THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 207222. June 18, 2014.]
WILSON & JACKSON AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR SHOP, INC. & JACINTO GAN, JR., petitioners, vs. RICHARD PRICONES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 18, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 207222 (Wilson & Jackson Automotive Repair Shop, Inc. & Jacinto Gan, Jr. v. Richard Pricones). — This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the January 30, 2013 Decision 1 and the May 14, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125816 entitled "Richard R. Pricones v. National Labor Relations Commission (Fourth Division), Wilson & Jackson Automotive Repair Shop, Inc./Jacinto Gan, Jr." The dispositive portion of the January 30, 2013 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2012 and the Resolution dated May 10, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fourth Division in NLRC LAC No. 09-002611-11 and NLRC-NCR Case No. 03-04953-11 are hereby REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. Private respondent Wilson & Jackson Automotive Repair Shop, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to reinstate the petitioner to his former position with full backwages from the date of dismissal until actual reinstatement. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
Wilson & Jackson Automotive Repair Shop, Inc. (WJARS), owned by Jacinto Gan, Jr. (Gan), filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the CA Resolution, dated May 14, 2013.
The Facts:
On March 24, 2011, respondent Richard Pricones (Pricones) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of rest day premium, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, attorney's fees, and damages against petitioners Wilson & Jackson Automotive Repair Shop, Inc. (WJARS) and its owner, Jacinto Gan, Jr. (Gan).
In his complaint, Pricones alleged that on November 29, 2000, he was hired by WJARS as an automotive mechanic; that he resigned in 2005, but was rehired in 2006 at the rate of P415.00 per day; that his tour of duty during the period of his employment was from 8:00 o'clock in the morning to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that on January 24, 2011, he was not able to go to work due to an illness; that he informed WJARS through its secretary, Ms. Thelma Larase, of his absence; that on January 26, 2011, he underwent an x-ray examination; that he was not able to report for work until January 31, 2011; that on March 15, 2011, he submitted a written explanation for his absence; that on March 19, 2011, he received a letter of termination of his employment for his alleged submission of a falsified medical certificate; that the medical certificate was not spurious; and that he not was working for another auto repair shop during the time of his absence from WJARS. AaITCH
For its part, WJARS alleged that Pricones had previously worked for the shop but he tendered a resignation and signed a quitclaim on December 23, 2005. Not long thereafter, he decided to work again at WJARS and was rehired on January 2, 2006 as a mechanic and remained as an employee for the next five (5) years. On February 13, 2010, he was given a performance memo due to certain infractions (negligence of working hours, disrespect to employer, poor performance, and absences) and perceived lack of interest in his work. WJARS then learned of his dishonesty when it came to know that he had been "moonlighting" in another automotive repair shop. Worse, he even persuaded some of his co-workers to join him. According to WJARS, he feigned illness and submitted a falsified medical certificate so that he could claim Social Security System (SSS) benefits from WJARS. Due to these infractions, he was issued a memo asking him to explain within twenty-four (24) hours the accusations of dishonesty against him. Pricones received the Memo but he did not act on it and instead threatened the security guard of the shop and his co-workers who squealed about his "sideline." Thereafter, he was sent a letter of termination.
On July 28, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Pricones' complaint for lack of merit. 4 The LA ruled that considering Pricones admitted working for another company, it was incumbent for him to show that he did so only after his tour of duty with WJARS or when it was closed. There was credence given to the statements executed by his co-workers to the effect that he was indeed "moonlighting."
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling on February 29, 2012. 5 It was of the view that no amount of his denial would change the admission of his five (5) co-workers that he indeed worked for another automotive repair shop. It also considered the report that he threatened his co-workers, as attested to by the shop's security guards and Thelma Larase. Thus, it held him guilty of the charges hurled against him, rendering his termination justifiable.
In a petition for certiorari with the CA, Pricones contended that WJARS failed to discharge the onus probandi that his dismissal was for a valid cause. He pointed out that the statements made by his co-workers and the security guard were not made under oath. He claimed that they merely succumbed to pressure to testify against him.
In the assailed decision, the CA reversed the NLRC ruling and ordered the reinstatement of Pricones on the following grounds:
a) The burden of proof to show that the dismissal of Pricones was legal rested on WJARS.
b) There was no substantial evidence to prove that he worked for another repair shop during his tour of duty with WJARS. While he admitted in his written explanation that he worked on a sideline, there was a qualification that he only did so after work hours.
c) The statements of his co-workers were not made under oath. Even if the statements were considered in evidence, the allegation of moonlighting had no leg to stand on. In the statements, there was no intimation that he did his "sideline" during his tour of duty with WJARS. There was even no specific allegations on the date and time.
d) There was also no citation of a specific company rule that restricted him from engaging in other sources of livelihood.
e) On the charge of dishonesty, there was no substantial evidence to prove that he falsified the medical certificate he submitted.
