Villamor v. Commission on Elections

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 250370. October 5, 2021.]

MAYOR ROVELYN ECHAVE VILLAMOR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ANTONIO BELLO VIERNES, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedOCTOBER 5, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 250370 (Mayor Rovelyn Echave Villamor v. Commission on Elections and Antonio Bello Viernes.) — This treats of the Most Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 assailing the Resolutions dated 26 April 2019 2 and 27 November 2019 3 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division and En Banc, respectively, in SPA Case No. 18-182 (DC).

Antecedents

Petitioner Mayor Rovelyn Echave Villamor (Villamor) filed on 16 October 2018, her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra in connection with the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections. Therein, Villamor stated that: (1) she has been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for thirty-six (36) years and eight (8) months up to the day before 13 May 2019; (2) she is a Filipino citizen and not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; and (3) she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to. 4

On 12 November 2018, private respondent and rival candidate Antonio Bello Viernes (Viernes) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancel CoC against Villamor 5 due to the latter's false representation that she is eligible for the office of Mayor. According to Viernes, Villamor was neither a Filipino citizen nor a resident of their locality for thirty-six (36) years and eight (8) months prior to the elections as declared in the latter's CoC. To buttress his claims, Viernes presented a photocopy of Villamor's American passport and pointed to Villamor's failure to attach her sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship to her CoC.

Villamor won in the 2019 national and local elections, and was proclaimed as Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra on 14 May 2019. 6

In her Verified Answer, 7 Villamor denied having committed material misrepresentations in her CoC. Villamor averred that although she became a naturalized American citizen on 29 October 2009, she has duly complied with all the requirements for the reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 8 prior to filing her CoC. As proof, she submitted as evidence: (1) an Order of Approval 9 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California regarding her application for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship; (2) Oath of Allegiance; 10 (3) Identification Certificate; 11 and (4) Affidavit of Renunciation dated 18 September 2018. 12 Villamor claimed that all these documents were attached to the CoC she filed before the local Election Officer. CAIHTE

Having reacquired Filipino citizenship, Villamor insisted that "it is only but (sic) accurate that [she] declared in her CoC that her period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before the May 13, 2019 Elections was 36 years and 8 months considering that in computing the same her period of stay in the United States was already deducted thereat." 13

Villamor also argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to deny due course or cancel her CoC as, following this Court's ruling in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC14(Poe-Llamanzares), there was no prior authoritative declaration against her qualifications for the office for which she seeks to be elected to.

In a Memorandum filed before the COMELEC, 15 Viernes additionally asserted that Villamor was not qualified to vote on the assumption that she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter for the 2018 Barangay elections. 16

On 26 April 2019, the COMELEC Second Division 17 issued a Resolution granting the Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancel CoC filed by Viernes. Although it refused to consider the additional issue (on Villamor's legal status and qualification as a voter) raised by Viernes in his Memorandum on due process grounds, the COMELEC Second Division rejected Villamor's contention and maintained that it had jurisdiction over the proceeding to cancel Villamor's CoC following the Court's Decision in Francisco v. COMELEC. 18 There, the Court revisited its ruling in Poe-Llamanzares19 and categorically upheld COMELEC's jurisdiction to itself ascertain the truth and/or falsity of a representation in a petition to cancel a CoC, or to determine facts that constitute as grounds to disqualify a candidate. 20

The COMELEC Second Division also found that while Villamor did not commit false material representation in her CoC as to her nationality, 21 she nevertheless made false material representation as to her residence. Considering that Villamor admitted to becoming a naturalized American citizen on 29 October 2009, she was considered to have abandoned her domicile of origin as of said date. It declared that in the absence of contrary proof, Villamor was presumed to have retained her status as a permanent resident of the United States (U.S.), her domicile of choice, notwithstanding her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. 22

Villamor subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration (MR). 23 There, she clearly outlined 24 the following material dates:

 

DATE	EVENT
September 25, 1970	Respondent [Villamor] was born of Filipino mother and father.
October 29, 2009	Respondent became a naturalized US Citizen.
July 16, 2013	Respondent acquired a portion of a farmland situated in Sitio, Cabasaan, Brgy. Laguiben, Lagangilang, Abra from her brother, Jay E. Villamor.
September 7, 2016	Respondent acquired another portion of the said farmland from her sister, Luz Villamor Sayen.
July 7, 2017	Respondent was issued a Community Tax Certificate by the Municipality of Lagangilang, Abra.
July 11, 2017	Respondent acquired a property located in Laang, Lagangilang, Abra from one Virginia E. Atmosfera where she eventually constructed her home.
July 12, 2017	Respondent caused the transfer of the tax declaration of the same property from the name of Atmosfera to her name.
June 19, 2018	Respondent re-acquired her Filipino citizenship by virtue of R.A. 9225 otherwise known as "Citizenship Retention and Reaquisition Act of 2003."
September 18, 2018	Respondent executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of her US citizenship, her allegiance to the US and the US government.
October 16, 2018	Respondent filed her CoC for the position of Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra in the upcoming May 13, 2019 Elections.

 

Villamor thereafter contended that:

35. To begin with, residence is distinct from citizenship. Hence, being a naturalized citizen of the U.S., it does not necessarily follow that he is also a resident thereat.

36. Here, Respondent's residency in Lagangilang, Abra remained and continued even after she became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. in October 29, 2009.

37. In fact, Respondent regularly flies back and forth the U.S. and Lagangilang, Abra. Moreover, not only her properties in the said municipality remained intact, Respondent was able to acquire several properties afterwards.

38. To prove such fact, a "Palawag" was executed by her brother, Jay E. Villamor dated July 16, 2013, wherein it was stated that he is transferring his portion of a certain farmland situated in Sitio Cabasaan, Brgy. Laguibem, n Lagangilang, Abra to Respondent as the payment for the latter's car.

39. In addition, on September 8, 2016, a portion of the same farmland owned by her sister, Luz Villamor Sayen was transferred also to Respondent through a "Palawag."

40. Furthermore, on July 7, 2017, Respondent was issued a Community Tax Certificate by the Municipality of Lagangilang, Abra.

41. Aside from the expansion of the said farmland, Respondent bought another lot situated in Laang, Lagangilang, Abra, in July 11, 2017 from one Virginia S. Atmosfera via execution of Deed of Absolute Sale where she eventually constructed a house. Consequently, Tax Declaration No. 11844, covering the said property, was then issued under her name.

42. With these, the intent of the Respondent to reside and return for an indefinite period of time in Lagangilang, Abra is clearly manifested.

43. Even assuming for the sake of argument that she gained a new "domicile" by virtue of her U.S. citizenship, Respondent's act of frequently returning back to Lagangilang, Abra, acquiring properties in the same place, constructing a residence thereat, securing a Community Tax Certificate, and voting in the last barangay elections are clear indications that she expressly chooses her domicile of origin as her domicile following the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC.

44. In Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, the Honorable Supreme Court pronounced that there are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

45. Also, to establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.

46. Here, by acquiring properties in the Philippines specifically in Lagangilang, Abra and constructing a residence thereat, Respondent's intent to permanently reside in the said municipality and elect the same as her new domicile of choice, and abandon her U.S. residence, is present and perfected.

47. Besides, it is equally settled that "incremental moves" can be done in acquiring such a new domicile.

48. Meanwhile, her residence or bodily presence in Lagangilang, Abra is supported by the fact that she was allowed to vote in the recently concluded May 14, 2019 Barangay and SK Elections, as shown in her Voter Certification, considering that the basic requirements in voting are the following: (1) must be at least 18 years old; (2) a resident of the Philippines for at least one year; and (3) a resident of the city or municipality where you intend to vote for at least six months prior to the election. The same was further buttressed by the issuance of a Community Tax Certificate by the Municipality of Lagangilang, Abra.

49. Applying the Grace Poe doctrine, it is clear that there is an overwhelming evidence in the instant case which when taken together will likewise lead to a conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence and permanently relocate to the Philippines, particularly in Lagangilang, Abra and established her residence thereat. Also, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and actual continuous stay in the Philippines, it can be gainsaid that as early as 2010 Respondent's intent to return was for good.

50. With all that stated, Respondent is indeed a resident of Lagangilang, Abra by which she sufficiently established her 1-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. 25

In fine, Villamor maintained that Lagangilang, Abra remained her domicile of choice as manifested by her acts and transactions in the town even after she became a naturalized U.S. citizen on 29 October 2009. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that Villamor acquired a new domicile when she became an American citizen, she asseverates that the said acts and transactions clearly indicate an express choice on her part to re-establish her domicile in Lagangilang, her domicile of origin. 26 DETACa

In its assailed Resolution dated 27 November 2019, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion. In affirming the findings and conclusions reached by its Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc held that: (1) Villamor could not claim denial of due process on the issue of the period of her residency as she herself brought up the issue when she asserted in her Memorandum that she has been residing in the Philippines, which assertion she must establish; 27 (2) the evidence to prove residence submitted by Villamor with her MR to prove her residence in Lagangilang could not be considered as this was not allowed under the Rules; 28 (3) nevertheless, even if said evidence were to be considered, the same would not prove her residence in Lagangilang as they were dated prior to Villamor's reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship. 29

Aggrieved, Villamor filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

We are called to resolve whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the cancellation of Villamor's CoC on the ground of false representation.

Ruling of the Court

We GRANT the petition.

COMELEC Resolution dated 27

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment, 30 points out that the COMELEC En Banc's Resolution dated 27 November 2019, which affirmed the Second Division's Resolution dated 26 April 2019, had already become final and executory. 31

We clarify.

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC for any elective office is classified as a Special Action, wherein a decision or resolution by the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from promulgation, unless otherwise restrained by the Supreme Court. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on the finality of COMELEC decisions and resolutions provides in pertinent part:

Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. — x x x

(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. 32

The phrase "final and executory" under Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules should be interpreted to mean "immediately executory" after five (5) days from promulgation. The absence of a restraining order does not make it final and executory to the effect that it becomes immutable, considering that the aggrieved party has thirty (30) days within which to assail said decision, order or ruling to the Supreme Court on certiorari. 33 If the special civil action for certiorari is granted, the assailed order is, in legal contemplation, null and void ab initio, and hence, in this sense, it did not become final and executory.

In his Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, 34 Justice Leonen explained how finality under the COMELEC Rules should be read in light of Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, thus:

The interpretation of any legal provision should be one that is in harmony with other laws on the same subject matter so as to form a complete, coherent, and intelligible system. "Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretand," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Assessing the validity of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure includes a determination of whether these rules can co-exist with the remedy of certiorari as provided by Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution.

A wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. In exercising this power, this court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, a writ of certiorari will be granted where necessary in order to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

The Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure are evidently procedural rules; they are remedial in nature. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice. They are the means by which its power or authority to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action. Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure refers only to the pleadings and practice before the Commission on Elections itself, and does not affect the jurisdiction of this court.

Accordingly, that the Commission on Elections may deem a resolution final and executory under its rules of procedure does not automatically render such resolution beyond the scope of judicial review under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure merely guides the Commission as to the status of a decision for its own operations; it does not prevent this court from acting on the same decision via certiorari proceedings. In any event, while it is true that certiorari does not immediately stay a decision of a constitutional commission, a temporary restraining order can still be issued, as in this case.

Finally, it should be noted that in promulgating this rule, the Commission on Elections was simply fulfilling its constitutional duty to "promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases." Cases before the Commission on Elections must be disposed of without delay, as the date of the elections is constitutionally and statutorily fixed. The five-day rule is based on a reasonable ground: the necessity to prepare for the elections. [Emphases supplied.]

COMELEC can be the proper body to

On the issue of COMELEC's jurisdiction over Viernes' petition, We agree that the ruling in Poe-Llamanzares has been revisited by the Court in the case of Francisco v. COMELEC. 35 There, the Court categorically ruled:

x x x the COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. This is simply in congruence with the concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory bodies are enjoined to observe.

The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over election contests.

Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares that the polling body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election contests outside the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of regression, contrary to the intent behind the constitutional innovations creating and further strengthening the Commission. There is no novelty in this pronouncement, but merely a reinstatement of Our consistent jurisprudence prior to Poe.

xxx xxx xxx

To reiterate, the COMELEC, as an adjunct to its adjudicatory power, may investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action. As held in Cerafica:

The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. We thus caution the COMELEC against its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.

It may be true that the sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC is false material representation compounded by intent to deceive on the part of the candidate; and that the intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain absent an established fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the Court categorically rules herein that the COMELEC can be the proper body to make the pronouncement against which the truth or falsity of a material representation in a COC can be measured. [Emphases supplied.]

COMELEC committed grave abuse of

Ordinarily, in a certiorari case, this Court does not review COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Where, however, COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but constitutionally duty-bound, to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. 36 ATICcS

Here, Villamor asserts that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) sustained a finding based on an issue that was never raised by Viernes in his petition; (2) refused to consider evidence subsequently adduced in Villamor's MR; (3) found that the evidence does not prove her residency as the evidence dated back to before Villamor reacquired her Filipino citizenship. Finally, Villamor argues that the purpose of the residency requirement has been met in this case considering that Lagangilang, Abra was the place of her birth, where she grew up, and the place she would always return to when she travelled back to the Philippines after she became a naturalized U.S. citizen. 37

There is merit in Villamor's contentions.

Our examination of the petition filed by Viernes before COMELEC shows that the same was premised primarily on the allegation that Villamor misrepresented the fact that she was a US citizen or was, at the very least, a dual citizen. On the other hand, Villamor's CoC was cancelled by COMELEC on the ground of an alleged failure "to prove that she is a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for at least one year before the date of the elections." 38

As pointed out by the Chief Justice, 39 a reading of the grounds raised in the petition, as a whole, shows that Viernes also took issue with Villamor's number of years of residency in Lagangilang, Abra. Furthermore, and even assuming arguendo that COMELEC cancelled Villamor's CoC on a ground not raised in the petition, We find that the requirements of administrative due process have been met in this case when Villamor was given the opportunity to seek the reconsideration of COMELEC's ruling. Indeed, observance of due process in administrative proceedings does not always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of due process is also met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. 40

This notwithstanding, We still find that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the cancellation of Villamor's CoC without any prior determination of whether or not she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate. 41

Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provide:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.

These provisions govern the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to CoCs; their combined application requires that the facts provided by the candidate in his CoC be true, under pain of denial or cancellation of the CoC if any false representation of a material fact is made. 42

Facts respecting a candidate's citizenship and residence are material as they pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office. 43 The prevailing rule is that naturalization in a foreign country results in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines, 44 but one has the option to retain his/her domicile in another country or re-establish the same in the Philippines.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, however, a false representation under Section 78 must also consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Otherwise stated, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office. 45 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections46(Mitra), We explained: TIADCc

x x x the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

In his Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC, 47 former Justice Tinga proposed that evidence of intent to deceive the electorate is not necessary for a Section 78 petition to prosper. Allegedly, nowhere in the said provision is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. 48

While not expressly provided under Section 78 of the OEC, the requirement of proof of intent to deceive can be gleaned from the Congressional deliberations of the OEC on Section 78, to wit:

HON. ADAZA.

Why should we give the COMELEC power to deny or to give due course when the acceptance of the certificate of candidacy is ministerial?

HON. FERNAN.

Iyon na nga ang sinasabi ko eh.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Baka iyong residences, this must be summary. He is not a resident of the ano, why will you wait? Automatically disqualified siya. Suppose he is not a natural born citizen.

HON. ADAZA.

No, but we can specify the grounds here. Kasi, they can use this power to expand.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Yeah, that is under this article nga.

HON. ADAZA.

Iyon na nga, but let's make particular reference. Remember, Nonoy, this is a new provision which gives authority to the COMELEC. This was never there before. Ikansel na natin yan.

HON. GONZALES.

At saka the Constitution says, di ba? "The Commission on Elections is the sole judge of all the contest." This merely refers to contest e. Petition lang to give due course e. You will only be declared disqualified.

THE CHAIRMAN.

No, no, because, clearly, he is a non-resident. Oh, why can we not file a petition? Supposing he is not a natural born citizen? Why?

HON. GONZALES.

This is a very very serious question. This should be declared only in proper election contest, properly litigated but never in a summary proceedings.

THE CHAIRMAN.

We will not use the word, the phrase "due course," "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy." For example, si Ading, is a resident of Cebu and he runs in Davao City.

HON. ADAZA.

He is a resident of Cebu but he runs in Lapu-Lapu? Ikaw, you are already threatening him ah.

THE CHAIRMAN.

These are the cases I am sure, that are . . .

HON. ADAZA.

I see. No, no, but let us get rid of the provision. This is dangerous.

THE CHAIRMAN.

No but, if you know that your opponent is not elected or suppose.

HON. ADAZA.

File the proper petition like before without providing this.

THE CHAIRMAN.

But in the mean time, why . . .

HON. SITOY.

My proposal is to delete the phrase "to deny due course," go direct to "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy."

HON. ASOK.

Every Certificate of Candidacy should be presumed accepted. It should be presumed accepted.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Suppose on the basis of . . .

HON. SITOY.

That's why, my proposal is, "any person seeking the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy."

HON. FERNAN.

But where are the grounds here?

HON. ADAZA.

Noy, let's hold this. Hold munaito. This is dangerous e.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Okay, okay.

HON. GONZALES.

Ginagamit lamang ng COMELEC ang "before" if it is claimed that a candidate is an official or that his Certificate of Candidacy has been filed in bad faith, iyon lang. Pero you cannot go to the intrinsic qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.

HON. DELOS REYES.

Which are taken up in an ordinary protest.

HON. GONZALES.

Dito ba, kasama iyong proceedings sa . . .? What I'm saying is: Kagaya iyong nabanggit kay Nonoy, natural course of margin, imagine, it will eventually reach the Supreme Court. The moment that the disqualification is pending, lalong lalo na kung may decision ng COMELEC and yet pending pa before the Supreme Court, that already adversely affect a candidate, mabigat na iyan. So, what I'm saying is, on this disqualification sub-judice, alisin ito except if on the ground that he is a nuisance candidate or that his Certificate of Candidacy has been filed in bad faith. But if his Certificate of Candidacy appears to be regular and valid on the basis that his certificate has been filed on time, then it should be given due course. 49 [Emphases supplied.]

Verily, the lawmakers contemplated Section 78 to cover CoCs filed in bad faith to limit the power granted to COMELEC. Intent to deceive is thus an integral element of the material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the OEC.

Here, there is nothing in the assailed Resolutions showing COMELEC's determination of whether Villamor had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate. This omission constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 50 In fact, records reveal that Villamor never hid the fact of her naturalization as an American citizen or the date when she renounced the same. Villamor's Certificate of Naturalization, the Order of Approval of her application for citizenship re-acquisition, Identification Certificate, and Affidavit of Renunciation all appear to have been submitted to, and received by, the local Election Officer. Further, in computing the number of years of her residence in Lagangilang, Abra, i.e., 36 years and 8 months prior to the 13 May 2019 elections, Villamor excluded the period of her stay in the U.S. This, to our minds, negate the existence of bad faith. Rather, it was a mere error or mistake by Villamor on a difficult question of law as to residency, which, in turn, may be the basis of good faith. 51

It is axiomatic that the law always presumes good faith. 52 In the same vein, it is presumed that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong, and that the law was obeyed. 53 Good faith being presumed, one who alleges malice has the burden of proving the same. It is elementary that contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be based on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. 54 None of Villamor's pieces of evidence have been successfully refuted, much less proven false, and her intent to deceive established. Thus, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled Villamor's CoC on the ground of false representation of a material fact.

Villamor has reestablished residence

It is settled that one loses one's Philippine domicile of origin after being naturalized as a citizen of a foreign country. 55 However, and as correctly pointed out by Justice Leonen, 56 this does not mean that he/she cannot, at some point thereafter, choose to reestablish residence in the Philippines.

In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 57 the Court was asked to settle the validity and effectivity of Governor Frivaldo's repatriation in relation to his bid as Governor of Sorsogon. There, the Court ruled that Frivaldo's re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship on 30 June 1995 — the day of proclamation — made him "qualified to govern his native Sorsogon" and that his repatriation "retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994." Notably, despite issues raised against his citizenship, Frivaldo's residence in the area was never put in issue. In other words, his residence in Sorsogon, even prior to the date of effectivity of his repatriation, was considered and counted for purposes of the law's residency requirement.

