Uy v. Anchor Land Holdings, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 254986. October 13, 2021.]

BENJAMIN ZABALA UY, petitioner, vs. ANCHOR LAND HOLDINGS, INC., STEPHEN LEE, STEVE LI, AND PERLA PATINGO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 254986 — BENJAMIN ZABALA UY v. ANCHOR LAND HOLDINGS, INC., STEPHEN LEE, STEVE LI, and PERLA PATINGO

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155559 entitled Benjamin Zabala Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, Anchor Land Holdings, Inc., Stephen Lee, Steve Li, and Perla Patingo:

1. Decision2 dated December 19, 2019, upholding the dismissal of petitioner Benjamin Zabala Uy; and

2. Resolution3 dated December 16, 2020, denying his motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On February 16, 2016, petitioner Benjamin Zabala Uy filed an action 4 for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, damages, and attorney's fees against respondents Anchor Land Holdings, Inc. (Anchor Land), Board Chairman Emeritus Stephen Lee (Lee), Chief Executive Officer Steve Li (Li), and Human Resource Manager Perla Patingo (Patingo).

In his Complaint-Affidavit 5 dated April 5, 2016, petitioner averred that in January 2011, Anchor Land hired him as Assistant Vice-President for Corporate Finance. Before his dismissal, he was receiving a monthly salary of P164,000.00. 6

On December 7, 2015, Patingo told him that the management wanted him out of the company allegedly due to his "unsatisfactory performance, punctuality, and attendance" per appraisal report of the company's Chief Finance Officer Neil Y. Chua (Chua) in 2012 to 2013. Patingo assured him though that the company would give him a graceful exit and the option to resign. He was further offered a benefit package of one (1) month salary for every year of service plus ownership of the Toyota Camry he availed of under the company's car plan, provided he assumed the balance. Firmly believing he was not guilty of any of the alleged deficiencies, he refused the offer. 7

Thereafter, he emailed Lee, Li, and Patingo, expressing surprise that despite his regular interaction with them, they never complained about his so-called deficiencies. He maintained though that he had always completed all his assigned tasks. He only missed work when absolutely necessary and his absences were always with approved leaves and within the allowed number of leaves per year; regarding his punctuality, since his duties required him to socialize and scout for clients and opportunities, he necessarily had to get out of the office and stay out late, especially during weekdays, because of this, it was sometimes inevitable for him to arrive in the office later than 9 o'clock in the morning but still, he always tried to come on time; as an executive, he should be judged based on his output and not on the hours he stayed in the office. In closing, he expressed regret that although he gave his best service to the company, it seemed, that the time for them to part ways had nonetheless come. He would have thus preferred that they (Lee and Li) personally talk to him. He also believed that his compensation package should be equivalent to his two (2) months salary for every year of service plus the Camry car. 8

But he never heard anything from Lee, Li, and Patingo. The only time he heard from Patingo again was when he got informed that he had been excused from attending the executive meeting scheduled on January 5, 2016. 9

On January 15, 2016, Patingo relayed to him the company's separation package offer of one (1) month salary for every year of service plus the Toyota Camry (unencumbered), to be released on January 18, 2016, upon Li's return from his foreign trip. 10

Nonetheless, on January 20, 2016, Patingo served him a notice of termination due to redundancy effective February 20, 2016. Patingo explained to him that the company had withdrawn its earlier separation package. 11

Thereafter, he discovered that the wheels of his Toyota Camry were already chained while in the parking lot and was blocked by a Toyota Innova. So he went back to Patingo and reminded the latter that his supposed termination was to take effect on February 20, 2016, or still a month away, so his car should be unchained and unblocked. But he was ignored. The following day, he received a memorandum entitled "Non-Entry into Company Premises." 12

His subsequent attempts for conciliation did not succeed, hence, he got constrained to file the complaint below. 13

On the other hand, respondents countered 14 that petitioner claimed to be an expert in budget analysis and management, investor relations and capital raising, and relationship management in financial institutions, among others. With this supposed expertise, the company hired him as Assistant Vice-President for Corporate Finance with an initial net monthly salary of P100,000.00 plus other privileges. He was also designated as head of the Corporate Finance and Corporate Planning Department. 15 One of his privileges was the availment of the company's Car Incentive Program. Under this program, he would become the owner of the car of his choice on the 6th year of his employment with the company. 16

Petitioner's performance, however, was consistently found to be very unsatisfactory. The company gave him all the time and opportunity to show his worth, but his performance only turned from bad to worse. 17

