FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231501. September 14, 2021.]
MERCEDES VILLAR, GLORIA SARINAGA, AMELITA OLARTE, ROSE MARIE PATIAG, MERCEDITA VICTORINO, MELODINA ORTEGA, LUISITA CABATU, and MARLON RAMIREZ, petitioners, vs. ANTONIO TAMBUNTING, JR., RALBY TAMBUNTING, and ANTONIO TAMBUNTING, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 14, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 231501 — Mercedes Villar, Gloria Sarinaga, Amelita Olarte, Rose Marie Patiag, Mercedita Victorino, Melodina Ortega, Luisita Cabatu, and Marlon Ramirez v. Antonio Tambunting, Jr., Ralby Tambunting, and Antonio Tambunting
Petitioners Mercedes Villar, Gloria Sarinaga, Amelita Olarte, Rose Marie Patiag, Mercedita Victorino, Melodina Ortega, Luisita Cabatu, and Marlon Ramirez assail the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128351 entitled Mercedes Villar, Gloria Sarinaga, Amelita Olarte, Rose Marie Patiag, Mercedita Victorino, Melodina Ortega, Luisita Cabatu, and Marlon Ramirez v. National Labor Relations Commission, Tambunting Financial Services, Antonio Tambunting, Jr., Ralby Tambunting, and Antonio Tambunting:
1. Resolution1 dated January 24, 2017 clarifying the Decision dated June 23, 2015 to the effect that respondent officers Antonio Tambunting, Jr., Ralby Tambunting, and Antonio Tambunting are absolved from liability in solidum for the illegal termination of petitioners; and
2. Resolution2 dated May 3, 2017 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
Petitioners sued respondents Tambunting Financial Services (TFS), Antonio Tambunting, Jr., Ralby Tambunting, and Antonio Tambunting for illegal dismissal, underpayment of 13th month pay, non-payment of separation pay and separation benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. They essentially alleged that they were long time employees of TFS, an entity engaged in the pawnshop business with several branches nationwide. They diligently reported for work until one day, they were verbally informed of their impending termination from employment. Respondents offered them a certain amount as separation pay which they refused. Thus, respondents terminated their services. They, therefore, demanded reinstatement but their demand fell on deaf ears.
For their part, respondents TFS and officers 3 justified petitioners' termination on ground of retrenchment brought about by serious business reverses. In 2007, TFS incurred losses of P7,373,457.00 and in 2008, P10,968,519.00. With these losses, TFS could not be expected to retain the same number of employees it had, otherwise, it would only be digging its own grave. 4
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
By Decision5 dated August 9, 2010, Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on declared the retrenchment illegal and ordered TFS to pay petitioners' backwages and other monetary benefits, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the retrenchment is declared Illegal. The respondent corporation is ordered to pay the complainants their backwages from the time of their termination to the date of this decision. The respondent is also ordered to pay complainants their separation pay and 13th month pay as computed in Annex "A" which forms part of this decision.
SO ORDERED. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
The labor arbiter held that TFS failed to establish the alleged serious business reverses it had suffered through audited financial statements of an independent external auditor. At any rate, prior to actual retrenchment, TFS should have first adopted measures to substantially reduce losses (e.g., reduced workweek and reduction of other overhead expense), set the policy for the selection of the employees to be retained or laid off (e.g., first in — first out or seniority), and notify the Department of Labor and Employment of the intended retrenchment a month before actual implementation thereof.
The labor arbiter did not order petitioners' reinstatement as they opted to be paid separation pay instead.
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
TFS 7 sought reconsideration, reiterating that petitioners' termination was justified on ground of serious business reverses NLRC treated said motion as an appeal.
Petitioners, on the other hand, partly appealed 8 to the NLRC insofar as the award of separation pay was concerned. They brought to fore that none of the parties alleged the existence of strained relations. In fact, they themselves amended their complaint and chose reinstatement as the relief sought. They manifested their desire to be reinstated and refused to be paid their separation pay.