With its motion for reconsideration denied, WJARS filed this petition anchored on the following arguments:
a) In totally reversing the rulings of the LA and the NLRC, the CA disregarded clear parameters for the exercise of judicial review under Rule 65, as there was no finding of grave abuse of discretion.
b) In the case of AGG Trucking v. Yuag, 6 the Court ruled that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
c) The factual findings of the LA and the NLRC, entities having the expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.
d) In reviewing the facts all together, the CA used a wrong evidentiary standard. The law only requires substantial proof to justify dismissals. Direct evidence is not needed to declare a termination valid.
e) The petitioner had ample grounds to terminate Pricones. His dismissal was not baseless.
On September 26, 2013, Pricones filed his Comment 7 contending that he was illegally dismissed from the service as the charges against him were not supported by substantial evidence. They were purely based on the allegations made by the forced employee-witnesses which were not under oath.
WJARS filed its Reply, 8 dated January 13, 2014, reiterating that the CA committed a serious procedural fault in reviewing and reversing the consistent factual findings without a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC and the LA. It stresses that the findings of the LA and the NLRC were supported by substantial evidence as there was an admission from Pricones, buttressed by statements executed by his co-workers.
The Court's Ruling
In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer, who has to prove that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. 9 In this case, the dismissal of Pricones from his employment as mechanic was due to "moonlighting" and dishonesty. It was, thus, incumbent upon WJARS to prove these grounds. It is clear from the evidence on record that WJARS miserably failed to discharge this burden. As correctly found by the CA, thus:
This Court finds that the private respondents failed to discharge this onus probandi. A perusal of the Notice to Explain issued by the private respondents to petitioner Pricones would show that the charge against the latter was dishonesty in connection with "moonlighting." Essentially, private respondents sought petitioner Pricones' dismissal as he allegedly lied about being sick in order to excuse himself from work with private respondent WJARS, and thus, be able to work for another repair shop. As these were the grounds set forth by the private respondents in the Notice to Explain and subsequently, in the termination letter dated March 19, 2011, these allegations of moonlighting and dishonesty must be supported by substantial evidence, otherwise, the dismissal is deemed illegal.
A careful examination of the records of the case leads this Court to conclude that neither petitioner Pricones' alleged moonlighting nor the supposed falsity of his medical certificate was sufficiently established.
First, on the issue of moonlighting, there is no substantial evidence to prove that petitioner Pricones worked for another repair shop during his tour of duty with private respondent WJARS. While petitioner Pricones stated in his written explanation that he worked on a "sideline," there was a clarification that he only did the same after his tour of duty with private respondent WJARS or whenever the latter's business was closed.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, it may be well to note that there was no allegation as to what particular date/s did petitioner Pricones supposedly go to his "sideline." There was likewise no mention as to what date/s when petitioner Pricones allegedly tagged along his co-workers with him. The Notice to Explain dated March 12, 2011 is silent on these matters. No Daily Time Record (DTR) of either petitioner Pricones or his co-workers was presented. These are all very crucial to prove the allegation of moonlighting since the statements of his co-workers are not inconsistent with petitioner Pricones' explanation that he worked on his "sideline" outside his tour of duty with private respondent WJARS or whenever the latter was closed. HEcIDa
xxx xxx xxx
On the charge of dishonesty, there is likewise no substantial evidence to prove that the medical certificates/records which petitioner Pricones submitted to justify his absences from January 24 to January 31, 2011, were falsified. Accusations are not proof. Again, private respondents failed to discharge the onus of proving the said charge. For dismissal to be valid, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts. A condemnation of dishonesty and disloyalty cannot arise from suspicions spawned by speculative inferences." 10
As can be gleaned therefrom, the CA properly gave more credence to the medical records of Pricones as against the statements of his co-workers. The said statements were not made under oath, thus, putting into question their weight and probative value. Well-entrenched is the principle that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. 11 Accordingly, the finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.
Contrary to WJARS' contention, the CA indeed made a finding of grave abuse of discretion. The CA wrote:
Lastly, while this Court is mindful of the general rule that factual findings of the NLRC are entitled to respect, this is so only when such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Otherwise, they shall be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. In fine, this Court finds that the assailed rulings of the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence. 12
[Emphases supplied]
WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED. (Villarama, Jr. designated Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring. Rollo, pp. 31-42.
2. Id. at 44-46.
3. Id. at 42.
4. Id. at 53-57.
5. Id. at 77-82.
6. G.R. No. 195033, October 12, 2011, 659 SCRA 91.
7. Dated September 25, 2013, rollo, pp. 135-156.
8. Id. at 158-162.
9. Josan, JPS, Santiago Cargo Movers v. Aduna, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 679, citing Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, 497 Phil. 621 (2005).
10. Rollo, pp. 36-39.
11. Cited case of Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. Pacia, G.R. No. 171189, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 121.
12. Rollo, pp. 41-42.