The Court, in Poe-Llamanzares, 58 also held that, based on the evidence, a person can, in good faith, be considered a Philippine resident even prior to formal repatriation as a Filipino citizen. Thus:

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

Villamor was able to prove that she has chosen to reestablish residence in the Philippines after her naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 2009. In addition to regularly flying back to the Philippines, Villamor, since 2013, has acquired additional properties 59 in Lagangilang, Abra, declared them for tax purposes under her name, 60 and paid taxes thereon. 61 She also presented a Community Tax Certificate, 62 which is issued only upon payment of community tax in one's place of residence. 63

Further, Villamor's Voter's Certification relative to the May 2018 synchronized Barangay and SK elections evinced that she was already in Lagangilang as of 14 May 2018, 64 and that she had already met the minimum residence of at least six (6) months required for voting purposes. 65 In other words, Villamor was allowed to vote because she was considered a resident of Lagangilang as of November 2017, at the very least. This, in turn, more than qualifies her, residence-wise, for purposes of the May 2019 National and Local elections. By then, she will have resided in Lagangilang for at least nineteen (19) months, or more than the one (1) year period of residency required to qualify as a mayoralty candidate inLagangilang. Notably, there is nothing in the records to show that Villamor's registration as a voter or her participation in the 2018 elections were ever challenged on the ground of failure to meet the residence qualification.

That Villamor may have gone to the U.S. in the interim should not detract from the fact that she has reestablished residence in Lagangilang, Abra. Continuous actual physical presence for the period provided by law is not required for purposes of meeting the residence requirement. At any rate, Villamor was merely returning to her domicile of origin, the place of her birth and childhood where she formed strong ties and community connections. SDAaTC

In Mitra, 66 it was ruled that the residence requirement can be complied with through an incremental process including acquisition of business interest in the pertinent place and lease of feedmill building as residence. 67 While separately, each evidence presented by Villamor might not convincingly show the fact of her residence in Lagangilang, Abra for at least the minimum period required by law, this Court finds that collectively, these pieces of evidence more than sufficiently establish the same. 68

COMELEC's failure to stay

The law, under Section 6 of RA 6646, 69 categorically gives COMELEC the power to order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidence of the guilt is strong. 70 Here, despite its findings against Villamor and her alleged ineligibility, COMELEC did not issue an order suspending her proclamation. If indeed the evidence against Villamor's eligibility was as strong as COMELEC would have this Court to believe, it should have itself issued an Order staying Villamor's proclamation. COMELEC should not have allowed Villamor to be proclaimed (much less assume) the position of Mayor if it truly believed that Villamor did not possess the requisite qualifications for the said post.

Viernes even appeared to have filed several motions seeking the suspension (and later, the nullification) of Villamor's proclamation; he even sought the issuance by COMELEC of a Cease and Desist Order, presumably against Villamor carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the mayoral office. 71 Despite all of these, COMELEC did not lift a finger to stop Villamor — a candidate it previously declared to be ineligible for the position — from assuming office. It also took COMELEC several months before finally denying Villamor's MR. In the meantime, Villamor remained in possession of the office in dispute. To the Court's mind, COMELEC's failure to stay Villamor's proclamation (or annul her subsequent proclamation) is simply inconsistent with its finding that the latter is ineligible for failing to meet the residency requirement.

We take this occasion to remind COMELEC of the importance of resolving matters before it with all deliberate haste. Time is of the essence in election cases. 72 By their very nature and given the public interest involved, election cases must be resolved speedily, otherwise the will of the electorate would be frustrated. 73 Thus, the law provides, in no uncertain terms, that courts, despite their already heavy caseload, are to prioritize the disposition of election cases over all other cases. 74 As the constitutional body specifically charged with the enforcement of election laws, COMELEC is also expected to do no less.

Villamor was voted for, and

It was only on 27 November 2019, or more than six (6) months after the elections on 13 May 2019, that COMELEC finally resolved Viernes' petition and ordered the cancellation of Villamor's CoC. In the meantime, Villamor was voted for and proclaimed Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra. She prevailed with an overwhelming majority of votes: 5,879 votes 75 as against the 1,534 votes received by Viernes. 76

Clearly, the electorate did not intend to squander their votes. If anything, Villamor's overwhelming lead over her lone rival, Viernes, adds weight to her claim that she had no intention to deceive the electorate in her CoC, compelling the Court to give effect to the will of the voters of Lagangilang, Abra, choosing Villamor as their Mayor. To borrow from the words of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno:

x x x In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established authority." The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.77 [Emphases and italics supplied.]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated 26 April 2019 and 27 November 2019 issued by the Commission on Elections Second Division and En Banc, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancel Certificate of Candidacy filed by private respondent Antonio Bello Viernes is DISMISSED. acEHCD

This Resolution is immediately executory." Leonen, J., on official leave. (11)

Separate Opinions

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

As will be explained hereunder, I disagree with the ponencia's grant of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by petitioner Mayor Rovelyn Echave Villamor (Villamor) on the erroneous notion that the Resolutions dated April 26, 2019 1 and November 27, 2019 2 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) — which granted the petition filed by respondent Antonio Bello Viernes (Viernes) to deny due course to/cancel the Certificate of Candidacy 3 (CoC cancellation petition) of Villamor — are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Contrary to the ponencia, and as correctly ruled by the COMELEC, there is no sufficient evidence on record to prove that Villamor re-established her residence in Lagangilang, Abra (domicile). 4 Moreover, I maintain reservations on the ponencia's finding that the COMELEC "ordered the cancellation of Villamor's [Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)] without any prior determination of whether or not she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate." 5 As will be further expounded below, one's intent to deceive or mislead the electorate should be discontinued as a jurisprudential requisite in resolving petitions to deny due course to/cancel CoCs under Section 78 (Section 78 petition) of the Omnibus Election Code 6 (OEC).

I.

Preliminarily, it bears pointing out that the case before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, 7 of the Rules of Court challenging the foregoing Resolutions of the COMELEC. Hence, it must be shown that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling her CoC on the ground that the statement in her CoC with regard to her residency qualification for the position of Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra constitutes a false material representation. Case law provides that "[f]or an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross."8 As such, any abuse of discretion short of the arbitrary and gross character that the established principle requires will not justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. 9

With this framework in mind and as will be demonstrated below, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC in finding that the erroneous statement in Villamor's CoC with regard to her residence constitutes a false material representation, which is a sufficient ground for the cancellation of her CoC.

To recapitulate, Villamor filed a CoC for Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra for the 2019 National and Local Elections (2019 NLE). Viernes then filed a Section 78 petition against Villamor, alleging that the latter made a false material representation in her CoC when she claimed that she had resided in the Philippines for 36 years and 8 months immediately preceding the 2019 NLE, when in truth, she had not. Viernes expounded that Villamor became a United States (U.S.) citizen who therefore abandoned her Philippine domicile and acquired a new domicile of choice in the U.S. as a legal and factual result. For these reasons, Villamor could not have resided in Lagangilang, Abra and in the Philippines for 36 years and 8 months prior to the 2019 NLE and is therefore not qualified to run for the mayoralty post, contrary to what she claimed in her CoC. To strengthen his argument, Viernes submitted in evidence Villamor's CoC, U.S. passport, Certificate of Naturalization, and Order of Approval by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California dated June 19, 2018 10 to prove, among others, that she was naturalized as a U.S. citizen and hence, abandoned her Philippine domicile and acquired a new domicile of choice in the U.S. as a result. 11 CAIHTE

In defense, Villamor responded by simply arguing that while she became a U.S. citizen on October 29, 2009, 12 she nonetheless reacquired her Philippine citizenship on June 19, 2018. Thus, she insisted that it was accurate for her to "[declare] in her [CoC] that her period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before the May 13, 2019 Elections was 36 years and 8 months." 13

In ruling for the cancellation of Villamor's CoC, the COMELEC pointed out that since Villamor herself admitted that she became a U.S. citizen who reacquired her Philippine citizenship only on June 19, 2018, Viernes sufficiently discharged his original burden to prove that Villamor had abandoned her Philippine domicile, acquired a new domicile of choice in the U.S., and therefore could not have been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra and the Philippines for 36 years and 8 months prior to the 2019 NLE. 14 Thus, it was incumbent upon Villamor to show countervailing evidence to prove that she had re-established her Philippine domicile for the period required by law. However, as the COMELEC ruled, she failed in this respect, observing that the only evidence submitted by Villamor on the main were the following: (a) her CoC; (b) Order of Approval by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California dated June 19, 2018 granting her application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. (RA) 9225; 15(c) Identification Certificate likewise issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California; 16(d) Oath of Allegiance; 17(e) Affidavit of Renunciation dated September 18, 2018; 18(f) Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (ASENSO Party); (g) Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (NUP); (h) List of Authorized Signatories; 19(i) Certificate of Naturalization; 20 and (j) Certificate of Live Birth. 21

Aggrieved, Villamor subsequently submitted additional documents 22 together with her Motion for Reconsideration to further address the issue of her residency. She also outlined therein pertinent material dates and incidents corresponding to the submitted documents — which include her registration as a voter and participation in the May 2018 Barangay Elections, purchase of lands, and acquisition of business interest — to purportedly prove that Lagangilang, Abra "remained [her residence] even after she became x x x a naturalized citizen of the U.S. [on] October 29, 2009," 23 or, in any event, that she intended to "permanently reside [therein] and abandon her U.S. residence." 24 The ponencia highlights these matters in arriving at its conclusion that Villamor has "more than sufficiently [established her residence in Lagangilang, Abra]," 25 which the COMELEC gravely failed to consider by affirming its earlier ruling; hence, this petition.

However, it must be stressed, at the onset, that these additional documents and matters were presented only in the Motion for Reconsideration after the parties had already argued on, and the COMELEC had considered, all the relevant issues and evidence presented. Thus, on a procedural level, and as pointed out itself by the COMELEC, these belatedly submitted documents could no longer properly be considered by it at that stage. As the COMELEC correctly noted, a "Motion for Reconsideration may be filed only on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, or that such decision is contrary to law." 26 Raising new evidence for the first time on a motion for reconsideration thus remains procedurally suspect.

In any event, even assuming that the same were submitted at the very beginning of the proceedings, these documents still do not provide sufficient basis to hold that Villamor had already re-established her residence in Lagangilang, Abra prior to June 19, 2018, when she reacquired her Philippine citizenship.

The term "residence" can be understood and construed in different forms depending on the object or purpose of the statute in which it is employed. 27In our election laws, it is settled that the term "residence" is synonymous with domicile28 and is considered as an indispensable requirement to be able to vote or be voted for in the locality chosen as the person's permanent residence. Given this characterization, it should therefore be recognized that residence is a legal concept that has to be determined by and in connection with our Constitution and election laws, independent of or in conjunction with physical presence. Thus, when determining a person's legal relation with the place he/she intends to be voted for, physical presence cannot be the sole basis.

Likewise, it should be recognized that since domicile is a necessary requirement for participation in governance, the establishment thereof assumes the character of a political right that must not be taken lightly, especially so since under our Constitution and election laws, Philippine domicile and citizenship must coincide in order to participate in our electoral processes. 29 For these reasons, persons who are not Philippine citizens, regardless of their Philippine residence status, cannot participate in the country's political processes in any manner, including donating to campaign funds, campaigning for or aiding any candidate or political party, and directly or indirectly, taking part in or influencing in any manner any election. 30An alien, therefore, who possesses permanent resident status in the Philippines does not have the right of suffrage in the Philippines, including the right to establish legal domicile for purposes of our election laws.

Moreover, Philippine citizens who are not domiciled in the Philippines cannot likewise participate in the electoral processes. By way of exception which must be strictly construed, qualified Philippine citizens permanently residing abroad are allowed to vote under specified limited conditions, pursuant to RA 9189, 31 otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act. Despite this limited permission, however, he/she still cannot be voted for and is disqualified from running for elective office under Section 6832of the OEC.

In addition to the aforesaid core principles, jurisprudence has laid down basic rules that must be considered in determining residence or domicile for purposes of election, as follows: DETACa

First, domicile is classified into three (3), namely: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth and which continues until, upon reaching the majority age, he/she abandons it and acquires a new domicile; (2) domicile of choice, which is the new domicile acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his/her residence or intention. 33

Second, and more pertinent to this case, in order to effect a change of domicile, either by acquiring a first or a new domicile of choice, a person must comply with the following requirements: (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (b) a bona fideintention to remain there or animus manendi; and (c) a bona fideintention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi. 34

Thus, the change of residence or domicile requires physical acts and the concurrence of the two (2) intents — the intent to remain in the new domicile and the intent to completely abandon the old domicile.These must be clearly and sufficiently proven by competent evidence. In this relation, case law settles that the (i) intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, (ii) the change of residence must be voluntary, and (iii) the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 35 Under these requirements, the surrounding circumstances must necessarily be considered in determining compliance because of the subjective character of the element of intent. 36 Overall, the applicable laws, rules and regulations must be considered in reflecting on the question of the actions taken pursuant to the intent.

Lastly, there are three (3) staple factors that attend to residency: (1) a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 37

Together, the foregoing rules and established principles should be fully taken into account in appreciating questions relating to a person's residence for election purposes. Accordingly, once a Philippine citizen permanently resides in another country and subsequently becomes a naturalized citizen thereof, he/she loses his/her domicile of birth, i.e., the Philippines, and establishes a new domicile of choice in that country. Consequently, he/she also loses the right to participate in our electoral processes. If such former Filipino seeks to establish domicile in our country, he/she must, as a general rule, possess the necessary citizenship to exercise this political right. Once Philippine citizenship is reacquired, he/she reacquires as well the right to reside in the Philippines. However, he/she does not automatically become a Philippine domiciliary unless he/she validly effects a change of domicile by complying with the requirements discussed above; otherwise, he/she remains a Filipino physically present in the Philippines but is domiciled elsewhere. This is because as discussed above, an individual can have only one domicile which remains until it is validly changed. 38

On a related point, a former Filipino may conceivably re-establish Philippine domicile prior to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. A former Filipino may, for example, acquire a "permanent residence" status in the Philippines in accordance with our Immigration Laws 39 in order to legitimize any actions to re-establish Philippine domicile and lend credence to his/her animus manendi and animus non revertendi. Until then, the former Filipino legally remains a non-Philippine domiciliary whose ambivalence to legitimize his/her Philippine residence renders doubtful any claimed animus manendi and animus non revertendi.

Applying the considerations discussed, the overt acts on which Villamor premises her claims are insufficient to prove her animus manendi and animus non-revertendi. As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, and which Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa) rightfully echoed, Villamor was still a naturalized U.S. citizen who was not granted the status of an immigrant or permanent resident in the Philippines at the time she performed these acts. 40 Prior thereto, she was still a U.S. citizen — an alien who "has to return again to her home state after the expiration of her Philippine visa" 41 and whose "continued possession of American citizenship is reflective of her lack of intention to stay indefinitely in Lagangilang, Abra." 42

Parenthetically, it should be stressed that Villamor's actual physical presence in Lagangilang, Abra during the relevant periods was not sufficiently shown so as to conclude that she re-established her domicile in the Philippines. While she highlighted certain acts and incidents which allegedly indicate her intent to re-establish Philippine domicile even prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, these are notably few and far between, rendering highly suspect any purported intent. 43In fact, she did not even allege nor support with evidence the date when she physically arrived in Lagangilang, Abra for purposes of re-establishing her residence there.

Moreover, it should be highlighted that Villamor's acquisition of real properties and business interests in Lagangilang, Abra prior to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not sufficiently prove her re-establishment of domicile therein.

To recall, Villamor alleged that she acquired three (3) lots on three (3) different dates, namely: two (2) farmlands from her siblings in 2013 and 2016, as shown by the documents entitled "Palawag," and a lot in 2017, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale and tax declaration. 44 Nonetheless, outside of these bare allegations, there is no evidence to show that Villamor was actually physically present and had actually proceeded to construct her permanent residential home in Lagangilang, Abra during any of these times. In fact, she did not even unequivocally claim that she had constructed her permanent home therein in 2017, nor shown any preparatory acts to show her clear and unmistakable intent to transfer her domicile to any permanent abode in such locality. At most, these pieces of evidence and incidents show that she acquired three (3) lots in Lagangilang, Abra — as a former natural-born Filipino citizen permitted to be a transferee of private lands under the Constitution 45 — the purpose of which, based on their nature, particularly of the two (2) farmlands, appears to be for agricultural/investment uses. aDSIHc

In the same vein, the issuance of a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) in Villamor's name in 2017 carries little to no evidentiary weight in proving her domicile in Lagangilang, Abra. A CTC is issued to every person upon payment of community tax in the place of residence of the individual. 46 In Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., 47 the Court disregarded the CTC as conclusive proof of residence in the city wherein it was issued, explaining that even assuming that a person could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his/her having a residence elsewhere. 48 Further, case law regards CTCs as generally unreliable evidence given the considerable ease in securing their issuance; as such, they have been excluded from the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them. 49 On this score, it should be emphasized that, in this case, the procurement of the CTC in 2017 coincides with the 2017 Deed of Absolute Sale; hence, it is highly apparent that the same was merely procured in relation to this document's execution. Accordingly, the said CTC does not sufficiently prove Villamor's re-establishment of her domicile in Lagangilang, Abra.

As for Villamor's Voter Certification, it is well to point out that, contrary to the ponencia's assertion, Villamor's registration and participation in the May 2018 Barangay Elections prior to her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship in June 2018 likewise does not support the conclusion that she had legally established permanent residence in Lagangilang, Abra. To reiterate, a Filipino who loses Philippine citizenship also loses the right to participate in our electoral processes. To recall, at that time, Villamor was a non-resident foreigner who had no right to register for and vote in the May 2018 Barangay Elections. 50It was only on June 19, 2018 that Villamor reacquired Philippine citizenship. Under Section 10 51 of RA 8189, otherwise known as the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, the data required in the application for registration include; (i) citizenship; (ii) periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration; (iii) exact address; and (iv) a statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter. With these requirements in mind, it is highly questionable how Villamor was able to legally register as a voter notwithstanding her lack of Philippine citizenship at that time. 52 In any event, case law provides that voting is not conclusive proof of residence. 53 Thus, in Perez v. COMELEC, 54 the Court ruled that a person's registration as voter in one district is not proof that he/she is not domiciled in another. 55

Lastly, Villamor's unsubstantiated "frequent visits" to the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship do not necessarily show her intention to re-establish her domicile therein as the ponencia suggests. 56 Neither do they amount to a waiver of her abandonment of her Lagangilang, Abra domicile upon her naturalization as U.S. citizen. At most, as case law has previously observed, these flights only show the custom of Filipinos — as shared among many other cultures —to visit their country of origin where they indisputably retain familial and social ties despite the transfer of residence to other places. 57

All told, Villamor failed to sufficiently prove the concurrence of all the requisites in order to effect a change of domicile during the relevant period. What is imperative is that a candidate must show that he/she had already re-established local domicile to meet the mandated residency requirement. The mere anticipatory desire or intention to re-establish domicile is not enough; actual re-establishment of domicile must be clearly and convincingly proven. In fact, when it comes to those who have lost Philippine citizenship, I submit that stronger proof is required in the re-establishment of national domicile. Undoubtedly, a person who has been domiciled in another country has already established effective legal ties with that country that are substantially distinct and separate from ours. 58 The need for stronger proof becomes more apparent when the person involved, such as Villamor, has been domiciled in another country as part of her naturalization as a citizen therein. Note that lawful permanent residence in the U.S. (or possession of a green card) for at least five (5) years (or three [3] in special cases) is required for acquisition of U.S. citizenship. 59

To add, while citizenship and residency are different from and independent of each other, one may invariably affect the other. To my mind, Villamor's ability to enjoy the privileges of U.S. citizenship at any time, while remaining under that status, conjures a reasonable presumption that she continues to avail of these privileges, which, among others, include the privilege to reside in that foreign country. Hence, absent compelling evidence to show that she had re-established domicile in the Philippines or in another country prior to June 19, 2018, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship, it should therefore be presumed that she continues to be domiciled in the U.S. of which she was a citizen. 60

With all of these considerations in mind, it can hardly be concluded that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was a false material representation in Villamor's CoC when she declared that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for 36 years and 8 months prior to the 2019 NLE. It should be stressed that Villamor lost her Philippine domicile when she became a U.S. citizen. She only reacquired her Philippine citizenship on June 19, 2018, and there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that she had re-established her Philippine domicile prior or after such time. Again, even assuming that she indeed re-established her domicile on said date, this period is only ten (10) months and twenty-three (23) days prior to the 2019 NLE or one (1) month and seven (7) days short of the required one (1) year residence for the mayoralty post. 61

II.

At this juncture, I deem it apt to express my views on the prevailing doctrine on Section 78 petitions. As intimated in the beginning of this Opinion, it is my view that intent to deceive or mislead the electorate is not necessary in order for the COMELEC to deny due course to/cancel a CoC. ETHIDa

A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that "speech is the index of intention"; this rule rests on the "presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently." 62

With this in mind, it should be underscored that "[n]owhere in Section 78 [of the OEC] is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a [CoC] to be denied due course or be cancelled." 63 As I extensively explained in my Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (Poe-Llamanzares):

As worded, a Section 78 petition is based exclusively on the ground that a CoC contains a material representation that is false. "The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the [OEC] pertains to [a] material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's citizenship and residence."

