THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193972. April 19, 2017.]
UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC., petitioner,vs. HON. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 274, RTC OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, GOLDEN SEA OVERSEAS SALES CORP., JOHNNY TRAJANO AND HON. AIDA ESTRELLA MACAPAGAL, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 195 OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 19, 2017, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 193972 (Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. vs. Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, as Presiding Judge of Branch 274, RTC of Parañaque City, Golden Sea Overseas Sales Corp., Johnny Trajano and Hon. Aida Estrella Macapagal, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 195 of Parañaque City). — This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (Uniwide) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the Decision 2 dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution 3 dated October 1, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95885.
The CA affirmed via the assailed issuances the voluntary inhibition by respondent Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona (Judge Madrona) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274 in Civil Case No. 00-0265, which was an action instituted by Uniwide against Golden Sea Overseas Sales Corporation (Golden Sea) and Johnny Trajano (Trajano), so as to compel said defendants to, first, honor an agreement to credit in Uniwide's favor the value of misdelivered, damaged, defective and unsaleable goods, and second, to prevent the encashment of post-dated checks that were issued by Uniwide. 4
During the pendency of the civil case, Trajano filed a motion that sought the voluntary inhibition of Judge Madrona. 5 In his motion, Trajano claimed that Judge Madrona appeared to have already prejudged the case. While the nature of the parties' relationships was vital in the determination of their respective liabilities, Judge Madrona already insisted that Trajano acted as an agent of Golden Sea. For Trajano, even the order made by Judge Madrona for an ocular inspection of the subject damaged goods lacked legal and factual bases. 6 Golden Sea later filed its own Manifestation and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, 7 as it joined Trajano in his motion and cited the same arguments relied upon by the latter in his pleading.
On February 15, 2006, Judge Madrona issued an Order 8 by which it rejected the arguments and allegations of prejudgment that were advanced by Trajano and Golden Sea. Judge Madrona, nonetheless, still inhibited from the case, as he declared:
Notwithstanding the foregoing re the instant case, however, much to his regret, in order to have equanimity and to preserve the trust and confidence of the parties, the present presiding judge is willing to inhibit himself in trying the case.
Let then the records of this case be forwarded to Hon. Raul E. De Leon, Executive Judge, [RTC], Parañaque City, for his appropriate action on the inhibition herein given.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 9 (Emphasis in the original)
The case was re-raffled off to the sala of Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal (Judge Macapagal) of the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 195.
The foregoing prompted Uniwide to file a motion that asked for the annulment of the re-raffle, and the return of the case to the sala of Judge Madrona. 10 Judge Macapagal referred the motion back to Judge Madrona, who eventually still refused to reconsider his decision to recuse from the case. 11 Thus, Uniwide filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, as it alleged that Judge Madrona gravely abused his discretion when he voluntarily inhibited from Civil Case No. 00-0265, even after he explained in his Order dated February 15, 2006 that Trajano's and Golden Sea's imputations against him were baseless. 12
On May 25, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision 13 denying Uniwide's petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders dated February 15, 2006 and June 30, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14
Uniwide's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 15 dated October 1, 2010. Hence, this petition for review.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition. There is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse the CA's decision that affirmed Judge Madrona's resolve to inhibit from the civil case.
Specific rules on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges are provided in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which reads: aScITE
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
In this case, Judge Madrona opted to voluntarily inhibit from the case for "equanimity and to preserve the trust and confidence of the parties," clearly on the basis of the second paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This provision on voluntary inhibition was crafted to pursue the ideals that judges not only act with fairness, independence, impartiality and honesty, but are likewise perceived to be the embodiment of such qualities. 16
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the decision whether to inhibit or not under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge. The judge, after all, is in the best position to evaluate the necessity or suitability of a recusal. In Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. v. Judge Janolo, Jr., et al., 17 the Court thus explained:
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied.
In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtroom. 18 (Citations omitted, and underscoring, emphasis and italics in the original)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution dated October 1, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-23.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Michael P. Elbinias concurring; id. at 27-39.
3.Id. at 41-42.
4.Id. at 28.
5.Id. at 145-152.
6.Id. at 29-30.
7.Id. at 153-155.
8.Id. at 156-159.
9.Id. at 158-159.
10.Id. at 30.
11.Id. at 30-31.
12.Id. at 31.
13.Id. at 27-39.
14.Id. at 39.
15.Id. at 41-42.
16.Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. v. Judge Janolo, Jr., et al., 640 Phil. 33, 47 (2010).
17. 640 Phil. 33 (2010).
18.Id. at 48-49.