Umali v. Umali

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 230349. June 7, 2017.]

JERRY K. UMALI [a.k.a. JERRY K. KABLUYEN and JEROME K. KABLUYEN], petitioner,vs. LORETA B. UMALI [a.k.a. LORETO KABLUYEN], respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 7, 2017, which reads as follows: ASEcHI

"G.R. No. 230349 (Jerry K. Umali [a.k.a. Jerry K. Kabluyen and Jerome K. Kabluyen] vs. Loreta B. Umali [a.k.a. Loreto Kabluyen]). — The Court resolves to:

(1) INFORM petitioners that they or their authorized representative may claim from the Cash Disbursement and Collection Division of this Court the excess payment of the prescribed legal fees in the amount of P470.00 under O.R. No. 0173674 dated March 24, 2017; and

(2) DIRECT the parties or their respective counsel to INDICATE their contact details in all papers and pleadings to be filed with this Court pursuant to A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC (En Banc Resolution dated July 10, 2007).

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated July 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution dated December 16, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 140745, that affirmed the Decision 2 dated December 12, 2013 and Resolution dated March 13, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 956-FC.

The Facts

Petitioner Jerry K. Umali (Jerry) met respondent Loreta B. Umali (Loreta) in the summer of 1968 and they were married on May 12, 1969, in Tuba, Benguet without the knowledge of their parents. Out of their union, the parties had four children namely: (a) Mabel; (b) Sheryl; (c) Charles; and (d) Jerry, Jr., all surnamed Kabluyen but subsequently changed to Umali by virtue of a court Decision dated December 22, 1997 in Special Proceeding Case No. 95-C-0509. 3

In the early part of their marriage, petitioner Jerry started as a sales representative of Grolier International. Respondent Loreta also wanted to work but she was not allowed by petitioner Jerry. He wanted her to just stay home and take care of their children. 4

Respondent Loreta described him as very domineering and abusive to the extent that whatever he wants must be followed. Otherwise, he will get mad, scream and berate respondent Loreta and their children. Petitioner Jerry does not allow his wife to get out of their house and he disciplines his children with belts and whips.

In 1983, petitioner Jerry decided to go into construction business with the government so they sold all their pigs and chicken for him to start. They also borrowed money from their parents. When their construction business prospered, they built their house in Km. 4 Asin Road in 1988 where they established their conjugal dwelling. 5

In the early part of 1990, petitioner Jerry spent most of his time away from his family in the guise that he is out on business. However, unknown to respondent Loreta, petitioner Jerry was then cohabiting with his paramour in Pangasinan with whom he had sired three children. In the birth records of petitioner Jerry's illegitimate children, he and his paramour made it appear that he and his paramour were married on June 2, 1992 and June 14, 1993, both in Baguio City. 6

Respondent Loreta discovered petitioner's infidelity only in the early part of the year 2008 when she received information that her husband is actually cohabiting with another woman in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. 7

Respondent Loreta's health began deteriorating and upon the advice of the doctor, respondent Loreta called petitioner Jerry to go to her doctor's clinic. Respondent Loreta told him that she is dying, which is why he better tell the truth. Petitioner Jerry became speechless for about 20 minutes before he admitted that he is having an affair with another woman. He told her that he will keep her and the woman as his wives to which petitioner Loreta objected.

With the help of Lolita Pascual, respondent Loreta was able to locate the house built by petitioner Jerry for his other family. It is a three-storey house, which includes a separate grocery store with the trade name BME Marketing — the initials of the first names of petitioner Jerry's three illegitimate children, namely: Brian, Megan and Erin. 8

On July 22, 2009, respondent Loreta filed a petition for Legal Separation. Petitioner Jerry averred that this is in contravention of their agreement that they will not file any case, civil or criminal against each other because they already agreed to settle their conflicts.

In his Answer, petitioner Jerry claimed that respondent Loreta had condoned his alleged infidelity by still cohabiting and living with him despite her knowledge of his infidelity; that respondent Loreta is likewise guilty of infidelity by having an extra-marital affair; that they agreed to live separately from each other; and that respondent Loreta is barred from instituting this petition because prescription has already set in. 9 ITAaHc

Petitioner Jerry revealed that aside from the properties agreed upon by them to be divided equally among their four children, they have no more conjugal properties. Those properties claimed by respondent Loreta to be conjugal in nature are actually his capital or exclusive properties as he inherited them from his parents.

A Temporary Protection Order (TPO) was issued by the trial court on August 18, 2009, prohibiting petitioner: (1) from verbally abusing and committing acts of physical, psychological or emotional violence upon respondent Loreta; (2) from harassing, annoying or communicating in any form with respondent Loreta; and (3) from entering their conjugal dwelling at Km. 4 Asin Road, Baguio City. The TPO was made permanent on August 2, 2011.