While there are decided cases wherein this Court has stated that "a false representation under Section 78 must consist of 'a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible,'" nowhere does the provision mention this requirement. In Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (Tagolino) [706 Phil. 534 (2013)], this Court enunciated that:

[T]he deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. x x x

Albeit incorporating the intent requirement into their respective discussions, a survey of certain cases decided after Tagolino only prove to demonstrate the "bare significance" of the said requisite.

xxx xxx xxx

Again, the plain text of Section 78 reads that the remedy is based "on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false." It pertains to a material representation that is false and not a "material misrepresentation." In my view, the latter is a semantic but impactful misnomer which tends to obfuscate the sense of the provision as it suggests — by employing the word "misrepresent," ordinarily understood to mean as "to give a false or misleading representation of usually with an intent to deceive or be unfair" — that intent is crucial in a Section 78 petition, when, in fact, it is not.

Notably, the Dissenting Opinion of former Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (Justice Tinga) in Tecson v. COMELEC (Tecson) [468 Phil. 421 (2004)] explains the irrelevance of the candidate's intention or belief in ruling on a Section 78 petition. There, he even pointed out the jurisprudential missteps in the cases of Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC (Romualdez-Marcos) [318 Phil. 329 (1995)] and Salcedo II v. COMELEC (Salcedo II) [371 Phil. 390 (1991)] wherein the phantom requirement of "deliberate intention to mislead" was first foisted:

[I]n accordance with Section 78, supra, the petitioner in a petition to deny due course [to or] cancel a certificate of candidacy need only prove three elements. First, there is a representation contained in the certificate of candidacy. Second, the representation is required under Section 74. Third, the representation must be "material," which, according to jurisprudence, means that it pertains to the eligibility of the candidate to the office. Fourth, the representation is false.

xxx xxx xxx

The pronouncements in Romualdez-Marcos and Salcedo II, however, are clearly not supported by a plain reading of the law. Nowhere in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. All the law requires is that the "material representation contained [in the certificate of candidacy] as required under Section 74 x x x is false." Be it noted that a hearing under Section 78 and Rule 23 is a quasi-judicial proceeding where the intent of the respondent is irrelevant. Also drawing on the principles of criminal law for analogy, the "offense" of material representation is malum prohibitum not malum in se. Intent is irrelevant. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.

The reason for the irrelevance of intent or belief is not difficult to divine. Even if a candidate believes that he is eligible and purports to be so in his certificate of candidacy, but is subsequently proven in a Rule 23 proceeding to be, in fact or in law, not eligible, it would be utterly foolish to allow him to proceed with his candidacy. The electorate would be merely squandering its votes for — and the COMELEC, its resources in counting the ballots cast in favor of — a candidate who is not, in any case, qualified to hold public office.

The Kapunan pronouncement in the Romualdez-Marcos case did not establish a doctrine. It is not supported by law, and it smacks of judicial legislation. Moreover, such judicial legislation becomes even more egregious[,] considering that it arises out of the pronouncement of only one Justice, or 6% of a Supreme Court. While several other Justices joined Justice Kapunan in upholding the residence qualification of Rep. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they did not share his dictum. It was his by his lonesome. Justice Puno had a separate opinion, concurred in by Justices Bellosillo and Melo. Justice Mendoza filed a separate opinion too, in which Chief Justice Narvasa Concurred. Justices Romero and Francisco each had separate opinions. Except for Chief Justice Narvasa and Justice Mendoza, the Justices in the majority voted to grant Rep. [Marcos's] petition on the ground that she reestablished her domicile in Leyte upon being widowed by the death of former President Marcos.

On the other hand, the reiteration of the Kapunan pronouncement in Salcedo is a mere obiter dictum. The Court dismissed the disqualification case on the ground that the respondent's use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy is not a material representation since the entry does not refer to her qualification for elective office. Being what it is, the Salcedo obiter cannot elevate the Kapunan pronouncement to the level of a doctrine regardless of how many Justices voted for Salcedo. Significantly, Justice Puno concurred in the result only.

Thus, in this case, it does not matter that respondent knows that he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen and, knowing such fact, proceeded to state otherwise in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate. A candidate's citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his good faith. It was, therefore, improper for the COMELEC to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove intent to mislead on the part of respondent. x x x

I could not agree more with Justice Tinga's exposition. Truly, "[n]owhere in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled." At the risk of belaboring the point, the candidate's intent to mislead or misinform on a material fact stated in his/her CoC is of no consequence in ruling on a Section 78 petition. To premise a Section 78 petition on a finding of intent or belief would create a legal vacuum wherein the COMELEC becomes powerless under the OEC to enjoin the candidacy of ineligible presidential candidates upon a mere showing that the material representations in his/her CoC were all made in good faith. It should be emphasized that "[a] candidate's citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his good faith." With this, the Romualdez-Marcos and Salcedo II rulings which "judicially legislated" this requirement should, therefore, be abandoned as legal aberrations. 64 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Again, nowhere in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a CoC to be denied due course or be cancelled. As such, there is nothing on the face of the statute which will show that the candidate's intent to mislead or misinform on a material fact stated in his/her CoC is of substantial consequence in ruling on a Section 78 petition.

The ponencia quotes a portion of the deliberations on Section 78, which equally appears in the Concurring Opinion of former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) in Poe-Llamanzares, to support the argument that the lawmakers, while not explicitly stating the requisite intent to deceive in the words of the statute, did actually intend bad faith to be an element of false material representation under Section 78. 65Quite the opposite, however, there is nothing in the quoted deliberations to show, whether explicitly or impliedly, that bad faith or intent to deceive was intended to be an element of false material representation. In fact, a careful scrutiny of the deliberations reveals that such intent was not required for the COMELEC's newly vested power to deny due course to/cancel the CoC of a candidate who is found to be ineligible. This power was likened to a quo warranto petition, only that the same was already made available prior to proclamation. A meticulous exposition is apropos.

While the phrase "bad faith" was mentioned during the said deliberations, it should be noted that the same was merely part of the arguments presented by some objecting lawmakers against the proposal to legislate the COMELEC's new power under a Section 78 petition. Accordingly, the mention of "bad faith" should thus be appreciated in its proper context — to point out that the power sought to be granted to the COMELEC under the proposal is far greater than its existing power under the then-prevailing election law. cSEDTC

To be sure, the objecting lawmakers argued that the power to deny due course to a CoC under the prevailing election law applies only to nuisance candidates whose CoCs facially appear irregular or had been filed in bad faith; but, if the same appears regular and valid, it should be given due course considering the ministerial duty of the COMELEC to accept CoCs. With regard to intrinsic qualifications and disqualifications of candidates, they noted that the same should be threshed out in an ordinary protest or quo warranto proceeding, viz.:

HON. ADAZA.

Why should we give the Comelec power to deny or to give due course when the acceptance of the certificate of candidacy is ministerial?

HON. FERNAN.

Iyon na nga ang sinasabi ko eh.

xxx xxx xxx

HON. GONZALES.

This is a very very serious question. This should be declared only in proper election contest, properly litigated but never in a summary proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN.

No but, if you know that your opponent is not elected or suppose . . .

HON. ADAZA.

File the proper petition like before without providing this.

THE CHAIRMAN.

But in the mean time, why . . .

HON. SITOY.

My proposal is to delete the phrase "to deny due course," go direct to "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy."

HON. ASOK.

Every Certificate of Candidacy should be presumed accepted. It should be presumed accepted.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Suppose on the basis of . . .

HON. SITOY.

That's why, my proposal is, "any person seeking the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy."

HON. FERNAN.

But where are the grounds here?

HON. ADAZA.

Noy, let's hold this. Hold muna ito. This is dangerous e.

xxx xxx xxx

HON. GONZALES.

Ginagamit lamang ng Comelec ang "before" if it is claimed that a candidate is an official or that his Certificate of Candidacy has been filed in bad faith, iyon lang. Pero you cannot go to the intrinsic qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.

HON. DELOS REYES.

Which are taken up in an ordinary protest.

HON. GONZALES.

Dito ba, kasama iyong proceedings sa . . .? What I'm saying is: Kagaya iyong nabanggit kay Nonoy, natural course of margin, imagine, it will eventually reach the Supreme Court. The moment that the disqualification is pending, lalong lalo na kung may decision ng Comelec and yet pending pa before the Supreme Court, that already adversely affect a candidate, mabigat na iyan. So, what I'm saying is, on this disqualification sub-judice, alisin ito except if on the ground that he is a nuisance candidate or that his Certificate of Candidacy has been filed in bad faith. But if his Certificate of Candidacy appears to be regular and valid on the basis that his certificate has been filed on time, then it should be given due course.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

No. 10, the power of the Commission to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. What is the specific ano, Tessie?

HON. ADAZA.

Page 45.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

Section 71.

HON. ADAZA.

Kasi kay Neptali ito and it is also contained in our previous proposal, "Any person seeking to deny due course to or cancel . . ." our proposal here is that it should not be made to appear that the Commission on Elections has the authority to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy. I mean their duty should be ministerial, the acceptance, except in cases where they are nuisance candidates.66 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

However, as the supporters of the proposal pointed out, the intended remedy was a new provision meant precisely to cover situations — beyond those of nuisance candidates — where the ineligibility of a candidate already surfaces based on the representations found in the CoCs. It was even likened to an electoral protest and quo warranto proceedings wherein eligibility requirements are squarely put at issue, thus:

HON. ADAZA.

Why should we give the Comelec power to deny or to give due course when the acceptance of the certificate of candidacy is ministerial?

HON. FERNAN.

Iyon na nga ang sinasabi ko eh.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Baka iyong residences, this must be summary. He is not a resident of the ano, why will you wait? Automatically disqualified siya. Suppose he is not a natural born citizen.

HON. ADAZA.

No, but we can specify the grounds here. Kasi, they can use this power to expand.

THE CHAIRMAN.

Yeah, that is under this article nga.

HON. ADAZA.

Iyon na nga, but let's make particular reference. Remember, Nonoy, this is a new provision which gives authority to the Comelec. This was never there before.Ikansel na natin yan.

xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN.

No, no, because, clearly, he is a non-resident. Oh, why can we not file a petition? Supposing he is not a natural born citizen? Why?

HON. GONZALES.

This is a very very serious question. This should be declared only in proper election contest, properly litigated but never in a summary proceedings.

THE CHAIRMAN.

We will not use the word, the phrase "due course," "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy." For example, si Ading, is a resident of Cebu and he runs in Davao City.

HON. ADAZA.

He is a resident of Cebu but he runs in Lapu-Lapu? Ikaw, you are already threatening him ah.

xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN.

No but, if you know that your opponent is not elected or suppose . . .

HON. ADAZA.

File the proper petition like before without providing this.

THE CHAIRMAN.

But in the mean time, why . . .

xxx xxx xxx

HON. ADAZA.

This power from the Comelec. This is the new provision, eh. They should not have this. All of us can be bothered, eh.

HON. CUENCO.

So in that case how can the Comelec cancel the certificate of candidacy when you said . . .

HON. ADAZA.

Only with respect to the nuisance candidates. There is no specific provision.

HON. ASOK.

There is already a specific provision for nuisance candidates.

HON. ADAZA.

This one refers to other candidates who are not nuisance candidates, but most particularly refers to matters that are involved in protest and quo warranto proceedings. Why should we expand their powers? This is a new provision by the way. This was not contained in other provisions before. You know, you can get bothered.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

Suppose you are disqualified, you do not have the necessary qualifications, the Comelec can motu proprio n cancel it.

HON. CUENCO.

On what ground, Mr. Chairman?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

You are disqualified. Let's say, wala kang residence or kuwan . . .

HON. ADAZA.

Ah, that's the problem.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

That's why.

HON. ADAZA.

We should not allow that thing to crop up within the powers of the Comelec because anyone can create problem for everybody. You know that's a proper subject for protest or quo warranto. But not to empower the Comelec to cancel. That's a very dangerous provision. It can reach all of us.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

Hindi, if you are a resident pero iyong, let's say a new comer comes to Misamis Oriental, 3 months before and file his Certificate of Candidacy.

HON. ADAZA.

Never mind, file the necessary petition.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

These are the cases they say, that will be involved.

HON. ADAZA.

I think we should kuwan that e.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

Iyon talagang non-resident and then he goes there and file his certificate, You can, how can anybody stop him, di ba?

xxx xxx xxx

HON. ADAZA.

Which one? That's right.

HON. LOOD.

That's why it includes full . . . (Unintelligible).

HON. ADAZA.

No, it's very dangerous. We will be all in serious trouble. Besides, that covered already by specific provisions. So, can we agree. Anyway it is this new provision which is dangerous. 67 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The fact that the law was passed without any further qualification of intent to deceive or bad faith speaks for itself; the arguments of the objecting lawmakers did not prevail, and the intended expansion of the COMELEC's power to not only deny due course to, but even to cancel a CoC, as envisioned by its proponent and its supporters, was passed into law. SDAaTC

Notably, the power granted to the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the CoCs of nuisance candidates has been retained under the current election law, despite the additional power granted to it under Section 78 of the OEC. However, it should be pointed out that under both the earlier election law — Presidential Decree No. 1296, 68 otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, and the OEC, 69 the COMELEC's power to deny due course to a CoC of a nuisance candidate was based on the ground that said the CoC was filed to cause confusion among the voters or under circumstances which demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office. It must be highlighted that this power to deny due course to a CoC of a nuisance candidate is found in a separate provision of the OEC, i.e., Section 69 and not Section 78 governing petitions to deny due course to/cancel CoCs. Accordingly, the bad faith requisite harped on by the ponencia70 — which was mentioned in the above-quoted deliberations and now contained in Section 69 of the OEC — pertains to the act itself of filing a CoC, and not to the false material representation made therein, which is a different requisite found in a separate OEC provision, i.e., Section 78.

Overall, despite the fears of several lawmakers 71 against the new power to be granted to the COMELEC, the same was still passed by majority votes and made its way to our election laws. Thus, rather than support the ponencia's conclusion, the deliberations 72 on Section 78, which the ponencia quotes and relies on, instead highlights the Congressional intent to strengthen the COMELEC's power to weed out ineligible candidates at the onset so as not to "[squander the electorate's] votes x x x and the [COMELEC's] resources in counting the ballots cast in favor [of a] candidate who is not, in any case, qualified to hold public office." 73 Indeed, this new power granted to the COMELEC, and the concomitant remedy granted to the electorate, are meant to ensure that only those who are truly eligible and who correctly represent the same in their CoCs may run for public office.

It may be wondered if the summary nature of the proceeding contradicts the intent for the provision to be a remedy to weed out ineligible candidates even before the election. However, to my mind, a Section 78 petition is a summary proceeding 74 conducted (and is meant to be resolved) prior to the elections to ensure that the issue 75 affecting the false representations on a candidate's eligibility is decided expeditiously so as to address the urgency/time-sensitive element of the impending elections. All in all, the summary nature of the proceeding coincides with the policy impetus to avert any wastage of the electorate's votes and the COMELEC's resources by permitting a candidate who is already determined to be ineligible to run for office and still be voted upon.

In any event, there is virtually nothing in the deliberations which will clearly show that intent to deceive was a requisite that was considered in the passage of Section 78. The deliberations likewise fail to show that Section 78 was approved upon the objecting lawmakers' compromise to limit it to a determination of bad faith/nuisance candidates, and to make the same an element for the successful prosecution of a petition to deny due course to/cancel a CoC. As worded, the sole ground for a Section 78 petition is the making of a false material representation. Indeed, to persist with this element of bad faith or intent to deceive recognized under current case law, is not only a clear contravention of the wordings of the statute, more significantly, it further betrays the intent of the legislature by clipping the COMELEC's then-new power. In particular, it would diminish the expanded power of the COMELEC to weed out ineligible candidates even prior to their proclamation which this proceeding clearly sought to address. Furthermore, the intent to deceive requisite would render a candidate's qualifications dependent on the candidate's frame of mind, and not the COMELEC's objective assessment of all attendant factors.

At this point, it is well to clarify that when the issue directly attacks the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, a petition for disqualification is not the proper remedy therefor. Instead, a Section 78 petition as well as a petition for quo warranto76 are the remedies that deal with the qualifications and eligibility of a candidate; 77 however, these remedies remain to be separate and distinct as discussed hereunder. EcTCAD

A petition to deny due course to/cancel a CoC is governed by Section 78 of the OEC. It may be filed by any person not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the CoC on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by Section 74 is false. 78 Section 74 provides what a CoC must contain or state; these pertain to all the basic and essential requirements applicable to all citizens to qualify for candidacy. A citizen must not only possess all these requirements; more importantly, he/she must positively represent in the CoC that he/she possesses them. Any falsity on these requirements constitutes a false material representation that can lead to the CoC's cancellation. Notably, with the exception of the requirement that the candidate "is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country," all the representations that a candidate must make in the CoC are positive representations of possession of all the qualification requirements under the Constitution and the law.

In contrast to a CoC denial of due course/cancellation case, a petition for disqualification essentially seeks to "deprive [a person] of a power, right, or privilege" or to "make ineligible x x x for further competition because of violations of the rules." 79 It shall be filed any day after the last day for filing CoCs but not later than the date of proclamation of the winning candidate. 80 The grounds are based on (i) possession of permanent resident status in a foreign country or (ii) violation of specified provisions of the OEC or commission of election offenses, as provided under Section 68 81 of the OEC. 82 It may likewise be premised on the grounds provided under Section 12 83 of the OEC, 84 or Section 40 85 of the Local Government Code. 86Together, these provisions, for which apetition for disqualification is anchored on, refer to the traits/acts imputable to a particular candidate, that are separate from the general qualifications that every citizen who wishes to run for a local public office must commonly satisfy. These general qualifications go into the eligibility of the candidate and are threshed out in a Section 78 petition or, as will be explained below, a quo warranto petition.

Thus, in a disqualification proceeding, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general rules of eligibility applicable to all citizens may nonetheless lose the right to be a candidate or if elected, may be deprived of the chance to serve, if he/she possesses any of the grounds for disqualification. But (save for possession of foreign permanent residence or immigrant status), his/her lack of substantive qualifications is not a ground for disqualification, 87 nor his/her possession of any of the disqualifying traits, acts, or characteristics, a ground for cancellation of his/her CoC. 88

Meanwhile, a petition for quo warranto is filed under Section 253 of the OEC89within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election90 to oust an elected official from his/her office on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 91 Although quo warranto and CoC cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ by the fact that, as noted above, the former directly attacks a candidate's eligibility regardless of reference to the CoC, while the latter squarely pertains to the candidate's false representations on these material qualifications (not mere innocuous mistakes) as reflected in the CoC. Moreover, a quo warranto petition can only be filed after the person is elected, while a Section 78 petition, as intended by the lawmakers, is filed prior to the elections to prevent a clearly ineligible candidate from running for public office as reflected in his/her representation in the CoC. SDHTEC

To conclude, bearing all the above disquisitions in mind, it is thus high-time that this Court rectify the mistaken impression in case law that intent to deceive or mislead the electorate is necessary for a CoC to be denied due course to/cancelled. Maintaining this doctrine does not only clip the COMELEC's mandate and power, it also denigrates the constitutional/statutory requirements prescribed for public office and in the process, taints the democratic process of elections. Verily, to premise a Section 78 petition on a finding of intent or belief would create a legal vacuum wherein the COMELEC becomes powerless under the OEC to enjoin the candidacy of ineligible candidates upon a mere showing that the material representations in his/her CoC were all made in good faith. Further, on a practical level, it remains a great operational quandary how the COMELEC can determine bad faith or good faith, which is a highly circumstantial question of fact, in a summary proceeding wherein no hearings for direct or cross examinations are made. Be that as it may, and operational parameters aside, the requisite of intent to deceive strikes against one bedrock principle in constitutional law: a candidate's eligibility is determined by law; hence it should not be premised upon one's good or bad faith, or his/her own mistaken perceptions of fact or misunderstandings of the law. 92

III.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be recognized that prevailing jurisprudence, at the time this case was filed, still requires intent to deceive as an integral element of the false material representation under Section 78 of the OEC. Due to the public's reliance on the Court's decisions that form part of the law of the land, this doctrinal shift — in the interest of fairness — must be made prospective in application.

As such, having been constrained to operate under Section 78's existing (albeit erroneous) jurisprudential framework, I concur with Justice Caguioa that Villamor had an intent to deceive or mislead the electorate when she made a false material representation in her CoC that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for a period of 36 years and 8 months prior to the 2019 NLE and hence, eligible for the office of Mayor. 93 As he aptly pointed out, jurisprudence settles that "the length of residence or domicile of one who had abandoned his domicile of origin and had eventually returned thereto, is reckoned from the time he returned and fixed it as his new domicile of choice." 94 Any "period of stay therein prior to such abandonment" should not be counted "to his period of stay upon return." 95 Considering that the computation of the length of residence of returning Filipinos is well-settled and hence, is in no way an unresolved complex question of law, it can be reasonably concluded that Villamor's false material representation in her CoC that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for a period of 36 years and 8 months prior to the 2019 NLE was made with an intent to deceive or mislead the electorate.