In 2014, there had been a significant decline in the business mainly due to reduction in sales. Based on the review of its overall organizational set-up, it abolished superfluous positions and centralized functions of several units/groups, among them, the entire Corporate Finance and Corporate Planning Department, headed by petitioner. Thus, petitioner got formally informed of his termination effective February 20, 2016, albeit he refused to receive the formal notice and even exhibited violent, arrogant, and hostile behavior toward company officers and staff. This was why the company banned him from entering its premises. 18

At any rate, the company submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the list of its employees who got terminated due to redundancy.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

By Decision 19 dated August 19, 2016, Labor Arbiter Michelle P. Pagtalunan granted the complaint. She ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed, and as a consequence, awarded him separation pay with backwages, viz.:

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Anchor Land Holdings, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay complainant his backwages computed at PhP1,136,520.00 and separation pay computed at PhP984,000.00

SO ORDERED. 20

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The decision was principally anchored on the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was no evidence on record showing that petitioner's position had indeed become superfluous and unnecessary. 21

The Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

By Decision22 dated November 14, 2016, the NLRC affirmed with modification, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by the complainant is PARTIALLY GRANTED, while the partial appeal of the respondents is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the decision of Labor Arbiter Michelle P. Pagtalunan dated 19 August 2016 declaring the illegality of complainant's dismissal is AFFIRMED with modification that respondent is ordered to pay the complainant the following:

a. Backwages computed from the time he was unlawfully dismissed on 20 January 2016 until finality of this decision;

b. Separation pay computed from the time he was hired on 03 January 2011 until finality of this decision;

c. Moral and exemplary damages each in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00); and

d. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award adjudged herein.

The demand for the return of the car is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 23

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The NLRC echoed the labor arbiter's finding on the absence of proof of redundancy on records such as: corporate sales and financial performance; and the company's business portfolio prior to 2014 to establish that for that span of time, it had been earning profits but from 2014 onward, it already incurred losses, forcing them to resort to redundancy and abolish petitioner's department. Respondents also failed to present the company's new organizational chart post retrenchment. More, respondents did not follow any specific set of reasonable criteria in determining which positions were redundant and which ones were not. Finally, the report submitted to DOLE showed that only petitioner's position was abolished. 24

As for petitioner's alleged below par performance, there was similarly no evidence presented to prove it. Even the 2012 and 2013 assessment report purportedly showing petitioner's alleged unsatisfactory performance were not submitted. In any case, petitioner's employment was terminated on ground of redundancy and not based on his alleged sub-standard performance. 25

On respondent's motion for reconsideration, however, the NLRC reversed under Resolution dated October 25, 2017. 26 This time, the NLRC held that in petitioner's e-mail sent to individual respondents, he admitted that the company was experiencing a decline in sales, which was confirmed by Chua in his affidavit submitted on appeal. Faced with this dilemma, the company decided to abolish petitioner's position. Petitioner made no categorical denial either that his performance was assessed to be unsatisfactory. After this assessment, petitioner already refused to be assessed further, thus, explaining the lack of performance assessment on him for 2014 and 2015. Petitioner's refusal to be assessed can also be considered as insubordination which was another ground to dismiss his employment. It is undisputed, too, that up to the present, the company no longer has a Corporate Finance and Corporate Planning Department. The fact that petitioner's department was the only one which got abolished did not invalidate the redundancy program. 27

By Resolution dated January 29, 2018, 28 the NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Under its assailed Decision 29 dated December 19, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's dismissal but on a different ground: loss of trust and confidence, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated October 25, 2017 and January 29, 2018 of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, 1st Division, in NLRC LAC No. 10-002827-16 (NLRC NCR Case No. 02-01884-16), finding petitioner Benjamin Zabala Uy validly DISMISSED is AFFIRMED, albeit on the different ground, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Respondent Anchor Land Holdings, Inc. is ORDERED to pay petitioner Benjamin Zabala Uy the following amounts:

(1) Moral and exemplary damages of P300,000.00 each;

(2) Nominal damages of P50,000.00; and

(3) Attorney's fees of 10% of the total award.