Rulings of the NLRC
Through its Resolution9 dated September 28, 2012, the NLRC dismissed TFS' motion for reconsideration for non-perfection. As it was, TFS failed to put up the corresponding cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the judgment award in violation of Section 6, 10 Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. It also failed to pay the appeal fee mandated under Section 5 11 of the same rule. Thus, insofar as respondents were concerned, the labor arbiter's disposition had already lapsed into finality.
The NLRC also denied petitioners' partial appeal for lack of merit. It denied their prayer for reinstatement because they actually prayed for separation pay in their verified complaint. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration got denied by Resolution 12 dated November 19, 2012.
Undaunted, petitioners elevated 13 the case to the Court of Appeals through certiorari, insisting anew on their reinstatement.
Dispositions of the Court of Appeals
By Decision14 dated June 23, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 September 2012 and 19 November 2012 Resolutions of the NLRC insofar as they denied the plea for reinstatement of petitioners, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private Respondents are ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY REINSTATE petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and other benefits computed from the time of dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
It ordered petitioners' reinstatement and found no basis to award separation pay instead. For though petitioners initially sought payment of separation pay, records show that in their Position Paper and subsequent pleadings, petitioners distinctly prayed for reinstatement.
The aforesaid decision lapsed into finality on August 12, 2015. 16
By Alias Writ of Execution 17 dated April 11, 2016, Labor Arbiter Libo-on ordered Sheriff Noli S. Nicdao to accompany petitioners to the premises of respondents, both TFS and its officers, for execution of judgment.
Pursuant to the alias writ, the Manager of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Intramuros, Manila received a Notice of Garnishment 18 on the properties in the bank's custody under the names of TFS, Antonio Tambunting, Jr., Ralby Tambunting, and Antonio Tambunting, ordering him (the manager) not to deliver, transfer, or otherwise dispose of these properties.
Respondent officers moved 19 to quash the alias writ and lift the notice of garnishment on ground that neither the appellate court nor the labor arbiter found them solidarily liable with TFS for the judgment awards.
Meantime, respondent officers, too, moved 20 for clarificatory judgment before the Court of Appeals for purposes of delineating their liability under the latter's Decision dated June 23, 2015.
In their Comment, 21 petitioners countered that the Decision dated June 23, 2015 was clear — "private respondents," not just TFS, were required to reinstate petitioners to their previous positions and pay them their backwages. Respondent officers could have moved for reconsideration of this ruling and even elevate the case to the Supreme Court but they did not. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated June 23, 2015 therefore lapsed into finality, hence, may no longer be modified even if erroneous.
By Resolution 22 dated January 24, 2017, the Court of Appeals clarified that only TFS was liable to petitioners, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED. The dispositive portion of Our decision dated 23 June 2015 is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 September 2012 and 19 November 2012 Resolutions of the NLRC, insofar as they denied the plea for reinstatement of petitioners, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tambunting Financial Services is ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY REINSTATE petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay their full backwages and other benefits computed from the time of dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement."
SO ORDERED. 23
The Court of Appeals noted that in the entire length of the decision subject for clarification, there was never a discussion of the respondent officers' participation, much less, any showing of malice or bad faith on their part. Thus, the fallo of said decision could not be interpreted as holding respondent officers liable to petitioners for full backwages and other benefits.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same got denied by Resolution 24 dated May 3, 2017.
The Present Petition
Petitioners 25 now seek affirmative relief from the Court. They insist on the solidary liability of respondent officers, reiterating their submissions before the Court of Appeals.
In their Comment, 26 respondent officers defend the dispositions of the Court of Appeals. They counter that the fallo of Decision dated June 23, 2015 did not in any way hold them personally liable for the monetary judgment.
