FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 255080. May 5, 2021.]
NOEL VIOLA, petitioner, vs.SPOUSES IGNACIO AND ROSALINDA SUN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMay 5, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 255080 (NOEL VIOLA, petitioner, v. SPOUSES IGNACIO AND ROSALINDA SUN, respondents). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated October 23, 2020 and Resolution 3 dated January 18, 2021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 111627. The CA in its assailed rulings affirmed the Resolution 4 dated February 26, 2018 of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-99-88818 which acquitted petitioner Noel Viola (Noel) of the crime of estafa but adjudged him civilly liable to respondents spouses Ignacio and Rosalinda Sun (spouses Sun) for damages.
The Antecedent Facts
An Information 5 dated November 15, 1999 was filed charging Noel and his wife, Jenny Viola (Jenny), with the crime of estafa committed with abuse of confidence. The accusatory portion of the Information provides:
That on or about the 3rd day of January, 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence[,] did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud SPS. IGNACIO SUN and ROSALINDA SUN in the following manner, to wit: the said accused got and received in trust from said complainant the total amount of P2,760,000.00, Philippine Currency, for the purpose of buying/purchasing for complainants $80,000.00 with the express obligation to deliver and turn over said amount thereof to complainant[s], but the said accused once in possession of said amount far from complying with their obligation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon them, accused failed and refused to turn over the said amount to said complainant[s], to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The court was not able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jenny as she had already taken flight when the warrant for her arrest was being implemented. 7 On the other hand, the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Noel who pleaded "Not Guilty" during his arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued. 8
The RTC, cited by the CA in its Decision, summarized the facts and respective positions of the parties as follows:
A. Prosecution's Evidence
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that complainants [respondents] and the accused [petitioner] were friends resulting from the seven (7) years spent by complainant Rosalinda Sun and Accused Jenny Viola as co-workers in Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Branch. On January 13, 1999, accused Jenny Viola called up Rosalinda Sun and told her that she and her husband, accused Noel Viola have a German friend from whom they can purchase dollars at the rate of Php34.50 to a dollar. At that time, the exchange rate was Php37.00 to a dollar. Thereafter, Rosalinda managed to convince her husband, Ignacio Sun that the two accused can be trusted which resulted in the spouses Sun to offer and entrust Php2,760,000.00 to the accused for the purchase of $80,000.00. Thereafter, Rosalinda Sun gave Php922,500.00 to Jenny Viola at their office. This money was withdrawn by Rosalinda from her savings account in PBCom and combined with what she had on hand at that time. Added to this amount was Php1,837,500.00 which was allegedly withdrawn from the account of Ignacio Sun with China Banking Corporation (Chinabank), Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Branch. This amount was then personally handed over by Ignacio to Noel at the complainants' house, [sic] These all happened in the morning of January 13, 1999.
According to the complainants, their agreement was for the accused to give $80,000.00 the following day (January 14). However, on the said day, the accused informed the complainants that they could no longer deliver the dollar equivalent of the money at [sic] they were allegedly swindled by their German friend. Eventually, the accused (Jenny) admitted that no such persons [sic] exists and that they used the money to pay off their personal debts and obligations.
Failing to heed the complainants' demands for the return of their money, accused Jenny issued a Pilipinas Bank Check No. 0029545 dated 13 January 1999 in the amount of Php2,760,000.00 to guarantee that they will return the money with an accompanying request that it be encashed at a later date. The said check was eventually dishonored for reason "Account Closed." Demands were made but went unheeded.
B. Defense Evidence:
Accused Noel Viola vehemently denied the assertions and allegations of the complainants. According to him, there was no agreement entered between him and his spouse, and the private complainants about the purchase of dollars. He also denied having received any money from the complainants. It is his assertion that the complainants and testimony of the complainants were mere fabrications and were concocted by them to go after the obligations of his wife, through him. He likewise argued that the Pilipinas Bank check allegedly issued by his wife was just a Replacement check for the earlier checks she issued and was supposed to be filled up only to the extend [sic] of his wife's existing obligation which is less than Php250,000.00. He then argues that the said check's entries were typewritten except for his wife's signature. This, according to him, belies the allegation that his wife issued the check in the complainants' house, and bolsters his contention that it was just one of two replacement checks pre signed by his wife in compliance with complainant Rosalinda's demand.
The accused likewise questions the credulity of the complainants' narrative considering that they had already filed a civil case against his spouse and just decided to file this criminal action after learning that they could no longer summon Jenny. He also questioned the fact that his alleged receipt of the money was never duly documented. He made a small matter of the testimony of the complainants' housemate for being biased and unworthy of belief.