For all these reasons, I therefore tender this dissent against the majority's ruling that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to/cancelling the CoC of Villamor.

I vote to DISMISS the petition.

CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:

The ponencia grants the Petition for Certiorari (Petition), annuls and sets aside the Resolutions dated April 26, 2019 and November 27, 2019 (collectively, assailed Resolutions) of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and dismisses the Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) (Section 78 Petition) filed before the COMELEC by Antonio Bello Viernes (Viernes) against Mayor Rovelyn Echave Villamor (Villamor). 1 It finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled the CoC of Villamor on the ground that she committed false material representation therein when she stated that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for 36 years and 8 months prior to the May 13, 2019 elections and, thus, eligible for the office of Mayor thereof.

I dissent.

Villamor had the burden of evidence to

The COMELEC was correct in rejecting

Under our election laws, the term "residence" is synonymous with domicile and refers to the individual's permanent home or the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, he or she intends to return. 2 Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines in determining a person's domicile: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) once established, that domicile remains until he or she acquires anew one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. 3

It is settled that domicile, once acquired, cannot be easily lost, as it is presumed to continue, unless its abandonment and the consequent acquisition of a new one, is proven by clear and positive evidence. 4 It is likewise settled that acquisition of a foreign citizenship automatically results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. 5

Here, Villamor's domicile of origin is Lagangilang, Abra, having been born and raised there. 6 However, she became a naturalized American citizen in 2009, 7 as a consequence of which she had effectively abandoned Lagangilang as her domicile. As such naturalization in the United States of America (the US) was admitted by Villamor, she acquired the burden of evidence to prove, by clear and positive evidence, 8 that she had re-established her domicile in Lagangilang, Abra at least one (1) year prior to the 2019 elections. AScHCD

Villamor failed to discharge such burden.

The documents attached to Villamor's Verified Answer relate to her re-acquisition of Filipino Citizenship under Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 9 on June 19, 2018. However, as also settled in jurisprudence, such re-acquisition of citizenship merely gives a person the option to, and does not ipso facto, establish his domicile in the Philippines. 10 Thus, even on the very gratuitous assumption that Villamor had immediately established her residence when she re-acquired her Filipino citizenship, the same is still clearly short of the one-year period required by law. 11

In turn, the evidence adduced by Villamor under cover of her Motion for Reconsideration (MR) were all rejected by the COMELEC, which ruled that because these pieces of evidence, except for her Voter's Certification, were all obtained when she was still an American citizen, they could not be used as basis to prove that she had acquired domicile in the Philippines. 12 The COMELEC ruled that Villamor lacked the requisite animus manendi et non-revertendi to acquire domicile in the Philippines, as she was then an alien without an immigrant or permanent resident status in the Philippines, thus:

It is too difficult to fathom how Respondent intended to permanently stay in Lagangilang, Abra when, owing to her status as an alien in this country, she had to return again to her home state after the expiration of her Philippine Visa. It would have been a different matter had Respondent present[ed] proof that she was granted an immigrant or permanent resident status in the Philippines. In this latter scenario, the issue of residence may be totally divorced from the question of citizenship. x x x 13 (Emphasis supplied)

Our immigration and election laws, as well as relevant jurisprudence, support the COMELEC's conclusions.

In the landmark case of Coquilla v. COMELEC14(Coquilla), Coquilla became an American citizen after enlisting in the United States Navy in 1965. In 1998, he returned to his domicile of origin in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he obtained a residence certificate. In 2000, his application for repatriation was approved and later, he registered as a voter in Oras. In 2001, he filed a CoC for mayor of Oras in connection with the 2001 elections, stating therein that he had been a resident of the town for two (2) years prior to said elections. He won. However, the COMELEC cancelled his CoC, which action was later affirmed by the Court, with the latter holding that, until Coquilla re-acquired his Philippine citizenship in 2000, he "was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines[,] save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien." 15 Hence, like the COMELEC in the present case, the Court in Coquilla rejected all evidence of domicile of Coquilla prior to his re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship after finding that he had not complied with immigration laws for waiver of his status as a non-resident alien, thus:

x x x it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

x x x It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern Samar.16 (Emphasis supplied)

Caasi v. Court of Appeals17(Caasi) likewise required from a Filipino green card holder, a separate and indubitable waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US. Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC18(Ugdoracion) applied the Caasi doctrine to another green card holder who contended that his American resident status was acquired involuntarily. AcICHD

In Velasco v. COMELEC19(Velasco), the Court applied Coquilla in rejecting Velasco's Voter's Certificate, ruling that he could not have complied with the residency requirement for purposes of voting considering that, during the concerned period, Velasco "was an American citizen who had lost his residency and domiciliary status in the Philippines [and] whose sojourn in the Philippines was via a visitor's visa." 20

In Reyes v. COMELEC, 21 the Court quoted, with approval, the COMELEC's finding that "[n]o amount of [Reyes'] stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the [US]." 22 The "stay" that the Court refused to consider in counting the one-year residency of Reyes was her employment as Provincial Administrator in Marinduque for almost six (6) months.

In Caballero v. COMELEC23(Caballero), the Court sustained the COMELEC's finding that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship that Caballero could claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to re-establish his domicile. His frequent visits to Uyugan from his domicile in Canada could not be considered a waiver of his abandonment of domicile in Uyugan when he became a Canadian citizen.

In the 1966 case of Ujano v. Republic24(Ujano), the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Ujano's petition to re-acquire citizenship for his failure to meet the six (6) months residency requirement therefor. The Court noted that Ujano was admitted into the Philippines as a temporary visitor as he failed to secure a permanent resident visa, so that his presence could not have ripened into a residence, thus:

x x x We find it to be a correct interpretation [Section 3(1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word "residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, January 31, 1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words, the term residence used in said Act should have the same connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing the qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.25 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, as early as 1966, the Court has been consistent in aligning its interpretation of residence or domicile in other laws — especially election laws — with our immigration laws. In so doing, it has consistently applied the rule that the stay of aliens, including former Filipino citizens, in the Philippines, who were admitted as temporary visitors under our immigration laws, cannot be counted to determine the length of residency for purposes of complying with election requirements. This is rightfully so in light of the axiomatic statutory construction rule that a statute must be interpreted to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. 26

It appears from the foregoing established and well-settled jurisprudence that the prohibition against non-resident aliens from establishing domicile in the Philippines is likewise rooted on the foundational doctrine that a person may only have one domicile at a time. Hence, until and unless he or she abandons his or her foreign domicile according to the requirements of our immigration laws, he or she cannot be deemed to have been able to acquire a domicile in the Philippines.

Such need to abandon the foreign domicile is likewise evident from the letter of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code 27 (OEC), mandating a waiver of permanent residence or immigrant status according to the periods required for residency under our election laws, thus:

SECTION 68. Disqualifications. — x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, as our immigration laws allow the alien, who had not abandoned his foreign domicile by obtaining an immigrant or permanent resident visa, to enter the Philippines as a visitor, and to stay for a limited period, he is deemed to lack, not just an intent to abandon such foreign domicile, but likewise an intent to remain in the Philippines. The Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion), in Caballero sheds light: TAIaHE

Given the Canadian citizenship requirements, Caballero (who had been living in Canada since 1989 prior to his naturalization as Canadian citizen in 2007) would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not applied for it and had he not shown proof of permanent residence in that country. This is the indicator of intent that I referred to in considering the question of Caballero's Philippine residency and his factual claim that he never abandoned his Philippine residence.

xxx xxx xxx

Of course, existing immigration laws allow former natural-born Filipinos, who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country, to acquire permanent residency in the Philippines even prior to, or without reacquiring, Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225.

x x x The returning former Filipino can apply for a permanent resident visa (otherwise known as Returning Former Filipino Visa) which, when granted, shall entitle the person to stay indefinitely in the Philippines. Other than through such permanent resident visa, Caballero could have stayed in the Philippines only for a temporary period. Any such temporary stay, of course, cannot be considered for purposes of Section 39 of the LGC as it does not fall within the concept of "residence."28 (Emphasis supplied)

In Ujano, the Court adopted the ratio of the trial court in ruling that he failed to meet the residency requirement to re-acquire Philippine citizenship — that is, he lacked animus manendi because he was an alien who had been admitted into the country only as a temporary visitor, thus:

x x x ["]In other words, domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing his present petition." 29 (Emphasis supplied)

My colleagues in the Court make much of the fact that Villamor is not a stranger, as she is merely returning to her domicile of origin in the Philippines. However, this is beside the point as Philippine immigration laws categorically regard returning former Filipinos such as Villamor as non-quota immigrants, whose stay is generally limited to only one (1) year and whose admission is subject to the conditions and requirements of relevant laws. Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 613, 30 the purpose of which is clear from its title, "An Act to Control and Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the Philippines," provides: ICHDca

IMMIGRANTS

Sec. 13. Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted into the Philippines immigrants, termed "quota immigrants" not in excess of fifty (50) of any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that the following immigrants, termed "non-quota immigrants," may be admitted without regard to such numerical limitations.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the Philippines for permanent residence, including his spouse and minor unmarried children, shall be considered a non-quota immigrant for purposes of entering the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the country's Balikbayan laws, 31 which provide for specific benefits and privileges to balikbayans, do not include as a benefit an exemption from the one-year limit to stay in the Philippines. 32 In fact, if they overstay, they are legally required to perform positive acts such as obtaining an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Certificate of Temporary Residence Visa (CTRV), as well as paying the appropriate fees for extension. 33

Hence, while it is true that the government's policy is "to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland x x x in recognition of their contribution to the economy of the country through the foreign exchange inflow and revenues that they generate," 34 there is nothing in our laws which dispenses with the requirement of obtaining an immigrant visa for former Filipinos who are still aliens to reside here. For the Court to confer such privilege would be nothing short of judicial legislation.

Indeed, Philippine immigration laws require returning former Filipinos to obtain immigrant or permanent resident visas if they intend to stay permanently in the Philippines. Absent such, they can only remain temporarily. Hence, it is but just and logical to treat aliens — including former Filipinos — who were admitted to the country on a temporary basis, as lacking animus manendi, precisely because they chose not to comply with the requirements of Philippine laws to permanently remain in the Philippines.

The laws' limitations on former Filipinos are not difficult to understand. Until and unless they reacquire Philippine citizenship, being citizens and residents of foreign states, they owe complete allegiance to such foreign land — as they, indeed, swore such allegiance before getting naturalized as foreign nationals — and none to the Philippines. They willfully abandoned their natural-born Philippine citizenship and domicile — and with it their loyalty and allegiance to the Philippines, when they resided abroad, and therein became foreign nationals. cDHAES

Caasi had explained the policy of our election laws to exclude from public office, persons with dual loyalties and allegiance, such as Filipinos who acquired permanent residences:

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. 35

The case of a Filipino who not only renounced his Philippine domicile, but likewise his or her citizenship, is more regretful than a Filipino who merely decided to remain abroad. The former's loyalty is not even dual; it is exclusive to the foreign state where he or she elected to reside and become a citizen of. In the case of Villamor, she consciously and voluntarily opted to renounce her allegiance to the Philippines, and swore true faith and allegiance to the US, as gleaned from the Oath of Allegiance she took to become an American citizen:

I, hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God. x x x 36 (Italics omitted; additional emphasis supplied)

Hence, Villamor, being a former Filipino who had, by naturalization, become a foreign national, resulting in having abandoned her Philippine domicile, is allowed by Philippine immigration laws to establish Philippine domicile, only if she waived her foreign residence by: (1) obtaining an immigrant or permanent resident visa pursuant to CA No. 613 and its implementing rules, or (2) re-acquiring Philippine citizenship, in which case she waives, not only her status as an alien, but likewise her status as a non-resident. Absent either of these, she is only allowed to stay for a limited period in the Philippines, and therefore, lacks both animus manendi and animus non revertendi.

However, such allowance does not automatically confer domicile. As discussed, domicile is acquired only when the three (3) requisites therefor concur. Hence, I fully agree with the ponencia, when it quotes Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), that a Filipino who was naturalized abroad can choose, at some point thereafter, to re-establish residence in the Philippines. 37 Indeed, he can, but he must do so in compliance with Philippine immigration and election laws.

The ponencia's reliance on Frivaldo v. COMELEC38(1996 Frivaldo case) to support the conclusion that residence may be counted from even before the returning Filipino's re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship (and even without waiving his or her foreign residency), is misplaced. The ONLY issue in the 1996 Frivaldo case was Frivaldo's citizenship. As observed by the ponencia, "Frivaldo's residence in the area was never put in issue." 39 Hence, the ponencia's conclusion that, "[in] other words, his residence in Sorsogon, even prior to the date of effectivity of his repatriation, was considered and counted for purposes of the law's residency requirement" 40 is misleading and lacks basis. To stress, the Court did not adjudicate on Frivaldo's residence.

Indeed, there was no reason to inquire on Frivaldo's residence in the 1996 Frivaldo case cited by the ponencia. Frivaldo had been living and residing in fact in Sorsogon from as early as 1987 or eight (8) years prior to the 1995 elections. 41 In fact, as explained by the Court in the 1996 Frivaldo case, Frivaldo had been repeatedly elected as governor of Sorsogon, as early as in the 1988 elections. However, he had likewise been repeatedly disqualified by reason of his failure to comply with the citizenship requirement, thus:

Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned this grant, and Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028. 42

Notably, in the earlier Frivaldo cases, 43 Frivaldo's residence was likewise never questioned. In the 1989 Frivaldo case, 44 he stated that he "returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy." 45 This does not appear to have been contested and is, in fact, consistent with the facts of all three (3) Frivaldo cases, in which he asserted that he had been forced, in 1983, to seek naturalization in the US for fear of persecution during the Martial Law period. 46 This fact was also affirmed by the Court in the 1996 Frivaldo case, and was one of its considerations when it retroactively applied Frivaldo's grant of repatriation to his application therefor. The Court, invoking "the real essence of justice," noted the remarkable loyalty and dedication of Frivaldo to the country who, "[a]t the first opportunity, x x x returned x x x and sought to serve his people once more." 47

In fact, the Court's only mention of residence in the 1996 Frivaldo case is to stress its conceptual distinction from citizenship — that the law does not require any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence, which must consist of at least one year immediately preceding the election day. 48 And it is this residency requirement that is precisely the reason why Villamor's qualification was rejected by the COMELEC, and rightfully so — because even assuming arguendo that she had re-acquired domicile, she still failed to prove that such re-acquisition occurred at least one year prior to the 2019 elections. ASEcHI

The exception to the prior waiver of

The Court seemingly carved out an exception to the rule that aliens must waive their foreign residence before they can establish domicile in the Philippines in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC49(Poe-Llamanzares), because Senator Poe's evidence of change of her domicile was extensive, overwhelming, and unprecedented, so that no judicial precedent came close to the facts of said case, thus:

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

xxx xxx xxx

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC, and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the[-]case basis. 50 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, Poe-Llamanzares set the standard against which the totality of evidence of a party may be weighed, so that proof prior to his or her waiver or abandonment of foreign residence may be considered in determining his or her change of domicile. To stress, the Court did not reverse the Coquilla doctrine, which is likewise anchored on Philippine immigration, naturalization and election statutes. Rather, it ruled said doctrine to be inapplicable, considering the magnitude of the evidence presented by the candidate, which was enough to overturn the legal presumption that she lacked animus manendi et non-revertendi. Stated differently, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the prior waiver of foreign residence rule to Villamor, thus, largely depends on the extent and strength of the evidence she offered to prove her change in domicile, considering the benchmark set by Poe-Llamanzares.

Poe-Llamanzares presented the following pieces of evidence for the Court to consider:

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home). 51

Compared to the foregoing, all that Villamor presented were the following pieces of evidence to prove her change of domicile: ITAaHc

1) The documents entitled "Palawag" dated July 16, 2013 52 and September 8, 2016, 53 under which the she supposedly acquired portions of a farmland situated in Lagangilang from her brother and sister, respectively;

2) Deed of Absolute Sale 54 dated July 11, 2017 of a piece of land situated in Lagangilang, with Villamor as Vendee, with Tax Declaration. 55 She alleges that she eventually constructed a home on this property;

3) Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated July 7, 2017; 56 and

4) Voter's Certificate of Villamor, 57 to prove that she was allowed to vote in the May 14, 2018 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections (Barangay Elections). 58

Clearly, Villamor's evidence is nowhere near as extensive as the ones presented in Poe-Llamanzares. Hence, I strongly take exception to Villamor's claim that "[a]pplying the Grace Poe doctrine, it is clear that there is an overwhelming evidence in the instant case x x x." 59 To the contrary, Villamor's case and evidence are even weaker than those obtaining in the cases where the Court observed the waiver of foreign residency doctrine.

Coquilla had returned and actually lived in Oras, Eastern Samar as early as in 1998 — three (3) years prior to the elections. Prior to this, he had visited the Philippines multiple times. He presented a residence certificate, his travel records, voter's registration and Community Tax Certificate (CTC) as proofs of domicile. Villamor, on the other hand, and as will be further discussed below, had not even alleged when she actually went back to the Philippines and started living in Lagangilang, Abra.

Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the US. He presented a residence certificate, voter's registration and an Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status. He became the town Mayor for three (3) terms and thereafter, a Councilor. He built a house and acquired several properties, and faithfully paid real property taxes thereon. 60

Villamor's sparse evidence notwithstanding, and although she did not present an immigrant or permanent resident visa, it appears, from the records, that the members of the COMELEC en banc still did evaluate the documents Villamor submitted which obtained prior to her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship, thus:

The Supreme Court was unequivocal in stating in the case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec and Elamparo that it is the fact of residence which determines compliance with legal requirements on residency. The Supreme Court likewise stated therein that in order "[t]o establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode."

Villamor attempted to prove change of domicile from the United States of America back to Lagangilang, Abra by evidence showing purchase of properties located in said jurisdiction and a community tax certificate. Villamor did not however prove her actual physical presence in Lagangilang, Abra.

Aside from Villamor's bare statement in her motion that she regularly flies back and forth to the United States of America and Lagangilang, Abra, she did not adduce any other evidence to prove her actual physical presence in said locality (e.g., travel records, affidavits of witnesses). The purchase of properties and securing a CTC may not be interpreted as Villamor's act of making Lagangilang, Abra her fixed and permanent place of abode without evidence of her actual physical presence therein. 61 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

Hence, I submit that the COMELEC, in applying the Coquilla doctrine and rejecting Villamor's evidence when she was still a non-resident alien, did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

An evaluation of all of Villamor's

To be sure, a perusal of Villamor's evidence, including those obtaining prior to her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship, still leads to a conclusion that she lacked the residency qualification.

Successfully acquiring a new domicile requires three (3) elements to concur: 1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2) an intention to remain there; and 3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. 62 Only with clear and positive proof of presence of all three (3) requirements can the presumption of continuity of residence or domicile be rebutted. 63 The absence of one will not result in the acquisition of new domicile. 64 Further, each element of domicile must satisfy the required length of time. 65

Other than establishing the three (3) requisites, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections, using the same standard of evidence. 66

A survey of jurisprudence shows that the Court had observed caution in examining the evidence of a winning candidate, carefully weighing the will of the electorate and the governing legal principles in change of domicile, primary of which is the presumption of continuity of present domicile. CHTAIc

Hence, in Jalosjos v. COMELEC67(Jalosjos), the Court sustained the disqualification of Jalosjos despite the rather substantial evidence she presented, including documents of sale of real property, sketches and photographs of her house being built, Voter's Certification, as well as several affidavits from residents, the people working on the construction of her house, the incumbent Barangay Chairman and civic organizations. The Court ruled that what Jalosjos' evidence established was that she stayed in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental only whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the house, but that she was not a resident therein.

In Domino v. COMELEC68(Domino), the Court rejected the contention of Domino that he had abandoned his domicile of origin, and emphasized the requirement that ALL three (3) elements of domicile must concur and satisfy the period required; otherwise, the old domicile continues. This, notwithstanding that Domino presented several affidavits and certifications from residents, certifying that he is a resident of Sarangani, a contract of lease of a real property, an extra-judicial settlement of estate with deed of sale, several official documents attesting to his transfer of voting registration and several Income Tax Returns.

Guided by the foregoing, I cannot but find the totality of Villamor's evidence lacking.

The documents supposedly showing

First, the pieces of evidence that Villamor presented showing her acquisition of properties in 2013, 2016 and 2017 cannot suffice as clear and positive proof of change in domicile. The Court has repeatedly held that acquisition of property is not indicia of right to vote or be voted for, 69 explaining thus:

To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. 70

Anent the supposed construction of her house in the property acquired on July 11, 2017, the same is unsubstantiated. Moreover, Villamor did not claim when she began such construction, as she only alleges that it followed the property's acquisition. In Jalosjos, the Court ruled that the mere acquisition of a property and the construction of a house thereon do not prove domicile. Moreover, it must be shown when such house was completed as a house under construction is further proof that its owner cannot yet reside therein. 71

Hence, these documents and allegations of Villamor pertaining to her having acquired properties and constructed thereon, cannot suffice to prove the three (3) requisites to acquire domicile. Even on the generous assumption that they can indicate an intent to effect a change of domicile, 72 Villamor still failed to establish the requisite of bodily or personal presence. Logically, these documents cannot prove the bodily or physical presence that is an element of obtaining new domicile.

