SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221722. November 10, 2021.]
XXX, *accused-appellant, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 November 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 221722 (XXX v. People of the Philippines). — The Court NOTES the letter dated August 26, 2021 of petitioner XXX, inquiring on the status of the instant case since he already served nine (9) years and three (3) months, including Good Conduct Time Allowance of his eight (8) to seventeen (17) years sentence.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by XXX, praying for the reversal of the June 5, 2015 Decision 2 and December 3, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36602, which affirmed the April 3, 2014 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51, ___________, Pangasinan. The RTC convicted him of Lascivious Conduct punishable under Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
Antecedents
In an Information 4 dated December 14, 2011, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5 (b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about 12:00 o'clock noon of October 16, 2011, at ________________________, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious conduct by kissing the lips and neck, removing the short pants and panty then touching the private parts of AAA, a minor, 14 years of age, which are acts of child abuse and cruelty prejudicial to the child's development and which debase and degrade the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human being.
CONTRARY to Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610. 5
XXX was arraigned on April 3, 2012, and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 6 Pre-trial was held on May 2, 2012. During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to the respective identities of the accused and complainant; the due execution of the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by AAA, BBB, and CCC, which shall serve as their direct testimony, without prejudice to supplemental direct and cross-examination; and AAA's birth certificate. 7 cAaDHT
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. However, during the trial, AAA's direct testimony was expunged due to her failure to appear at her scheduled cross-examination. 8
Version of the Prosecution
The antecedent facts reveal that XXX is the common law spouse of AAA's mother DDD. At around 12 noon of October 16, 2011, CCC (AAA's brother) and EEE were cleaning XXX's house when AAA arrived to ask for her allowance from XXX. While waiting, she watched television. 9
XXX ordered CCC and EEE to leave the house to buy snacks (merienda). While Outside, CCC heard his sister crying and he noticed that the front and back doors were locked. 10 Consequently, he and EEE peeped through the window and saw XXX removing AAA's shorts and panty. 11 XXX was hugging AAA, while the latter was crying. 12 Seeing this, CCC cried and called his sister.
Thereafter, XXX turned off the radio and opened the door. CCC and EEE then went inside and saw XXX put on his sando. AAA who was already dressed, ran towards the terrace, crying. 13 XXX warned CCC not to report the incident to anyone. 14
After which, CCC called AAA and told her that they should just go home. At first, AAA was hesitant because she was afraid of their mother. 15 They proceeded to their grandmother BBB's home 16 wherein AAA told BBB of the incident. 17
AAA and BBB filed a report against XXX. However, during the trial, AAA recanted her accusation against XXX. She claimed that nothing untoward happened, as she and XXX were merely talking inside the room. She further related that BBB forced her to falsely accuse XXX, out of spite.
Version of the Defense
XXX vehemently denied the charge leveled against him. He related that he had been living together with DDD since 2010. As a stepfather, he treated AAA and CCC as his own children and provided for their school allowance.