He also offered as part of his evidence the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the filing of an Information against the accused for Estafa on the ground that it is hard to believe that the complainants would still repose trust and confidence upon a person who already owed them money and could not pay a much smaller amount, and the fact that there was no document evidencing receipt [sic] of such a large sum. 9
RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its Decision 10 dated January 15, 2018 dismissing the criminal case for estafa against Noel:
WHEREFORE, [a]bove premises considered, the case filed against accused NOEL VIOLA and JENNY VIOLA is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the correct Information with the appropriate and proper charge(s) as may be warranted under the circumstances of this case.
SO ORDERED. 11
The RTC dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the Information filed was erroneous. Hence, the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of the correct Information with the proper charges.
It explained that Noel was charged with the commission of estafa with abuse of confidence penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC. However, he could not be convicted for this crime since he and Jenny did not receive spouses Sun's money "in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under the obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same." 12 The nature and purpose of the money they received (i.e., to buy dollars) only transferred material possession and not juridical possession to them which is essential in this mode of estafa. Hence, the proper charge for Noel and Jenny's acts should have been qualified theft or simple theft. 13
Aggrieved, spouses Sun filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 with respect to the civil aspect of the RTC Decision, to which Noel filed an Opposition. 15
The RTC found merit in the spouses Sun's Motion for Reconsideration and issued its Resolution 16 dated February 26, 2018 holding Noel solidarily liable for the civil aspect of the criminal case:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the decision dated January 15, 2018 is partially reconsidered.
The court finds NOEL VIOLA civilly and solidarily liable for the loss and damage incurred by the private complainants. He is ORDERED to pay the civil indemnity in the amount of TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,760,000.00) with legal interest in the amount of 12% per annum from January 14, 1999 to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum beginning 01 July 2013 to present.
No pronouncement as to costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 17
The RTC reasoned that despite its dismissal of the criminal case for estafa, Noel should still be held civilly liable since the prosecution was able to establish that he and Jenny obtained money from the spouses Sun to purchase dollars but they did not do so and never returned such money. 18
Noel appealed the RTC Resolution to the CA assigning the following error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING HEREIN APPELLANT [NOEL] CIVILLY LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED OUT OF TIME BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WHICH ALREADY RENDERED THE DECISION PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 19, 2018, DISMISSING [WITHOUT PREJUDICE] THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST HIM ALREADY FINAL HAVING BEEN FILED BELATEDLY BY THREE (3) DAYS AND THE LACK OF A DEFINITIVE FINDING OF GUILT ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT [NOEL] FROM WHICH THE CIVIL LIABILITY WOULD ARISE FROM AS IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT HE COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA CHARGED IN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION SINCE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PROSECUTION WOULD INSTEAD FASHION OUT A CRIME FOR QUALIFIED THEFT NOT TO MENTION THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY ALREADY SET IN THEREBY PRECLUDING ANY ADJUDICATION OF ANY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST THE ACCUSED AS THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST HIM WAS DISMISSED WITHOUT HIS CONSENT. 19
CA Ruling
The CA issued its Decision 20 dated October 23, 2020 denying Noel's appeal and affirming the RTC Resolution holding Noel civilly liable to spouses Sun:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 21
The CA held that spouses Sun's Motion for Reconsideration filed with the RTC was timely filed. The Motion for Reconsideration pertained only to the civil aspect and was thus filed under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, and not Section 6, Rule 122 as Noel posits. Spouses Sun therefore had 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision on January 19, 2018, or until February 3, 2018 to file the Motion for Reconsideration. However, considering that February 3, 2018 was a Saturday, they had until the next working day, or until February 5, 2018, to file the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, spouses Sun's filing on such date was still within the prescriptive period. 22
Further, Noel cannot claim double jeopardy as a defense since this precludes only subsequent criminal actions and finds no application to the civil aspect. 23 The CA also upheld Noel's civil liability on the ground that the RTC Decision did not state that the acts or omissions complained of did not exist. It affirmed that Noel and Jenny were able to obtain money from the spouses Sun and did not return it despite their failure to purchase the dollars agreed upon. 24
Noel filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the CA through its Resolution 25 dated January 18, 2021:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appellant's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Notice of Change of Firm Name and Contact Details filed by counsel for Spouses Sun is NOTED.
SO ORDERED. 26
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC Resolution holding Noel liable for the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied. A perusal of the petition shows that it merely reiterated arguments from its appeal which have already been fully passed upon and resolved. No sufficient grounds were alleged to show that the CA committed any reversible error in affirming the RTC Resolution.
The Spouses Sun's Motion for
Noel in his petition insisted that the RTC gravely erred in issuing the assailed Resolution since its Decision had already become final due to spouses Sun's failure to timely file their Motion for Reconsideration. He relied on Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court 27 to claim that the 15-day reglementary period to file a Motion for Reconsideration should have been computed from the date of the promulgation of the judgment. In this case, the RTC Decision was promulgated on January 19, 2018. Spouses Sun therefore had 15 days therefrom, or until February 2, 2018, to file a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the spouses Sun's Motion for Reconsideration was filed only on February 5, 2018, which was already too late. 28
The argument is erroneous.