The CTC and Voter's Certificate cannot

Villamor, in her MR, specifies two (2) pieces of evidence to prove bodily presence in Lagangilang — her: 1) CTC and 2) Voter's Certificate. She states:

48. Meanwhile, her residence or bodily presence in Lagangilang, Abra is supported by the fact that she was allowed to vote in the recently concluded May 14, 2019 Barangay and SK Elections, as shown in her Voter Certification, considering that the basic requirements in voting are the following: (1) must be at least 18 years old; (2) a resident of the Philippines for at least one year; and (3) a resident of the city or municipality where you intend to vote for at least six months prior to the election. The same was further buttressed by the issuance of a Community Tax Certificate by the Municipality of Lagangilang, Abra. 73

These documents simply do not suffice. A CTC and Voter's Certificate are baseline pieces of evidence in disqualification cases involving domicile. They are hardly accorded evidentiary value vis-a-vis the issue of residency due to the relative ease in which they can be obtained. 74In any case, a closer examination of these documents renders them even less credible.

The CTC dated July 7, 2017 75 is not a complete document and contains falsities. As such, it cannot be accorded evidentiary weight. It lacks the signature of Villamor as taxpayer, her thumbprint and the signature of the Municipal/City Treasurer who supposedly issued the same, as well as some important entries such as the Taxpayer's Identification Number. Moreover, when it was issued, Villamor was still an alien, which thereby renders as false the representation on the CTC that she was Filipino. 76 In Mitra, the Court refused to afford credence to a CTC which lacked the signature of Mitra. EATCcI

The Voter's Certificate cannot likewise be given evidentiary value. Foremost, Villamor was disqualified to vote in the May 14, 2018 Barangay elections, as she had then not yet reacquired Philippine citizenship. Hence, she was an alien with no right of suffrage under the Constitution. 77

To recall, Villamor re-acquired her Filipino citizenship on June 19, 2018 and renounced her US citizenship on September 18, 2018. 78 Indeed, a closer perusal of the Voter's Certificate would show that Villamor's registration as a voter on September 29, 1997 was reactivated, and the Certificate was issued only on May 6, 2019. 79 Hence, she could not have voted in the Barangay elections in 2018. That she did so only means that she falsely represented she could, and that she voted illegally.

To be sure, this is not the first case that candidates facing disqualification for allegedly lacking residence requirements had interposed the defense of their having registered as a voter. Hence, the Court had long settled that such registration does not, and cannot, prove residence for purposes of complying with the requirements for running for public office. As early as in 1954, 80 the Court already held that registration as a voter does not constitute loss of residence. 81 This was followed by a multitude of other cases which were ruled in the same manner. 82

In Coquilla, similar to the present case, Coquilla tried to prove his residence by invoking his registration as a voter of Oras. This was rejected by the Court, saying that "as held in Nuval v. Guray, x x x registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate's lack of residency." 83

In fact, not even a final judgment in the appropriate exclusion proceedings upholding the voter's registration can bar a disqualification case based on the common matter of residence. 84 In Domino, the Court was faced with the contention that the decision of the lower court in an exclusion proceeding, which affirmed the right of Domino to be included in the list of voters as he satisfied the residency requirement therefor, is binding upon the COMELEC in the disqualification case, likewise based on his compliance with the residency requirement. The Court rejected the argument and held that "the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote x x x are not conclusive upon the COMELEC." 85

In Velasco, similar to this case, the Court, in a Section 78 Petition against Velasco, looked into the alleged invalidity of his registration as a voter, for lacking the citizenship requirement therefor. The Court noted that, at the time Velasco applied for registration with the COMELEC local office, he was still a dual citizen, having re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, but had not yet then renounced his American citizenship. The Court held:

x x x We observe, however, that at the time he filed his application for registration with the COMELEC local office on October 13, 2006, Velasco was a dual citizen. The records show that Velasco renounced his American citizenship only on March 28, 2007, although he secured his dual citizenship status as early as July 31, 2006 at the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California. Under his dual citizenship status, he possessed the right to vote in Philippine elections through the absentee voting scheme under Republic Act No. 9189 (the Overseas Absentee Voting Law or the OAVL) as we ruled in Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC. In Macalintal v. COMELEC, we significantly said that absentee voters are exempted from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. Thus, the residency requirements we cited above under the VRA and the LGC do not apply to Velasco, assuminghe registered as a dual citizen/absentee voter.

By law, however, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials, specifically: the president, the vice president, the senators, and party-list representatives. Thus, Velasco was not eligible to vote as an absentee voter in the local election of 2007. In fact, the records do not show that Velasco ever registered as an absentee voter for the 2007 election.

On the other hand, Velasco could not have registered as a regular voter because he did not possess the residency requirement of one-year stay in the Philippines and six-month stay in the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time of the election. The records show that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and applied for registration on October 13 of that year for the election to be held in May of the following year (2007). To hark back and compare his case to a similar case, Coquilla v. COMELEC, Velasco, before acquiring his dual citizenship status, was an American citizen who had lost his residency and domiciliary status in the Philippines; whose sojourn in the Philippines was via a visitor's visa; and who never established permanent residence in the Philippines. Like Coquilla before him, Velasco could not have therefore validly registered as a regular voter eight months before the May 2007 local elections.86 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

The relevant doctrines that can be gathered from Velasco are: (1) a person who had re-acquired his or her Philippine citizenship but has not yet renounced his or her foreign citizenship, hence a dual citizen who may vote only through the absentee voting scheme of RA 9189, 87 is exempted from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters; (2) such dual citizen, if he or she registers as a voter under RA 9189, may only vote for national officials and not for local officials; and (3) a former Filipino, prior to his or her re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship, may not register as a regular voter (nor as an absentee voter), 88 hence, cannot vote in any elections.

Applying Velasco to the present case, Villamor was, on May 14, 2018 — the day of the 2018 Barangay elections — still an alien, as earlier explained. She had then neither re-acquired Philippine citizenship nor renounced her American citizenship. Hence, she could neither have validly registered as a voter nor validly voted in said elections. Also, even on the assumption that she was treated then as having re-acquired her Philippine citizenship, she would have then still been a dual citizen, hence disqualified to vote for the Barangay elections. Moreover, such registration cannot be taken as evidence of residence because voters under RA 9189 are exempted from the residency requirements for regular voters. DHITCc

In any case, a unanimous Court in Jalosjos had already categorically declared that the requirement for residency for registration as a voter is different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office. 89

For the above reasons, I take exception to the ponencia's ruling that "Villamor's Voter's Certification relative to the May 2018 [barangay elections] evinced that she was already in Lagangilang as of 14 May 2018, and that she had already met the minimum residence of at least six (6) months required for voting purposes." 90 To stress, these allegations of voting during the 2018 Barangay elections, despite the admission by Villamor that, at which time, she was not yet a Philippine citizen, are either blatant falsehoods or, if true, illegal.

Moreover, it does not matter that, as the ponencia points out, Villamor's registration as a voter or her participation in the 2018 elections was never challenged on the ground of failure to meet the residence qualification. 91 As discussed, not even a final decision upholding the validity of such registration can bar a subsequent action for the candidate's disqualification.

From a reading of the ponencia, its sole basis in concluding that Villamor had satisfied the physical presence element to obtain domicile was her Voter's Certificate and her concomitant allegation that she had voted in the May 2018 Barangay Elections. Unfortunately, as discussed, I cannot, in good conscience, agree with the conclusion. I submit that the same does not just lower the bar for proof of physical presence (again, a separate element from intent) from the quantum of clear and positive evidence, which the Court had consistently set as early as in 1995. 92 Worse, it condones the election fraud that Villamor evidently committed.

There is utter lack of evidence of

During the deliberations for the case, Associate Justice Jhosep L. Lopez (Justice Lopez), in relation to the issue of Villamor's physical presence, raised the point that she had to travel back to Lagangilang to sign the documents of sale which she presented in evidence.

Respectfully, I submit that such inference cannot constitute proof of physical or bodily presence of Villamor in Lagangilang, Abra.

First, Villamor does not even make such allegation, rendering the conclusion without basis, not to mention, non-sequitur. Second, there is no case law that supports the attribution of bodily presence to a contract of sale. Third, while uninterrupted presence is not necessary, the law requires substantial presence, as explained below. Finally, the conclusion appears to muddle the elements of intent and physical presence, and is not in line with the standards set by jurisprudence for clear and positive evidence.

To stress, while intent is primordial in establishing a domicile, actual or bodily presence is likewise a requisite, distinct and separate from intent or the acts manifesting such intent, and must separately be established with clear and positive proof. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC93(Romualdez-Marcos) instructs:

x x x To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. x x x 94 (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement of bodily or physical presence is magnified when one considers the wisdom behind the minimum residential requirement — to ensure that officials are acquainted with the conditions and needs of their constituents, thus:

The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the candidates' residency in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that community.

The requirement is rooted in the recognition that officials of districts or localities should not only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their constituencies; more importantly, they should know their constituencies and the unique circumstances of their constituents — their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. Familiarity or the opportunity to be familiar with these circumstances can only come with residency in the constituency to be represented. 95

Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC96(Torayno) adds that the requisite period is likewise intended to give the electorate the opportunity to evaluate the candidates' qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek. 97

Logically, mere intent, without physical and bodily presence, will not familiarize the candidate with the conditions and idiosyncrasies of his or her prospective constituents, and the geographical unit he or she intends to govern. Owing to this purpose, physical presence, to successfully acquire domicile, must be substantial enough to show an intent to reside as well as to fulfill the duties of the desired office and to give him or her and the voters an opportunity to be acquainted with each other. 98 It must be of such a character as exuding the very essence of a residence. cEaSHC

Hence, in Jalosjos, the Court rejected Jalosjos' claim of change in domicile, although it was proven that she had regularly visited the new domicile, had transferred her voter's registration thereto and, like Villamor, had a house constructed. The Court noted that she could not have been an "actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008 as the house was still then being constructed."

On the other hand, in Torayno, the Court set aside legal technicalities and considered the purpose of the law in affirming Emano's qualifications. It noted that Emano had been physically present in the independent city of Cagayan de Oro (CdO) in the three (3) years that he was governor of the province of Misamis Oriental, so that such physical presence is "substantial enough" to enable him to fulfill the duties of Mayor of CdO.

In these lights, I respectfully submit that Justice Lopez's postulation cannot stand. As mentioned, the most that can be accorded the documents of sale is that they are proof of intent. But certainly, these documents do not establish substantial physical presence.

Further, Justice Lopez stressed that more than the physical presence, the intention must be considered. Villamor did not transfer to just another place of domicile, rather, she returned to her domicile of origin, with which she naturally shares strong ties. Hence, her intention to change domicile must be prima facie presumed. Justice Lopez demonstrated this point by citing Japzon v. COMELEC99(Japzon), wherein the Court held that a returning Filipino, who was once a naturalized American citizen, had animus manendi et revertendi to his or her domicile of origin. 100

With due respect, even if it be conceded that Villamor had intent to reside in Lagangilang, the fact remains that, she failed to allege, much less prove, a single instance when she physically went to Lagangilang. To excuse this failure to perform the barest minimum is to set the standards of the Court to an irrationally low level.

Moreover, while it may be said that a person retains some degree of connection to his or her domicile of origin, such fact alone does not guarantee that the purpose of the law of acquainting candidate, constituents and place will be met. Necessarily, changes happen and memories weaken over time. This is why the law, in requiring the period of minimum residence, does not distinguish between newcomers and those who are merely returning. To recall, considering the residence requirement to acquire American citizenship, 101 Villamor must have left Lagangilang around the year 2004 or fifteen (15) years from the 2019 elections. To state the obvious, so much could have already happened in Lagangilang in that span of time. It may be different if she, in fact, travelled regularly to Lagangilang in those years. However, as explained, the circumstances of this case make it difficult to lend credence to this bare allegation.

Finally, Japzon is not applicable in the present case. Ty left after he had already acquired new domicile in his domicile of origin. Hence, his mere absence did not result in the loss of such domicile. Here, the issue is whether and when Villamor had acquired a domicile in Lagangilang, which, as explained, cannot be determined.

On this note, it bears to stress the distinction between the character of physical presence required in acquiring domicile and one needed to maintain it after successful acquisition. Once domicile is acquired, the length of a person's physical stay in the place of domicile becomes irrelevant, for as long he has animus revertendi. 102 This is because domicile, once established, is presumed to continue unless a new one is acquired, with the concurrence of the three (3) requisites of animus manendi, animus non revertendi, and physical or bodily presence in the new domicile. In short, domicile is not easily lost because the law presumes that it continues. 103

Hence, the Court has held that mere absence, no matter how long, as long as it is without intention to abandon, will not result in a change of domicile. 104 This is the character of domicile in Japzon — as it was already acquired, physical presence became a non-issue, because intent determines loss of domicile.

On the other hand, the kind of physical presence required in acquiring a new domicile must be more substantial, although need not be uninterrupted. This is so because, at the risk of belaboring the point, domicile is presumed to continue; hence, the physical presence must be relatively considerable to rebut the presumption. Likewise, it must be meaningful enough to show that the candidate can fulfill the duties of his or her elected office, apart from showing animus manendi et non-revertendi. CTIEac

Villamor failed to allege, much less

Without the documents of sale, the CTC and Voter's Certificate, Villamor is left with only her bare and sweeping statement that she had been flying back and forth to Lagangilang since 2009. 105 Truly, there is nothing more, by way of evidence or allegation, that may support a finding that the element of bodily presence obtained. The "material dates" Villamor enumerated in her MR, which are reproduced in the ponencia, are utterly lacking any statement indicating that she was physically present in Lagangilang, thus:

 

DATE	EVENT
September 25, 1970	Respondent [Villamor] was born of Filipino mother and father.
October 29, 2009	Respondent became a naturalized US Citizen.
July 16, 2013	Respondent acquired a portion of a farmland situated in Sitio Cabasaan, Brgy. Laguiben, Lagangilang, Abra from her brother, Jay E. Villamor.
September 7, 2016	Respondent acquired another portion of the said farmland from her sister, Luz Villamor Sayen.
July 7, 2017	Respondent was issued a Community Tax Certificate by the Municipality of Lagangilang, Abra.
July 11, 2017	Respondent acquired property located in Laang, Lagangilang, Abra from one Virginia F. Atmosfera where she eventually constructed her home.
July 12, 2017	Respondent caused the transfer of the tax declaration of the same property from the name of Atmosfera to her name.
June 19, 2018	Respondent re-acquired her Filipino citizenship by virtue of R.A. 9225 otherwise known as "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
September 18, 2018	Respondent executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of her US citizenship, her allegiance to the US and the US government.
October 16, 2018	Respondent filed her CoC for the position of Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra in the upcoming May 13, 2019 Elections. 106

 

It is curious why Villamor, despite her allegation of "frequent flights" to Lagangilang from 2009 to 2018, is unable to specify a single instance of those alleged trips. She did not even state the date when she departed the US and finally settled in Lagangilang for good. From the records, she was still in the US when she re-acquired her Filipino citizenship on June 19, 2018. 107

It bears noting that Villamor is represented before this Court — and before the COMELEC — by one of the more established law firms and practitioners in election law practice in the country. 108 Hence, it is hard to imagine that the omission to specify, or even approximate, such a critical point as her physical presence in Lagangilang was due to inadvertence or ignorance of the law. Moreover, such frequency of travels as she alleges can very easily be proven by travel documents or affidavits of Lagangilang residents attesting to Villamor's presence therein. No such evidence was ever presented.

Logically, the bare and unsubstantiated allegation of "frequent travels" cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be taken to satisfy the quantum of clear and positive evidence. 109

Moreover, such sweeping allegation does not, as it cannot, provide the Court basis to determine the critical point when domicile was acquired, because there is no specified or approximated date of when the alleged travels transpired. In other words, the point when physical presence concurred with intent cannot be determined. Because domicile is only acquired upon the simultaneous concurrence of all three (3) elements of animus manendi, animus non revertendi and physical presence, the point of acquisition of such domicile, which is critical because it shows if there was compliance with the one-year period required by law, 110 is not determinable. Jalosjos is unequivocal in mandating the determination of this critical point, over and above successfully establishing the three (3) elements of domicile, thus:

These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC and subsequently in Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.111 (Emphasis supplied)

To recall the 1996 Frivaldo case, the law specifies a minimum period for residency of elective candidates, unlike citizenship which may be possessed at any time prior to the elections. Moreover, while the two (2) intents may precede or succeed physical presence, domicile is only acquired at the point where all three (3) elements converge. In the words of the Court in Domino — intention to acquire a domicile, without actual residence in the locality, does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. 112

Indeed, the Court has always identified a critical point when domicile was acquired, which always corresponded to a time when the person was physically present at his or her claimed domicile. 113 In other words, the Court has always 1) fixed the point of acquisition of domicile at a time when the claimant was bodily present in the new domicile; hence, identifying the point of physical presence is indispensable; and 2) determined compliance with the statutory period using the critical time when domicile was acquired. In the present case, there is absolutely nothing in the records on which a finding of such physical presence and, hence, acquisition of domicile, may be anchored. For this, Villamor's claim that she had resided in Lagangilang for at least a year before the 2019 elections must be rejected.

Intent to deceive is required for a

During the case deliberations, questions were raised as to the jurisprudential requirement of intent to deceive for successful Section 78 petitions. Specifically, it was raised that the same may not have legal bases as it is not expressed nor implied by the law. SaCIDT

Intent to deceive, as an element of a Section 78 case, is firmly entrenched in jurisprudence. In a long line of cases starting with the 1995 case of Romualdez-Marcos, the Court had invariably upheld intent to deceive as a material element for a successful petition under Section 78.

Admittedly, Section 78 does not expressly mention the element of intent to deceive:

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

However, it mandates that the petition must be filed upon the exclusive ground that any material representation contained in the CoC, as required under Section 74 of the law, is false. Hence, reference must be made to Section 74, which reads:

SECTION 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 requires the inclusion in the CoC of a declaration that the facts stated therein are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge. Evidently, this declaration qualifies all of the information that Section 74 requires. In other words, the law does not demand from candidates perfect accuracy and absolute certainty in the information that they supply in a CoC, but only such facts which they believe to be true to the best of their knowledge. This means that a candidate who makes a representation which is subsequently found to be false, would still be compliant with Section 74 if he or she made such representation in good faith. What is material is that at the time that he or she made such declaration, he or she believed said information to be true to the best of his or her knowledge.

Accordingly, the reference by Section 78 to Section 74 effectively limits the scope of Section 78 to only those false material representations which were knowingly made, i.e., those which the candidate did not know to be true to the best of his or her knowledge or which he or she downright knew to be false. A contrary interpretation of Section 78 would lead to the absurdity that a CoC of a candidate who had fully complied with the requirements under Section 74 can nonetheless be denied due course or cancelled under Section 78. To stress, Section 78 requires that the ground for the petition be the existence of a false material representation in the CoC as required in Section 74 and Section 74 requires only facts which are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge. aTHCSE

Moreover, the Court has ruled that a more reasonable and just construction of Section 78 would be to limit its scope, considering its grave consequences. 114 When a candidate commits a false material representation, two (2) causes of action arise against him or her under the OEC: 1) a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 and 2) a criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262, 115 for which Section 264 prescribes the penalty of imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years, along with accessory penalties. 116 In Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 117 the Court, in strictly construing the word "material" under Section 78 to refer only to qualifications for elective office, likewise looked into its serious repercussions, and ruled that the law could not have intended to deprive a person of his or her basic rights upon just any innocuous mistake, thus:

As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].

xxx xxx xxx

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.118 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, it appears that limiting Section 78 in order to restrict the powers of the COMELEC was likewise the intention of the lawmakers. Citing the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa on the draft of Section 78, the Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC119 discussed how the lawmakers feared partisanship on the COMELEC's part, which made it imperative that Section 78 be only for the strongest of reasons. 120 A reading of the quoted portions of the deliberations shows that the lawmakers even contemplated removing Section 78, for fear that it would only expand the powers of the COMELEC and because the matters treated therein are already "normal issues for protest or quo warranto." 121

Lest it be misunderstood, a Section 78 petition is not the proper remedy to challenge a candidate's eligibility or qualification, or to declare a candidate disqualified or ineligible. Section 78 is based on a candidate's act of falsely representing a material fact in a CoC, and not his or her lack of eligibility or qualifications. The latter are proper grounds for petitions to disqualify under Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC in relation to Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), if filed before the elections, or a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the OEC, if filed after the elections. 122 It is these actions which question a candidate's eligibility and qualifications that do not require the element of intent to deceive.

