FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218281. September 29, 2021.]
ANNA LIZA VALMORES-SALINAS AND ATTY. ALBERTO N. HIDALGO, petitioners, vs.ROY SALINAS, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 218281 (Anna Liza Valmores-Salinas and Atty. Alberto N. Hidalgo v. Roy Salinas). — Submitted before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated March 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 06507, which affirmed in toto the Order 3 dated December 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7 in Civil Case No. 2011-08-60, finding Atty. Alberto N. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) guilty of contempt of court for using harsh language in his Motion for Reconsideration and imposing upon him a penalty of fine in the amount of P1,000.00. HTcADC
The Antecedents
The present case stemmed from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Prayers for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction filed by respondent Roy Salinas (Roy) against his wife, Anna Liza Valmores-Salinas (Anna Liza) represented by his counsel Atty. Hidalgo (collectively known as petitioners). 4
During the continuance of the hearing for the injunction, the parties and their respective counsels agreed to appoint Mervin Añover (Añover) as administrator of the spouses' properties and businesses. Thus, in an Order dated November 16, 2011, the RTC presided by Judge Crisologo Bitas (Judge Bitas) appointed Añover as administrator. The parties were also enjoined from interfering with the management of the businesses in view of the administrator's appointment. 5
On November 21, 2011, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contending that while the parties have agreed to appoint an administrator, the same was subject to the condition that the administrator be qualified first, and a hearing for the purpose be conducted. However, Judge Bitas hastily appointed Añover without first determining his fitness and qualifications. Petitioners also posited that under the rules, it is not allowed for the judge to appoint a third person of his choice who will act as the administrator of the properties of the husband and wife in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage. Hence, the haste made by Judge Bitas in issuing the letters of administration, the order issuing the same, and the immediate assumption of office of the administrator, even if the wife and her counsel have yet to be furnished with a copy of the order and letters of administration, created a clear and convincing proof that the presiding judge is biased in favor of the husband. 6
Respondent submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Cite Defendant for Indirect Contempt of Court, asserting that since there was already an agreement between the parties to appoint Añover as administrator of the conjugal properties, the obstinate refusal of Anna Liza to obey the same is a ground for indirect contempt of court. 7
On December 14, 2011, the RTC rendered an Order declaring Atty. Hidalgo in contempt of court and imposed upon him a fine of P1,000.00 for using harsh language in his Motion for Reconsideration, which imputed upon the judge, partiality, without basis. 8
On even date, another Order was issued by the RTC, which held Anna Liza in civil contempt of court and meted a penalty of five (5) days imprisonment for violating the court's Order dated November 16, 2011 by disallowing the administrator to do his duty, and violating the injunction of the court to desist from getting the income of the spouses' businesses. The Order also fined Atty. Hidalgo another P1,000.00 for shouting at the presiding judge. 9
Despite issuing these twin Orders of contempt, the RTC had not issued a commitment order against Anna Liza. 10
Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of TRO before the CA to stay the execution of the contempt Orders. 11
On April 11, 2013, the CA denied petitioners' Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of TRO for lack of merit. 12
Pending appeal, petitioners filed an administrative case against Judge Bitas, charging him with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Bias, Manifest Partiality and Impropriety for summarily holding Anna Liza in contempt of court and imposing upon her the penalty of five (5) days imprisonment. 13 The administrative case was docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335. 14
On March 18, 2013, this Court rendered a Decision finding Judge Bitas guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failure to comply with the procedural requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court when he peremptorily held Anna Liza in contempt of court. 15
Taking its cue from the aforementioned Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 from the Resolution dated April 11, 2013 of the CA, which denied the prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of TRO.
On February 18, 2015, the CA issued a Resolution 17 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. aScITE
Subsequently, on March 24, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, 18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated December 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Magsaysay Boulevard, Tacloban City in Civil Case No. 2011-08-60 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Prayers for Issuance of TRO and Preliminary Injunction, declaring Atty. Alberto Hidalgo in contempt of court and fined [P]1,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 19
In arriving at such disposition, the CA ratiocinated that Atty. Hidalgo's baseless imputation of bias against Judge Bitas in the Motion for Reconsideration constitutes direct contempt of court which is summarily punishable without the need for a hearing. The CA also opined that the parties have already agreed to appoint Añover as administrator in the November 16, 2011 hearing. Thus, the imputation of bias against Judge Bitas for appointing Añover was bereft of basis, malicious and derogatory.
As to the contempt charge against Anna Liza, the CA no longer passed upon this issue based on the ruling of this Court on the administrative case of Judge Bitas finding him guilty for Gross Ignorance of the Law in holding Anna Liza in contempt of court without notice and hearing.
