FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233842. November 18, 2021.]
VISTA VERDE COUNTRY HOMES (AREA 1, 2, 3, 4B, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11) HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY: 2015 BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND IN THEIR CAPACITY AS HOMEOWNERS, petitioners, vs.ATTY. JOHNIELLE KEITH P. NIETO, MAYOR, MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, RIZAL; SOFIA SCHUCK-VELASCO, VICE-MAYOR/SANGGUNIANG BAYAN PRESIDING OFFICER, MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, RIZAL; MARIE LOISE A. TICMAN, ALLAN G. TAJUNA, BUTCH G. TOLENTINO, GILBERT L. IGTIBEN, ACE B. SERVILLON, GIOVANNI JINO H. ALCANTARA, DANILO J. CRUZ, MACAIROG DELA PAZ, ALL MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, RIZAL; ENGR. DAN ROAN B. GUTIERREZ, OIC-MUNICIPAL ENGINEER OFFICE, MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, RIZAL; EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES, PRESIDENT/CEO, STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.; DANILO VILLESTAS, PRESIDENT OF THE SENIOR CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, VISTA VERDE COUNTRY HOMES, CAINTA, RIZAL; AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 18, 2021which reads as follows: CAIHTE
"G.R. No. 233842(Vista Verde Country Homes (Area 1, 2, 3, 4b, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) Homeowners Association, Inc., represented by: 2015 Board of Directors and in their capacity as homeowners v. Atty. Johnielle Keith P. Nieto, Mayor, Municipality of Cainta, Rizal; Sofia Schuck-Velasco, Vice-Mayor/Sangguniang Bayan Presiding Officer, Municipality of Cainta, Rizal; Marie Loise A. Ticman, Allan G. Tajuna, Butch G. Tolentino, Gilbert L. Igtiben, Ace B. Servillon, Giovanni Jino H. Alcantara, Danilo J. Cruz, Macairog Dela Paz, all members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Municipality of Cainta, Rizal; Engr. Dan Roan B. Gutierrez, OIC-Municipal Engineer Office, Municipality of Cainta, Rizal; Exequiel D. Robles, President/CEO, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.; Danilo Villestas, President of the Senior Citizens Association, Vista Verde Country Homes, Cainta, Rizal; and the Office of the Ombudsman). — Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the criminal aspect of the October 15, 2015 Joint Resolution 2 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), specifically OMB-L-C-15-0169. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint filed by Vista Verde Country Homes (VVCH, for brevity) (Area 1, 2, 3, 4b, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) Homeowners Association, Inc., represented by its 2015 Board of Directors and in their individual capacities as homeowners, namely: Ronald Alma Jose, Gerry Gonzales, Evangelina Gunio, Bernie Isaga, Jesus Llano, Violeta Quimpo (Quimpo), Eleazar Sabio (Sabio) and Lourdes Velilla (petitioners) for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 3 against Mayor Johnielle Keith P. Nieto (Mayor Nieto); Vice-Mayor Sofia Schuck-Velasco (Vice Mayor Schuck-Velasco); Engineer Dan Roan B. Gutierrez (Engr. Gutierrez) and members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB), namely: Marie Loise A. Ticman, Allan G. Tajuna, Butch G. Tolentino, Gilbert L. Igtiben (Igtiben), Ace B. Servillon, Giovanni Jino H. Alcantara, Danilo J. Cruz and Macairog Dela Paz, all of the Municipality of Cainta (public respondents); Danilo P. Villestas (Villestas) as representative of the Senior Citizens Association (SCA) of VVCH; and Exequiel D. Robles (Robles) as President and Chief Executive of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Incorporated (Sta. Lucia) for lack of probable cause.
