alegria, et al., appealed to the CA and applied for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Their application for such preliminary injunctive reliefs was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 22, 2015. 22
Subsequently, Alegria, et al., filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA found no reason to alter, reverse, or modify its Resolution. 23
During the CA's review of the appeal before it, Alegria, et al., filed anew an Application for Issuance of a WPI and TRO, seeking to restrain the enforcement of a writ of demolition that was issued by the RTC. In its Decision, the CA stated that it will no longer separately address the new application for preliminary injunctive reliefs, as it will proceed to resolve the case on the merits. 24
In its Decision 25 dated July 28, 2016, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and MTC. It found that the sale made by Gabriel contradicted Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which expressly provides that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, legally constituted banking corporation, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a terms of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant. By reason of the provision, the CA opined that the subject properties were never validly alienated to Alfredo and Fredeswinda. 26 Consequently, according to the CA, Alfredo and Fredeswinda did not have a right to its possession, more so to cause the ejectment of respondents. 27 The dispositive portion of the CA Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Dumaguete City, in Civil Case No. AP-08-13-132, dated October 22, 2013, is hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 637-12 before the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 28
Unfazed, Alfredo and Fredeswinda filed the instant petition. Alfredo and Fredeswinda assert that the CA effectively reversed its previous finding in G.R. No. 161317, which did not invalidate the sale to Alfredo and Fredeswinda. Alfredo and Fredeswinda likewise cite the rulings of the MTC and RTC which, according to them, were guided by the principle of stare decisis and immutability of judgment. 29 They claim that the facts and the opposing parties of the present case and in G.R. No. 161317 are substantially the same, hence, the principle of stare decisis et no quieta mover applies. Based on the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 161317, Alfredo and Fredeswinda assert that the CA should not have nullified the sale between them and Gabriel. 30
In their Comment, 31 Alegria, et al., reason out that the principles of stare decisis and immutability of judgment were not violated because the parties and issues in that case were different from the parties in the instant case. Nevertheless, Alegria, et al., argue that the decision in G.R. No. 161317 did not explicitly consider the sale by Gabriel as valid nor did it consider Alfredo and Fredeswinda to have the right to possess the same. 32
Issue
At the crux of the instant Petition is the question of whether Alegria, et al., should vacate the subject properties and surrender possession thereof to Alfredo and Fredeswinda.
Our Ruling
We reverse.
At the outset, we must state the general rule that the Court does not review factual questions, primarily because it is not a trier of facts. 33 Thus, it is generally not inclined to reexamine and reevaluate the evidence of the parties, whether testimonial or documentary. 34
We note that this case presents factual disputes as to the possession of respondents, the Spouses Drilon, and petitioners, as the latter's successor-in-interest. In contradiction to petitioners' assertions, respondents adamantly claim that they were the prior, public, and actual occupants, possessors and tillers of portions of Lot No. 3658 with an area of 1,986 square meters and Lot No. 3660 with an area of 3,703 square meters. They assert that the late Gabriel and even his wife Eustaquia had never occupied nor possessed the subject lots. 35
As the Court explained in Heirs of Villanueva v. Heirs of Mendoza, 36 to review factual questions would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which is not its intended purpose under the law. 37
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, it may review the facts and re-examine the records of the case under certain exceptions, such as:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees;
(7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 38
Verily, the findings of fact by the MTC and RTC contradict with that of the CA. The MTC and RTC, analyzing the issue of possession by tackling the issue of ownership, found that the petitioners were able to introduce evidence that would substantiate their claim of ownership to Lot Nos. 3660 and 3658. 39 In arriving at this conclusion, the MTC relied on the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gabriel before his death, as well as the tax declarations which show that taxes were paid by Gabriel and continued by the petitioners. 40
The CA, also tackling the issue of ownership, found that the alienation of the subject property in their favor was void for being executed within the prohibited period under Section 118 of C.A. 141, causing their claim of ownership and suit for ejectment to fail. 41
Given the inconsistencies in the findings of the CA and the trial courts, this Court shall review the issue as to whether petitioners sufficiently established their possession of the subject lots as well as their case for unlawful detainer against respondents.
To be sure, petitioners' reliance on this Court's previous ruling in G.R. No. 161317 is misplaced.
