Vitangcol, III v. Carpio Morales

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 234398. July 17, 2018.]

AL S. VITANGCOL, III, petitioner,vs. HON. CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedJULY 17, 2018, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 234398(Al S. Vitangcol, III, petitioner, v. Hon. Conchita C. Carpio Morales, Office of the Ombudsman, respondent.)

RESOLUTION

Through this Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition, petitioner Al S. Vitangcol III (Vitangcol) assails the constitutionality of Section (Sec.) 8, paragraph (par.) (3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 for being inconsistent with the intent of the legislature. Petitioner claims that any interpretation which runs counter to the legislative intent is invalid. cDCEIA

THE FACTS

On 17 November 1989, R.A. No. 6770 1 was enacted. Sec. 8 (3) of the Act reads:

Sec. 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term. In case the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.

On 1 December 2005, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) assumed the position of Ombudsman after being appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Gutierrez would have served her seven-year term as Ombudsman until 30 November 2012; however, she resigned on 6 May 2011.

On 28 July 2011, respondent Conchita Carpio Morales (respondent) assumed the position of Ombudsman with a full term of seven years pursuant to her appointment by President Benigno S. Aquino III. DHESca

Vitangcol asserts that respondent should have served only until 30 November 2012, to complete the remainder of the unexpired term of Gutierrez. Petitioner avers that the continued stay of the respondent in office as Ombudsman after such period is unconstitutional; 2 thus, his prayer, viz.:

1. Declaring Sec. 8, par. 3 of Republic Act No. 6770, known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" as unconstitutional. Thus, the same law should now read as follows:

"(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed to serve only the unexpired term of the predecessor. x x x."

2. Declaring that the term of office of respondent CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES had already expired on November 30, 2012 and compelling her to immediately cease and desist from further performing her functions as Ombudsman.

3. Corollary to these, declaring that all Orders, Decisions, and Resolutions rendered personally by the respondent CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, from December 1, 2012 up to the present time, are deemed null and void. Affected cases should be remanded to the Deputy Ombudsman for proper disposition, pending the appointment of a new Ombudsman. 3 (emphasis and underlining in the original)

ISSUE

WHETHER SEC. 8, PAR. 3 OF R.A. NO. 6770 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

OUR RULING

The petition should be dismissed.

Foremost, it must be stated that the main issue raised in this petition was the very same issue raised in Ifurung v. Carpio Morales, 4 and decided by the Court En Banc on 24 April 2018. Noteworthily, the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions; thus, time and again, the Court has held that when the Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, the desirable and necessary judicial practice is to adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. 5 TEHIaD

In Ifurung, petitioner Ifurung, through his petition for certiorari and prohibition, sought that Sec. 8 (3) in relation to Sec. 7 6 of R.A. No. 6770 be declared as unconstitutional for being an outright transgression of Sec. 11 7 in relation to Secs. 8, 8 9, 9 and 10 10 of Article (Art.) XI of the 1987 Constitution. In view of this, petitioner Ifurung sought a declaration from the Court that respondents Carpio Morales and deputies ombudsman are de facto Ombudsman and deputies ombudsman, respectively; and that corollary thereto, their positions are vacant.

The Court dismissed the petition in Ifurung on the ground, inter alia, that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission, viz.:

In contrast, the present Office of the Ombudsman, albeit composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, the Deputy for the Visayas, the Deputy for Mindanao, the Deputy for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Office (MOLEO), and the Special Prosecutor, is not a collegial body. The Ombudsman and the deputies do not resolve cases by a majority of all its members but rather are confined within the sphere of their respective jurisdiction, i.e., the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, for cases involving public officials and employees assigned in Luzon; the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, for those assigned in Visayas; the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, for those assigned in Mindanao; the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO, for those assigned in the military and the police; and the Special Prosecutor, in the conduct of preliminary investigation and prosecution of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Overall Deputy, on the one hand, oversees and administers the operations of the different offices under the Office of Ombudsman while the Ombudsman is the final approving authority on the disposition of cases before the sectoral offices, i.e., Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, MOLEO, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. 11