Unconvinced, petitioners resorted to this present petition for review on certiorari, claiming that the CA gravely erred when it selectively ruled only on the contempt charge against Atty. Hidalgo, but refused to rule on the main petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Bitas. 20 According to petitioners, they availed the judicial remedy of a petition for certiorari and prohibition to correct the errors of Judge Bitas in the exercise of his adjudicative functions. At the same time, they availed an administrative remedy of filing an administrative complaint against Judge Bitas to discipline him for his violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. These two remedies are different from one another but the CA failed to appreciate the same when it decided not to pass upon the contempt charge against Anna Liza. 21 Petitioners submit that the CA should have declared void the contempt Orders of the RTC for being issued in violation of the right to due process. More specifically, the contempt charge against Anna Liza was not initiated through a verified petition and she was not given an opportunity to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt of court, in complete disregard of the rules. 22
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. 23
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. 24
Thus, contempt proceedings have dual functions: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the Court. 25
In Our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely direct contempt and indirect contempt. 26
Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. 27 The punishment for direct contempt is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. 28
On the other hand, indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt. 29 As opposed to direct contempt, the proceedings for indirect contempt generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed. 30
Moreover, contempt may be civil or criminal, as explained in Montenegro v. Montenegro, 31 thus:
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. 32 HEITAD
In this case, there were two contempt Orders both dated December 14, 2011 that was issued by the RTC. The first Order held Atty. Hidalgo in contempt of court for using harsh words in his motion for reconsideration and imposed upon him the penalty of fine in the amount of P1,000.00. The second Order held Anna Liza in civil contempt of court and punished her with five (5) days imprisonment for violating the order of the RTC dated November 16, 2011 by disallowing the administrator to do his duty and violating the injunction order of the RTC to desist from getting the income of the businesses, and fined Atty. Hidalgo with another amount of P1,000.00 for shouting at the presiding judge.
The CA did not err in upholding the
Anent the first Order, the CA upheld the guilt of Atty. Hidalgo for contempt of court due to his unfounded and baseless imputation of bias on the part of Judge Bitas in appointing Añover as administrator of the spouses' properties. The statements made in the motion for reconsideration are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The rules do not allow for a judge to appoint a third person of his choice to act as administrator of the properties of the husband and wife in a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
The haste made by the Presiding Judge of the RTC in issuing the letters of administration, the order issuing the same and the immediate assumption of office of the administrator appointed by the RTC even if the wife and his counsel have not even been furnished a copy of the order and the letters [of] administration created a clear and convincing proof that the Presiding Judge of the RTC is already biased against the wife and in favor of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
The issuance of the letters of administration hastily on November 16, 2011, the almost immediate acceptance thereof by the administrator and his assumption of the administratorship on November 17, 2011 indicate the sinister motive and design and the apparent collusion with the husband to deprive and deny the wife of her right to continue managing the hotel — a right which she is entitled to.
xxx xxx xxx 33
As correctly held by the CA, the imputation of bias in the motion for reconsideration was malicious, derogatory and without basis because the parties themselves, including their respective counsels, had an agreement to appoint Añover as administrator during the hearing on November 16, 2011. 34 Put differently, Atty. Hidalgo had absolutely no reason to ascribe bias or partiality on the part of Judge Bitas in ordering the appointment of Añover as the same was with the parties' imprimatur. There being such an agreement, the assumption of office of Añover as court appointed administrator, followed as a matter of course. While Atty. Hidalgo in pursing his client's interest, may not agree with the Order of Judge Bitas, the same does not give him the unbridled right to use intemperate and uncalled for remarks or to impute manifestly baseless and malicious statements of bias or partiality in his pleadings which tend to promote distrust in the judicial administration or to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of the Court or to degrade the administration of justice.
In Habawel, et al. v. Court of Tax Appeal, 35 this Court remarked:
Indeed, this Court has not lacked in frequently reminding that every attorney must use only fair and temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. The language, though forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession. It is always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive. No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. 36
Furthermore, it has been held that the test for criticizing a judge's decision is, whether the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. 37 A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 38
In this case, Atty. Hidalgo clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as an officer of the court, and disregarded his sworn duty to respect the court when he imputed a groundless and malicious accusation of bias on the part of Judge Bitas. Settled is the rule that unfounded accusations or allegations, or words, tending to embarrass the court, or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in faciecuriae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 39 ATICcS
On this score, the CA did not err in upholding the guilt of Atty. Hidalgo for direct contempt. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, direct contempt is punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank. Thus, the penalty of fine imposed upon Atty. Hidalgo in the amount of P1,000.00 is in accordance with law.