The rule of stare decisis bars any attempt to relitigate the same issue in cases where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. 42
A review of the issues involved in G.R. No. 161317 and the instant case would show that the two cases do not face the same questions.
The instant action for an unlawful detainer is entirely different from the subject of G.R. No. 161317, which involved an action for reconveyance of title. As We have stated in De la Cruz v. CA: 43
What is involved in an unlawful detainer case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue.
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The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. 44
Verily, the only issue for resolution in this case is the question of possession de facto. As explained in Garcia v. Anas: 45
[I]n an action for ejectment x x x, the purpose of which is merely to protect the owner from any physical encroachment from without. The title of the land or its ownership is not involved, for if a person is in actual possession thereof he is entitled to be maintained and respected in it even against the owner himself. The main thing to be proven is prior possession and if same is lost through force, stealth or violence, it behooves the court to restore it regardless of its title or ownership[.] 46
In any case, the discussion in G.R. No. 161317 did not delve into the validity of a sale conducted within the five-year prohibitory period under C.A. 141. In that Resolution, this Court confined its discussion to the proper party with legal personality to file a case for reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660. Therein it was pronounced that actions for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 47
Given that the adjudication of ownership by the trial courts and the CA in the instant ejectment case was merely provisional and would not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the property, 48 it is unnecessary to discuss here the validity of the sale from Gabriel to petitioners. In this regard, We disagree with the procedure taken by the trial courts and the CA when they considered the issue of ownership in analyzing the issue of possession.
We proceed to discuss the possession held by both parties and the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint for unlawful detainer instituted by petitioners before the MTC. 49
Tolerance was established.
In civil cases, the burden of proof, which is to be established by preponderance of evidence, is on the plaintiff who is asserting the affirmative of an issue. 50 Having the burden of proof, the plaintiff will be defeated if no evidence was given on either side. 51
Jurisprudence has established that what is important in an action for ejectment is to find out who the actual possessor is and if their possession had been disturbed. 52
A perusal of the pleadings and the evidence offered would show that petitioners do not contradict the respondents' possession over the subject property. They however contend that respondents' possession is by mere tolerance.
In cases of unlawful detainer, tolerance is a jurisdictional fact that must be alleged as a cause of action, thus:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 53
This Court has previously emphasized in the case of Dallas Energy and Petroleum Corporation v. Auzno54 that in unlawful detainer cases, the tolerance granted to the respondent as their basis of possession must be supported by evidence, thus:
[A]n ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. As petitioner in this case opted to file an unlawful detainer case hinged upon mere tolerance, it had the correlative burden to allege as well as prove by preponderance of evidence all the jurisdictional facts required in such action, failing which, it could pursue other appropriate legal remedies granted to it by law. 55
Stated otherwise, an action for unlawful detainer presupposes an initial lawful possession which eventually acquires an unlawful nature. This is why tolerance by the petitioners must be proved; it serves as the basis for the initial lawfulness of respondents' possession.
As thoroughly explained in the case of Go v. Court of Appeals, 56 tolerance, although required to be proved as jurisdictional fact in an unlawful detainer case, is often given in a tacit manner, thus:
Tolentino explains the concept of tolerance under the said article thus: —
Acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. They are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from the well. Although this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription.
There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, act[s] of possession are realized and performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of permission.