He admitted that AAA and CCC were at his house on October 16, 2011, but denied the allegations against him. He narrated that AAA went to his house to ask for money. As such, he went inside the room to get money and invited AAA to go with him wherein they merely had a conversation. He denied undressing, touching, or kissing her. 18 He claimed that the charges filed against him were fabricated because BBB disapproved of his relationship with DDD. XXX asserted that AAA was compelled to testify, so that he would be incarcerated and out of DDD's life. 19
Ruling of the RTC
On April 3, 2014, the RTC rendered a Decision 20 convicting XXX of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The RTC refused to accord any credence to the retraction made by AAA. It was not convinced that BBB, AAA's grandmother, would deviously use her granddaughter just to separate XXX and DDD. Likewise, the RTC regarded XXX's defense as unbelievable and self-serving. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused is found GUILTY as charged, and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is likewise directed to pay AAA the sum of PhP30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 21
Aggrieved, XXX filed an appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In a Decision 22 dated June 5, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment. The CA opined that XXX's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Similar to the RTC, the CA refused to give credence to AAA's recantation. It noted that the repudiation was made for monetary gain, since AAA admitted that XXX provided for her school allowance. 23 AAA further disclosed that the ongoing case is causing her to sacrifice her studies. 24 HCaDIS
Likewise, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It declared that the witnesses provided a clear narration of how the offense was committed and made categorical statements that XXX indeed had defiled AAA. 25 Moreover, the CA observed that AAA testified in open court and identified her Sinumpaang Salaysay where she narrated that XXX undressed her, hugged, and kissed her inside his house. Although she later on stated that she was pressured by BBB to falsely charge XXX, this attribution of ill motive was not substantiated. 26
The decretal portion of the assailed CA ruling states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated April 3, 2014 which was rendered by Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region in ____________, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. T-5324 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION insofar as the monetary award for damages which shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 27
XXX filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 10, 2015, which was denied in the CA's December 3, 2015 Resolution. 28
Undeterred, XXX filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. 29
Issue
The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not XXX's guilt for lascivious conduct was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking his exoneration from the charge, XXX claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the criminal charge which was based on AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay should be subordinated to her declaration in court that she was merely forced to falsely accuse him. 30 He argues that AAA herself stated that no molestation took place and that BBB coached her on what to say. 31 XXX added that BBB's prejudice against him was further corroborated by DDD. 32
Likewise, XXX asserts that even assuming that AAA's sworn statement may be given credence, the prosecution still failed to prove all the elements for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. 33 He points out that AAA was not exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, which are required under jurisprudence. 34 There is no evidence that he had been sexually abusing AAA prior to the alleged incident on October 16, 2011. 35 At best, he may only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. 36
On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that XXX's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt as all the elements for the offense charged were present. 37 The OSG contends that XXX's insistence that the prosecution failed to prove the second clement is flawed. 38 Likewise, the RTC and the CA correctly exercised their discretion in refusing to give any weight to AAA's recantation. 39
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
XXX is Guilty Beyond Reasonable
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes acts of sexual abuse committed against children: AHCETa
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
To sustain a conviction under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the prosecution must establish that "(i) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (ii) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (iii) the child is below 18 years old." 40
Notably, lascivious conduct is defined as "the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person." 41 Furthermore, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. 42
Undoubtedly, XXX's acts of kissing AAA's lips and neck, removing her shorts and panty, and then fondling her private part43 to gratify his sexual desire, fall under the definition of lascivious conduct under Section 2 (h) of the implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7610. Likewise, XXX used his moral ascendancy over AAA, the daughter of his common-law spouse, in order to perpetrate his lewd objective as AAA regarded him as her stepfather, whom she relied upon for financial help. 44 Moreover, AAA's age was established through her birth certificate 45 indicating that she was born in June of 1997, which makes her fourteen (14) years old when she was sexually abused on October 16, 2011.
In a blatant attempt to overturn his conviction, XXX tenuously argues that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, which is that the victim must have been molested or abused more than once, or was engaged in prostitution.
It bears stressing that this faulty argument has been debunked by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of People v. Tulagan, 46 the Court explained the meaning of the phrases "exploited in prostitution" and "other sexual abuse" as used in Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610:
To avoid further confusion, We dissect the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" as an element of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct" has a clear definition which does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse.
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. 47 (Emphasis supplied) DACcIH
Based on all the foregoing, it can be easily seen that XXX's argument that AAA was not subjected to prostitution, or that the prosecution failed to prove other acts of sexual abuse, falls flat. XXX succeeded in committing lascivious and lewd acts against AAA through coercion and influence.