The CA erred when it decided not to
Anent the second Order, the CA dispensed with the need to discuss the contempt charge against Anna Liza on the notion that the matter was already settled in A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335 where Judge Bitas was held administratively liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law for summarily holding Anna Liza in contempt of court without notice and hearing. Material portion of the CA's disquisition is reproduced as follows:
With the ruling of the Supreme Court on the impropriety of the Order of the RTC in declaring petitioner An[n]a Liza Valmores-Salinas in contempt of court without notice and hearing, the only issue left for resolution is the issue regarding the Order dated December 14, 2011, declaring Atty. Alberto Hidalgo in contempt of court for using a harsh language in his motion for reconsideration, imputing partiality on Judge Bitas without basis. 40
In so ruling, the CA failed to consider that petitioners availed two (2) distinct legal remedies. First, a judicial remedy via a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to question the propriety of the two contempt Orders and to declare the same void for being violative of the due process of law. Second, an administrative remedy through an administrative complaint which seeks to discipline Judge Bitas for his alleged Gross Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Bias, Manifest Partiality, and Impropriety relative to the issuance of the contempt Order against Anna Liza. While these two cases are interrelated and arose from the same set of facts, their causes of action and reliefs sought are entirely different, such that the ruling in the administrative case does not serve as a bar to the resolution of the issue raised in the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
It is doctrinally settled that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. 41 Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Where a sufficient judicial remedy exists, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety. 42 A party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders in the course of a trial, is with the proper reviewing court and not through an administrative complaint. 43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred when it decided not to pass upon the propriety of the second contempt Order. To stress, the finding of Judge Bitas' administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law does not preclude the resolution of the issue in the petition for certiorari and prohibition which seeks to correct his alleged adjudicative lapses in issuing the two contempt Orders.
The indirect contempt Order against
To recall, Anna Liza was held in civil contempt by Judge Bitas and penalized her with five (5) days imprisonment for violating the order of the RTC dated November 16, 2011 by disallowing the administrator to do his duty and violating the injunction of the RTC to desist from getting the income of the spouses' businesses.
Indisputably, the alleged contemptuous acts of Anna Liza fall under the category of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraph (b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states:
SECTION 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Correlatively, Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how the proceedings for indirect contempt should be commenced, thus:
SECTION 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. TIADCc
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)
It is readily apparent that indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.
In any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, it is the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted in line with the right to due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the respondent's answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly. 44
In this case, it is undisputed that the contempt charged against Anna Liza was not initiated through a verified petition but through a mere "Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration wit Motion to Cite Defendant for Indirect Contempt" filed by her husband, Roy. On such flaw alone, Judge Bitas exceeded his authority when he entertained Roy's motion which utterly failed to comply with the rules.
In Arriola, et al. v. Arriola, 45 We emphasized that an indirect contempt charge, not initiated by the court motu proprio, must be commenced by a verified petition. We reasoned out that even if the contempt proceedings emanated from a principal case, still, the governing rules require that a petition be filed and treated independently to the main action. We further stressed therein that filing a verified petition to initiate an indirect contempt proceeding is a mandatory requirement quoting this Court's earlier pronouncement in Regalado v. Go, 46viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, the RTC seriously erred when it took cognizance of the motion to cite Anna Liza in indirect contempt. In this instance, the Rules mandatorily require the filing of a verified petition and conformity with the requirements for filing of initiatory pleadings, i.e., submission of certification against forum shopping and payment of docket fees. Hence, the motion to cite defendant in direct contempt filed by Roy should have been dismissed outright.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the indirect contempt charge against Anna Liza was initiated by the court motu proprio, still, the same suffers from a fatal procedural defect.