This Court in Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso29 established how to properly determine the period private offended parties may appeal the civil aspect in criminal cases. This Court clarified that the manner of computing the period to appeal for the accused in a criminal case (i.e., reckoned from the date of promulgation of judgment) is different from that of the private offended party. 30 This is because the private offended party is not required to be present at the hearing for the promulgation of judgment. Accordingly, it was explicitly pronounced that Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court cannot be applied to compute the period of appeal of private offended parties:
Appeal of the Accused Different from That of the Offended Party
Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the proceedings. Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but logical to begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused. It is only through notice to the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it is only from that date that the complainant will have knowledge of the need to elevate the case. Till then, the remedy of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
The period to appeal, embodied in Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, cannot be applied equally to both accused-appellant and private offended party. Further bolstering this argument is the second sentence of this provision which mandates as follows:
"x x x This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run."
The above-quoted portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming the reglementary period of appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding sentence. However, it is clear that the procedure operates only in relation to the accused. This conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the period to appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel of the accused is given notice of the order overruling the motion for reconsideration or for new trial. Verily, the assumption behind this provision is that the appeal was taken by the accused, not by the private offended party. 31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citation omitted)
It was elucidated in Neplum that the appeal of the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action and can no longer be considered a criminal action per se. Consequently, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action shall apply and be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure:
Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the same as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, "[t]he appeal from the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal cannot affect the criminal aspect thereof." Being akin to a civil action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.
In People v. Santiago, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the solicitor general may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
However, the offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. As such, the present appeal undertaken by the private offended party relating to the civil aspect of the criminal judgment can no longer be considered a criminal action per se, wherein the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. Instead, it becomes a suit analogous to a civil action.
Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latter's original jurisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal. An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting of the period to appeal from the "promulgation" of the judgment to the accused.
In sum, we hold that an offended party's appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or the final order appealed from. To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby directed to cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended parties or their duly appointed counsels — the private prosecutors. This step will enable them to appeal the civil aspects under the appropriate circumstances. 32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
In this regard, the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration in a civil action provided under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is 15 days from the notice of the judgment. 33 In computing this period, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court shall apply such that "the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.''
The CA thus correctly applied the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine the timeliness of the spouses Sun's filing of their Motion for Reconsideration. 34 The spouses Sun received notice of the judgment on January 19, 2018, and had 15 days therefrom, or until February 3, 2018 to file a Motion for Reconsideration. However, since February 3, 2018 was a Saturday, they had until the next working day, on February 5, 2018, within which to file. Hence, contrary to Noel's claim, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by spouses Sun on February 5, 2018 was still within the reglementary period.
The CA Correctly Affirmed
Noel in his petition argued that the RTC and CA should not have resolved the civil aspect of the criminal case because there was no definitive determination yet of his innocence or guilt. His liability, if any, should be determined through trial anew in a qualified theft case. 35 It was additionally argued that based on Dy v. People, 36 the prosecution's failure to prove the elements of estafa precludes a ruling on the accused's civil liability. 37
These arguments are bereft of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that this Court is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. 38 This Court will not review the evidence adduced by the parties all over again since the factual findings of the appellate court are final, binding, and conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings shall no longer be disturbed on appeal to this Court. 39
Moreover, it is well-settled that an acquittal of an accused in a criminal case does not necessarily extinguish the civil liability ex delicto. 40 This Court's ruling in Dayap v. Sendiong41 is instructive on instances when the extinction of the criminal action does not result in the extinction of the civil liability:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 42 (Citations omitted)
In Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba, 43 although this Court acquitted the accused for estafa, it nevertheless adjudged her civilly liable to the private complainants. It pertinently held:
At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando's acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that ''the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him."
In this case, Rimando's civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check. Verily, Rimando's civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of P500,000.00 does not arise from or is not based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the estafa case. 44 (Citations omitted)
It was similarly held in Gamaro v. People45 that the co-accused's acquittal in the estafa case did not preclude this Court from finding her civilly liable to the private offended parties.
In this case, although the complaint for estafa was dismissed, the lower courts held Noel civilly liable on the ground that the prosecution sufficiently established that: (1) Noel and Jenny were able to obtain P2,760,000.00 from spouses Sun to purchase dollars; (2) they did not purchase the dollars; and (3) they did not return the money to spouses Sun.