Vitangcol harps on the 2 February 1989 deliberation on House Bill 13646 by the Committee on Justice where the issue raised was the term of office of the newly appointed Ombudsman. During the deliberation, Raul Roco (Roco) stated that "whatever [is] the current jurisprudence on appointment and term" should apply to the Ombudsman. Petitioner insists on the fact that Roco stated that "[t]he COMELEC may be a model x x x;" thus, petitioner implies that the jurisprudential teachings that time as to the term of office in the COMELEC should find its application in the Office of the Ombudsman. 12

This issue was already addressed in Ifurung with the Court holding as follows:

The Court draws attention to the fact that its ruling in Gaminde applies exclusively to the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA for the reason that Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution pertains solely to the constitutional commissions. Indeed, the jurisprudential teachings since 1949 in Bautista and De Vera, and in 1955 in Imperial, albeit referring to the terms of office of the COMELEC chairman and members, and now in Gaminde, pertain to the three constitutional commissions, and nothing else. It will be absurd, as it is devoid of any valid and legal reason, to extend the application of the Gaminde ruling to the Office of the Ombudsman when this office is admittedly not a constitutional commission. 13 (emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the applicable jurisprudence since 1949, and which was observed in 2000 in Gaminde and at present in Ifurung, is that the "term of office" in relation to the "regular rotational plan" applies to the constitutional commissions. The "term of office" for the constitutional commissions has been explained in Gaminde as follows: the terms of the first chairmen and commissioners of the constitutional commissions must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointment and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five, and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. 14 Considering that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission, the "term of office" observed in the commissions cannot be applied to the anti-graft body. DETACa

Significantly, the Court has emphasized in Ifurung that the obvious intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in Sec. 10, Art. XI was to provide similarity only as to the rank and salary of the chairman and members of the constitutional commissions to the Ombudsman and his deputies, respectively. For sure, the definition of the words "rank" and "salary" cannot even remotely include or refer to "term of office." Moreover, "[i]t is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressiouniusestexclusioalterius;" 15 hence, the term of office in relation to the regular rotational plan of the constitutional commissions cannot find its meaning in the Office of the Ombudsman.

In rejecting the claim of Ifurung that Sec. 8 (3) of R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional, the Court ruled:

Contrary to the position of the petitioner, Sec. 11, Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand on its own. Notably, the framers plainly provided for a seven-year term of the Ombudsman and the deputies. For sure, nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to any vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. This can only mean that it was the intent of the framers that the appointment to the positions of the Ombudsman and the deputies, whether it be for the expired or unexpired term of the predecessor, shall always be for a full term of seven years. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. 16 (emphasis supplied) TaDCEc

The Court sees no reason to depart from this ruling.

For guidance, the Court reiterates the summary of its declaration in Ifurung:

Pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only as to the rank and salary that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions.

Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven years.

Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from their date of appointment unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability.

The Gaminde ruling applies to the constitutional commissions and not to the Office of the Ombudsman. (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED." Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official business. Caguioa, J., on leave. (adv30) cDEHIC

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETAClerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Entitled "An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes."

2.Rollo, p. 10.

3.Id. at 20.

4. G.R. No. 232131, 24 April 2018.

5.Umali v. The Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, 25 July 2017.

6. Sec. 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.

7. Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

8. Sec. 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

   During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.

9. Sec. 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

10. Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office.

11.Ifurung v. Carpio Morales, supra note 4.

12.Rollo, pp. 8-9.

13.Ifurung v. Carpio Morales, supra note 4.

14.Gaminde v. COMELEC, 401 Phil. 77, 87-88 (2000).

15.Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319, 335 (2002).

16.Ifurung v. Carpio Morales, supra note 4.