(4) That the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED. 30

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The Court of Appeals agreed with the labor arbiter that respondents failed to comply with the requisites for a valid redundancy program. It noted that aside from Chua's affidavit, no other evidence was presented to support the company's claim of decline in sales and losses. The company also failed to show any fair and reasonable criteria in determining what positions should be declared redundant. 31

The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that while there was no valid redundancy to speak of, petitioner was validly dismissed on ground of loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was holding an executive position and performing a crucial function for the company. As such, petitioner's position required full trust and confidence, thus, he may be terminated for loss of this trust and confidence. His poor performance, which he did not controvert, was inimical to the company's interests. This was enough to erode the company's trust and confidence in him. 32

While holding that petitioner was validly dismissed, the Court of Appeals awarded him nominal, moral, and exemplary damages on ground that he was not afforded due process when he got terminated and respondents acted in bad faith when they summarily dismissed him. 33

In its assailed Resolution 34 dated December 16, 2020, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now prays that the dispositions of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside. He argues that there was truly no ground for his dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC in its original decision, and the Court of Appeals all held that respondents failed to prove the presence of redundancy. Having found that there was no redundancy, the Court of Appeals should have reversed the NLRC's resolutions and reinstated the latter's original decision which found that he was indeed illegally dismissed. It was an error for the Court of Appeals to hold that he was validly dismissed based on an entirely different ground, i.e., loss of trust and confidence.

Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, he never admitted in his email that he was not performing well and was not punctual. More, the alleged 2012 and 2013 performance ratings were never presented before the labor tribunals and even before the Court of Appeals itself. Thus, there was simply no basis for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the supposed loss of trust and confidence ever existed. 35

In their Comment 36 dated June 16, 2021, respondents counter that employers have the right to dismiss employees as long as procedural and substantive due process have been observed. Petitioner himself, as head of the Corporate Finance and Corporate Planning Department, was aware of the financial status of the company, hence, there was a valid ground for the redundancy program. 37

In any event, the Court of Appeals did not err when it upheld petitioner's dismissal on ground of loss of trust and confidence. From the beginning, they had been candid and honest that they could have dismissed petitioner due to loss of trust and confidence, but they eventually preferred redundancy to enable petitioner to get a more substantial amount of separation pay. For having been dismissed on valid ground, petitioner is not entitled to any form of damages. 38

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it held that petitioner was validly dismissed on ground of loss of trust and confidence?

Ruling

We affirm.

Preliminary, the Court is not a trier of facts. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or erroneous appreciation of the evidence, factual findings of the labor tribunals, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon the Court. 39 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court will only take cognizance of pure legal issues and will not calibrate anew the evidence passed upon and evaluated thrice before.

Here, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner's employment was terminated for cause, albeit, for different reasons. On one hand, the NLRC ruled that petitioner's employment was severed through a valid redundancy program. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that Anchor Land dismissed petitioner for loss of trust and confidence. Such significant variance compels us to review the conflicting factual findings of the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals and determine whether there was a valid ground for petitioner's termination.

Petitioner was validly terminated

Article 297 (c) 40 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in him or her. 41 As a just cause for termination of employment, loss of trust and confidence is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. 42 To invoke this cause, the following requirements must be complied with: (i) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and onfidence; and (ii) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. 43

First requisite:

There are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are defined as those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed, or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff. They are those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. They are defined as those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. 44

Petitioner belonged to the first class of position of trust, i.e., managerial employees. Both parties admit this. As Assistant Vice-President for Corporate Finance, he was tasked with financial planning and financial strategies of the company. Similarly, as head of the Corporate Finance and Corporate Planning Department, he was responsible for the management of said department and supervision of the staff therein. These positions are naturally one of trust and confidence.

Hence, the first requisite is met.

Second requisite:

The degree of proof required in proving loss of trust and confidence differs between a managerial employee and a rank-and-file employee. In SM Development Corporation v. Ang, 45 the Court reiterated the difference in this manner: in terminating managerial employees based on loss of trust and confidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, but the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his or her employer suffices. With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence, as a ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient.

As discussed earlier, petitioner is a managerial employee. Hence, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer suffices.

Respondents averred that petitioner was hired as Assistant Vice-President for Corporate Finance because of his claimed expertise in budget analysis and management, investor relations and capital raising, relationship management with financial institutions, identification of business opportunities, and business financial modeling, among others, in the hopes of raising the company's income and prospects. Similarly, the Corporate Finance and Corporate Planning Department was specifically created for him because of his supposed expertise in his field. As time went by, however, petitioner failed to deliver on his promises. Worse, he hardly reported for work or was often late.

Petitioner admitted in his e-mail to respondents that he often gets out of the office and socialize, especially during weekdays, as his duties required him to scout for clients and opportunities. Thus, it was sometimes inevitable for him to arrive in the office later than 9 o'clock in the morning but still, he always tried to come on time. As respondents asserted though, petitioner's "socializing," "partying," and "catching up" at the expense of the company never resulted in any potential business opportunity for the company. 46 Instead of acquiring more profits, the company's income started to decline further in 2014. The company's financial situation was not amiss to petitioner.