The Antecedents
The SB members of the Municipality of Cainta (LGU) invited petitioners as well as the officers of Cainta Greenland Subdivision and Greenwoods Executive Village of Cainta to a public consultation on September 10, 2014 to discuss the proposed turnover/donation of the subdivisions to the LGU. During the said meeting, SB Member Igtiben requested petitioners to give their consent to the turnover/donation of Sta. Lucia, VVCH's developer, of the open spaces, roads and easements of VVCH to the LGU. Petitioners first asked to be provided for their study Sta. Lucia's letter of intent to donate its properties; list and description of properties intended to be donated, and the subdivision map to determine the areas to be donated. 4
On November 21, 2014, the petitioners received a letter from Villestas through Sabio, its president, informing them that Mayor Nieto has approved the construction of a two-storey SCA building beside the Administration Building of VVCH. 5
Disagreeing with the planned construction of the SCA building, petitioners sent separate letters both dated December 8, 2014 to Villestas and Mayor Nieto to express their disapproval of the project on the grounds that: (1) the SCA building will obscure the existing VVCH Administration Building; (2) the VVCH Homeowners Association was not consulted and no consent was given to the planned construction in the open spaces of the subdivision; and (3) no building plan was presented for its consideration. Notwithstanding petitioners' disapproval of the proposed construction of the SCA building, a ground-breaking ceremony for that purpose was held on December 10, 2014 and the construction of the SCA building immediately followed. 6
On December 11, 2014, petitioners sent another letter to Mayor Nieto expressing their continuing objection to the ongoing construction based on the grounds previously raised and for the following additional reasons: (a) VVCH Homeowners Association has the responsibility, authority and right to govern VVCH; (b) VVCH is a private property as it has not yet been turned over to the VVCH Association or LGU; (c) the homeowners are the rightful owners of the open spaces in the subdivision who must be consulted regarding any plan to donate the same; and (d) no building permit, homeowners association and barangay clearance were secured for the said construction. 7
Petitioners also called the attention of Engr. Gutierrez on the construction of the SCA building despite the absence of approved building plan and building permit but the same proved futile. 8
Meanwhile, on November 26, 2014, SB passed Resolution No. 2014-111 9 authorizing Mayor Nieto to accept the turnover/donation of roads, open spaces, and easements in VVCH by Sta. Lucia to the LGU. These roads, open spaces and casements are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 648795, 648796, 515774, 515775, 515776, 515777, 524800, 521520 and 520381. 10 In spite of the passage of the Resolution, however, petitioners claimed that they were not notified of the turnover/donation and that they were furnished with a copy of the Resolution only in the second week of January 2015. 11
Petitioners labeled as irregular the donation of the VVCH properties to the LGU inasmuch as Sta. Lucia did not apply with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for a Certificate of Completion for purposes of donating the roads, open spaces, easements; and it has not submitted to the HLURB a letter of intent to donate the same to the LGU in violation of Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 957, 12 as amended by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216 13 and Human Settlement Resource Commission Administrative Order No. 82-01, series of 1982 (HSRC Rules), the rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216. 14
Considering that Sta. Lucia has not completely fulfilled its obligations to VVCH as developer even after the lapse of more than two decades (such as the installation of a sturdy main gate for the subdivision, improvement of water and drainage system, and payment of the P1M accumulated electric bills), petitioners averred that they have every right to object to the donation as it would relieve Sta. Lucia of its duties to them, resulting to their prejudice and harm. 15 Thus, they filed a complaint 16 against the respondents before the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
To substantiate their complaint, petitioners contended that respondents, in conspiracy with each other, persuaded, induced, influenced, and allowed themselves to be persuaded, induced and influenced to pass the said Resolution in blatant disregard of the pertinent laws and rules paving the way to the donation of open spaces in the subdivision for the construction of the SCA building in violation of Section 3 (a) of the anti-graft law. 17 Respondents' evident had faith or gross inexcusable negligence in not requiring Sta. Lucia to submit the documents required under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216 and its implementing rules, gave Sta. Lucia unwarranted benefits by relieving it of its obligations to petitioners and caused them undue injury, violating Section 3 (e) of the same law. 18
In their Consolidated Counter-Affidavit, 19 public respondents and Villestas denied that the donation to the LGU was laden with irregularities. They explained that it was actually the homeowners of VVCH, through letters dated September 4, 2013 20 and October 17, 2013, 21 who requested for the assistance and intervention of the LGU to compel Sta. Lucia to turn over the open spaces of VVCH to the LGU after Sta. Lucia failed to heed their several requests for turnover. 22
When Sta. Lucia finally relented and conveyed to the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) its intention to turn over the open spaces in VVCH, the MPDC required Sta. Lucia to submit its Certificate of Completion, Deed of Donation and the TCTs over the properties to be donated. After the submission of the said documents, the MPDC referred the matter to the Committee on Housing, Land Use and Planning of the SB. The SB then conducted a public hearing to thresh out all matters relative to the proposed turnover and donation. It was only after the public hearing was held on September 10, 2014, which was attended by Sabio and Quimpo, 23 that the SB passed Resolution No. 2014-111 authorizing Mayor Nieto to accept the donation. 24 The LGU was only complying with its obligation under the law when it passed the said Resolution and allowed Mayor Nieto to accept the donation given that, under Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216, it shall be mandatory for LGUs to accept the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds donated to it by the developer upon completion of the subdivision project. 25
