Unity Fishing Development Corp. v. Dyguani

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 225823. March 7, 2018.]

UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION & ALEX DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,vs. WILKIE DYGUANI, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE "GD COMMERCIAL", respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated07 March 2018which reads as follows: EATCcI

"G.R. No. 225823 (Unity Fishing Development Corporation & Alex Del Rosario v. Wilkie Dyguani, doing business under the name and style "GD Commercial") — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated November 11, 2014 and Resolution 2 dated June 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 07294.

Facts of the Case

The instant case originated from a Complaint 3 for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Application for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment filed by Wilkie Dyguani (Dyguani) on January 16, 2001 against ASB Fishing and Development Corporation (ASB Fishing) which was raffled to Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC Branch 16). In the said complaint, Dyguani alleged that he is engaged in the business of trading rice and corn products under the name and style "GD Commercial." In April to November 1999, ASB Fishing purchased corn products amounting to P3,784,552.60 but failed to pay its obligation despite repeated demands; hence, the commencement of the collection suit against it. 4

In an Order 5 dated January 19, 2001, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued against the properties of ASB Fishing, among which is a vessel, F/V Prince Arnold. The writ, however, was subsequently dissolved in an Order 6 dated December 4, 2001. Dyguani seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom.

In a Supplemental Complaint 7 dated September 24, 2002, Dyguani impleaded Alex Del Rosario (Del Rosario) as a co-defendant of ASB Fishing. In support thereof, he alleged that on December 13, 2001 before the lifting of the preliminary attachment became final and executory, ASB Fishing and Del Rosario executed a deed of sale over F/V Prince Arnold in a fraudulent scheme designed to deprive him of his lawful claim. He argued that since both ASB Fishing and Del Rosario acted in bad faith in perpetrating the fraudulent disposal of the attached vessel despite the non-finality of the order lifting the writ, the deed of sale over the said vessel should be declared null and void. 8 In the same pleading, he prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Del Rosario.

In his Answer, 9 Del Rosario denied the pertinent allegations in the Supplemental Complaint, particularly that he had knowledge that the vessel was subject of a writ of preliminary attachment at the time of the execution of the deed of sale. 10

In its Order dated January 5, 2004, the RTC Branch 16 denied Dyguani's motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Del Rosario. 11 Dissatisfied, Dyguani filed a motion for reconsideration and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the original complaint against ASB Fishing as well as a separate Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Del Rosario.

In its Omnibus Order dated March 31, 2004, the RTC Branch 16 granted Dyguani's motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Del Rosario and declared the sale of F/V Prince Arnold to the latter null and void. 12 A motion for reconsideration was filed by Del Rosario but the same was denied.

Unyielding, Del Rosario filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00063. In its Decision dated August 19, 2005, the CA partially granted the petition, affirming the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment but setting aside the partial summary judgment. It likewise ordered RTC Branch 16 to try the case on the merits with dispatch. 13

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In his Amended Supplemental Complaint 14 dated May 10, 2006, Dyguani alleged that in the Sheriff's Report dated April 7, 2006, it was confirmed that Del Rosario sold the subject fishing vessel to Unity Fishing Development Corporation (Unity Fishing) which was issued a Certificate of Ownership and Certificate of Vessel Registry by the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) on January 11, 2002. He thus prayed that the sale between Unity Fishing and Del Rosario (petitioners) be declared null and void and that damages be awarded in his favor.

In their Amended Answer, 15 the petitioners admit that a deed of sale was executed over F/V Prince Arnold on December 13, 2001, with Del Rosario transferring the same to Unity Fishing but reiterate that they were not aware of the existence of any preliminary attachment being enforced against the vessel. 16 They averred that even as of the time of the execution of the first sale between ASB Fishing and Del Rosario, there was no annotation on the certificates of registry and ownership of the vessel that the same is subject of a writ of preliminary attachment. They only came to know of the existence of the writ when Del Rosario received summons and a copy of the supplemental complaint. 17