Villamor had intent to deceive when she

In most decided cases, intent to deceive under Section 78 had referred to a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible." 123Mitra v. COMELEC124 expounds:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. 125

The deliberate character of the false representation stressed in Mitra is consistent with the qualification in Section 74 — that a candidate must state in his or her CoC only facts which are true to the best of his or her knowledge. Hence, only false material representations which were knowingly and deliberately made can be grounds to cancel a CoC under Section 78.

In the present case, Villamor made the false representation that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for a period of 36 years and 8 months prior to the 2019 elections and, hence, eligible for the office of Mayor. She arrived at this computation by adding the period of her stay in Lagangilang prior to her acquisition of American citizenship, to her period of stay therein when she returned and re-established her residence upon re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. 126 In her MR, she claims that this was computed in good faith and "in accordance with the prevailing laws and jurisprudence." 127

This is, however, evidently erroneous and patently deceitful. The ponencia considers this misrepresentation as "a mere error or mistake x x x on a difficult question of law as to residency, which, in turn, may be the basis of good faith." 128 The ponencia even references my Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares in declaring that the law presumes good faith, hence, one who alleges malice is burdened to prove the same. 129

I beg to differ, and place in its proper context, my Concurring Opinion referred to by the ponencia. cAaDHT

It is a basic legal tenet that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. 130Ignorantia juris non excusat. Hence, one who makes a false representation on a basic matter of law is necessarily presumed to have done so knowingly and with intent to deceive. Because of this imputed knowledge, a law, to be binding, must be duly published. 131 The landmark case of Tañada v. Tuvera132 succinctly explains that the requirement for publishing is grounded on the due process mandate of notice, without which the basic doctrine of ignorantia legis cannot be enforced, thus:

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. x x x

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. 133 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, once a law is duly published, there arises a conclusive presumption that all persons are aware of the same. This is necessarily so because the administration of justice would be imperiled should the courts be required to determine a man's knowledge or ignorance of the law in every case. This would entangle the courts in the assessment of virtually impossible problems, thus:

The rule, that a mistake of law does not avail, prevails in equity as well as at common law. Bank of U.S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32: Hunt v. Rousman, l id. 1; 8 Wheat, 174; Mellech v. Robertson, 25 Vt. 603; Leant v. Palmer, 3 Comst. 19.

"If ignorance of law was admitted as a ground of exemption, the court would be involved in questions which [are] scarcely possible to solve, and which would render the administration of justice next to impossible; for in almost every case ignorance of law would be alleged, and the court would, for the purpose of determining this point, be often compelled to enter upon questions of fact insoluble and interminable." Austin's Jour., vol. ii, p. 172; Kerr, 397 134

Hence, the justice system would be rendered inutile should courts assume good faith on everyone even when there is evident violation of law. The Court has held:

To begin with, nothing is more settled than the principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. To allow employers to conveniently claim exemptions on their purported naïveté of the provisions of the minimum wage law would be detrimental to the employees. This would certainly run afoul to the constitutional requirement to afford a strict protection to labor. 135

Moreover, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns. 136For documents sworn to under oath, it has been held that, if a person chooses to swear that an act is legal when he or she is uncertain that it is in fact legal, the choice carries with it the duty of investigating the law.137 Hence, an aspirant is obliged to observe reasonable diligence to know the requirements for his or her particular objective and assess if he or she is able to meet the same. This is especially true when he or she is required to swear to his or her qualification under oath. The Court has ruled:

x x x Petitioner's claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Moreover, petitioner — as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE — cannot expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office. x x x 138

Hence, the rule in mistakes of law is that they are not excusable by a claim of ignorance. An exception would be if the misrepresentation was a mistake made upon a doubtful or difficult question of law, which can be a basis of good faith. 139 This exemption is grounded on the same rationale for the requirement of publication of laws before they could be binding — due process. 140 When a law is ambiguous or affords different interpretations and has, in fact, been the subject of differing jurisprudence, the people are deprived of fair warning of what conduct is proscribed. 141

Fundamental fairness no doubt requires that an individual be given the opportunity to discover a statute's existence, applicability and meaning. Not every layman will read the Penal Code from cover to cover. But, if the statute in question is either clear in meaning upon reading, or sufficient to warn the layman that he should seek legal advice as to its applicability and meaning, it is proper to charge the potential violator with such knowledge of a law's applicability as he could obtain through competent legal advice . . . If a competent lawyer is consulted, he should be able to predict whether the statute might be used as a basis for prosecuting his client. If the words of the statute and other related law make it impossible to make such a prediction, a statute comes close to inadequate advance notice . . . 142

Hence, what is required by due process is only an opportunity to discover the existence, applicability, and meaning of a law. This is accorded by the due publication of the law prior to its effectivity. Even if the published law is not readily clear upon reading, but sufficient to put a layman on guard that he may be at risk of violating the law and such layman still omits to seek legal advice, then ignorantia legis should still apply, rendering futile any defense of ignorance. However, if the layman does consult a lawyer and the latter is still unable to predict if his or her client's intended action will violate the law, based on such law's language and from other related statutes, then the law may then be said to be doubtful or difficult, so that mistake thereon should not prejudice the people. Hence, too, reliance, in good faith, on a prior decision of the Court will exculpate the offender. aCIHcD

Thus, when a law is doubtful or difficult so that its meaning is not discoverable upon the observance of reasonable diligence, as, for instance, its language does not warn of the potential violation thereof or that even legal experts, including the Court, differ as to its import, the person who had no fair warning, cannot be held liable for violation thereof. This is the import of my Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, which reads:

The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. In Kasilag v. Rodriguez, this Court, citing Manresa, recognized the possibility of an excusable ignorance of or error of law being a basis for good faith:

x x x However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers Article 2, and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.

xxx xxx xxx

If indeed a mistake was made by petitioner as to her real status, this could be considered a mistake on a difficult question of law that could be the basis for good faith. In this regard, good faith is presumed. In the same vein, it is presumed that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong, and that the law was obeyed. Without more, the legal conclusion alleged by the respondents in the petitions for cancellation, and thereafter reached by the COMELEC, that the petitioner was not a natural-born citizen simply because she is a foundling is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the petitioner made the representation as to her citizenship in good faith. 143 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly then, my statement that "good faith is presumed" is in regard to a mistake on a difficult question of law. Stated differently, when the error concerns a difficult or doubtful legal question, then good faith is presumed, and this is because, as earlier explained, the person charged of violating such law cannot be said to have been fairly warned of its meaning and application. Moreover, the citizenship of a foundling such as Senator Poe was then, undoubtedly, a complex and novel legal issue, as indeed, the Court had to resort to an elaborate discussion of general principles of international law for lack of directly applicable domestic case law and statutes. Hence, Senator Poe's alleged misrepresentation regarding her citizenship on her CoC, having been made in good faith, is excepted from the conclusive presumption of knowledge of the applicable laws under Article 2 of the Civil Code.

To stress, what is presumed is knowledge of the law. This is axiomatic and is practically a universally accepted legal doctrine. Hence, good faith — that is, lack of knowledge of the law and its meaning — is no excuse. The exception is if the mistake was made upon a difficult and doubtful question of law. The burden thus lies on the person claiming the exception, to prove that the error of law that was mistakenly applied or misunderstood is complex or not fairly discoverable as it is unclear, novel or subject of conflicting jurisprudence or statutes. Once he or she proves that the law is doubtful or difficult, a presumption of good faith arises in his favor. This is precisely the situation that faced Senator Poe and what the Court considered in her favor.

The present case, however, is totally different.

First of all, it is already well-settled in, or established jurisprudence that the length of residence or domicile of one who had abandoned his or her domicile of origin and had eventually returned thereto, is reckoned from the time he or she returned and fixed it as his or her new domicile of choice. 144 His or her period of stay therein prior to such abandonment cannot be added to his or her period of stay upon return. 145 Our jurisprudence is replete with cases of similar facts and issue as Villamor's — period of residence of elected candidates who are natural-born Filipino citizens, who had abandoned their domiciles of origin after obtaining foreign citizenships, and who had thereafter returned and sought public office in their place of birth. 146A simple survey of this substantial body of case law would readily show that the length of residence cannot retroact to the time of the returning candidate's birth. 147 Indeed, in not one of this abundant case law has the Court retroactively counted the period of residence of a returning Filipino who had domiciled abroad.

As mentioned, mistake of law is excusable only when its meaning is not ascertainable with due diligence, as when the law is difficult or doubtful. Evidently, such cannot be said in the present case. First, the relevant jurisprudence is well-settled — without a single case that deviated — that length of residence does not retroact to the time of the returning candidate's birth. Second, the jurisprudence is abundant, hence, unlike Poe-Llamanzares, this is not a novel question of law.

In short, had Villamor exerted the least amount of effort to ascertain the propriety of retroacting her period of residence, she would not have mistaken the same. She is all the more expected to be diligent as the declarations in her CoC were sworn to under oath, and, thus, made her vulnerable to criminal prosecution.

Hence, Villamor's manner of accounting for her period of residency cannot be excused under a good faith invocation. To the contrary, this bespeaks deceit. Ignorantia legis non excusat. She is presumed to have known how to properly compute her length of residence when she made the representation that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for 36 years and 8 months before the 2019 elections. Thus, there can be no other conclusion than that she made the false material representation with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to deceive. cHaCAS

Again, the records disclose Villamor's deliberate intent.

First, her explanation on how she arrived at the period stated in her CoC — that she added her period of stay in Lagangilang prior to her acquisition of American citizenship, to her period of stay therein when she returned — is mathematically implausible. Villamor was born in Lagangilang on September 25, 1970 and became a naturalized American citizen on October 29, 2009. 148 Hence, her period of stay in Lagangilang before becoming an American citizen already amounts to 39 years. Evidently, it is impossible to arrive at the 36 years and 8 months she stated in her CoC using her explanation.

Second, as earlier demonstrated, she maliciously misrepresented that she voted in the last barangay elections and offered such misrepresentation as evidence of her bodily presence. As earlier explained, Villamor was still an alien without any right of suffrage on May 14, 2018, having re-acquired Filipino citizenship only on June 19, 2018. 149

Third, she misrepresented in her CTC dated July 7, 2017 150 that she was Filipino when, again, she only re-acquired her Philippine citizenship in 2018.

Fourth, Villamor's propensity to deliberately assert falsehoods is likewise manifest from her Voter's Certificate, where she entered in the space for period of residence in Lagangilang, "39 Year(s) and 00 Months." 151 This is obviously inconsistent and irreconcilable with the information she wrote on her CoC. If she truly believed, in good faith, the period she had entered in her CoC, she would not have entered another period in her Voter's Certification, just a few months later.

In Poe-Llamanzares, the Court considered as evidence of Senator Poe's good faith, the fact that her explanation of her false entry was reasonable. Here, as mentioned, Villamor's explanation is mathematically impossible. Worse, she appears to have tried to deceive both the Court and the COMELEC, repeatedly, by introducing into evidence documents and statements which are dubious, false and irreconcilable. There can be no other conclusion than that she knowingly made the false material representations on her CoC.

There is no legal basis to fault the

The ponencia finds that the COMELEC's failure to exercise its power under Section 6 of RA 6646, 152 and stay Villamor's proclamation is inconsistent with its finding that Villamor failed to prove her eligibility; 153 that it should not have allowed Villamor to be proclaimed (much less assume) the position of Mayor if it truly believed that Villamor was disqualified. 154

Section 6 of RA 6646 provides:

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As held in Grego v. COMELEC, 155 and as evident from its language, the power of the COMELEC to suspend a proclamation under Section 6 is discretionary; hence, the exercise of such discretion cannot be interfered with unless upon a showing that it was with grave abuse of discretion. 156 There is no such showing in the present case and neither is this raised as an issue. Hence, respectfully, I submit that faulting the COMELEC for being "inconsistent" because it failed to suspend Villamor's proclamation despite finding her disqualified, offends the discretionary nature of Section 6.

Moreover, it appears that no motion to suspend the proclamation was filed, 157 but only a motion to annul such proclamation. But it does not show that Section 6 may be used to annul a proclamation that was already made.

Finally, there is jurisprudence supporting the view that Section 6 is not applicable in a Section 78 petition, as it applies only to Section 68 Petitions for Disqualification. 158 According to this view, there is no provision in the law governing the effects of Section 78 petitions. Hence, unlike a winning candidate who is disqualified by judgment of the COMELEC under Section 68, who must be proclaimed unless such proclamation is suspended, such candidate whose CoC is canceled under Section 78 by executory judgment of the COMELEC must not be proclaimed. 159 As noted by the ponencia, Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure renders immediately executory decisions of the COMELEC after five (5) days from promulgation unless restrained by the Court. 160

In other words, the COMELEC did not need to annul the proclamation of Villamor after finding her disqualified because its decision is not stayed by the present petition before the Court. Indeed, from the records, the COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality, 161 citing the Court's non-issuance of a restraining order.

On this note, I observe that Villamor had asked the Court at least three (3) times for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), starting as early as on November 29, 2019. 162 The Court did not act on these motions, nor did it issue an injunctive order. The ponencia, however, is granting the Petition, and finding that Villamor is qualified to sit as Mayor of Lagangilang, Abra. In other words, the Court appears to be just as guilty of its imputation of "inconsistency" as the COMELEC — if not worse because, as mentioned, the COMELEC's Decision is executory, hence, there was no need to annul Villamor's proclamation. There does not likewise appear to be multiple motions for suspension of proclamation filed before the COMELEC, per the records, including the ponencia's relevant citation. 163 DACcIH

As Villamor utterly failed to prove that

Moreover, as Villamor committed false

Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier places utmost importance to the electoral's choice, and opines that the Court is bound to exert the highest effort to resolve a disqualification case in a manner that preserves and gives effect to the will of the people.

In Velasco, the Court assessed the will of the people as a factor in disqualification proceedings against its possible effects to the rule of law, which is likewise a manifestation of the will of the Filipino people, as well as to the integrity of the elections. In the end, the Court held that the balance must always tilt in favor of the law, thus:

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.

In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary.

xxx xxx xxx

x x x A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate[s] will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law. 164 (Italics in the original)

In sum, I cannot but affirm the COMELEC's cancellation of Villamor's CoC. The COMELEC was not incorrect in finding that her period of residence in Lagangilang, Abra could not have started before she re-acquired her Philippine citizenship, and without any showing that she was granted an immigrant or permanent resident status in the Philippines. In any case, even from an evaluation of all of her evidence, including the ones which obtained prior to such re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship, she still failed to discharge her burden of evidence to prove that she had timely acquired a new domicile in Lagangilang, and rebut the presumption of continuity of her US domicile.

The evidence she presented, including her bare allegations, was gravely inadequate to prove the requisite animus manendi, animus non revertendi, and bodily presence. Of particular note is her utter lack of evidence and allegation to support her claim of bodily presence. The Voter's Certificate — the sole basis of ponencia's finding that she satisfied this element of physical presence — is tainted with fraud and illegality, hence, cannot be given evidentiary value. Likewise, she is imputed with knowledge of how her period of residence must be computed. Nevertheless, her repeated misrepresentations to the Court and the COMELEC sufficiently evince her intent to deceive in fact. HSCATc

It bears to note that, as the ponencia had pointed out, the COMELEC's assailed Resolutions lack any finding on whether Villamor had intended to deceive when she made the material misrepresentation in her CoC. However, under the circumstances, I cannot ascribe upon the COMELEC, on this sole basis, grave abuse of its discretion which is nothing less than a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, x x x the [exercise of power] in an arbitrary x x x manner[, where the abuse is] so patent and gross as to amount to [an] evasion of positive duty." 165

A perusal of the assailed Resolutions shows that the COMELEC had properly considered all the evidence of the parties and judiciously applied the relevant laws. Even if the COMELEC can be said to have erred in failing to include in its Resolutions a discussion on Villamor's intent to deceive, the same is not tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. In the end, far from having exercised its judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner, the COMELEC was correct in ruling that Villamor failed to prove that she had been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra for at least one (1) year prior to the 2019 elections, and that she is guilty of false material representation in her CoC, for which the same must be cancelled pursuant to Section 78.

Finally, the law must be upheld, lest the grave dangers contemplated in Velasco ensue. In the end, the law is, itself, a manifestation of the will of the Filipino people, expressed through their duly-elected legislators; hence, the balance must necessarily tilt in its favor even as against the will of the electorate in Lagangilang, Abra. 166

In light of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., concurring:

I concur with Justice Rodil V. Zalameda on his ponencia to grant the present petition. I find, as the ponencia does, that Resolutions dated April 26, 2019 and November 27, 2019 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA Case No. 18-182 (DC) are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Contrary to these Resolutions, there is no substantial evidence to support the claim that petitioner had materially and intentionally misrepresented to deceive that she satisfied the one-year residency required of candidates running for the local elective position of mayor.

SUMMARY

First, petitioner fulfilled all the requirements under Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) in relation to Section 39 1 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) (Local Government Code of 1991) to qualify for, run, and eventually win in the May 13, 2019 elections for mayor of Lagangilang, Abra.

Second, change of residence or domicile is essentially a matter of intent supported by acts confirming the existence of the intent. These acts occurred priorto or after the re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship. All these must be appreciated under elementary rules that jurisprudence has long established. COMELEC was seriously remiss in not canvassing and applying these rules.

Third, there is no substantial evidence on record to show or lead to the conclusion that petitioner committed a deliberately false and deceptive representation sufficient to grant the petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy (CoC).

Fourth, petitioner re-established her domicile in Lagangilang both by intent and acts prior to and after her repatriation as a Filipino citizen. Notably, continued and uninterrupted actual bodily presence — or even substantial physical presence — in Lagangilang is not required either under Section 39 of RA 7160 or the Constitution.

Lastly, given that the attempt to disqualify petitioner was filed before the election and was a live issue before the electorate of Lagangilang, all doubts should have been resolved in favor of petitioner's qualification after the people of Lagangilang themselves overwhelmingly voted for her as mayor in the May 13, 2013 elections.

With due respect, the void rulings of the COMELEC disregarded the voice of the electorate of Lagangilang. This is a constitutional infirmity that the Court cannot and should not allow.

ANTECEDENTS

Petitioner was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 2006, she obtained permanent residency status in the United States of America. In 2009, she became a naturalized citizen of this country. On June 19, 2018, she reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.

Between 2009 and 2018, petitioner travelled back and forth the Philippines and the United States. She applied for and was given a community tax certificate from Lagangilang. She retained all the properties she owned when she was naturalized as an American citizen and acquired several other parcels of land in the years 2013, 2016 and 2017. In 2017, she built her house in Lagangilang on the lot she had purchased in the same year for her purpose of residing there. This house has been her recorded abode. She registered as a voter in Lagangilang and cast her vote in the May 14, 2018 barangay elections.

After her repatriation, petitioner filed her CoC for mayor of this town. Private respondent filed a petition to cancel her CoC under Section 74 in relation to Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended (Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines). Despite the petition, she was voted overwhelmingly to this position in the May 13, 2019 local elections. IDTSEH

REASONS

A. The review power of the Court

In reviewing this case, the Court has to determine whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the cancellation of petitioner's CoC based on the alleged material and intentional misrepresentation allegedly found in her residency qualification for the position of mayor of Lagangilang.

Petitioner challenges the rulings of the COMELEC pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, invoking the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review, viz.:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Grave abuse of discretion requires that the COMELEC did not simply err either in its appreciation of facts or in the application of the law but that it decided the case in a manner patently outside the contemplation of the law.

Mitra v. COMELEC2 explained that the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by the COMELEC is not ordinarily reviewed in a petition for certiorari. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC overstepped the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, this Court is constitutionally mandated to intervene to rectify such grave abuse of discretion.

Under Section 5, Rule 64, Rules of Court, the factual findings of the COMELEC, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence refers to that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. This limited authority to review such factual findings means that the COMELEC's appreciation of the evidence is reviewed only to determine if the findings are supported by substantial evidence.

If substantial evidence exists, such findings and conclusions, even if erroneous, are accorded respect since these errors are merely error of judgment. On the other hand, if the determinations are not based on substantial evidence, the resulting errors mutate from errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction. In this latter instance, the Court has the constitutional duty to intervene and set aside the assailed COMELEC decision for lack of jurisdiction.

The burden of proof is upon private respondent to establish his claim of material and intentional misrepresentation in his petition for cancellation. 3 It is not petitioner's burden to disprove this claim though she may adduce evidence as she did to rebut private respondent's evidence or submissions.

The present case is one such instance in which the Court has to intervene.

Here, instead of evaluating the probative value of the evidence presented by petitioner, the COMELEC abruptly concluded that she had failed to re-establish her domicile in Lagangilang, simply because the acts indicative of her intent to do so were done while she was still a naturalized American citizen and prior to her repatriation as a Filipino citizen on June 19, 2018.