Anent the construction of the SCA building, public respondents and Villestas contended that the LGU merely granted the request of the SCA for the construction of the same on the lot turned over to the LGU. Given that all documents for a valid turnover of the VVCH open spaces had been submitted by Sta. Lucia coupled with the fact that the construction of the SCA building will benefit all homeowners of VVCH and not just the SCA, the ground breaking ceremony and the construction proceeded as scheduled. 26 Also, by reason of the valid donation, the subject lands became patrimonial properties of the LGU giving it the right to utilize it for the benefit of its constituents, which is precisely what the LGU did when it constructed the SCA building. 27
Respondents added that petitioners cannot complain that the SCA building was built on a non-buildable open space considering that Section 10 28 of the HSRC Rules gave the LGU the power to determine whether it will put up buildings on open spaces for as long as the structures to be erected are essential thereto. The fact that the Administration building stood on the very same parcel of land where the SCA building was constructed belies the claim of petitioners that said land is not buildable open space. 29 There is also no truth that no building permit was issued for the construction of the SCA building, the same having been issued on November 17, 2014. 30
The passage of the subject Resolution after all the requirements of law have been complied with which gave imprimatur to the donation of the subject land and the eventual construction of the SCA building thereon for the benefit of all the residents of VVCH disprove their liability for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019. 31
Robles, for his part, argued that the issues concerning Sta. Lucia fall squarely with the HLURB as it involves the developer's obligations. 32
On October 15, 2015, the Ombudsman rendered a Joint Resolution 33 dismissing for lack of probable cause the criminal complaint lodged against the respondents for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant criminal and administrative complaints filed against respondents JOHNIELLE KEITH P. NIETO, SOFIA SCHUCK-VELASCO, MARIA LOISE A. TICMAN, ALLAN G. TAJUNA, BUTCH G. TOLENTINO, GILBERT L. IGTIBEN, ACE B. SERVILLON, GIOVANNI JINO H. ALCANTARA, DANILO J. CRUZ, MACAIROG DELA PAZ, ENGR. DAN ROAN B. GUTIERREZ, SENIOR CITIZENS ASSOCIATION of VISTA VERDE HOMES as represented by DANILO P. VILLESTAS and EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES are DISMISSED for lack of probable cause and substantial evidence. 34
The Ombudsman held that the charge for violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 cannot be sustained for lack of sufficient evidence that respondents conspired and confederated to persuade, induce or influence another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by competent authorities. The charge for violation of Section 3 (e) of the anti-graft law must likewise fail considering that respondents did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and that their concerted action in building a facility inside the subdivision did not cause undue injury to the government or any private party. 35
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Ombudsman held that when the SB passed the Resolution authorizing Mayor Nieto to accept the donation of the roads and vacant spaces of VVCH, the open spaces and roads ceased to be private lots. Mayor Nieto, being the Municipal Mayor, is mandated to negotiate and secure the financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services and facilities enumerated under Section 17 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Thus, no further clearance from the homeowners association was needed by the LGU in order to build the SCA building on the donated lot. The construction of the facility inside the subdivision is a recognized endeavor on the part of the LGU, appropriate and incidental to its mandate for the efficient and effective delivery of basic services to its constituents. Moreover, Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216 was not violated when the SCA building was built thereon since the building was intended mainly as recreation venue of the seniors residing in VVCH, a use consistent with that allowed of open spaces by the laws. Although VVCH has the right to regulate some activities and the use of properties of its residents and members, it cannot overshadow the power of the municipal mayor to exercise general supervision over component barangays, such as building a facility for public use on a donated lot. 36
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit by the Ombudsman in an Order 37 dated April 3, 2017.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present Petition.
Petitioners argued that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded the evidence they presented which overwhelmingly prove respondents' liability for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioners insisted that the Certificates of Completion 38 dated November 27, 1997 that were presented by the respondents should not be given credence as they contravene the letter 39 dated February 5, 2015 of Engr. Alfredo Gil M. Tan II, Regional Director, HLURB, National Capital Region Field Office, that the only certification 40 issued to Sta. Lucia is one dated April 1, 1987 for the purpose of cancelling its performance bond, and not for donation. 41 To begin with, they contended that VVCH could not be considered a completed project given that Sta. Lucia had not completely fulfilled its obligations as a developer to them such as the payment of VVCH's accumulated electric bills, construction of main gate and amenities in the subdivision, renovation of the dilapidated Administration Building, and improvement of drainage system. 42