The RTC in its Decision dismissed the complaint for estafa only for the reason that it charged the wrong offense. However, the ruling was clear that Noel and Jenny obtained money from the spouses Sun which they did not return despite failing to purchase the agreed upon dollars:
In this case, the possession by the accused [Noel and Jenny] of the money given to them is merely material and not juridical. It was given to them for a particular purpose/obligation. They were not empowered to claim their possession over the money against the complainants [Spouses Sun]. They were just asked to buy dollars without any conditions and/or agreements regarding commissions, reimbursements, or the like. The complainants, given the factual milieu of the prosecution's case, could have asked for the return of the money at any time, had they decided not to pursue the purchase. The proper charge, therefore, should have been for Qualified Theft or Simple Theft. 46
The RTC in its Resolution explicitly reiterated these factual findings when it held Noel civilly liable:
Clearly, as plaintiff argues, the prosecution was able to establish that the spouses Viola were able to obtain money from the plaintiffs with the concomitant obligation to purchase its dollar equivalent. The spouses failed to do this and never returned the money. Hence, they should be held accountable civilly for the money lost and damages incurred by the plaintiffs. As correctly observed by the movant, the court recognized this, in part, in its statement that the accused could [have] been made liable for Qualified Theft or Theft for their act of taking the money of the plaintiffs, if not for the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusations against them. This could only be corrected if/when another charge will be filed sufficiently informing the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
However, as borne by the records, the court was not able to obtain jurisdiction over the person of Jenny Viola as she had already taken flight. This leaves accused Noel Viola as the only one subject to this court's finding regarding his civil liability incurred by him and Jenny, as husband and wife. 47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA, after reviewing the records on appeal, affirmed the RTC's ruling and factual findings on Noel's civil liability:
In the RTC Decision, there was no finding that the acts or omissions complained of did not exist. However, in the RTC Resolution, the RTC found that "the prosecution was able to establish that the spouses Viola were able to obtain money from the plaintiffs with the concomitant obligation to purchase its dollar equivalent. The spouses failed to do this and never returned the money. Hence, they should be held accountable civilly for the money lost and damages incurred by the plaintiffs." Thus, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the RTC, as there can be no extinction of the civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action. 48
It is evident that the RTC's dismissal of the criminal case for estafa against Noel did not extinguish his civil liability. There was no finding that the acts or omissions from which the civil liability arose did not exist or that he did not commit the acts or omissions imputed to him. On the contrary, the factual findings which formed the basis of his civil liability to spouses Sun were supported by substantial evidence and repeatedly upheld by the CA and RTC. Again, this Court is not a trier of facts and there are no compelling reasons given to disturb and reverse these factual findings.
Lastly, Noel cannot rely on the doctrine pronounced in Dy v. People49 which is inapplicable to this case. The ruling in Dy presupposes the peculiar factual circumstance that accused's civil liability was based on a contract. It was therefore held that the civil liability arising from the civil contract may not be enforced in a criminal case. However, in the instant case, no contract was executed between spouses Sun and Noel and Jenny, which precludes the application of Dy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 23, 2020 and the Resolution dated January 18, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111627 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Noel Viola is ORDERED to PAY spouses Ignacio and Rosalinda Sun P2,760,000.00 representing the amount he obtained from them. A legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall also be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction.
SOORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-28.
2.Id. at 34-46; penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin, with Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Alfredo D. Ampuan, concurring.
3.Id. at 49-51.
4.Id. at 88-91; penned by Presiding Judge Ferdinand C. Baylon.
5.Id. at 53-54.
6.Id. at 53.
7.Id. at 90.
8.Id. at 35.
9.Id. at 36-37.
10.Id. at 55-63.
11.Id. at 63.
12.Id. at 59-60.
13.Id. at 61-63.
14.Id. at 65-82.
15.Id. at 83-87.
16.Id. at 88-91.
17.Id. at 91.
18.Id. at 90.
19.Id. at 41.
20.Id. at 34-46.
21.Id. at 45.
22.Id. at 41-43.
23.Id. at 43-44.
24.Id. at 44-45.
25.Id. at 49-51.
26.Id. at 50.
27. RULES OF COURT, Rule 122, Section 6 provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
28.Rollo, pp. 15-18.
29. 433 Phil. 844 (2002).
30.Id. at 862.
31.Id. at 862-864.
32.Id. at 864-865.
33. RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Section 3.
34.Rollo, pp. 41-43.
35.Id. at 27.
36. 792 Phil. 672 (2016).
37.Rollo, pp. 20-26.
38.Gatan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257, 265 (2017).
39.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016).
40.Daluraya v. Oliva, 749 Phil. 531, 536-537 (2014).
41. 597 Phil. 127 (2009).
42.Id. at 141.
43. 745 Phil. 358 (2014).
44.Id. at 362-363.
45. 806 Phil. 483 (2017).
46.Rollo, p. 62.
47.Id. at 90.
48.Id. at 45.
49.Supra note 46.