I concur in the ponencia's rejection of this ruling. In my respectful opinion, the ruling is grossly unreasonable — it is unreasonable because it does not fall within a reasonable range of acceptable outcomes, and such unreasonableness is gross because the ruling is contrarynot only to the elementary legal principle that allows balikbayans to re-establish their domicile in the Philippines even as they retain their alienage 4but also to the summary nature of a cancellation petition under Section 74 and Section 78 that only allows the COMELEC to rule on patent material misrepresentations of fact and not to make conclusions of law which are even contrary to jurisprudence.

In addition, no substantial evidence has been presented to support the conclusion of the COMELEC that petitioner committed a deliberately false and deceptive representation sufficient to grant the petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy (CoC). For ignoring the elementary legal principle that administrative findings must be based on substantial evidence, the ruling of the COMELEC is grossly unreasonable and gravely abusive of discretion.

On the other hand, petitioner offered evidence to prove her intent to change her domicile to and establish it in Lagangilang, and to abandon the United States as her place of residence. This she did by acts taking place both prior to and after she reacquired her Filipino citizenship. Her evidence rebutted private respondent's submissions and precluded him from discharging his burden to prove by substantial evidence his claim that petitioner committed a deliberately false and deceptive representation as to her residency qualification.

B. Petitioner's compliance with the

Section 2 5 and Section 3 6 of RA 9225 allow former natural-born Filipino citizens, who were subsequently naturalized citizens in a foreign country, to reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Once the oath of allegiance is taken, the right to enjoy full civil and political rights that attach to this citizenship follows, subject to compliance with other requirements of the Constitution and applicable laws for the exercise of these rights.

Significantly, no other step is required under these laws, except for Filipinos with reacquired citizenship who —

(i) intend to vote in Philippine elections, who must then meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) and other existing laws. SICDAa

(ii) intend to run for public office, who must then: (1) execute an oath of renunciation, and (2) meet all of the qualifications imposed by the Constitution and the law for holding the public office.

Section 5 (1) & (2) of RA 9225 is relevant on these points:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

xxx xxx xxx

The qualifications for holding local elective office are found in Section 39 of RA 7160:

SECTION 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

RA 9225 lays down the process for reacquiring Filipino citizenship and identifies the rights attached to reacquired Filipino citizenship. On the other hand, Section 39 of RA 7160 imposes, among others, the residencyrequirement to qualify a candidate for public office.

RA 9225 grants the political and civil rights to reside in the Philippines and to run for public office upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, while Section 39 of RA 7160 regulates the exercise of this political right to run in a local election through, among others, the residency requirement.

The reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 does not by itself imply or establish the fact of Philippine residency. This is because the process and grant of reacquisition does not require any residency obligation. Residency accrues as a right upon one's reacquisition of citizenship under RA 9225, and is, thus, demandable as a result of the process; but the fact of residency, especially the specific locus of its existence, must be claimed independently of the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.

In the present case, there is no issue that petitioner has reacquired Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. This process granted her the right to reside in the country. Whether she has in fact exercised this right depends on what she has done both prior to and after she reacquired her Filipino citizenship to re-establish her domicile. As regards her right to run as a candidate in the local elections, RA 9225 simply opened the door for her to exercise this right, but the actual availability of this right to her is based on her compliance with the requisites imposed by other laws, among them, a year-long residency criterion in the place she sought to be voted for under Section 39 of RA 7160.

C. Legal contemplation

The term residence in Section 39 of RA 7160 is synonymous with domicile. Both concepts refer to the individual's permanent home or the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return to. They depend on the attendant facts and circumstances in confirming the individual's intent and actions to carry out this intent.

Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his or her residence or intention.

Limbona v. COMELEC7 held that to effect a change of domicile or to acquire a domicile of choice, there must concur —

(i) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,

(ii) a bona fideintention to remain there, and

(iii) a bona fideintention to abandon the old domicile.

In other words, there must be physical presence at the new domicile, coupled with animus manendi in this new residence and animus non revertendi to the former residence. DHIcET

There is no specific unbending rule governing the evaluation of the evidence on these requisites. This is because of the element of intent — an internal proposition determined from both objective and subjective circumstances. The objective circumstances to prove intent are outside events or acts that to a reasonable person would be indicative of remaining at the new residence and abandoning the old one. The subjective circumstances to prove intent pertain to the meaning given by the petitioner herself or himself to these outside events or acts.

But the issue of residence or domicile is determined not only from one's objective and subjectiveintent and the actions or events associated with this intent. We must also account for the perspectives of applicable laws, rules and regulations vis-à-visintent and actions, among them, the following three basic rules imposed by case law on residency issues:

(i) an individual must have a residence or domicile somewhere;

(ii) when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and

(iii) an individual can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

Jurisprudence has also clarified that the intent and acts we examine in determining one's new domicile of choice are not only those occurring or present at the time of and after the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship but also those prior to such timeline.

Thus, in Poe-Llamanzares, the Court considered preparatory acts showing an intent to establish a new domicile even before the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship in computing the period of residence. In Mitra, the incremental steps in establishing a new domicile were considered in computing the period when residency began.

Further, while physical presence, along with animus manendi et revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, case law has not required such physical presence to be unbroken. To be considered a resident of a local government unit, the candidate is not asked to stay 24 hours a day 7 days a week and never leave the place for a full one-year period prior to the date of the election.

D. No substantial evidence that

As may be gleaned from the assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC ordered the cancellation of petitioner's CoC not on the basis of substantial evidence BUT using self-serving logic.

According to the logic employed by the COMELEC, since petitioner was granted permanent residency status in 2006 and later naturalized as an American citizen in 2009, she lost her domicile of origin. It then became her burden to prove in the petition for cancellation proceeding that she had re-established her domicile of choice in Lagangilang, Abra a year prior to the May 2019 local elections. Absent this evidence, she would be conclusively presumed to have materially and intentionally misrepresented the period of her residency in Lagangilang that she alleged in her CoC so as to deceive the electorate and the COMELEC about her residency qualification. Unfortunately for her, the COMELEC erroneously deemed as irrelevant and, therefore, rejected the pieces of evidence she had offered since, according to the COMELEC, the evidence all pertained to her intent and acts prior to her re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship. As a result, the COMELEC held that the conclusive presumption of a material, deceptive and intentional misrepresentation in her CoC proved substantially this claim of private respondent.

To be sure, private respondent also offered no evidence to support his claim of a material, deceptive, and intentional misrepresentation in petitioner's CoC. Instead, he relied merely on the fact that petitioner re-acquired Filipino citizenship only in June 2018, and on his legal conclusion from this fact that she could not have domiciled in Lagangilang for one year prior to the elections in May 2019.

From this manner of case presentation, it is obvious that petitioner was not able to discharge his burden to prove his claim by substantial evidence.

It is true that domicile of choice must be established by the individual who seeks one — here, petitioner. But I have to stress that once that choicehas been made or at least alleged in the individual's CoC, as petitioner did, the burden of proof is upon private respondent, as the petitioner in the CoC cancellation proceeding, to prove by substantial evidence the material, deliberate, and deceptive misrepresentation of petitioner's residency qualification in her CoC.

Essentially, as applied to this case, this burden of proof demands proving by substantial evidence the following elements:

(i) petitioner alleged in the CoC a residency period that is false,

(ii) she actually did not comply with the year-long residency requirement, and

(iii) she intentionally alleged the false residency period in the CoC in order to deceive the COMELEC, other candidates, and the electorate of her false eligibility for the elective post.

As shown, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in deciding the petition for cancellation merely on the basis of self-serving logic and not on evidence, much less, substantial evidence. This is contrary to the basic precept that the burden of proof lies with the party seeking the cancellation of the CoC. Private respondent won in the cancellation proceeding not because of the substantial evidence he had offered, which he had none, but using a self-serving and erroneous logic that dispensed with proof on each of the three elements of his burden. The COMELEC unreasonably aided private respondent by shifting the burden of proving each of the three elements to herein petitioner. This, to repeat, is grave abuse of discretion. HcDSaT

The error of the COMELEC in the allocation of the burden is compounded by another mistake — when COMELEC deemed as irrelevant acts and intent taking place prior to the re-acquisition of herein petitioner's Filipino citizenship. This opinion contradicts the elementary legal principles expressed in Poe-Llamanzares and Mitra (see above), and totally skewed the analysis in and outcome of the cancellation proceeding, unfortunately to petitioner's prejudice.

To stress, there is no substantial evidence on record to show or lead to the conclusion that petitioner committed a deliberately false and deceptive representation sufficient to grant the petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy (CoC). In fact, as will be shown below, petitioner actually had at least a year of residency in Lagangilang before the May 2019 elections, and for this reason, the erroneous statement in her CoC about her 30 years plus residence in Lagangilang could not have been intended to deceive anyone that she possessed the residency qualification — because she truly was qualified, residency-wise.

All in all, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it granted private respondent's petition for cancellation, and as a result, cancel petitioner's CoC.

E. Substantial evidence that

The COMELEC also gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner failed to re-establish her domicile of choice in Lagangilang, Abra. This grossly unreasonable ruling is borne by the use of an erroneous legal principle, i.e., that acts and intent prior to the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship are irrelevant.

Petitioner's acts and intent prior to her re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship on June 19, 2018 are in fact relevant to prove her residence or bodily presence in Lagangilang, Abra, bona fideintention to remain there, and bona fideintention to abandon the old domicile. Residency is established independently of citizenship. A Filipino can become a permanent resident of the United States or any other country for that matter. In the same manner, a foreigner can also obtain permanent residency status in the Philippines. 8Poe-Llamanzares and Mitra have affirmed and applied this legal principle in concrete cases.

Between 2009 and 2018, petitioner travelled back and forth the Philippines and the United States. She applied for and was given a community tax certificate from Lagangilang. She retained all the properties she owned when she was naturalized as an American citizen and acquired several other parcels of land in the years 2013, 2016 and 2017. In 2017, she built her house in Lagangilang on the lot she had purchased in the same year for her purpose of residing there. This house has been her recorded abode. She registered as a voter in Lagangilang and cast her vote in the May 14, 2018 barangay elections.

While the intent behind the foregoing acts appeared to be equivocal, if these acts were simply considered on their face or in isolation, their intent or purpose became obvious and categorical when petitioner articulated her plan to run in the local elections in May 2019. The acquisition of several parcels of land and the construction of her house in Lagangilang, the issuance to her of a community tax certificate for Lagangilang, and her registration as a voter and casting of vote in the May 2018 barangay elections were not intended for temporary entry, i.e., investment or leisure purposes, but infurtherance of her decision to run in the May 2019 local elections. By these incremental acts, she was slowly but surely making an imprint of her intention to abandon the United States as her domicile of choice and to establish and remain in Lagangilang as her new domicile of choice.

As later events would show, after her repatriation, petitioner filed her CoC for mayor of Lagangilang. Despite private respondent's petition to cancel her CoC, she was voted overwhelmingly as mayor in the May 13, 2019 local elections. She assumed this office and has been discharging its duties. These events have thus cemented the reason, purpose, and intent behind her acts in the years after 2009, especially in 2018. Her intent, as shown by her acts, was clearly to be present in Lagangilang and to live and remain there and to abandon the United States as her domicile.

This conclusion as regards petitioner's acts and her intent behind these acts is supported by the legal principles that "an individual must have a residence or domicile somewhere" and "an individual can have but one residence or domicile at a time."

Using these legal principles, it is simply common sense to confirm that after leaving the United States to take on an arduous political job in the Philippines, petitioner must still have a domicile somewhere and this domicile can only be singular. By process of elimination, since her domicile cannot be the United States anymore as she has lost her meaningful connections to it, i.e., she has no work there as she may no longer be a citizen of that country after having renounced her American citizenship, Lagangilang, Abra has become by her own choice her new place of residence.

To conclude that petitioner has not re-established her domicile in Lagangilang, Abra despite the abandonment of her American domicile would not only violate the rule that an individual must have a domicile or residence somewhere. More than anything, it would result in the absurd situation where returning and reacquiring Filipinocitizens, despite having abandoned their foreign domicile, would not still be residents of the Philippines. ASTcaE

The use of the foregoing legal principles would be even more appropriate in this case since we are talking of an alleged shortfall of only 26 days for petitioner to meet the one-year residency qualification for mayoral candidates — if we adopt the COMELEC's simplistic and erroneous reckoning date of June 19, 2018. For a measly 26 days, after losing the United States as her domicile, it would be grossly unreasonable for the Court to deny petitioner her residency in Lagangilang when the legal principles demand that "an individual must have a residence or domicile somewhere" and "an individual can have but one residence or domicile at a time." As these are what the legal principles require, assigning her domicile of choice in Lagangilang is more consistent with the essence of substantial evidence — in other words, this conclusion is something a reasonable mindmightbe willing to accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

Clearly, petitioner re-established her domicile in Lagangilang both by intent and acts prior to and after her repatriation as a Filipino citizen. While we cannot point to any evidence that she was in Lagangilang 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 48 weeks in a year, the element of physical presencedoes not call forcontinued and uninterruptedactual bodily presence — or even substantial physical presence. It is enough that she was there at some points in time coupled with the intention of establishing residence there and leaving the United States as the place she would be returning to. In any event, it is more likely than not that between 2009 and 2018, especially in the years 2017 and 2018, she was physically present in Lagangilang for at least 26 days to compensate for the missing number of days between June 19, 2018 and May 13, 2019 to complete the year-long residency qualification for mayoral candidates deemed insufficient by the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.

The COMELEC therefore gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner failed to prove that Lagangilang was her new domicile of choice.

A last point. Petitioner's statement in her CoC about her 30 years plus of residency in Lagangilang is erroneous but obviously not fatal. It was a mistake done in good faith, and even if it were not, it is a statement that was overcome by petitioner's own evidence proving compliance with the yearlong residency requirement.

Indeed, COMELEC cannot treat the CoC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 9 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. The Court thought of this statement as an innocuous error. The Court held that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement."

F. Doubts resolved in favor of petitioner's

Independently of the residence requirement issue, the Court cannot and should not ignore the undeniable fact that the people of Lagangilang, Abra made their own ruling when they elected petitioner as their mayor in the May 13, 2019 elections despite the pervasivenon-resident label that her political opponents pinned on her.

The people of Lagangilang have spoken and chosen petitioner to be as she has been their mayor. She prevailed with an overwhelming majority of votes: 5,879 votes as against the 1,534 votes received by private respondent. Under this situation, everyone — including the Court — should heed the majority's verdict by resolving all doubts in favor of petitioner's eligibility. The law and the courts, including the Court, must accord petitioner every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will.

This admonition should have a special ring to this case because the period of residency upon which COMELEC cancelled her CoC is, by the COMELEC's faulty reckoning, only short of 26 days.

In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, the Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority. For it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles; that overriding such ineligibility and consequently giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. To repeat, even if we go by the COMELEC's own reckoning, petitioner was short of just 26 days for her to allegedly qualify, residency-wise. cDSAEI

It is safe to assume that here, the people of Lagangilang have been well acquainted with petitioner's background, character and qualifications, among others, and that she, in turn, has not been oblivious to the needs, difficulties, aspirations, and potential for growth and development of Lagangilang and its people.

To be sure, these are the concerns, the raison d'etre, that animates elections and its residency requirement. These were the issues, too, that the electorate of Lagangilang voted upon when they elected petitioner. Deference to the electorate's choice would strengthen the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.

G. Conclusion.

To finally reiterate, petitioner has not committed any materially false and deceptive representation in her CoC because private respondent failed to prove this claim by substantial evidence and also because petitioner had in fact been a resident of Lagangilang, Abra, for at least one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2019 local elections. She could legally change herdomicile to this country as early as she wanted to, though she was still a naturalized American citizen. She indisputably acted pursuant to this right and intent to re-settle in Lagangilang when she started to acquire properties, build a house, and register as a voter and vote, all towards actualizing the not-so-easy decision and commitment to run and wage a serious campaign for mayor of this town. No reason, therefore, exists to nullify her CoC on the basis of an alleged false material and deceptive representation.

For these reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.

 

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 8-32.

2.Id. at 43-54.

3.Id. at 36-42.

4.Id. at 112.

5.Id. at 81-92.

6. <https://comelec.gov.ph/phptplsattachments/2019NLE/ElectionResults/2019

7.Rollo, pp. 99-111.

8. Otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

9.Rollo, p. 121.

10.Id. at 123.

11.Id. at. 122.

12.Id. at 117-118.

13.Id. at 106.

14. 782 Phil. 292, 391 (2016) [Per J. Perez].

15.Rollo, pp. 155-176.

16.Id. at 170-172.

17. Composed of Presiding Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting and Antonio T. Kho, Jr.

18.Rollo, pp. 48-50.

19.Supra at note 14.

20.Rollo, p. 48.

21.Id. at 51.

22.Id. at 53.

23.Id. at 55-70.

24.Id. at 57-58.

25.Id. at 65-67.

26.Id. at 66.

27.Id. at 38.

28.Id. at 39.

29.Id. at 39-40.

30.Id. at 520-539.

31.Id. at 239-241. A Certificate of Finality was issued by the COMELEC on 12 December 2019.

32.See also Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules which similarly provides:

SECTION 3. Decisions Final after Five Days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (COMELEC Rules of Procedure, 15 February 1993)

33. Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. See also Section 3, Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

34.Supra at note 14 (Concurring Opinion).

35. 831 Phil. 106 (2018) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].

36.Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 315 (2010) [Per J. Brion].

37.Rollo, pp. 8-32.

38.Id. at 53.

39.Reflections, pp. 3-4.

40.Agustin v. Commission on Elections, 772 Phil. 592, 604 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin].

41.Dano v. Commission on Elections, 794 Phil. 573, 595-596 (2016) [Per C.J. Sereno].

42.See Velasco v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1172, 1184 (2008) [Per J. Brion].

43.See Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, 733 Phil. 822, 844 (2014) [Per J. Peralta].

44.Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 861, 873 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza].

45.Supra at note 43 at 844-845.

46.Id. at 70.

47.Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug].

48.See J. Tinga's Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC, supra.

49. Concurring Opinion of C.J. Sereno in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 14 at 429-431, citing Deliberations of the Committee: Ad Hoc, Revision of Laws, 20 May 1985, pp. 65-68.

50.See Dano v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 41 at 595.

51.See Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 Phil. 217, 231 (1939) [Per J. Imperial], cited in the Concurring Opinion of J. Caguioa in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 14 at 851.

52.See Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Austria-Martinez in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 47 at 565, Chua v. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 341, 345 (1995); see also Concurring Opinion of J. Caguioa in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra.

53. Concurring Opinion of J. Caguioa in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 14 at 851.

54.See Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Austria-Martinez in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 47 at 565.

55.Supra at note 44 at 872-873.

56. Letter, 26 July 2021.

57.Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 559-561 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban].

58.Supra at note 14 at 418.

59.Rollo, pp. 72, 73, 75-76.

60.Id. at 77.

61.Id. at 78.

62.Id. at 74.

63.See Administrative Order No. 260, s. 1992. See also <https://ntrc.gov.ph/images/journal/j20130910b.pdf> (last accessed 17 September 2021).

64. Section 1 of R.A. No. 10952, otherwise known as "An Act Postponing the October 2017 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 9164, as Amended by Republic Act No. 9340, Republic Act No. 10632, Republic Act No. 10656, and Republic Act No. 10923, and for Other Purposes," provides:

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9164, as amended by Republic Act No. 9340, Republic Act No. 10632, Republic Act No. 10656, and Republic Act No. 10923, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 1. Date of Election. — There shall be synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections, which shall be held on July 15, 2002. Subsequent synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections shall be held on the last Monday of October 2007 and every three (3) years thereafter: Provided, That the barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections on October 23, 2017 shall be postponed to the second Monday of May 2018. Subsequent synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections shall be held on the second Monday of May 2020 and every three (3) years thereafter." (Emphasis supplied.)

65. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides: "SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."

66.Supra note 58. See also 648 Phil. 165 (2010), G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010 [Resolution, Per J. Brion].

67.Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, supra at note 14 at 420.

68. 686 Phil. 649, 688 (2012) [Per J. Sereno].

69. Otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.

70.See Sunga v. Commission on Elections, 351 Phil. 310, 324 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo].

71.Rollo, p. 15.

72.See Sanchez v. Eduardo, 413 Phil. 551, 557 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban]; Sanchez v. Alaan, 532 Phil. 471, 477 (2006) [Per J. Carpio] citing Bolalin v. Occiano, 334 Phil. 178, 182 (1997) [Per J. Regalado].

73.Baltazar v. Commission on Elections, 403 Phil. 444, 454 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago].

74. Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

SECTION 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. — The RTC, in their respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over all other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and within thirty (30) days from the date of their submission for decision, but in every case within six (6) months after filing, decide the same.

75. <https://comelec.gov.ph/php-tplsattachments/2019NLE/ElectionResults/2019NLELIstofElectedCityMunCandidates.pdf>

76. <https://halqa.abs-cbn.com/local/abra/lagangilang>

77. Concurring Opinion of J. Puno in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections; supra at note 57 at 581-582.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., dissenting:

1.Rollo, pp. 43-54.