Ruling
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment; Exceptions
A decision which already lapsed into finality has become immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This is the doctrine of immutability of judgment. 27
The doctrine has a two-fold purpose: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied. 28
The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an ironclad rule but is subject to exceptions:
(1) Correction of clerical errors;
(2) Nunc pro tunc entrieswhich cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) Void judgments; and
(4) Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 29
The third exception is applicable here.
The appellate court's Decision dated June
It is every litigant's right to be informed of the facts and the law upon which he or she is being held accountable. This is part and parcel of his or her right to due process of law. 30 Corollarily, Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution requires all courts to observe this right, viz.:
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court again reminds magistrates to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law upon which his or her decision is based. It ordains:
SECTION 1. Rendition of Judgments and Final Orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (1a) 31
This is complemented by Administrative Circular No. 1-88 which decrees:
5.3 Judges should make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to "generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced." 32
The above provisions have a common denominator — upholding every litigant's right to be informed of how the case was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. 33
Here, the appellate court rendered its Decision34 dated June 23, 2015:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 September 2012 and 19 November 2012 Resolutions of the NLRC insofar as they denied the plea for reinstatement of petitioners, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private Respondents are ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY REINSTATE petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and other benefits computed from the time of dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. (Emphases supplied)
Verily, the fallo appears unequivocal, ordering private respondents, herein TFS and respondent officers to reinstate petitioners and pay their monetary awards. As a general rule, such dispositive portion or fallo is the decisive resolution and is the subject of execution. 35
A closer look at the body of the decision, however, shows a variance between the discussion and the dispositive portion of the decision subject of execution. In particular, the Decision dated June 23, 2015 did not contain the facts and law on which respondent officers' liability was based.
To be sure, it is settled that a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and from the people comprising it. As a general rule, an officer may not be held liable for the corporation's labor obligations unless he or she acted with evident malice and/or bad faith in dismissing an employee. 36
Here, petitioners themselves failed to specify respondent officers' actions which could have constituted bad faith, viz.:
Complainants are long-time employees of respondent Tambunting Financial Services which is managed by respondent Ralby Tambunting.
Complainants' respective salary rates, positions, and dates of hiring are indicated in their complaint-forms which form part of the records of this case.
Complainants served respondent company diligently. However, they were called to the office one day and orally informed that respondent company would be terminating them from work. In turn, respondents offered to pay them a certain amount as separation pay. Complainants refused. Respondents then terminated complainants from work a few days thereafter.
Complainants demanded that they be reinstated but respondents refused. Complainants were thus forced to file the instant action for illegal dismissal and for payment of their 13th month pay. 37 x x x
As well, nowhere in the labor arbiter's decision were respondent officers found guilty of bad faith or malice. To recall, it found TFS alone to be liable to petitioners, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the retrenchment is declared Illegal. The respondent corporation is ordered to pay the complainants their backwages from the time of their termination to the date of this decision. The respondent is also ordered to is also ordered to pay complainants their separation pay and 13th month pay as computed in Annex "A" which forms part of this decision.
SO ORDERED. 38 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, too, the Decision dated June 23, 2015 did not contain any discussion on or finding of bad faith, malice, or capriciousness on the part of respondent officers in terminating petitioners' services, thus:
The only issue for resolution here is whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision ordering the payment of separation pay to petitioners instead of reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, both the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC declared that reinstatement is no longer viable because petitioners specifically asked for separation pay and due to strained relations.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, it appears that the NLRC based its findings of strained relations on impression alone. The facts and the evidence on record do not prove the presence of strained relations. Petitioners are correct in asserting that the theory of strained relations was never made an issue by either party. Additionally, petitioners' proposition that the findings strained relations was based merely on the fact of filing of the illegal dismissal case, is strengthened by the very words of the Labor Arbiter when he distinctly stated, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Referring again to the statement of the Labor Arbiter that no credible explanation was given why petitioners were singled out in the retrenchment program, it is clear that there was no imputation of wrong doing or infraction against petitioners.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Accordingly, We find no basis for an award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The assailed NLRC resolution, not being in accord with the evidence on record, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 39 x x x
xxx xxx xxx
To reiterate, absent any allegation and finding of bad faith on the part of respondent officers, they cannot be held solidarily liable with the company for the illegal termination of its employees. Consequently, the Court of Appeals could not have validly held respondent officers solidarily liable with TFS without violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, Administrative Circular No. 1-88, and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. The Court, therefore, finds that the Decision dated June 23, 2015 was void insofar as it included respondent officers among those liable for the judgment award.
In Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corp., 40 the Court declared void the trial court's ruling insofar as the collection case was concerned, as it contained neither an analysis of the evidence of East Oceanic and Go as regards the outstanding balance of the latter's loan obligation, nor a reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion as to Go's civil liability to East Oceanic. There was absolutely no discussion on the collection case, particularly, on how it arrived at its conclusion finding Go liable to pay East Oceanic "the sum of P2,814,054.86 plus 6% interest to be computed from the time of the filing of the complaint." Clearly, the trial court therein failed to meet the standard set forth in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, and in so doing, deprived Go of his right to due process.
A void judgment does not lapse into finality and may be assailed at any time. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not violate the doctrine of immutability of judgment when it clarified its Decision dated June 23, 2015 and corrected its own error.
A clarificatory ruling was necessary
Even assuming for sake of argument that the ruling against respondent officers was not void, the clarificatory resolution was nevertheless proper for purposes of resolving the conflicting rulings of the labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals.
To recall, the labor arbiter, on the one hand, absolved respondent officers of liability and held TFS solely liable to petitioners for separation pay. Petitioners partly appealed the labor arbiter's ruling but only insofar as the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement was concerned. In other words, petitioners neverassailed respondent officers' exoneration from liability, allowing it to lapse into finality.
In Moll v. Convergys Philippines, 41 the Court held Convergys solely liable to petitioner for the monetary award. There, Labor Arbiter Makasiar exonerated respondents Ayers, Valentine, Pontius, Twomey, Gonzales, Sangcal, and Cabugao from all liabilities for lack of showing that they acted with malice or bad faith nor assented to petitioner's illegal dismissal. Petitioner did not assail their exoneration on appeal before the NLRC. Thus, the Court noted that they should have already been dropped as party respondents as the labor arbiter's decision exonerating them had already lapsed into finality.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 42 dated June 23, 2015 which seemingly held both TFS and respondent officers liable to pay the monetary awards. Neither party appealed from this ruling.
Considering the apparent conflict between the final dispositions of the labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals, it behooved the Court of Appeals (and this Court for that matter) to go beyond the conflicting dispositive portions of these rulings and refer to the bodies thereof to determine their real intent.
As discussed, the real intention of both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals was to exonerate respondent officers from liability. This was clear from the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's ruling which held TFS solely liable to petitioners for the monetary award. It became obvious that this, too, was the intention of the Court of Appeals when it clarified its earlier decision, thus:
At first glance, the fallo of Our decision appears to be clear and unambiguous, which ordinarily would have left no room for interpretation. However, a second closer look thereat would reveal that there appears to be some confusion as to what the fallo truly ordains, specifically whether or not it was this Court's intendment to make private respondents Tambuntings solidarily liable with private respondent TFS for the monetary award of the decision.
It was not the intention of this Court to make private respondents liable for any monetary responsibility to petitioners. This is clear from the first sentence of the fallo which declared in no uncertain terms that public respondent's resolutions — which affirmed the decision of LA Libo-on — were being reversed and set aside only insofar as these had denied petitioners' prayer for reinstatement. Consequently, all other aspects of the decision of LA Libo-on should be retained, including his disposition that the monetary liability should be shouldered by private respondent TFS alone, since such payment of backwages entirely has nothing to do with the issue of reinstatement.
Verily, the Court of Appeals itself was apologetic for the way its decision was drafted. Realizing that the fallo inadvertently held respondent officers solidarily liable, the appellate court deemed it proper to rectify its error.