Even assuming that the November 27, 1997 certificates were validly issued, it still cannot be denied that the purpose for their issuance is the cancellation of Sta. Lucia's performance bonds, and still not for donation. Assuming further that the certificates were issued for purposes of donation, the certificates do not make the donation valid given that the HSRC Rules clearly provides that the Deed of Donation must be issued within six months from the issuance of a certificate of completion. In this case, the Deed of Donation was executed only on November 27, 2014, or 17 years after the issuance of the certificates. 43
Petitioners also claimed that they were not the ones who requested for the turnover of the open spaces and road lots from Sta. Lucia. They explained that VVCH is comprised of three associations, namely: (1) VVCH (Area 1, 2, 3, 4B, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) Homeowners Association, Inc., the petitioners in this case; (2) VVCH Area 5 Homeowners Association; and (3) VVCH Phase 1C and 2E Homeowners Association. Since the areas donated are situated within their area of jurisdiction, petitioners' consent should have been the one obtained, and not the consent of the other associations. 44
Further, respondents' conspiracy is shown by the following: (1) Robles' act of making it appear that the requirements of the applicable laws pertaining to a valid donation are followed by submitting the November 27, 1997 Certificates of Completion despite the fact that they were issued not for purposes of donation; and (2) SB Member Igtiben's act of persuading the other respondents and the latter having allowed themselves to be so persuaded, led to the passage of the said Resolution. This enabled Mayor Nieto to accept the donation of the open spaces, road lots and easements in VVCH for the LGU, notwithstanding respondents' knowledge that Sta. Lucia had no valid certificate of completion for purposes of donation, the vagueness of the Deed of Donation as it did not specify the areas donated; 45 and lack of consent of the petitioners. 46
Petitioners claimed further that the supposed donation of the open spaces does not convert them to public lots inasmuch as the donation was not validly made for lack of valid certificate of completion and intent to donate. Thus, such properties remain to be the private lots of VVCH. 47 Given that the donation is invalid, it follows that the construction of the SCA building on one of the donated lots is also invalid. Not only is the lot where the building was constructed questionable, petitioners insisted that the construction of the building in itself was tainted with irregularities because no bidding was conducted by the public respondents in the award of the construction of the said building, and no homeowners' clearance and building permit were secured prior to the construction. 48
Petitioners also insisted that they adduced sufficient evidence to prove respondents' liability for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Public respondents being public officials and acting in their official functions exhibited bad faith and manifest bias, and thereby favored Robles when they did not require him to submit a certificate of compliance for purposes of donation and hastily accepted the donation despite Robles' non-compliance with the requirements for a valid donation. Unjustified benefit accrued to Sta. Lucia by reason of the passage of the Resolution which authorized the acceptance of the Donation as it relieved Sta. Lucia of its obligations to the petitioners. Acting in conspiracy with each other, respondents made possible the illegal donation and illegal construction of the SCA building which cause petitioners undue injury as they were deprived of their right to negotiate and go after St. Lucia for the payment of electric bills and demand the fulfilment of its other obligations to them prior to the donation and turnover. 49
For their part, public respondents contended that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the charge for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against them. 50
As regards the complaint for violation of Section 3 (a) of the anti-graft law, they insisted that petitioners failed to present specific acts that would show that they indeed persuaded, induced and influenced, and allowed themselves to be persuaded, induced and influenced to perform an act in violation of law. Since the passage of the Resolution complied with all the requirements provided for by law, they could not be said to have violated Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019. 51
The charge for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 was likewise not substantiated for failure of the petitioners to prove that they suffered any injury by reason of public respondents' acts. They emphasized that the law made it ministerial on their part to accept the donation by subdivision developers of their open spaces, especially so when the donation, as in this case, complied with the mandates of the law. Moreover, the construction of the SCA building on the donated property will redound to the benefit of all homeowners of VVCH. Hence, no unwarranted benefit may be said to accrue to another entity to the prejudice of the petitioners. 52
Like the public respondents, Robles likewise asserted that the Ombudsman was correct when it dismissed the said criminal complaints as no proof was shown by the petitioners to sustain their complaint. He argued that Sta. Lucia merely complied with its legal obligation when it donated the areas in VVCH that were reserved for roads and open spaces to the LGU, and nothing more. Neither he nor Sta. Lucia participated in the government project complained of. 53 Robles added that a scrutiny of the complaints raised by the petitioners would show that they revolved on the lack of development and the developer's obligations. Thus, he contended that the matter should have been brought before the HLURB being the agency that has the exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the same. 54
Issues
The Court winnows down the arguments of the parties and streamlines the discussions into the following determinative issues:
I
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding that the respondents conspired with each other in the commission of the crimes charge.
II
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019.
