FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176760. June 5, 2013.]
FE PAULINA ROQUE VILLALUZ AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTIAGO CITY, BRANCH 36, PRESIDED BY JUDGE ANASTACIO D. ANGHAD AND BENJAMIN Q. CARDENAS, ERLINDA A. VALERIO, REVELINA C. NIEVERA, DANILO B. GOROSPE, FREDDIE L. BUAHON, HERMINIGILDO N. SIBAYAN AND ROLANDO U. NIEVERA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 5, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 176760 (Fe Paulina Roque Villaluz and the People of the Philippines, petitioners, versus Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Branch 36, Presided by Judge Anastacio D. Anghad and Benjamin Q. Cardenas, Erlinda A. Valerio, Revelina C. Nievera, Danilo B. Gorospe, Freddie L. Buahon, Herminigildo N. Sibayan and Rolando U. Nievera, respondents.). — Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated May 30, 2006 and Resolution 2 dated February 7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81209, which affirmed the Resolutions 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 36, granting respondents' motion for bail in Criminal Case No. 36-3944. HSacEI
The facts follow:
On January 12, 2002, at around 8:30 a.m.,a group of persons entered the farm lot of petitioner Fe Paulina Roque Villaluz located at Caquilingan, Municipality of Cordon, Isabela. The farm caretakers Ernesto Fernandez, Jimmy Padapat and Richard Bautista ordered said persons to vacate the area, but the group did not heed the demands. Instead, the group proceeded to cut and gather the grass surrounding the farm. Thereafter, they set the grass on fire which spread to the nearby trees and wooden fence. About 30 mango trees, a Melina tree and the area fence were burned. The fire also caused the leaves of some of the mango trees to turn brown or "naladaman."
On July 18, 2002, respondent Benjamin Q. Cardenas and 15 others were charged with the crime of arson, defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1613, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 4 However, only respondents Cardenas, Danilo Gorospe, Rolando Nievera, Revelina 5 "Ruby" Nievera, Erlinda Valerio, Freddie Buahon and Herminigildo Sibayan were arrested. When arraigned, they entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to the offense charged.
Respondents, with the assistance of Bishop Sergio L. Utleg of the Diocese of Ilagan, Isabela, and Father Ranhilio C. Aquino of the Philippine Judicial Academy, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Admission to Bail. 6 They argued that under Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,as amended, bail is denied only when evidence of guilt is strong, and the prosecution has the burden to prove the same. Respondents also informed the court that there is a pending administrative action before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources wherein they are claiming ownership of the subject parcels of land. Atty. Eleazar Balderas, respondents' counsel of record, adopted the said arguments and prayers. The prosecution, meanwhile, opposed the motion arguing that the offense charged, syndicated arson, is penalized by reclusion perpetua, and therefore non-bailable.
On June 17, 2003, the RTC issued a resolution 7 granting the motion for admission to bail and fixing the amount of bail at P100,000 for each of the accused. After considering the testimonies of the six prosecution witnesses, the RTC concluded that the evidence against the accused is not strong. It observed that the witnesses could hardly identify the seven accused who were inside the courtroom. It also took some time before they identified some of the accused. The prosecution moved to reconsider the RTC Resolution. 8 On September 22, 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and reduced further the amount of bail for respondents' provisional liberty to P50,000. 9 caHASI
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA 10 but the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. 11 The CA noted the observation of the RTC that the prosecution witnesses had difficulty identifying respondents in open court. The CA held that this inability militates against the allegations made by the witnesses in their sworn affidavits. Hence, the CA ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in granting respondents' motion for admission to bail. 12
With regard to the amount of the bail, petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in setting the bail of respondents at P50,000 each or way below the P200,000 recommended by the prosecutor. The CA however explained that all seven respondents belong to the marginalized sectors of society as they are mere farmers who are barely surviving on the land on which they till. Given their predicament, the CA believed that respondents would not be in a position to raise the amount recommended by the RTC. Thus, the P50,000 bail set by the RTC for their provisional liberty is just and proper. 13
The main issue is whether the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the respondents.
The petition is without merit.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or by a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. The right to bail is recognized under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,as amended. As provided for by the fundamental law of the land, all persons charged with an offense shall, before conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right. It admits an exception, when a person is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and when evidence of guilt is strong. In such a case, the right to bail shall be denied. The grant or denial of an application for bail is thus dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which is something that the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. 14
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. 15 By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has been held to make clear, strong evidence which leads a well guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. 16
In this case, we note that the RTC granted bail to respondents on the basis of its observation that the prosecution witnesses could hardly identify the accused who were present in the courtroom. The RTC also noted that the witnesses took some time before they identified some of the accused. Hence, we find that the CA was correct in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted respondents' application to bail. Neither did the CA err in affirming the trial court's determination of the amount of bail considering that such determination was in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence and just and proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED." CaDATc
Very truly yours,
EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 27-44. Penned by then Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring.
2.Id. at 45-46.
3.Id. at 57-64, 238-241. Penned by Judge Anastacio D. Anghad.
4.Id. at 47-48.
5."Revelita" in some parts of the records.
6.Rollo, pp. 53-56.
7.Id. at 57-64.
8.Id. at 65-77.
9.Id. at 238-241.
10.Id. at 82-99.
11.Id. at 44.
12.Id. at 39-40.
13.Id. at 40-43.
14.People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 709 (1999).
15.Id.
16.Id. at 709, citing Montalbo v. Santamaria,54 Phil. 955 (1930) and 8 CJS p. 70 citing Ford v. Dilley,156 N.W. 513.