The general rule may be that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. 43 The exception, however, is when the inevitable conclusion from the body is that there was a glaring error in the fallo, in which case the body of the decision will prevail. 44
Certainly, the exception is applicable here. We have scoured the entirety of the Decision dated June 23, 2015 and found no bad faith, malice, or capriciousness on the part of respondent officers in effecting petitioners' termination. There was simply no basis to hold respondent officers solidarily liable with TFS. As such, they should not be unduly burdened by the satisfaction of judgment.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in clarifying its Decision 45 dated June 23, 2015 and dropping respondent officers from solidary liability. In affirming the assailed resolutions, the Court is not altering the rulings below. On the contrary, the Court harmonizes these rulings, reveals the true intention of the Court of Appeals, and upholds respondent officers' right to due process of law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated January 24, 2017 and May 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128351 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 23-30.
2.Id. at 32.
3.Id. at 13.
4.Id. at 39-40.
5.Id. at 38-51.
6.Id. at 49.
7.Id. at 60-67.
8.Id. at 52-56.
9.Id. at 69-72.
10.SECTION 6.Bond. — In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. x x x (The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, May 31, 2011).
11.SECTION 5.Appeal Fee. — The appellant shall pay the prevailing appeal fee and legal research fee to the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office of origin, and the official receipt of such payment shall form part of the records of the case. (5a) (The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, May 31, 2011).
12.Rollo, pp. 79-80.
13.Id. at 81-89.
14. Penned by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, id. at 93-102.
15.Id. at 102.
16.Id. at 23.
17.Id. at 103-107.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to accompany the following complainants x x x to the premises of respondents TAMBUNTING FINANCIAL SERVICES, ANTONIO TAMBUNTING JR., RALBY TAMBUNTING, and ANTONIO TAMBUNTING, for the purpose of reinstating complainants to their former positions x x x; and to collect x x x the total amount of P7,820,811.94 from said respondents x x x, representing complainants' judgment award pursuant to the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals dated June 23, 2015.
18. "YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED x x x for recovery of complainant/s against the respondent/s of the amount P7,820,811.94. execution fee of P77,708.12, and P39,124.06 as deposit fee of said complainant's and other expenses that may be incurred in connection with this, GARNISHMENT is hereby made upon all the goods, effect, credits, interest, bank deposits and other personal properties in your possession or under your control belonging to the respondent[s] TAMBUNTING FINANCIAL SERVICES, ANTONIO TAMBUNTING, JR., RALBY TAMBUNTING, and ANTONIO TAMBUNTING as of the date of service hereof, sufficient to cover the above mentioned amount.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, that you should not deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose of such properties or Bank deposits in your possession or under your control belonging to said respondent[s] to any person or entity except to the undersigned Sheriff under prescribed by law." Id. at 110.
19.Id. at 108-115.
20.Id. at 136-141.
21.Id. at 184-186.
22.Id. at 23-30.
23.Id. at 29.
24.Id. at 32.
25.Id. at 11-19.
26.Id. at 191-199.
27.National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, 731 Phil. 401, 405 (2014).
28.Id.
29.Mercury Drug Corp. v. Spouses Huan, 817 Phil. 434, 446 (2017).
30. Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
31. Rules of Court, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended, April 8, 1997.
32. Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-88, January 28, 1988.
33. See Alentajan v. Molaer, A.C. No. 11820, November 10, 2020.
34.Rollo, pp. 93-102.
35.PH Credit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821, 833 (2001).
36. See Moll v. Convergys Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 253715, April 28, 2021.
37.Rollo, p. 39.
38.Id. at 49.
39.Id. at 97-101.
40. 824 Phil. 1, 9 (2018).
41. G.R. No. 253715, April 28, 2021.
42.Rollo, pp. 93-102.
43. See PH Credit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821, 834 (2001).
44.Id.
45.Rollo, pp. 93-102.