III
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Our Ruling
It is basic that a petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. 55 Notably, such abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 56 In other words, mere abuse of discretion is not enough as it must be grave. 57
As to the review of the Ombudsman's resolutions on the finding of probable cause, Fabian v. Desierto58 instructs that an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 must be resorted to as a remedy for judicial review for what is involved here is an incident in a criminal action. 59 Nonetheless, it is a general rule that this Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. 60 This is because a finding of probable cause is a finding of fact which is generally not reviewable by this Court unless there is grave abuse of discretion; 61 for, normally, a petition for certiorari does not include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. 62 However, it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition. 63 In such case, a writ of certiorari will only issue when there has been a gross misapprehension of facts. 64
In this case, the petitioners ask this Court to undertake a factual review of the case on the ground that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thus, the Court now proceeds to determine whether the Ombudsman had indeed grossly misapprehended the facts of the case. DETACa
Substantive Considerations
A. On the Existence of Conspiracy:
Since the respondents are a mix of public officers and private individuals, it is imperative to first determine whether all of them indeed conspired to violate Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019. At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it — its essence is the unity of action and purpose. 65 It is not presumed. 66 To establish conspiracy, there must be convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. 67
Here, the petitioners merely alleged the presence of conspiracy without providing an iota of proof amounting to probable cause. They merely presumed and inferred the existence of conspiracy from their own suppositions and conjectures based on the other alleged facts which will be addressed in the succeeding discussions.
B. On Violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019:
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
The elements of the aforementioned offense are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act; and (3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter. 68
Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion in not finding probable cause because the second and third elements are wanting for the following reasons:
One. Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, as amended by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216 as well as Section 5 69 of Rule III of the HSRC Rules make it the obligation of the owner and developer, Sta. Lucia in this case, to comply with the same if it intends to donate open spaces and roads within its project.
Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 reads:
Section 31. Donations of roads and open spaces to local government. — The registered owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project, upon completion of the development of said project may, at his option, convey by way of donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or municipality wherein the project is located. Upon acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality concerned, no portion of the area donated shall thereafter be converted to any other purpose or purposes unless after hearing, the proposed conversion is approved by the Authority. 70
This Section was further amended by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216 with the relevant portion which reads:
Section 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open Spaces. — x x x
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the localgovernmentsto accept provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with the consent of the city or municipality concerned. No portion of the parks and playgrounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or purposes. 71
Such provision was supplemented by Section 5, Rule III of the HSRC Rules as follows:
Section 5. Application for Certificate of Completion. — Every registered owner or developer of a subdivision project whowishes to donate the road lots and open space of the same to the Local Government shall first apply with the Commission for Certificate of Completion by filing in triplicate the following:
1) application duly filled up; and
2) letter of Intent to Donate the road lots and open space to the local Government. 72
Moreover, as owner of these open spaces, Sta. Lucia enjoys the following rights over them: (1) jus possidendi or the right to possess; (2) jus utendi or the right to use and enjoy; (3) jus fruendi or the right to the fruits; (4) jus accessionis or right to accessories; (5) jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use; (6) jus disponendi or the right to dispose or alienate; and (7) jus vindicandi or the right to vindicate or recover. 73 Significant to this case, jus disponendi also includes the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the thing owned. 74
Clearly, the SB Members have no control over the actions of Sta. Lucia as regards its compliance with P.D. No. 957, as amended, including its implementing rules, in matters involving donations of open spaces as the prerogative to donate the same as well as the duty to comply with the provisions of the above-mentioned laws and rules belong solely to Sta. Lucia. It is fundamental that criminal responsibility is personal and that in the absence of conspiracy, one cannot be held criminally liable for the act or default of another. 75 To hold them as probably liable for the acts of third parties which are beyond their control would be to punish or indict them sans criminal responsibility.
Two. What was passed, which the petitioners insist was instrumental in persuading Mayor Nieto to accept the donation in violation of the law, was a mere Resolution. A "resolution" merely expresses the sentiment of a local legislative body. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the law-making body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. 76 It has no binding force similar to that of an ordinance, as it is temporary in nature. 77 Moreover, a local legislative body cannot enact "persuasive" issuances as they are neither binding (ordinance) nor mere expressions of sentiments (resolution). More importantly, the resolution merely authorized the acceptance of the donation, nothing more. Therefore, the SB Members' act of issuing Resolution No. 2014-111 cannot be reasonably construed as having been done in persuasion of Nieto to perform acts contrary to law.
Three. Since the foregoing discussions already established that the SB Members could not have committed an act of persuasion in issuing Resolution No. 2014-111 thereby negating the second element of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, it logically follows that Mayor Nieto cannot also be indicted and held liable for the same offense due to the absence of the same offense's second element. It is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results. 78 Here, it would be absurd to hold that there is probable cause to conclude that Mayor Nieto was persuaded to violate the provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended, when no one is considered to have committed the act of persuasion.
Four. The third element of the offense is also absent given that the acts complained of — passage of the Resolution and acceptance of the donation, do not constitute a violation of any law or rule.
Last. Since the Court had already found that the Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion in not finding probable cause to indict Mayor Nieto and the SB Members for violating Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, it stands to reason that there is no probable cause to bind all the other respondents, public and private, by reason of conspiracy.