It is difficult to draw a dividing line between tolerance of the owner and abandonment of his rights when the acts of the possessor are repeated, specially when the lapse of time has consolidated and affirmed a relation the legality of the origin of which can be doubted. When there is license or permission, the proof of easy. It is for the court to decide in each case whether there exists tolerance or an abandonment of right on the part of the owner. 57
This was squarely the tenor of the petitioners' allegations in this case. In their Complaint 58 before the MTC, petitioners alleged tolerance and provided details which illustrated the circumstance of the permission granted by the Spouses Drilon to the respondent out of friendship or family relations:
c. That during the lifetime of Gabriel Drilon several relatives got permission from him to build shanties in these two adjoining Lots . . . out of generosity their continued stay was by mere tolerance of the owners;
d. That the original occupants, who were permitted to stay in LOT 3660 were:
1. Florencia Abol,
2. Felixberta Abol and
3. [S]pouses JERRY DRILON AND ESTERLORE DRILON(defendants herein);
e. That Florencia Abol and Felixberta Abol vacated the land; the former abandoned her house and was destroyed; . . . that in 1995, Florencia Abol's daughter CRISTITA ALEGRIA (defendant herein) got permission from the owners to repair the house and stay thereof with the consent of the owners;
f. That JERRY DRILON initially rented from G[A]BRIEL DRILON but did not pay his rental later; his continued stay was just tolerated by the owners;
g. That the other original occupants of the other Lot 3658 were:
1. The brother of Gabriel Drilon in the name of Demetrio Drilon,
2. Joaquin Forasteros,
3. APOLONIO MANSING (defendant herein),
4. PREXEDES BANQUERIGO (defendant herein),
5. Spouses GAVINA OLLENA and Ladislao Ollena;
h. That when Demetrio Drilon['s] children got married, they got permission from the owners to build a shanty at the back of their father's house in Lot 3658; EVILLA DRILON CABUNILAS was married to ROLANDO CABUNILAS (defendants herein) and constructed their house in Lot 3658 upon tolerance of the owners; likewise, EDGARDO DRILON was married to TURTILLANA DRILON (defendants herein) and they were allowed to build a shanty in Lot 3658 by the owners;
i. That upon the death of Demetrio Drilon, his children — EFREN DRILON and ROWENA DRILON (defendants herein) continued to occupy the house of their father in Lot 3658 upon tolerance of the owners;
j. That Joaquin Forasteros died and his son NOEL FORASTEROS (defendant herein) succeeded him in occupying their house in Lot 3658 upon tolerance of the owners;
k. That defendant ERLINDA SINANGOTE was ejected from another lot 3656, but she transferred in the house of her mother GAVINA OLLENA in Lot 3658 upon the acquiescence of plaintiffs due to her promise in the barangay office to vacate in the year 2000; her continued stay is upon tolerance of the plaintiffs;
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m. That the plaintiffs occupied the major part of Lot 3660 and under the principle of "tacking of possession" they continued the possession of the original owners, while tolerating the defendants' occupancy over the portions of Lot 3660 and Lot 3658 free of rent;
n. That defendants DEMETRIO OYOS and EUFEMIA OYOS asked permission from plaintiffs to build a shanty in Lot 3660; the plaintiffs allowed them to stay with a promise to vacate if they will use the land;
o. That defendants allowed other persons to stay in their house without permission from plaintiffs and became belligerent claiming unfounded rights over the land; plaintiffs demanded to vacate the land, but they were very arrogant and asserted that only a court order could drive them away[.] 59
Petitioners likewise attached in their Position Paper 60 dated May 30, 2013 an affidavit executed by Eustaquia. 61 Her affidavit, consistent with the allegations in the complaint, discussed how her husband, during his lifetime, permitted his relatives and friends to stay on the subject property, thus:
1. That my husband and I were the original owners of Lots 3658 and 3660, both adjoining each other and situated in Barangay Ajong, Sibulan, Negros Oriental;
2. These parcels of land were possessed by Gabriel Drilon in an open, continuous, and adverse manner since time immemorial and declared in the name of my husband since 1949 for taxation purposes and titles were issued for these two parcels of land in our names;
3. That during the lifetime of my husband several relatives and friends got permission from us to build shanties in these two adjoining Lots, out of generosity we acceded and their continued stay on different portions of the lands was by mere tolerance;
4. That on October 8, 1993, I and husband GABRIEL DRILON sold the above-mentioned adjoining Lots in favor of spouses ALFREDO YBIOSA and FREDESWINDA YBIOSA, and they continued to stay and possessed major part of the land in the concept of an owner; the present occupants are just staying therein by mere tolerance;
5. That I am executing this affidavit in good faith to attest the veracity of the foregoing facts and for all legal intents and purposes. 62