2.Id. at 36-42.

3.Id. at 81-90.

4. See ponencia, pp. 2-3 and 6.

5. See id. at 11.

6. Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; approved on December 3, 1985.

7. See Section 1, Rule 64, in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

8. See Beluso v. COMELEC, 635 Phil. 436, 443 (2010); Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, 591 Phil. 146, 153 (2008); and People v. Sandiganbayan, 483 Phil. 223, 230 (2004); emphasis supplied.

9. See Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 663 (1999).

10.Rollo, pp. 120-121.

11. See id. at 85-89.

12. See id. at 101-102.

13.Id. at 106.

14. See id. at 50-53.

15.Id. at 121.

16.Id. at 122.

17.Id. at 123.

18.Id. at 117-118.

19. See id. at 127-128.

20.Id. at 120.

21.Id. at 119.

22. These pieces of evidence, as noted by the COMELEC, were: (a) two (2) documents entitled "Palawag" which appeared to convey a portion of certain farmlands to her; (b) Community Tax Certificate; (c) Deed of Absolute Sale involving a parcel of land; and (d) Voter Certification; see id. at 39.

23.Ponencia, p. 4.

24.Id. at 5.

25.Id. at 17.

26.Rollo, p. 39; emphasis supplied.

27. For example, under the Articles 50 and 51 of the Civil Code, the term "residence" refers to the actual residence, or the place of abode or of habitual residence, when pertaining to the exercise of civil rights and the fulfilment of obligations.

28. See Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 371 (2009); and Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586, 634 (2003).

29. Such as: (a) Philippine citizenship is a requirement for the exercise of the right of suffrage (see Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Section 117 of the OEC, and Section 9 of RA 8189); (b) Philippine natural-born citizenship is a requirement to be a member of Congress (see Sections 3 and 6, Article VI of the Constitution); (c) Philippine natural-born citizenship is a requirement to be President and Vice President (see Sections 2 and 3, Article VII of the Constitution); and (d) Philippine citizenship is a requirement to be an elective local official (see Section 3, Article X of the Constitution in relation to Section 39 of the RA 7160).

30. See Section 81 of the OEC. See also Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 686 Phil. 563, 567-568 (2012); and Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, 616 Phil. 167, 172-173 (2009).

31. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"; approved on February 13, 2003.

32. Section 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

33.Caballero v. COMELEC, 770 Phil. 94, 124 (2015).

34. See Limbona v. COMELEC, 619 Phil. 226, 232 (2009).

35. See Limbona v. COMELEC, 578 Phil. 364, 374-375 (2008).

36. See Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, supra, at 173; and Abella v. COMELEC, 278 Phil. 275, 288 (1991).

37. See Jalosjos v. COMELEC, supra, at 568; and Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, id.

38. See Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion's (Justice Brion) Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, 782 Phil. 292, 1159 (2016).

39. A former Filipino may, for example, apply for a "Visa for Returning Natural-Born Filipinos who were Naturalized as Citizens of Foreign Countries" or "Special Resident Retiree's Visa" (see Bureau of Immigration, Returning Former Natural-Born Filipino Citizen, available at <https://immigration.gov.ph/visa-requirements/immigrant-visa/returning-formal-natural-born-filipino-citizen> [last visited October 5, 2021]; and Philippine Retirement Authority, The SRR Visa, available at <https://pra.gov.ph/srrv/> [last visited October 5, 2021]). See also RA 7837 entitled "AN ACT GRANTING PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS, OTHER RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO FILIPINO VETERANS OF WORLD WAR II WHO ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 AND ANY OTHER PRIOR ACTS FOR THESE PURPOSES"; approved on December 16, 1994.

40. See rollo, pp. 52-53.

41.Id. at 39-40.

42.Id. at 39.

43. As outlined in the ponencia, these incidents include: (i) one incident in 2013 where Villamor acquired a portion of a farmland situated in Sitio, Cabasaan, Brgy. Laguiben, Lagangilang, Abra from her brother, Jay E. Villamor on July 16, 2013; (ii) another incident in 2016 where Villamor acquired another portion of the said farmland from her sister, Luz Villamor Sayen on September 7, 2016; and (iii) three incidents in 2017, but which appears to refer to one transaction — Villamor was issued a CTC by the Municipality of Lagangilang, Abra on July 7, 2017, Villamor acquired a property located in Laang, Lagangilang, Abra from one Virginia E. Atmosfera (Atmosfera) where she eventually constructed her home on July 11, 2017, and Villamor caused the transfer of the tax declaration of the same property from the name of Atmosfera to her name on July 12, 2017; see ponencia, p. 3.

44.See id. at 4-6.

45. See Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads:

Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

46. See Sections 160 and 162 of the Local Government Code.

47. 521 Phil. 585 (2006).

48.Id. at 603.

49. See Baylon v. Almo, 578 Phil. 238, 242 (2008).

50. See Section 1, Article V of the Constitution and Section 9 of RA 8189, which provides that only those who are "citizens of the Philippines," who are "not otherwise disqualified by law," "are at least eighteen years of age," "who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year," and "in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election" may exercise the right of suffrage.

51. Section 10. Registration of Voters. — x x x

The application shall contain the following data:

xxx xxx xxx

d) Citizenship;

xxx xxx xxx

g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

h) Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the precinct maps maintained by the local office of the Commission, or in case there is none, a brief description of his residence, sitio and barangay;

i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;

xxx xxx xxx

52. Note that Section 261 (y) (2) of the OEC provides, "[a]ny person who knowingly makes any false or untruthful statement relative to any of the data or information required in the application for registration" — which includes the information required under Section 10 of RA 8189 — shall be guilty of an election offense.

53.Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, supra note 30, at 174, citing Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 820 (1999).

54. 375 Phil. 1106 (1999).

55.Id. at 1118.

56. See ponencia, pp. 15-16.

57. See Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 33, at 112-115; and Abella v. COMELEC, supra note 36, at 288.

58. See Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe's (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, supra note 38, at 1298.

59. See USA Government, How to Apply for U.S. Citizenship, available at <https://www.usa.gov/become-us-citizen> (last visited October 5, 2021); and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, I am a Lawful Permanent Resident of 5 Years, available at <https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learn-about-citizenship/citizenship-and-naturalization/i-am-a-lawful-permanent-resident-of-5-years> (last visited October 5, 2021).

60. See Justice Perlas-Bernabe's Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, supra note 38, at 1299.

61. See Justice Perlas-Bernabe's Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, which states that the falsity of a material representation concerning an eligibility requirement in a CoC will justify cancellation of the CoC for false material representation; intent to deceive, is not required; id. at 1300.

62.Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction Incorporated, 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009).

63. See Justice Perlas-Bernabe's Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, supra note 38, at 1288, citing Justice Tinga's Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421, 607 (2004).

64. See Justice Perlas-Bernabe's Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, id. at 1283-1289; citations omitted.

65. The ponencia asserted that the lawmakers contemplated Section 78 of the OEC to cover CoCs filed in bad faith to limit the power granted to the COMELEC, see ponencia, pp. 12-14.

66. See Deliberations of the Committee: Ad Hoc, Revision of Laws dated May 20, 1985, pp. 65-68 and May 30, 1985, as cited in Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, supra note 38, at 429-431.

67.Id. at 429-434.

68. Entitled "ENACTING 'THE 1978 ELECTION CODE'"; approved on February 7, 1978. See Section 26, which reads:

Section 26. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances which demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

Its predecessor provision, Section 31 of RA 6388 entitled "ELECTION CODE OF 1971"; approved on September 2, 1971, similarly provides:

Section 31. Ministerial Duty of Receiving and Acknowledging Receipts. — x x x Provided, That in all cases the said Commission maymotu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been presented and filed to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances which demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of electorate. (Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied).

69. The COMELEC's power to deal with nuisance candidates was expanded under Section 69 of the OEC as it now includes the power to cancel the CoC, not just to deny due course as previously provided in PD 1296. It also added another ground or basis to cancel or deny due course to a CoC for being a nuisance candidate. Section 69 reads:

Section 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied).

70. See ponencia, pp. 12-14.

71. Particularly: Hon. Adaza, Hon. Gonzales, and Hon. Cuenco; see Deliberations of the Committee: Ad Hoc, Revision of Laws dated May 20, 1985, pp. 65-68 and May 30, 1985, as cited in Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, supra note 38, at 429-434.

72. See id. at 429-431.

73. See Justice Tinga's Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC, supra note 63, at 607.

74. See Reyes v. COMELEC, 720 Phil. 174, 204-205 (2013). See also Section 3, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

75. See Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares, where it was noted that nature of a Section 78 proceeding as summary in nature implies that only simple issues are to be heard since it dispenses with long drawn and complicated litigation; supra note 38, at 434-436.

76. In response to Justice Caguioa's Dissenting Opinion, which stated "a Section 78 petition is not the proper remedy to challenge a candidate's eligibility or qualification, or to declare a candidate disqualified or ineligible. Section 78 is based on a candidate's act of falsely representing a material fact in a CoC, and not his lack of eligibility or qualifications. The latter are proper grounds for petitions to disqualify under Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC in relation to Section 40 of the [LGC], if filed before the elections, or a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the OEC, if filed after the elections"; emphasis supplied.

77. See id.

78. See Section 78 of the OEC. However, Section 2, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "[t]he petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of [CoC]."

79. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Disqualify, available at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disqualify> (last visited October 5, 2021).

80. See Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

81. Section 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

82. See Munder v. COMELEC, 675 Phil. 300, 312 (2011).

83. Section 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications (sic) to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity of incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

84. See Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 601, 632 (2012); Munder v. COMELEC, supra, at 312; and Fermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449, 468-469 (2008).

85. Section 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

86. See Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra, at 632; Munder v. COMELEC, supra, at 312; and Fermin v. COMELEC, supra, at 468-469. See also Justice Brion's Dissenting Opinion in Aratea v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 700, 748-750 (2012).

87. See Munder v. COMELEC, id. at 313.

88. See Justice Brion's Dissenting Opinion in Aratea v. COMELEC, supra, at 752.

89. Section 253 hereof with respect to quo warranto petitions filed in election contests affecting municipal officers, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission within five days after receipt of a copy of the decision. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained by the court. The appeal shall be decided within sixty days after the case has been submitted for decision. (See Section 196, Art. XVIII of the 1978 Election Code).

90. See Section 253 of the OEC and Rule 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

91. See Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019; Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534, 551 (2013); Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra, at 630; Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 660 Phil. 225, 251-252 (2011); and Fermin v. COMELEC, supra, at 465-467.

92. See Tecson v. COMELEC, supra note 63, at 608-609.

93. See Justice Caguioa's Dissenting Opinion.

94.Id., citing Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 33, at 116; and Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 28, at 370.

95.Id., citing Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 33, at 115.

CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:

1.Ponencia, p. 19.

2.J. Brion, Separate Concurring Opinion in Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, 771 SCRA 213, 246.

3.Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 572, 576.

4. See Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 331-332.

5.Coquilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607, 617; Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 2, at 236.

6.Ponencia, p. 3.

7.Id.

8.Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 331.

9. AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on August 29, 2003.

10.Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331, 347.

11. See Sec. 39 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.

12.Rollo, p. 39.

13.Id. at 39-40.

14.Supra note 5.

15.Id. at 616.

16.Id. at 618-620.

17. G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508, November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 229.

18. G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.

19. G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590.

20.Id. at 611-612.

21. 712 Phil. 192 (2013).

22.Id. at 220. Emphasis omitted.

23.Supra note 2.

24. No. L-22041, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 147.

25.Id. at 149-150.

26.Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 756, 764.

27. Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 3, 1985.

28.Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 2, at 249-253.

29.Ujano v. Republic, supra note 24, at 149.

30. Otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, accessed at <https://immigration.gov.ph/images/ImmigrationLaw/2017_Feb/1_CA613.pdf>.

31. RA 6768, entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM," as amended by RA 9174, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 6768 X X X BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO BALIKBAYAN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

32. See RA 9174, Sec. 3 on "Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan."

33. For requirements specific to former Filipinos who became naturalized American citizens, see "Living and working in the Philippines," Non-Quota Immigrant Visa, accessed at <https://ph.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/living-working-philippines/>.

34. RA 9174, Sec. 1.

35.Caasi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 236.

36. As reproduced in Tan v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993, November 8, 2017, 844 SCRA 365, 380-381.

37.Ponencia, p. 15.

38.Id.; Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727.

39.Id.

40.Id.

41. See Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, supra note 38, at 752.

42.Id. at 734-735, footnote no. 6.

43.Frivaldo v. COMELEC and the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245; Republic v. De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 104654, 105715 & 105735, June 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 785.

44.Frivaldo v. COMELEC and the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, id.

45.Id. at 248.

46. See Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, supra note 38, at 747, Frivaldo v. COMELEC and the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, id.; Republic v. De la Rosa, supra note 43, at 794.

47.Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, id. at 772.

48.Id. at 748.

49. G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1.

50.Id. at 155-156.

51.Id. at 153-154.

52.Rollo, p. 72.

53.Id. at 73.

54.Id. at 75-76.

55.Id. at 77.

56.Id. at 74.

57.Id. at 78.

58.Ponencia, pp. 4-5. Villamor stated that she participated in the "May 14, 2019" Barangay Elections. However, upon checking, there were no such elections that took place in 2019.

59. As quoted in the ponencia, p. 5.

60.Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 18, at 235, 236-237.

61. Separate Concurring Opinion of COMELEC Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia in the assailed Resolution dated November 27, 2019, rollo, p. 42.

62.Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, supra note 49, at 153.

63. See Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 331.

64. See Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 569.

65. See id. at 571.

66.Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013, 691 SCRA 646, 658.

67.Id.

68.Supra note 65.

69.Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 302; see also Jalosjos v. COMELEC, supra note 66, at 659 and Fernandez v. HRET, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733, 759.

70.Jalosjos v. COMELEC, id.

71. See id. at 658-659.

72. See Dano v.COMELEC, G.R. No. 210200, September 13, 2016, 802 SCRA 446, 485-487.

73. As quoted in the ponencia, p. 5.

74. See Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 580, where Mitra's Secretary attested that she secured Mitra's CTC due to "force of habit," id. at 614.

75.Rollo, p. 74.

76.Id.

77. 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. V, Sec. 1, provides:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

78.Ponencia, pp. 3-4.

79.Rollo, p. 79.

80.Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).

81.Id. at 298.

82. See Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692; Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 4; Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 641; Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 664.

83.Coquilla v. COMELEC, supra note 5, at 621. Citation omitted.

84. See Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

85.Domino v. COMELEC, supra note 64, at 564. Italics supplied.

86.Velasco v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 610-612.

87. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" otherwise known as the "OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT OF 2003."

88. See RA 9189, Secs. 4 and 5; 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. V, Sec. 1.

89.Jalosjos v. COMELEC, supra note 66, at 659.

90.Ponencia, p. 16.

91.Id.

92.Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 4.

93.Supra note 4.

94.Id. at 331-332.

95.Jalover v. Osmeña, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, 271-272. Citations omitted.

96. G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 574.

97.Id. at 577, 587.

98. See id.

99.Supra note 10.

100. See id. at 351-352.

101. See Coquilla v. COMELEC, supra note 5, at 617, citing Title 8, Section 1427 (a) of the United States Code which requires five (5) years of continuous residence immediately preceding the filing of application for naturalization.

102. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, supra note 82, at 714.

103. See Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 4.

104.Domino v. COMELEC, supra note 64, at 570.

105.Ponencia, p. 4.

106.Id. at 3-4.

107. See rollo, p. 12.

108. G.E. Garcia Law Office of Atty. George Erwin M. Garcia, rollo, pp. 31, 69.

109.Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, supra note 49.

110. See Jalosjos v.COMELEC, supra note 66, at 658.

111.Jalosjos v. COMELEC, id. at 657-658.

112.Domino v. COMELEC, supra note 64, at 569.

113. For example, in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (supra note 49), domicile was acquired on May 24, 2005, when Senator Poe actually and physically returned to the Philippines as proven by her passport; in Mitra v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744), domicile was acquired in March 2008, when Mitra started moving in his belongings to a place he leased as early as February 2008, which was also the start of his "incremental steps"; in Dano v. COMELEC (supra note 72), domicile was acquired on May 2, 2012, when Dano physically went to Sevilla and registered as a voter; in Sabili v. COMELEC (supra note 82), domicile was acquired on April 2007, when Sabili started physically residing in the locality, as certified by barangay officials; in Jalosjos v. COMELEC (supra note 3), domicile was acquired in November 2008 when Rommel physically went to live with his brother; in Japzon v. COMELEC (supra note 10), domicile was acquired on May 4, 2006 when Japzon was bodily present in the new domicile; and in Fernandez v. HRET (supra note 69), domicile was acquired in February 2006, when Fernandez started physically and actually residing in a townhouse in the new domicile, as certified by the President of the Homeowners Association.

114.Lluz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456, 471, citing Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 458.

115. See Lluz v. COMELEC, id. at 470.

116. See id. at 473.

117.Supra note 115.

118.Id. at 455-458.

119.Supra note 49, at 163-333.

120. See Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, id. at 168.

121.Id. at 168-172.

122. See Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782, 792-794.

123. See J. Caguioa, Separate Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, supra note 49, at 921; Agustin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 353, 365; Mitra v. COMELEC, supra note 113, at 769.

124.Supra note 113.

125.Id. at 769.

126.Rollo, pp. 63-64.

127.Id. at 63.

128.Ponencia, p. 14.

129.Id., footnotes nos. 51-53.

130. CIVIL CODE, Art. 3; David v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 127116 & 128039, April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 90, 108.

131. See id., Art. 2.

132. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27.

133.Tañada v. Tuvera, No. L-6315, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452-453.

134.Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1875).

135.Erning's Vaciador Shop v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 234483, June 10, 2019, p. 8 (Unsigned Resolution), accessed at <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/5401/>.

136. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (d).

137.United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

138.Catipon, Jr. v. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015, 759 SCRA 557, 574.

139. See Davao Doctors College, Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Davao Doctors College-NFL, G.R. No. 209666, March 4, 2019 (Unsigned Resolution), accessed at <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/3507/>.

140. See United States v. Cianciulli, supra note 137, at 621-622.

141.Id. at 621.

142.Id., citing Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934, 941 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).

143.J. Caguioa, Separate Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, supra note 49, at 928-929.

144.Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 10; see Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 2, at 237.

145. See Caballero v. COMELEC, id.

146. To name a few examples, Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 2; Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, supra note 49; Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 10; Caasi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17; Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 18.

147. See Japzon v. COMELEC, id. at 347.

148.Ponencia, p. 3.

149.Id.

150.Rollo, p. 74.

151.Rollo, p. 79.

152. AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987," January 5, 1988.

153. See ponencia, p. 17.

154.Id.

155. G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481.

156. See id. at 497.

157.Ponencia, p. 17 refers to rollo, p. 15.

158. See Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 122, at 802 in relation to the Separate Dissenting Opinion of J. Davide, Jr. in Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400, 445-452; Also see Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223 and the Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion, id. at 265-292.

159. See Hayudini v. COMELEC, id. and the Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion, id.

160. See ponencia, p. 7.

161.Rollo, pp. 239-241.

162.Most Urgent Reiterative Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated December 4, 2019 (id. at 225-230); Another Most Urgent Reiterative Motion [To Resolve the Application for the Issuance of Injunctive Writ in View of a Supervening Event] dated December 17, 2019 (id. at 231-238); Most Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed on November 29, 2019, with the urgent prayer that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order (id. at 8-35).

163.Ponencia, p. 17 refers to "Rollo, p. 15," which, upon examination, relevantly contains statements in the Petition regarding Viernes' Urgent Motion to Nullify the Proclamation of Rovelyn Echave Villamor with Prayer to Expedite Proceedings dated May 17, 2019 and Urgent Motion to Resolve [Villamor's MR] with Prayer for Issuance of Cease and Desist Order. It appears that Viernes filed two (2) motions — to nullify Villamor's proclamation and for a Cease and Desist Order against her assumption to office. As mentioned, from Sec. 6 of RA 6646, the COMELEC's power is only to stay a proclamation, not nullify the same after it has been done.

164.Velasco v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 614-615.

165.Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 573, 587.

166. See Velasco v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 615.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., concurring:

1. SECTION 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

2. 648 Phil. 165, 176 (2010).

3.Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 534 (2004).

4.Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, 782 Phil. 292 (2016).

5. SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

6. SECTION 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic . . . Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

7. 619 Phil. 226, 232 (2009).

8. Section 13 (g), CA 613 as amended (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940): "Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted into the Philippines immigrants, termed "quota immigrants" not in excess of fifty (50) of any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that the following immigrants, termed 'non-quota immigrants,' may be admitted without regard to such numerical limitations. . . . (g) A natural born citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the Philippines for permanent residence, including his spouse and minor unmarried children, shall be considered a non-quota immigrant for purposes of entering the Philippines."

9. 318 Phil. 329-466 (1995).

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "propio" in the official document.