XXX may not harp on AAA's
Time and again, the Court has viewed a retraction with considerable disfavor as it is exceedingly unreliable due to the possibility that it may be repudiated in the future. 48 In the same vein, a recantation may be easily inveigled from a witness through intimidation or monetary consideration. 49 Thus, as with any other testimony, a retraction must be subjected to the test of credibility based on relevant circumstances, and especially on the witness' demeanor on the stand. 50
Equally important, a recantation merely serves as an additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses. It is not the sole consideration that may result in an acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction, create doubts as to the truth of the witness' testimony. 51
Similarly, a retraction does not automatically negate an earlier declaration. 52 Rather, if a previous testimony is repudiated, and thereafter a different or contrary statement is uttered by the same witness, the court must decide which testimony to believe according to the general rules of evidence. The previous and subsequent testimonies must be juxtaposed and keenly scrutinized, the circumstances under which they were made carefully analyzed, and the motives behind the sudden change thoroughly deliberated. 53 Furthermore, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the recanting witness is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination. After all, the trial court is in a better position to observe the witness' deportment, conduct and attitude. 54
In the case at bar, both the RTC and the CA refused to give weight to AAA's recantation. The Court espouses the same view. After poring over AAA's testimony, it is apparent that her recantation was based on practical and financial considerations. She broke into tears and admitted before the RTC that she wanted to drop the charges considering that the ongoing case affected her studies. She likewise revealed that she did not want XXX to go to jail since he was the only one supporting her and sending her to school. 55 Additionally, more than one (1) year prior to her recantation in court, she freely and voluntarily gave her testimony before the proper authorities detailing XXX's abuse. Her testimony is telling:
ATTY HAYES ALLEN:
Q: What is now your prayer before this Honorable Court regarding your complaint?
A: I just want to end this case, madam.
Q: What do you mean end?
A: Para wala ng gulo. (Make of record that the witness is on the verge of tears.)
Q: Do you want your uncle to be in jail?
A: No, madam because he is the only one supporting my studies.
COURT:
Witness is now crying.
ATTY. HAYES ALLEN:
Q: Can you explain to this Honorable Court why are you crying?
A: Because I was not able to finish my schooling because of this case, madam.
Q: Do you still want your mother and the accused to live as husband and wife?
A: Yes, madam.
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. ULANDAY:
Q: Madam Witness, on October 18, 2011 at about 3:30 p.m. you went to the _____________ police station. Is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You voluntarily gave your sworn statement there. Correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this is your sworn statement? EHaASD
COURT:
The prosecutor is showing Exh. A, found on page 5 of the record, to the witness.
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. ULANDAY:
Q: On October 19, 2011, you also went to the Prosecutor's Office in _________, Pangasinan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you voluntarily sworn in. Correct?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Was the statement explained to you by the prosecutor who subscribed your statement?
WITNESS:
A: No, sir.
COURT:
Q: But the statement was written in Pilipino. You can understand Pilipino.
A: Yes, madam. 56 IDTSEH
Verily, AAA's recantation is far from spontaneous and truthful. The motives behind her sudden turnabout are doubtful. It was further revealed that during the trial, AAA had been living with her mother DDD who is still in a relationship with XXX, and who staunchly insisted on his innocence. 57 Similarly, DDD admitted that she loves XXX very much and will do anything to prevent his incarceration. 58
Suffice it to say, even without AAA's testimony, XXX's dastardly act was still proven through the statements of CCC and EEE, child witnesses who innocently related what transpired. Particularly, CCC testified as follows:
PROS. ULANDAY:
Q: When you peeped at the window, what did you see, if any?
A: [XXX] was undressing my eldest sister, sir.
COURT:
Q: Are you referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And whom are you referring as your eldest sister? What is her name?
WITNESS:
A: [AAA], sir.
Q: But did [XXX] succeed in undressing your sister?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was your sister completely naked after that?
A: Only the shorts and panties were taken off, sir.
Q: Who took off the shorts?
A: Uncle [XXX], sir.
Q: And who took off your sister's panties then?
A: [XXX], sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. ULANDAY:
Q: What did you see?
A: [XXX] opened the door and had switched off the radio, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: You mentioned about EEE. Is EEE your companion when you went to buy merienda?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you and EEE go back to that house after buying?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did both of you peep?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How large was that window from which you peeped?
A: It was just a small one, sir. 59
CCC's testimony was corroborated by EEE who confirmed that at 11:30 in the morning of October 16, 2011, she and CCC were at XXX's house, cleaning. While they were cleaning, AAA arrived and watched television. Then, XXX took AAA upstairs while EEE and CCC went outside. They noticed that both the back and front doors of the house were locked so they proceeded to the back of the house and peered through the window. It was then that they saw XXX removing AAA's shorts and panty. 60 SICDAa
Equally telling is the fact that XXX admitted that he invited AAA to his room, albeit claiming that they merely talked. 61 It is certainly odd that XXX would invite AAA to his room and then lock all the doors.