In contrast, respondents provided only a denial of tolerance by the Spouses Drilon, yet did not offer any other reason behind their occupation of the subject property. While they admitted that they possessed the property, citing their familial relationship with the Spouses Drilon, there was a glaring absence of any claim of co-ownership as their basis for their occupation of the subject lots. They stated the following in their Comment: 63
A. Respondent Cristita Alegria has been in Lot 3660 since the year 1958 and not by the alleged tolerance of petitioners;
B. Respondents Spouses Jerry Drilon and Esterlore Drilon had been in Lot 3660 since the year 1987 and not by the tolerance of petitioners. The former is the grandson of the brother of Gabriel Drilon, claiming that he was the one who applied for the issuance of patents for Gabriel Drilon;
C. Respondents Demetrio Oyos and Eufemia Oyos have been in Lot 3660 since 1987 and not by the tolerance of petitioners;
D. Respondents Spouses Apolonio Mansing and Arita Mansing, have been in Lot 3658 since the year 1964 and not by the alleged tolerance of petitioners;
E. Respondent Teodosia Banquerigo and her deceased husband Praxedes Banquerigo have been in Lot 3658 since the year 1954 and not by the tolerance of petitioners;
F. Respondent Gavina Ollena has been in Lot 3658 since the year 1954 and not by the alleged tolerance of petitioners;
G. Respondent Erlinda Sinangote has been in Lot 3658 since the year 1949 up to the present and not by the tolerance of the petitioners;
H. Respondents Spouses Evelia D. Cabunilas and Rolando Cabunilas have been in Lot 3658 since the 1980s and not by the alleged tolerance of petitioners. The former claims that she is an heir or successor-in-interest of Gabriel Drilon, she being a daughter of the Demetrio Drilon, who is the brother of Gabriel Drilon;
I Respondents Spouses Edgardo Drilon and Turtillana Drilon have been in portions of Lots 3660 and 3658 since the year 1990 and not by the alleged tolerance of the petitioners. The former claims that he is an heir or successor-in-interest of Gabriel Drilon, he being a son of the late Demetrio Drilon, the brother of said Gabriel Drilon;
J. Respondents Spouses Efrin Drilon and Bernadeth Drilon have been in Lot 3658 since Efr[e]n was born on March 7, 1954 up to the present and not by the alleged tolerance of the petitioners. The former claims that he is the son of the late Demetrio Drilon who is a brother of said Gabriel Drilon, hence, he is an heir or successor-in-interest of the said Gabriel Drilon;
K. Respondents Spouses Narciso Mansing and Rowina Drilon Mansing have been in lot 3658 since the birth of Rowina Drilon Mansing on July 9, 1964 and not by the alleged tolerance of the petitioners. Furthermore, the latter claims that she is the daughter of the late Demetrio Drilon who is the brother of Gabriel Drilon; and
L. Respondents Spouses Noel Forasteros and Fedeliza Forasteros have been in Lot 3658 since the birth of Noel Forasteros on January 30, 1975 and not by the alleged tolerance of the petitioners. 64
To Our mind, a reading of the position of both parties would lead to the conclusion that the authorization by the Spouses Drilon for the occupancy by respondents of the subject property was borne out of friendship and family ties, especially considering the fact that several of the respondents claim to be relatives of Gabriel Drilon. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of permission, which We find in the affirmative.
As explained in the case of Calubayan v. Pascual: 65
It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 66
Petitioners bought the subject property from the Spouses Drilon in 1993, thus stepping into the shoes of the seller with respect to their relationship with respondents. Even if early on, petitioners made no demand or filed no action against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby maintained the status quo and allowed respondents' possession by tolerance. 67 By the execution of the demand letters, however, it is apparent that petitioners' tolerance had expired and the cause of action for an unlawful detainer case arose.
We come now to the question of whether the complaint by petitioners was filed within the prescribed period from demand. The records indicate that the sale between petitioners and respondents took place in the year 1993 and the complaint was filed before the MTC on April 2, 2012. Notably, the complaint manifests that despite the sale, the respondents continued to possess the subject properties and that some of the respondents even obtained permission from petitioners to build a shanty on Lot No. 3660. Case law would instruct, however, that the one-year period should be counted from the date when the last demand was made and the failure to file action shortly after the sale to petitioners is to be considered as a waiver on their part to eject the possessor in the meantime. 68 Hence, considering that demand was made to respondents on January 14, 2012, as evidenced by the demand letters, the complaint filed before the MTC on April 2, 2012 was well within the one-year prescriptive period provided by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
All the jurisdictional facts for a complaint for unlawful detainer having been proven, this Court reverses the ruling of the CA which dismissed the instant complaint. The decision of the RTC is thereby reinstated and respondents are ordered to pay rent accordingly.