During the trial, Dyguani presented his lone witness, Sydney Dyguani (Sydney) and thereafter submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits, 18 consisting of several documents, including certified true copies of the Certificates of Ownership (Exhibit C) 19 and Vessel Registry (Exhibit D) 20 of the subject vessel when it was still under the ownership of ASB Shipping, which contained identical annotations (Exhibit C-1 and D-1) at the back portion thereof which reads:

09 March 2001

F/V PRINCE ARNOLD

Notice of Levy on Attachment dated 01 February 2001 by Office of the Provincial Sheriff, RTC 7th Judicial Region Br. 16, Cebu City, under Civil Case No. CEB-26027 Wilkie Dyguani, etc. vs. ASB Fishing and Devt. Corp. for collection of sum of money amounting to P4,273,815.96 and damages. DHITCc

(Signed)

After Dyguani formally offered his evidence, the petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, which was granted by RTC Branch 16. In their Demurrer to Evidence, 21 the petitioners alleged that Dyguani failed to discharge the burden of proof in establishing that they were buyers in bad faith. They claimed that the evidence presented by Dyguani were all hearsay and thus lack probative value especially since the witness for Dyguani failed to identify the source and origin and the person who procured the documentary exhibits which purportedly are certified true copies of the official issuances of the MARINA.

Ruling of the RTC

In an Order 22 dated August 21, 2007, the RTC Branch 16 granted the petitioners' demurrer to evidence and dismissed Dyguani's complaint.

Aggrieved, Dyguani filed a motion 23 for reconsideration of the foregoing order, as well as a motion for inhibition of the presiding judge of RTC Branch 16.

In an Order dated September 24, 2007, the presiding judge of RTC Branch 16 granted the motion for inhibition and the case was raffled to Branch 10 (RTC Branch 10) of the same court.

On October 4, 2012, the RTC Branch 10 issued an Order, 24 granting Dyguani's motion for reconsideration and setting aside the Order dated August 21, 2007 of RTC Branch 16. It ratiocinated, thus:

Basic is the rule that the evidentiary value of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. This is complimentary to the rule on the admissibility as evidence under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court x x x

Since the defendants have not proven that the contents of plaintiff's documentary evidence are false, this Court is of the considered view that such documents, as presented and admitted by the Court, are prima facie evidence of the facts in issue. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

As to whether or not defendant Alex del Rosario is a buyer in good faith, this Court considered the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff, to wit: Exhibit "C" and sub-markings "C-1" and "C-2"; Exhibit "D" and sub-markings "D-1" and "D-2". A cursory examination of the foregoing exhibits would readily reveal that a writ of attachment was annotated on the certificate of ownership and certificate of vessel registry of FB Prince Arnold on March 9, 2001 and was lifted on January 11, 2002. Henceforth, when defendant Alex Del Rosario bought the FB Prince Arnold from ASB Fishing and Development Corporation on December 13, 2001, the annotation of the writ of attachment on the abovementioned vessel was still subsisting thus, defendant Alex Del Rosario could not be considered a buyer in good faith. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the transfer made by ASB Fishing and Development Corporation to Alex Del Rosario may have a badge of fraud, as it was made by a debtor (ASB Fishing) while a suit is pending against them.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City, dated August 21, 2007, is hereby reconsidered and set aside. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is henceforth reinstated and the defendants are given their right to present evidence in accordance with Section 1, Rule 33 of the Revised Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED. 25

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition 26 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC Branch 10 for reversing the order of dismissal of Dyguani's complaint.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision dated November 11, 2014, the CA affirmed the Order dated October 4, 2012 of the RTC Branch 10, the pertinent portions of which read, thus:

The Court finds the present petition unmeritorious.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the public respondent's assailed 4 October 2012 Order, which is clearly violative of the rules. The entrenched rule is that a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Thus, the petitioners should have first filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration, as such special civil action may be resorted to only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." x x x

xxx xxx xxx

At any rate, even if the Court allows the premature recourse to certiorari without the petitioners having filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, the present petition would still fail. Nothing is more settled than principle that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. x x x

x x x [T]he Court finds no arbitrary exercise of judicial authority attributable to the public respondent when it denied the petitioner's demurrer to evidence, there being sufficient basis for Dyguani's claims which require the presentation of countervailing evidence. x x x