Petitioner was also negligent in his duties. He did not deny that Chua and his (Chua's) team were the ones handling all dealings and transactions with banks and other financing companies, which petitioner himself or his department should have been doing. 47

In fine, petitioner's failure to help produce income for the company and his negligence in performing his official duties are enough for respondents to lose confidence in him. Instead of being an asset to the company, he became a liability.

In SM Development Corporation v. Ang, 48 the Court upheld the employee's dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, viz.:

Set against these parameters, the Court holds that respondent was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. Respondent was not an ordinary company employee. His position as one of SMDC's Project Director is clearly a position of responsibility demanding an extensive amount of trust from petitioners. The entire project account depended on the accuracy of the classifications made by him. It was reasonable for the petitioners to trust that respondent had [the] basis for his calculations and specifications. The preparation of the project is a complex matter requiring attention to details. Not only does (sic) these projects involve the company's finances, it also affects the welfare of all the other employees and clients as well.

Respondent's failure to properly manage these projects clearly is an act inimical to the company's interests sufficient to erode petitioners' trust and confidence in him. He ought to know that his job requires that he keep the trust and confidence bestowed on him by his employer untarnished. He failed to perform what he had represented or what was expected of him, thus, petitioners had a valid reason in (sic) losing confidence in him which justified his termination.

The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees is subject to the regulation by the State in the exercise of its paramount police power. However, there is also an equally established principle that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer and justifying [the] loss of confidence in him. 49

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So must it be.

The alleged redundancy was a mere

It is true that the original ground for petitioner's dismissal was redundancy. But it is safe to say that the company opted for this ground in order to spare petitioner from the humiliation of being terminated for loss of trust and confidence. This is apparent from petitioner's own version of the facts.

To recall, petitioner revealed that he was repeatedly offered severance packages which he invariably rejected.

First. As early as December 7, 2015, petitioner was informed of the management's intention to let him go. He was, thus, offered one (1) month salary for every year of service plus ownership of the Toyota Camry he availed of under the company's car plan, in exchange for his resignation. 50 Petitioner rejected this offer.

Second. On January 15, 2016, Anchor Land reiterated its earlier offer 51 but petitioner rejected it just the same.

Finally. Petitioner was terminated on ground of redundancy effective February 20, 2016. 52 As such, he was entitled to one (1) month salary for every year of service under Article 298 53 of the Labor Code.

Indeed, respondents had been more than generous in repeatedly offering severance pay to petitioner though they had all the reason to validly dismiss him from employment due to loss of trust and confidence. Knowing full well though that petitioner would not receive a single centavo had they dismissed petitioner on that ground, they came up with alternatives to give petitioner a graceful exit and monetary benefits.

But petitioner was unsatisfied with their offers and argued against his removal. He also made a counter-offer: two (2) months salary for every year of service, albeit this was unacceptable to respondents. Having reached an impasse, respondents decided to redundate petitioner. They coordinated with the DOLE for the purpose of effecting a redundancy program, but in truth, this was a mere subterfuge so at least petitioner would not be leaving the company empty-handed.

It appears, therefore, that respondents were simply trying to salvage their relationship with petitioner through face-saving techniques. But after they got sued for illegal dismissal, all gloves were off. They argued that petitioner was not entitled to a single centavo, a complete turnabout from their erstwhile benevolent stance.

Were it not for their attempt to salvage their relationship with petitioner and the subterfuge they employed, respondents could have removed petitioner, a managerial employee, without issue. As it was, though, respondents resorted to a redundancy program which the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC in its original decision, and the Court of Appeals all found to be invalid. But this does not negate the fact that respondents had actual cause to terminate petitioner for loss of trust and confidence. It only entitles petitioner to an award of nominal damages as it violated his right to procedural due process.

Monetary Awards

As for damages, we deem it proper to reduce the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal or ineffectual. Nevertheless, the violation of the employee's right to statutory due process by the employer warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. 54 But while it is true that the Court is given wide latitude as to the amount of nominal damages, it cannot simply give any amount thereof. On this score, Libcap Marketing Corp. v. Baquial55 instructs:

Again, we stress that though the Court is given the latitude to determine the amount of nominal damages to be awarded to an employee who was validly dismissed but whose due process rights were violated, a distinction should be made between a valid dismissal due to just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code and those based on authorized causes, under Article 283. The two causes for a valid dismissal were differentiated in the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot where the Court held that:

A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies that the employee concerned has committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e.[,] the employee has committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud against the employer, or, as in Agabon, he has neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said that the employee himself initiated the dismissal process.

On (sic) another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer's exercise of his management prerogative, i.e.[,] when the employer opts to install labor[-]saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.