Finally, XXX's defense of ill motive due to BBB's resentment towards him is unconvincing.
Penalty for Lascivious Conduct
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 states that the imposable penalty for lascivious conduct shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. 62 It bears noting that the Information failed to state that XXX was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother. Thus, in the absence of any attending circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Accordingly, the maximum term of the sentence imposed by the RTC should be modified. Thus, XXX is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In addition, the damages awarded by the CA must be modified to conform with the Court's recent pronouncement in the case of People v. Tulagan. 63 XXX shall be liable for P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, he shall pay a fine of P15,000.00 as provided for in Section 31 (f) of R.A. No. 7610.
Finally, the CA correctly ordered the payment of interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, which shall run from the finality of the Court's Resolution until full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The June 5, 2015 Decision and the December 3, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36602 are AFFIRMED with modification. XXX is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
He is further ORDERED to PAY the victim AAA the following amounts: (i) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (ii) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (iii) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (iv) P15,000.00 as fine. The total amount due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of the Court's Resolution until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., no part; Lazaro-Javier, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated September 6, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise the identity of the victim, including the names of her family members or relatives, and the barangay and town where the incidents occurred, are withheld. The names of the victim and her family members or relatives are replaced with fictitious initials. Likewise, the real name of the accused-appellant is replaced with fictitious initials be reason of his relationship to the minor victim.
1. Rollo, pp. 12-21.
2. Id. at 76-87; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a member of this Court) and Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.
3. Id. at 39-44; rendered by Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas.
4. Records, p. 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 37.
7. Rollo, p. 40.
8. Id. at 77.
9. Id. at 78.
10. TSN, August 28, 2012, p. 21.
11. Id. at 17-18.
12. Records, p. 7.
13. TSN, August 28, 2012, p. 20.
14. Records, p. 7.
15. Rollo, p. 79.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 79-80.
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 39-44.
21. Id. at 44.
22. Id. at 76-87.
23. Id. at 82.
24. Id. at 83.
25. Id. at 82.
26. Id. at 84.
27. Id. at 87.
28. Id. at 98-99.
29. Id. at 12-21.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 121.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 125.
40. People v. Rayon, Sr., 702 Phil. 672, 683 (2013), citing People v. Fragante, 657 Phil. 577, 596 (2011).
41. Id.
42. People v. Montinola, 567 Phil. 387, 407-408 (2008), citing Navarrete v. People, 542 Phil. 496, 511 (2007).
43. Records, p. 5.
44. TSN, May 8, 2013, records, p. 47.
45. Records, p. 8.
46. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.
47. Id.
48. People v. Espenilla, 718 Phil. 153, 166-167 (2013), citing People v. Nardo, 405 Phil. 826, 842 (2001).
49. Id., citing People v. Bulagao, 674 Phil. 535, 543 (2011).
50. Id., citing People v. Bulagao, id. at 544.
51. People v. Orje, 673 Phil. 58, 69 (2011), citing People v. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343, 351 (1997).
52. People v. Bulagao, supra note 49.
53. Id., citing Molina v. People, 328 Phil. 445 (1996).
54. People v. Menaling, 784 Phil. 592, 606-607 (2016), citing People v Teodoro, 704 Phil. 335, 356-357 (2013).
55. Rollo, p. 80.
56. TSN, May 8, 2013, pp. 47-49.
57. Id. at 47.
58. TSN, June 28, 2013, p. 59.
59. TSN, August 28, 2012, pp. 17-20.
60. TSN, January 10, 2013, pp. 35-37.
61. Rollo, p. 14.
62. People v. Ursua, 819 Phil. 467, 481 (2017); citing People v. Caoili, 815 Phil. 839-954 (2017); see also People v. Tulagan, supra note 46.
63. Id.