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the present petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed Order dated 4 October 2012 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 in Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-26027, is hereby AFFIRMED. 27

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution 28 dated June 29, 2016. Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The main issue raised for the resolution of the Court in this case is whether the CA was correct in affirming RTC Branch 10's denial of the petitioners' demurrer to evidence which was anchored primarily on their claim that Dyguani failed to discharge the burden of proof necessary to prove that they were buyers in bad faith. cEaSHC

In Celino vs. Heirs of Santiago, 29 the Court defined a demurrer to evidence as "a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced, is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." 30

In determining the propriety of granting a demurrer to evidence, the Court, in Spouses Condes vs. CA, 31 declared, thus:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. 32

The procedure, as laid down in Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, is that after the plaintiff rests his case, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that based on the facts and the law, the plaintiff failed to establish his right to the relief prayed for. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. In the event, however, that the motion is granted but on appeal the same is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

In civil cases, when the court grants the demurrer to evidence, the defendant may appeal the order of dismissal since the same is tantamount to a final disposition of the case. If, on the other hand, the court denies the demurrer to evidence, the remedy of appeal does not lie since the order denying a demurrer to evidence is merely interlocutory.

It bears noting, however, that in David vs. Rivera, 33 the Court clarified that as exception to the rule, resort to certiorari may be permitted if the act is accompanied by grave abuse of discretion. It was held thus:

[I]t may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the demurrer. However, it is also settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 34

Being an exception to the rule, "the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross." 35 In Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio, et al., 36 grave abuse of discretion was defined as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction" 37 or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 38

The petitioner carries the burden of proof to "clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice." 39

After a careful evaluation of the facts and records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC Branch 10 in denying the demurrer to evidence. Quite the contrary, the challenged order of RTC Branch 10 was well-supported by facts and evidence completely negating the petitioners' claim of lack of knowledge on the existence of the writ of attachment over F/V Arnold at the time that the same was sold and transferred to Del Rosario and, thereafter, to Unity Fishing.

In ruling for the denial of the demurrer, RTC Branch 10 gave credence to the documentary exhibits presented by Dyguani, particularly, the certified photocopies of the certificates of ownership and vessel registry of F/V Arnold issued by the MARINA. It pointed out that the annotations in the said certificates establish that as early as March 9, 2001, F/V Prince Arnold had been the subject of a writ of attachment which was lifted only on January 11, 2002. It then concluded that at the time of the sale of the mentioned vessel of ASB Fishing to Del Rosario on December 13, 2001, the annotation was still subsisting and, by reason thereof, he cannot be a buyer in good faith. It held that any prudent person who has the intention of buying a property, the subject vessel in this case, should first examine the records of the MARINA if the same is not subject to any attachment, lien or encumbrance before proceeding with the transaction.

The petitioners questioned the ruling of RTC Branch 10 in a petition for certiorari before the CA and argued that the certificates relied upon by the lower court had no probative value since Dyguani and/or his witness was not able to identify the source, the contents and the person who secured the same.

The CA dismissed the petitioners' argument, stressing that the certificates submitted in evidence by Dyguani are public documents that require no authentication. The CA ruled:

Considering that the assailed Exhibits appear to be stamped on the face thereof as certified true copies of the Certificate in the custody of MARINA, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent when the latter gave credence to the same as public documents, in the absence of controverting evidence on record. x x x

x x x It must be remembered that public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. x x x

As public documents, the assailed MARINA Certificates are not only admissible, but they also deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein pursuant to Section 23, Rule 132. Thus, the public respondent acted judiciously when it considered the annotations on Exhibits "C" and "D" to show that the petitioners were in bad faith when they purchased the shipping vessel from ASB Fishing. x x x. 40