C. On Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019:
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of the aforementioned offense are: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his or her action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 79
In the case at hand, the Court finds that the second and third elements of the foregoing offense are lacking for the following reasons:
One. There is no evidence on record that public respondents SB Members, Mayor Nieto and Vice Mayor Schuck-Velasco performed their duties with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, as petitioners alleged. 80
In Uriarte v. People, 81 this Court had the occasion to rule that:
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. 82
Petitioners cannot label as manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence respondents' failure to require Robles and/or Sta. Lucia to submit a Certificate of Completion and any other document as a pre-condition to the acceptance of the donation as there is no law that imposes such obligation on the respondents. It is well to note that it is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 83 Without such benefit, every official action could be negated with minimal effort from litigants, irrespective of merit or sufficiency of evidence to support such challenge. 84 Absent any proof to overcome the same, the presumption that respondents regularly performed their duties stands.
Two. The petitioners cannot be considered to have suffered an injury due to the issuance of Resolution No. 2014-111 and the eventual acceptance by Mayor Nieto of the subject VVCH properties donated by Sta. Lucia.
One must first have a right or, at the very least, a demandable interest recognized by law in order to sustain an injury. This is because an injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. 85 Any loss or damage suffered by a person or entity resulting from the legitimate exercise of another's right is considered to be without injury (damnum absque injuria) for which the law gives no remedy. 86 The only exception to this statutory rule is if there is an abuse of rights contemplated under Article 19 of the Civil Code which has the following elements: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty; (2) an exercise of such right or discharge of such duty in bad faith; and (3) such exercise of right or discharge of duty was made with the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 87
A thorough reading of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, P.D. No. 1216 and the HSRC Rules points to one thing: the act of donation to the local government is dependent on the volition or prerogative of the registered owner or developer. It does not matter if recent jurisprudence 88 rejected the "mandatory" character of such donation when it "emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners' and developers' freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces developed as roads." The registered owner or developer, the one who exercises the right of dominion over properties subject of the donation, not the local government officials, still has this duty to comply with Section 5, Rule III of the HSRC Rules in consonance with Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, as amended by the applicable portion of Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216. Thus, since the local government officials do not have any duty as regards the validity requirements of donating subdivision properties to the local government units, it follows that any act of acceptance they perform on behalf of the local government unit cannot be reasonably construed as the cause or result of any "undue injury" supposedly suffered or "unwarranted benefit" purportedly enjoyed by parties concerned under the purview of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Besides, the acceptance of the subject donated subdivision properties is in consonance with the general welfare obligation of every local government unit under Section 16 of the Local Government Code. As it is now firmly established in jurisprudence, the protection of senior citizens is a recognized public duty which is part of the State's police power. 89 The public respondents would be remiss in their duty if they would refuse to accept a donation favorable to and consistent with their duty to provide for the welfare of senior citizens. Hence, the act of acceptance of the subject subdivision properties despite failure of developer Sta. Lucia to comply with statutory requirements as regards the execution of a donation could hardly equate to probable cause of some criminal act.
Three. The Ombudsman does not have any jurisdiction to pass upon the existence of any ownership right over the donated open spaces of VVCH.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. 90 Accordingly, in order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. 91 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint is conferred by law. 92 For disputes involving ownership or title to real property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is with the second or first level courts depending on the assessed value of such real property. 93 For claims involving subdivision lots against the developer, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is with the HLURB. 94
Without question, the homeowners have the right to enjoy the subdivision's open spaces. Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 as amended by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1216 is again reproduced. It reads:
Section 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open spaces. — The owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty percent (30%) of the gross area for open space. Such open pace shall have the following standards allocated exclusively for parks, playgrounds and recreational use:
(a) 9% of gross area for high density or social housing (66 to 100 family lot per gross hectare).
(b) 7% of gross area for medium-density or economic housing (21 to 65 family lot per gross hectare).
(c) 3.5% of gross area low-density or open market housing (20 family lots and below per gross hectare).
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable. The plans of the subdivision project shall include tree planting on such parts of the subdivision as may be designated by the Authority. HEITAD
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local governments to accept provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with consent of the city or municipality concerned. No portion of the parks and playgrounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or purposes. 95
A careful reading of the law immediately shows that: (1) it is the duty of the owner or developer to reserve 30% of the subdivision's gross area for open spaces; and (2) only parks and playgrounds donated to the local government unit where the subdivision is located cannot be converted to any other purpose. From the said provision, it is clear that the homeowners have the right to a certain area of their subdivision's open spaces. However, such area is demandable on the owner or developer who is statutorily charged with the duty to make such reservation. There is nothing in the law which makes such duty to reserve a pre-condition to the acceptance of any donated properties of the subdivision. In other words, such duty cannot be reasonably imposed on the local government as it is but only a passive recipient and, more importantly, the law does not obligate the local government to monitor or ascertain the land area requirements for open spaces. What this implies is that, whatever right to such open spaces that a homeowner should enjoy under the law will be necessarily hinged on the project owner or developer's compliance with the statutory duty in Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, as well as the actual presence of at least 30% of the subdivision's open spaces for common use of subdivision residents/members.