On July 23, 2010, respondent Loreta again filed two criminal cases against petitioner Jerry for Falsification of Public Document and Concubinage which were both dismissed at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio.

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC granted the petition for legal separation on grounds of sexual infidelity and abandonment. The RTC held that the birth of the three illegitimate children of petitioner Jerry with his mistress as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live Birth and the admission of the respondent that he had fathered three children with another woman are clear indications of acts of sexual infidelity on the part of petitioner Jerry. 10 Furthermore, it has been proven that petitioner Jerry abandoned respondent Loreta and their children with a deliberate intent to cease living with them. The petition has not yet prescribed since respondent Loreta established that it was only in October 2007 that she received reports of petitioner Jerry's infidelity and it was only in January 2008 that she confirmed the same.

The dispositive portion of the Decision dated December 12, 2013 reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring petitioner LORETA BIGWEL BUDOD and respondent JERRY K. UMALI a.k.a. JERRY K. KABLUYEN AND JEROME K. KABLUYEN with the following effects:

1. The spouses are hereby entitled to live separately from each other, but their marriage bond is not severed;

2. The obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases; and

3. The respondent being the guilty spouse is disqualified from inheriting from the petitioner, the innocent spouse, by testate and intestate succession, and provisions in favor of respondent in the will of the petitioner are revoked by operation of law. Any designation by the petitioner of the respondent as beneficiary in any insurance policy secured by petitioner shall likewise be revoked by operation of law.

Upon entry of judgment, on motion of either party, the court shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of spouses.

The Decree of Legal Separation shall be issued by the court only after full compliance with liquidation under the Family Code, to include payment of the appropriate fees at the Office of the Clerk of Court pursuant to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Furnish copies of this Decision to the parties, counsels, Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City; and the City Prosecutor of Baguio.

SO ORDERED. 11

Petitioner Jerry's Motion for Reconsideration was partially granted in order to correct a typographical error in the above Decision. Aggrieved, petitioner Jerry filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision dated July 13, 2016, the CA dismissed the petition for being fatally defective. Petitioner Jerry's proper remedy should have been an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. The general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The CA also held that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the RTC Decision was made in accordance with the law. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: CHTAIc

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the December 12, 2013 Decision and March 13, 2015 Resolution, both issued by public respondent Judge Mia Joy Oallares-Cawed, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 956-FC are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the CA in a Resolution 13 dated December 16, 2016. Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner Jerry's appeal on the ground that he availed of an improper remedy.

Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition.

We find that the CA committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party's remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. 14 As such, these two remedies are mutually exclusive and the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the lower court would depend on whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 15 this Court laid down the following rules to determine whether a court's disposition is already a final order or merely an interlocutory order and the respective remedies that may be availed in each case, thus:

Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party's remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:

As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.

On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.

In the case at bar, petitioner Jerry filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to question the December 12, 2013 Decision and the March 13, 2015 Resolution of the RTC. Said Decision and Resolution are in the nature of a final order as the same completely disposed of the petition for legal separation filed by respondent Loreta against petitioner Jerry. Consequently, petitioner Jerry's proper remedy should have been an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof.

It is elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the requirement that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied. 16

Aside from filing an improper remedy, it must be noted that petitioner Jerry still failed to comply with the Court's directive to indicate the contact details of his counsel in all papers and pleading filed with this Court. In the Notice dated March 8, 2017, this Court stated, to wit: EATCcI

3. DIRECT the parties or their respective counsel to INDICATE their contact details in all papers and pleading to be filed with this Court pursuant to A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC (En Banc Resolution dated July 10, 2007) 17

Petitioner Jerry was already given a chance to rectify the infirmities but did not even do so. It is well-settled that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. 18 Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. 19

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140745, the Court resolves to DENY the petition and, thus, AFFIRMIN TOTO said Decision and Resolution.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando.

2. Penned by Judge Mia Joy C. Oallares-Cawed.

3.Rollo, p. 39.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 40.

6.Id.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 44.

10.Id. at 81.

11.Id. at 82.

12.Id. at 55-56.

13.Id. at 64.

14.Spouse Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011.

15. G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011.

16.Ormoc Sugarcane Planters' Association, Inc., et al. v. CA, G.R. No. 156660, August 24, 2009 citing Manacop, Jose F. v. Equitable PCIBank, G.R. Nos. 162814-17, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 256, 270-271.

17.Rollo, pp. 8-9.

18.Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012, citing Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000), citing Galang v. CA, G.R. No. 76221, July 29, 1991, 199 SCRA 683.

19.Id.