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Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of his management prerogative.

Since in the case of JAKA, the employee was terminated for authorized causes as the employer was suffering from serious business losses, the Court fixed the indemnity at a higher amount of P50,000.00. In the case at bar, the cause for termination was abandonment, thus[,] it is due to the employee's fault. It is equitable under these circumstances to order the petitioner company to pay nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00, similar to the case of Agabon. 56 (Emphases supplied)

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Here, petitioner's employment was terminated based on a just cause. Hence, as with Baquial, 57 nominal damages is reduced from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. 58

Moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are recoverable when the dismissal was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner. 59

Respondents do not deny that they chained the wheels on petitioner's car even though the termination of his service had not yet taken effect. They also refused to remove the same despite petitioner's demand. Thus, petitioner is entitled to moral damages for respondents' oppressive acts. To deter respondents from repeating such behavior, we also sustain the award of exemplary damages.

We, nevertheless, find that moral and exemplary damages of P300,000.00 each are too much. In Bayview Management Consultants, Inc. v. Pre, 60 the Court awarded the moral and exemplary damages at P100,000.00 each because of the derogatory words and ill-treatment that Pre suffered. Thus, the award of moral and exemplary damages is reduced from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00 each.

As regards attorney's fees, we delete the same because contrary to the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals, petitioner had no just and demandable claim that respondents allegedly refused to satisfy pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 61

In accordance with Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 62 all monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 19, 2019 and Resolution dated December 16, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155559 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Anchor Land Holdings, Inc. is ordered to pay petitioner Benjamin Zabala Uy the following amounts:

1. P30,000.00 as nominal damages;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 63

The respondents comment on the petition for review on certiorari is NOTED.

SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-51.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Perpetua Susana T. Atal-Paño and concurred in by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales; id. at 56-73.

3.Id. at 75-77.

4.Id. at 126-129.

5.Id. at 224-232.

6.Id. at 224.

7.Id. at 224.

8.Id. at 224-229.

9.Id. at 229.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 225-230.

12.Id. at 225-230.

13.Id.

14. See respondents' Position Paper dated March 31, 2016; id. at 248-263.

15.Id. at 249-250.

16.Id. at 250.

17.Id. at 251.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 129-137.

20.Id. at 136.

21.Id. at 135-136.

22. Penned by Commissioner Gina F. Cenit-Escoto and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Romeo L. Go; id. at 139-158.

23.Id. at 157-158.

24.Id. at 150-151.

25.Id. at 151.

26. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, while Commissioner Gina F. Cenit-Escoto dissented; id. at 160-173.

27.Id. at 167-171.

28.Id. at 176-182.

29. Penned by Associate Justice Perpetua Susana P. Atal-Paño and concurred in by Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Pedro Corales; id. at 56-73.

30.Id. at 73.

31.Id. at 66-68.

32.Id. at 68-70.

33.Id. at 70-71.

34.Id. at 75-77.

35.Id. at 31-46.

36.Id. at 444-474.

37.Id. at 459-465.

38.Id. at 465-469.

39. See Milan, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 753 Phil. 217, 238 (2015); see also Jack C. Valencia v. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, et al., 804 Phil. 492, 503 (2017).

40.Termination by Employer.

 An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

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(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly representative.

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(Former Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, Presidential Decree No. 442, Amended and renumbered under DOLE's Department Advisory No. 1, Series of 2015).

41. See Central Azucarera De Bais v. Heirs of Apostol, 828 Phil. 211, 227 (2018).

42.SM Development Corporation v. Ang, G.R. No. 220434, July 22, 2019.

43.Supra note 41 at 228.

44.Cadavas v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 228765, March 20, 2019; citing Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban, 594 Phil. 620, 628 (2008) and Casco v. NLRC, 826 Phil. 284, 299 (2018).

45. G.R. No. 220434, July 22, 2019.

46.Rollo, p. 450.

47.Id. at 450 and 457.

48.Supra note 45.

49.Id.

50.Id. at 224.

51.Id. at 229.

52.Id. at 230.

53. Article 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel.

The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Former Article 283 of the Labor Code, Presidential Decree No. 442, Amended and renumbered under DOLE's Department Advisory No. 1, Series of 2015).

54.Moral v. Momentum Properties, G.R. No. 226240, March 06, 2019.

55. 737 Phil. 349-364 (2014).

56.Id. at 362-362. n

57.Id.

58.Supra note 54.

59. G.R. No. 220170, August 19, 2020.

60.Id.

61. Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers[,] and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

62. 716 Phil. 267, 280 (2013).

63.Id.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.