FOR THESE REASONS, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 28, 2016 and the Resolution dated April 7, 2017 of the Court of the Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08686 are REVERSED.
Cristita Alegria, Jerry B. Drilon, Esterlore Drilon, Demetrio Oyos, Eufemia Oyos, Apolonio Mansing, Arita Mansing, Praxedes Banquerigo, Teodosia Banquerigo, Gavina Ollena, Rolando Cabunilas, Evelia Cabunilas, Efrin Drilon, Bernadeth Drilon, Edgardo Drilon, Turtillana Drilon, Narciso Mansing, Jr., Rowena D. Mansing, Noel Forasteros, Fedeliza Forasteros, Erlinda Sinangote and all persons or parties claiming rights under them are ORDERED to VACATE Lot Nos. 3660 and 3658 of Barangay Ajong, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and peacefully surrender possession thereof to Alfredo Ybiosa and Fredeswinda Ybiosa. They shall PAY Alfredo Ybiosa and Fredeswinda Ybiosa jointly and severally the amounts of P1,000.00 rent per month reckoned from January 16, 2012 until they vacate the property; attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and cost of suit.
The amounts herein shall earn legal interest at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 29-41.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired member of this Court) and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, concurring; id. at 46-53.
3.Id. at 60-61.
4. Also spelled as Prexedes in some parts of the rollo.
5. Also spelled as Efren in some parts of the rollo.
6.Id. at 198.
7.Id. at 145.
8.Id. at 129-133.
9.Id. at 132.
10.Id. at 199.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 169-179.
13.Id. at 214-240.
14.Id. at 223.
15. Penned by Presiding Judge Jaena Tangente-Laguda; id. at 191-197.
16.Id. at 196. (Emphasis in the original)
17.Id.
18. Penned by Presiding Judge Cenon Voltaire B. Repollo; id. at 198-202.
19. Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dumaguete City.
20.Rollo, p. 49.
21.Id. at 202.
22.Id. at 50.
23.Id.
24.Id. at 51.
25.Id. at 46-53.
26.Id. at 51.
27.Id. at 52.
28.Id. at 53.
29.Id. at 37,
30.Id. at 38.
31.Id. at 214-240.
32.Id. at 226.
33.JR Hauling Services v. Solamo, G.R. No. 214294, September 30, 2020.
34.Id.
35.Rollo, p. 170.
36. 810 Phil. 172 (2017).
37.Id. at 178.
38.Sigaya v. Mayuga, 504 Phil. 600, 611 (2005). (Emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
39.Rollo, p. 193.
40.Id.
41.Id. at 52.
42.Lazatin v. Hon. Desierto, 606 Phil. 271, 282-283 (2009). (Citation omitted)
43. 218 Phil. 492 (1984).
44.Id. at 498-499. (Citation omitted)
45. 121 Phil. 1040 (1965).
46.Id. at 1042. (Citation omitted)
47.Rollo, p. 117.
48.Heirs of Albina G. Ampil v. Manahan, 697 Phil. 413, 422 (2012). (Citation omitted)
49.Rollo, pp. 129-133.
50.Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 462 Phil. 546, 561 (2003).
51.Id. (Citation omitted)
52.Garcia v. Anas, supra note 45, at 1042.
53.Cabrera v. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009). (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
54. UDK-17166 (Notice), January 3, 2022.
55.Id. (Citations omitted)
56. 415 Phil. 172 (2001).
57.Id. at 180-181; citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1972 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 253-254.
58.Rollo, pp. 129-133.
59.Id. at 130-132.
60.Id. at 62-70.
61.Id. at 108.
62.Id.
63.Id. at 214-240.
64.Id. at 216-218.
65. 128 Phil. 160 (1967).
66.Id. at 163. (Underlining supplied and citation omitted)
67.Spouses Abad, et al. v. Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corp., et al., 650 Phil. 608, 618 (2010).
68. See Calubayan v. Pascual, supra note 65, at 164. (Citation omitted)