The Court is in full accord with the CA and the RTC in giving evidentiary weight to the certificates issued by the MARINA. Contrary to the petitioners' claim, they are not mere xerox copies lacking in probative value, but certified photocopies signed by the officer of the agency who has custody thereof. In Quintano vs. NLRC, 41 the Court declared that "for all intents and purposes, a "certified xerox copy" is no different from a "certified true copy" of the original document." 42 This was reiterated in Coca Cola Bottler Phils., Inc. vs. Cabalo, 43 where a certified photocopy of the NLRC decision attached to the petition for certiorari was deemed no different from a certified true copy thereof. CTIEac

Further, in Bunagan-Bansig vs. Celera, 44 the Court admitted in evidence a certified true copy of a marriage certificate issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. It was emphasized that "the certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." 45

The certified photocopies of the certificates of ownership and vessel registry of F/V Prince Arnold are therefore public documents and must accordingly be given full weight and credit. And, as reiterated by the RTC Branch 10 and the CA in their respective decisions, the said documents indubitably establish that at the time of the sale between ASB Fishing and Del Rosario, the annotation of the notice of levy of F/V Prince Arnold was already existing.

In Saberon, et al. vs. Ventanilla, Jr., et al., the Court pointed out, thus: 46

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact shown by the record and to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.47 (Emphasis in the original)

Moreover, the certificates being questioned by the petitioners constitute only a portion of the numerous documentary exhibits submitted in evidence by Dyguani to prove that Del Rosario had notice of the existence of the writ of attachment. Corroborative of these documents is a Certification 48 issued by Director Roberto C. Arceo of the MARINA, confirming the sale of the vessel to Del Rosario and, thereafter, to Unity Fishing, and of the fact that the Notice of Levy on Attachment had been annotated on the certificates of ownership and vessel registry on March 9, 2001. This certification alone is sufficient to debunk the petitioners' claim that there was no annotation on the title to vessel until after the sale between them had been concluded.

Apart from the foregoing, there were other evidence submitted by Dyguani which collectively proved the allegations in his complaint. Against all these evidence, the petitioners merely offered a denial of knowledge of the existence of the writ and argued on the inadmissibility of only some of the numerous evidence submitted by Dyguani.

Verily, the demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict. 49 It entails the examinations of all the evidence submitted by the plaintiff to establish his case and a determination by the trial court on whether the same is sufficient to warrant recovery or grant of relief prayed for. In this case, the Court finds that RTC Branch 10 properly denied the demurrer in view of the number of evidence that Dyguani submitted to prove his allegations against the petitioners. The CA is therefore correct in holding that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the lower court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated November 11, 2014 and Resolution dated June 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07294 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-45.

2.Id. at 49-51.

3.Id. at 52-55.

4.Id. at 53.

5.Id. at 57.

6.Id. at 58-59.

7.Id. at 60-62.

8.Id. at 61.

9.Id. at 65-78.

10.Id. at 66.

11.Id. at 31.

12.Id. at 32.

13.Id.

14.Id. at 79-83.

15.Id. at 85-99.

16.Id. at 86.

17.Id. at 92.

18.Id. at 160-165.

19.Id. at 167.

20.Id. at 168.

21.Id. at 199-232.

22.Id. at 234-235-A.

23.Id. at 236-250.

24.Id. at 251-257.

25.Id. at 254-257.

26.Id. at 258-284.

27.Id. at 36, 39, 43-44.

28.Id. at 49-51.

29. 479 Phil. 617 (2004).

30.Id. at 623.

31. 555 Phil. 311 (2007).

32.Id. at 324.

33. 464 Phil. 1006 (2004).

34.Id. at 1013-1014.

35.Id.

36. 667 Phil. 474 (2011).

37.Id. at 482.

38.Id.

39.People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 755 Phil. 80, 100-101 (2015).

40.Rollo, pp. 40-41.

41. 487 Phil. 412 (2004).

42.Id. at 423.

43. 516 Phil. 327, 334 (2006).

44. 724 Phil. 141 (2014).

45.Id. at 151.

46. 733 Phil. 275 (2014).

47.Id. at 310.

48.Rollo, p. 176.

49.Leni O. Choa v. Alfonso C. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 183 (2002).