FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249765. November 23, 2021.]
IN RE: ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST INGRID UY-MILITANTE, FORMER HEAD, MARKET I, BPI CORPORATE BANKING GROUP, CEBU BUSINESS CENTER, INGRID UY-MILITANTE, petitioner, vs.TSI VENTURES SDN BHD, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 23, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249765 (In Re: Administrative Complaint against Ingrid Uy-Militante, former Head, Market I, BPI Corporate Banking Group, Cebu Business Center, Ingrid Uy-Militante v. TSI Ventures SDN BHD). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions dated May 8, 2019 2 and August 23, 2019 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 158454. The CA dismissed the petition for review 4 filed by Ingrid Uy-Militante (petitioner) assailing the Resolution Nos. 1006 5 and 1605 6 issued by the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(BSP).
The controversy stemmed from a complaint 7 filed by TSI Ventures SDN BHD (respondent) with the BSP's Office of Special Investigation unit (BSP-OSI) against the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Ingrid Militante-Uy, Raymond Go, and other responsible officers of BPI for alleged commission of irregularities and/or the conduct of business in an improper, unlawful and unsound manner, restitution, and damages.
On June 14, 2018, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 1006 8 recommending the filing of formal charges against Uy-Militante liable for violation of Section 56 (3) 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791, entitled "An Act Providing for the Regulation of the Organization and Operations of Banks, Quasi-banks, Trust Entities and for Other Purposes" in relation to Section 37 of R.A. No. 7653 or the New Central Bank Act. Uy-Militante moved for the reconsideration of Resolution No. 1006, but this was denied by the Monetary Board in their Resolution No. 1605. 10
On November 19, 2018, Uy-Militante filed a petition for review before the CA assailing Resolution Nos. 1006 and 1605.
On May 8, 2019, the CA issued its Resolution 11 dismissing the petition for review for failure to comply with the requirements as to the contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA ruled Uy-Militante failed to state the full names of the parties to the case either as petitioners or respondents. 12 In particular, it failed to provide the names of the appropriate parties-respondents in its caption which is required under Section 6 of Rule 43, and said procedural defect is a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition for review as provided in Section 7 of the same Rule. 13
On June 25, 2019, Uy-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 14 which was denied by the CA in the assailed August 23, 2019 Resolution for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
Aggrieved, petitioner comes to this Court raising the lone issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement of the contents of a petition under Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner invokes the liberal application of the Rules of Court in assailing the ruling of the CA. Petitioner contends that the omission of the name of a party in the caption of the petition for review is not a fatal defect that should warrant its dismissal. Petitioner also invokes the ruling of the Court in the cases of Oasis Park Hotel v. Navaluna15(Oasis) and Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals16(Vlason) to argue that it is not the caption but the averments in the pleading that are controlling, 17 and that mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of a complaint is not fatal by itself. 18
We grant the petition.
Appeals of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The requirements of the contents of said petitioner are enumerated as follows:
Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.
Section 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 19 this Court held that:
[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply strictly with the requirements of the rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. 20
Clearly, compliance with procedural rules is a must, "since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice." 21
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. 22 The Rules must be followed, otherwise, they will become meaningless and useless. 23 In some instances, however, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the Rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. 24 This Court's pronouncement in Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda25 is instructive on this matter, thus:
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this juncture, the Court reminds all members of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Villamar [16 Phil. 315, 322 (1910)]:
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the CA dismissed the petition for review filed by the petitioner for failure to state the full names of the parties to the case, either as petitioners or respondents. In particular, the CA dismissed the petition for review for failure to provide the names of the appropriate parties-respondents in its caption.
We find that the liberal application of the Rules is justified in this case.
The ruling of the Court in Asia Traders Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals26(Asia Traders) is instructive. In the said case, a petition for review on Certiorari was filed before the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner therein, however, failed to implead the proper respondent both in the caption and the body of the petition. The Court relaxed the application of the Rules and proceeded to dispose the case on the merits. Thusly:
The Court will first dispose of the issue of whether or not the present petition should be dismissed for its formal defects.
A look at the petition's title bears out that indeed only the Court of Appeals was impleaded as respondent. Also, in the portion of the petition under the heading "THE PARTIES," Asia Traders identified the Court of Appeals as the only respondent in the case. Section 4 (a) of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires the petition to state the full names of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents. Clearly, the petition is seen to suffer from two defects, for not only did it fail to implead the adverse party, it erroneously made the appellate court a party thereto.
Formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for review that erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals or failed to implead the proper respondent. In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners' attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the cases on their merits. The Court finds no reason why it should not to afford the same liberal treatment to herein petitioner. While the Court unquestionably has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on a technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice. Moreover, no prejudice will be caused to Cabever as it was an original party before the lower courts and had been furnished all the pleadings and resolutions in this petition. In view thereof, the Court grants the Motion to Admit the Amended Petition and denies Cabever's motion to be dropped as respondent.
This notwithstanding, the Court admonishes the petitioner to be more circumspect in its pleadings. To recall, Asia Traders received an adverse decision from the Court of Appeals because its petition precisely failed to implead Cabever as one of the respondents. Asia Traders admits that this was a mistake but pleads that since this was a mistake only as to form, the Court of Appeals should have been less stringent with the application of the rules of procedure for the sake of substantial justice.
The dismissal Asia Traders encountered before the Court of Appeals should have been enough to teach Asia Traders to be conscientious about impleading the proper parties in its petitions. Surprisingly, however, Asia Traders committed the very same omission before the Court when it again failed to implead the adverse party.