In the case at hand, the petitioners/homeowners never alleged that Sta. Lucia violated the 30% requirement of subdivision open spaces when it donated the subject properties. Instead, what they essentially alleged was that they have no more security or collateral to force Sta. Lucia to make good of its other obligations under the law and their project contract. In effect, their supposed right over the subject donated properties was not even firmly established in their allegations, let alone the evidence they presented. Even if Sta. Lucia were to violate such obligations, the remedy would still be to file a case before the HLURB and not a criminal case before the Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of R.A. No. 3019. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, only the HLURB, a quasi-judicial body with the power to pass upon with finality the existence of any right that homeowners might have over a part of these donated open spaces, if any, not the regular courts and, certainly, not the Ombudsman, is authorized under the law to receive the necessary evidence and to make a final factual finding whether Sta. Lucia indeed violated the 30% requirement of subdivision open space. Stated differently, there must be a final ruling on the ownership of these open spaces favorable to the petitioners in order to establish the existence of their demandable right or interest to be the subject of injury in the first place. This means that the Ombudsman does not have any authority or jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners' claim of any interest on the property owned by the developer, Sta. Lucia, to even make a subsequent determination whether there is a demandable right to speak of for the existence of a possible injury.
Moreover, even if this Court were to consider the petitioners' argument that the construction of a two-storey building on the subject properties "would obstruct the Administration Building" as to mean obstructing their light and view, or access, the Ombudsman would still be considered an improper forum to ventilate such claims. The issue of easement, which is an action involving title to real property, is under the jurisdiction of regular courts as provided in Sections 19 96 and 33 97 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 11576.
Four. The respondents cannot be considered to have enjoyed unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference from the said donation.
For Sta. Lucia's part, it cannot be said to have enjoyed an unwarranted benefit from such donation as it already deprived itself of the ownership of the subject property upon its donation to the LGU. It would be absurd to hold that a divestment of property interest is in any way beneficial to the donor without any showing that it will stand to gain or suffer a loss if it does not perform such donation. Also, petitioners' claim of deprivation of right to go after Sta. Lucia, by reason of the passage of the subject Resolution and acceptance of the donation, to demand from it the fulfillment of its obligations to them as developer of VVCH, at this stage, cannot be construed as unwarranted benefit on the part of Sta. Lucia. This matter is properly addressed to the HLURB which has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the matter as the pivotal issue involved claims of the homeowners against the developer.
For the respondent local government officials' part, they were just performing their general welfare mandate under Section 16 of the Local Government Code in according benefits to the senior citizens in their locality. Just because such pursuit of general welfare mandate happened to exclude or, in any way, prejudice those who are not yet senior citizens, it does not mean that such benefit is "unwarranted" for these homeowners, since at least a majority of them will still get to enjoy the donated properties when they are of age. The benefits that they still get to enjoy are merely deferred which cannot be reasonably considered as an "unwarranted benefit" on the part of those who are members of the class that the law considers as "senior" citizens. Besides, there is no showing in the records that non-senior citizens of VVCH are precluded from the use and enjoyment of the SCA building.
Last. Since the petitioners failed to establish the second and third elements of Section 3 (e) with evidence amounting to probable cause, there is no reason to indict the respondents. In effect, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
In sum, the petitioners failed to show and substantiate their allegations that the Ombudsman abused its discretion in not finding probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Not only did the petitioners fail to adequately substantiate their allegation of conspiracy, the evidence on record also fails to substantiate that there has been an abuse or irregularity at all on the public respondents' part as it appears from the records that the latter were only acting consistent with their duties and in protection of the LGU's interests. Moreover, the petitioners have no established demandable right to prevent the donation. They also have other statutory remedies properly cognizable by other forums which can adequately protect their interests.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Joint Resolution dated October 15, 2015 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED. The Office of the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint filed against the respondents in OMB-L-C-15-0169.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-90.
2.Id. at 91-101. The Joint Resolution was approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales on February 7, 2017.
3. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
4.Rollo, p. 25.
5.Id. at 16-17.
6.Id. at 16-19.
7.Id. at 19-21.
8.Id. at 22, 243-244.
9.Id. at 417-418.
10.Id. at 26, 417.
11.Id. at 194.
12. Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree.
13. DEFINING "OPEN SPACES" IN RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION AND AMENDING SECTION 31 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 REQUIRING SUBDIVISION OWNERS TO PROVIDE ROADS, ALLEYS, SIDEWALKS AND RESERVE OPEN FOR PARKS OR RECREATIONAL USE.