In Esperida, et al. v. Jurado, Jr., 47 this Court laid down the procedure to be observed for indirect contempt proceedings initiated by the court motu proprio, to wit:
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly. The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. 48
Here, none of the foregoing requirements have been complied with as Judge Bitas hastily arrived at a conclusion that Anna Liza is guilty for indirect contempt of court. More specifically, Judge Bitas, first and foremost, did not issue an order requiring Anna Liza to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt of court. Such show cause order should have been clear and specific in nature to give Anna Liza an opportunity to explain why she should not be cited in contempt of court. Second, Judge Bitas did not give Anna Liza the opportunity to comment on the charges against her or to present her side. Third and last, Judge Bitas did not conduct a hearing to investigate the contempt charge or for Anna Liza to be heard in court. Suffice it to state, Judge Bitas unceremoniously cited Anna Liza in contempt of court without observing her right to due process and therefore, has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Concomitantly, the indirect contempt Order against Anna Liza should have been nullified and set aside for being in complete disregard of Sections 3 and 4, of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. To reiterate, the indirect contempt charge was not initiated through a verified petition as mandated by the rules. And even if the same was commenced by the court motu proprio, the due process requirements of notice and hearing have not been complied with. AIDSTE
Judges are thus reminded that the power to punish for contempt must be used with due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. 49 Strict compliance with procedural guidelines governing the contempt power is mandatory. 50
Atty. Hidalgo's act of shouting at the
Finally, it was uncontroverted that Atty. Hidalgo shouted at the presiding judge for which he was fined P1,000.00. In Roxas v. DeZuzuarregui, Jr., 51 We emphasized that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. 52 Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. 53 Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by "heated and acrimonious tone." 54 Here, it is unmistakably clear that Atty. Hidalgo's act of shouting at the presiding judge constitutes direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of so near a court or judge as to show an utter disrespect towards the court. For committing direct contempt, which is summarily punishable, the fine imposed upon Atty. Hidalgo in the amount of P1,000.00 is affirmed.
As a final note, We need to remind once more that the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. 55 The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 56 Thus, judges have time and again been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. 57 And, as in all other powers, the power to punish for contempt is not limitless; it must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. 58
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Decision dated March 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 06507 is MODIFIED as follows:
1) The Order dated December 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 7 in Civil Case No. 2011-08-60, finding Atty. Alberto Hidalgo in contempt of court for using harsh language in his Motion for Reconsideration and imposing upon him the penalty of fine in the amount P1,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
2) The separate Order dated December 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 7 in Civil Case No. 2011-08-60 which: (a) held Ann Liza Valmores-Salinas in civil contempt of court and imposing upon her the penalty of five (5) days imprisonment for violating the RTC's Order dated November 16, 2011 by disallowing the administrator to do his duty and violating the injunction of the RTC to desist from getting the income of the spouses' business is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE; and (b) the penalty of fine imposed upon Atty. Alberto Hidalgo in the amount of P1,000.00 for shouting at the presiding judge is AFFIRMED.
To deter counsels from committing disrespectful acts toward magistrates, Atty. Alberto Hidalgo is hereby given a STERNWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-27.
2.Id. at 30-40. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired member of this Court) and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob.
3.Id. at 34.
4.Id. at 31.
5.Id. at 31-32.
6.Id. at 32-33.
7.Id. at 33.
8.Id. at 33-34.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 35.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 69-71.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 46-58.
17.Id. at 74-79.
18.Id. at 30-40.
19.Id. at 39-40.
20.Id. at 19.
21.Id. at 20.
22.Id. at 21-24.
23.Limbona v. Hon. Lee, et al., 537 Phil. 610, 618 (2006).
24.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Labor Arbiter Calanza, et al., 647 Phil. 507, 514 (2010).
25.Regalado v. Go, 543 Phil. 578, 591 (2007).
26. See Sections 1 and 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
27.Prosecutor Baculi v. Judge Belen, 604 Phil. 1, 9 (2009).
28.Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, et al. v. Distribution Management Association of thePhilippines, et al., 672 Phil. 1, 11-12 (2011).
29.Supra note 27.
30.Supra note 28 at 12.
31. 475 Phil. 350-365 (2004).
32.Id. at 361.
33.Rollo, pp. 15-16.
34.Id. at 37-38.
35. 672 Phil. 582-609 (2011).
36.Id. at 601-602.
37.Supra note 28 at 19.
38.In Re: Almacen, 142 Phil. 353, 371 (1970).
39.Supra note 28 at 17.
40.Rollo, p. 36.
41.Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese, 529 Phil. 594, 597 (2006).
42.Id. at 598.
43. See Atty. Tamondong v. Judge Pasal, 820 Phil. 220, 230 (2017).
44.Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc., et al. v. Sanchez, 728 Phil. 58, 72-73 (2014).
45. 566 Phil. 654, 663 (2008).
46.Supra note 25 at 596-597.
47. 686 Phil. 775-785 (2012).
48.Id. at 781-782.
49.In Re: Calilim, 584 Phil. 377, 384-385 (2008).
50.Supra note 25 at 595.
51. 554 Phil. 323-342 (2007).
52.Id. at 341.
53.Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, 674 Phil. 1, 8 (2011).
54.Supra note 34 at 601.
55.Sison v. Judge Caoibes, Jr., 473 Phil. 251, 260-261 (2004).
56.Supra note 28 at 10-11.
57.Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardido, 444 Phil. 12, 25 (2003).
58.Judge Belen v. Comilang, 705 Phil. 165, 173 (2013).