The Court also takes notice of the fact that after the comment was filed, wherein it was pointed out that the petition was defective because it failed to include an indispensable party, Asia Traders immediately filed a reply taking a stand that Cabever is not an indispensable party and that the petition may be decided without its inclusion. However, a month later, Asia Traders filed a Motion to Admit Amended Petition in order to implead Cabever which it now insists to be an indispensable party. 27
In the case of Asia Traders, it should be noted that the proper respondent was not even identified in the body of the petition. Instead, the petitioner therein erroneously impleaded the CA only as the adverse party, which means that there was clearly a failure to implead the proper respondent both in the caption and the body of the petition.
In this case, the record shows that although the name of TSI did not appear in the caption as a party-respondent, the allegations in the body of the petition for review filed in the LA clearly indicate that it is the party-respondent. Under the heading "The Parties," the name of TSI was properly identified as the respondent, 28 and included in the designation is its company address, the name of its counsel, and the latter's address. Unlike in the case of Asia Traders where no party-respondent was impleaded at all, in this case, TSI was properly impleaded as the party-respondent, although not in the caption but in the body of the petition for review. Clearly, the CA erred when it ruled that, in this case, there was an absolute failure to implead any party-respondent at all.
Moreover, TSI was not prejudiced by the omission of its name in the caption of the petition for review with the CA. In fact, TSI, through its counsel, was furnished with a copy of the said petition, in its given address indicated in the body of the petition for review. Also, petitioner correctly noted that the records of the proceeding before the BSP, which clearly identified TSI as the private complainant in said BSP proceeding, 29 were attached to the petition for review. Therefore, TSI is estopped from claiming that it was not properly named or identified as the party-respondent in this case.
Thus, following this Court's pronouncement in the case of Asia Traders, the same liberal application of the Rules should be afforded to herein petitioner. In Spouses Genato v. Viola, 30 We enunciated:
[I]t is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. 31
Moreover, the CA erred in ruling that the cases of Oasis32 and Vlason33 are not applicable in this case. We find the CA's interpretation of the ruling in these cases as unnecessary nitpicking since the Court, in these cases, did not make any distinction between whether the names of the parties were not identified at all, or whether one or some (but not all) of the parties were identified. Besides, even if the CA is correct in its interpretation, as previously mentioned, TSI was properly identified as the party-respondent in this case, although not in the caption but in the body of the petition for review with the CA. Thus, the cases of Oasis and Vlason will still apply.
To reiterate, in the case of Oasis, 34 this Court was categorical in ruling that "[t]he failure of petitioner to implead the complete names of all private respondents in the caption of the [p]etition did not warrant the dismissal of said petition, especially when all the names and circumstances of the parties were stated in the body of the petition, under "'PARTIES.'" 35 Similarly, in the case of Vlason, the Court ruled that:
The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance and not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading. The averments in the complaint, not the title, controlling. Although the general rule requires the inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint, the non-inclusion of one or some of them is not fatal to the cause of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating that a defendant was made a party to such action. 36
Having been identified in the body of the petition for review as the private complainant before the BSP proceedings, TSI was properly impleaded as the party-respondent in this case. To emphasize, the averments in the body of the petition, not the caption, are controlling.
It must be noted that as correctly observed by the CA, petitioner twice failed to implead the party-respondent. According to the CA, before filing her petition for review, petitioner filed a Motion for Additional Period to File petition for review under Rule 43 with the same defect. Petitioner is thus reminded, however, to be more circumspect in its pleadings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated May 8, 2019 and August 23, 2019 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the Petition for Review under Rule 43 on its merits.
SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 13-30.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Louis P. Acosta with Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a retired Member of this Court) and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, concurring; id. at 39-41.
3.Id. at 35-38.
4.Id. at 245-264.
5.Id. at 52-53.
6.Id. at 193-194.
7.Id. at 159-177.
8.Id. at 52-66.
9.Section 56. Conducting Business in an Unsafe or Unsound Manner. — In determining whether a particular act or omission, which is not otherwise prohibited by any law, rule or regulation affecting banks, quasi-banks or trust entities, may be deemed as conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner for purposes of this Section, the Monetary Board shall consider any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
56.3 The act or omission has caused any undue injury, or has given any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the bank or any party in the discharge by the director or officer of his duties and responsibilities through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; or
xxx xxx xxx
10.Id. at 193-199.
11.Id. at 39-41.
12.Id. at 41.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 473-478.
15. 800 Phil. 244 (2016).
16. 369 Phil. 264 (1999).
17.Rollo, p. 21.
18.Id.
19.G.R. No. 238203, September 3, 2020.
20.Id.
21.Curammeng v. People of the Philippines, 799 Phil. 575, 581 (2016).
22.Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda v. CA, 680 Phil. 334, 345 (2012), citing Dimarucot v. People, 645 Phil. 218, 229 (2010).
23.Id.
24.Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda v. CA, supra, citing Asian Spirit Airlines v. Spouses Bautista, 491 Phil. 476, 484 (2005).
25. 729 Phil. 639, 651-652 (2014).
26. 467 Phil. 531 (2004).
27.Id. at 535-537. (Citations omitted)
28.Rollo, p. 247.
29.Id. at 177.
30. 625 Phil. 514 (2010).
31.Id. at 525. (Emphasis supplied)
32.Supra note 15.
33.Supra note 16.
34.Supra note 15.
35.Supra note 15, at 261.
36.Supra note 18, at 304.