14.Rollo, pp. 195-196.
15.Id. at 199.
16.Id. at 183-221.
17.Id. at 199-203.
18.Id. at 203-206.
19.Id. at 333-359.
20.Id. at 363.
21.Id. at 364.
22.Id. at 337-339, 361-362.
23.Id. at 638-639.
24.Id. at 339-344.
25.Id. at 348.
26.Id. at 344-346.
27.Id. at 348.
28.Section 10. Use of Donated Road Lots and Open Space. — Road lots and open space donated by the owner or developer to the City/Municipality or to the Homeowners' Association as the case may be shall not be converted to any purpose or purposes. In connection therewith, parks, playgrounds and recreational uses and other similar facilities and amenities shall be non-alienable, and no building or structure shall be built thereon other than those which are essential to the said open space as determined by the City/Municipality.
29.Rollo, pp. 348-349.
30.Id. at 347, 642.
31.Id. at 350-354.
32.Id. at 97.
33.Id. at 91-101.
34.Id. at 99-100.
35.Id. at 97.
36.Id. at 97-99.
37.Id. at 102-107. The Order was approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales on July 2, 2017.
38.Id. at 367-369.
39.Id. at 474.
40.Id. at 476.
41.Id. at 39-40.
42.Id. at 54-58.
43.Id. at 39-46.
44.Id. at 48-49.
45.Id. at 34-37, 50-51.
46.Id. at 59-60.
47.Id. at 52-53.
48.Id. at 58-59.
49.Id. at 73-81.
50.Id. at 734.
51.Id. at 735, 785.
52.Id. at 736-737, 785-786.
53.Id. at 752-756.
54.Id. at 752.
55.Government Service Insurance System Board of Trustees v. Court of Appeals, 833 Phil. 978, 989 (2018).
56.Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, 507 Phil. 631, 645 (2005). (Citations omitted)
57.Bonifacio Construction Management Corporation v. Perlas-Bernabe, 501 Phil. 79, 84 (2005). (Citations omitted)
58. 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
59.Id. at 799.
60.Casing v. Ombudsman, 687 Phil. 468, 475 (2012). (Citations omitted)
61.Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman, 554 Phil. 86, 102 (2007).
62.Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater, 628 Phil. 81, 92 (2010).
63.Balba v. Peak Development, Inc., 504 Phil. 166, 176 (2005).
64. See United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581, 592 (2007).
65.People v. Jesalva, 811 Phil. 299, 307 (2017).
66.Rimando v. People, 821 Phil. 1086, 1097 (2017). (Citations omitted)
67.People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 723 (1968).
68.Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman, 715 Phil. 733, 755 (2013).
69. Section 5. Application for Certificate of Completion. — Every registered owner or developer of subdivision project who wishes to donate the road lots and open spaces of the same to the local Government shall first apply with the Commission for Certificate of Completion by filing in triplicate the following:
1) application from duly filled up; and
2) letter of intent to Donate the road lots and open spaces to the local government.
70. Emphasis supplied.
71. Emphasis supplied.
72. Emphasis supplied.
73.Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019. (Citations omitted)
74.Archipelago Management and Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 363, 377 (1998). (Citations omitted)
75.Vizconde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 233 Phil. 231, 239 (1987).
76.Spouses Yusay v. Court of Appeals, 662 Phil. 634, 643 (2011).
77.Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 354 Phil. 684, 693 (1998).
78.People v. Villanueva, 111 Phil. 897, 899 (1961).
79.Cabrera v. People, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019. (Citations omitted)
80.Rollo, pp. 75-77.
81.Uriarte v. People, 540 Phil. 477 (2006). (Citations omitted)
82.Id. at 494-495. (Emphases in the original)
83.Bustillo v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 548 (2010).
84.Yap v. Lagtapon, 803 Phil. 652, 653 (2017).
85. See Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 575, 585 (1996).
86. See Amonoy v. Spouses Fornilda, 404 Phil. 586, 593 (2001). (Citations omitted)
87.Tocoms Philippines, Inc. v. Philips Electronics and Lighting, Inc., G.R. No. 214046, February 5, 2020. (Citations omitted)
88. See Republic v. Spouses Llamas, 804 Phil. 264, 276 (2017).
89. See Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 809 Phil. 315, 342 (2017).
90.Foronda-Crystal v. Son, 821 Phil. 1033, 1042 (2017). (Citations omitted)
91.Bilag v. Ay-ay, 809 Phil. 236, 243 (2017).
92.Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018.
93. See: Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
94. See: Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344; see also Geronimo v. Spouses Calderon, 749 Phil. 871, 880-882 (2014). (Citations omitted)
95. Emphasis Supplied.
96.Section 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
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(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
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97.Section 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
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(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or any interest therein does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) exclusive on interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
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