FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 240014. November 11, 2021.]
UDS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION AND BENITO UY, petitioners, vs. EMAR DELARA DELA CRUZ, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 240014 (UDS Agricultural Products Corporation and Benito Uy v. Emar Delara Dela Cruz). — Emar Delara Dela Cruz (Emar) filed a Complaint 1 for Constructive Dismissal, Underpayment of Wages, and Non-Payment of Benefits against Universal Dragon Seeds/UDS Agricultural Products Corporation (UDS) and its owner and president, Benito Uy (Benito), before the Labor Arbiter. Allegedly, UDS hired Emar sometime in August 2007 as a stevedore. His task was to unload imported cargo from the containers at the pier and unload them at the company's warehouse. His daily wage was P300.00 for 13 hours of work from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., seven days a week. He did not receive any premium for working overtime, or on holidays and rest days, as well as payment for service incentive leave, 13th month pay, and E-COLA. UDS also did not remit his SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG contributions or issue any payslip or voucher. Sometime in November 2016, Emar asked for financial help from UDS because of a medical problem. UDS offered P5,000.00 but he did not accept. Later, UDS informed him that his services were no longer needed. UDS gave him P5,000.00 as separation pay. He rejected the money and continued reporting for work until he was ejected from the company premises.
On the other hand, UDS countered that Emar is a freelance stevedore and not a regular employee. 2 As freelance stevedore, Emar unloads imported cargo directly from the containers at the pier to be delivered to the warehouses or a specified client. Emar is contracted randomly depending on whether he is available when cargo arrives. Different companies in the surrounding area hired Emar's services. Indeed, Emar does not receive a regular salary or a wage, and is paid based upon the number of sacks he unloaded and delivered to UDS' warehouse. Moreover, UDS does not exercise control over Emar's work. Lastly, Benito should not be impleaded in the Complaint because he is not connected to UDS. 3
On May 31, 2017, 4 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint on the ground that Emar failed to establish an employment relationship with UDS. Aggrieved, Emar appealed to the NLRC. On August 14, 2017, Emar filed his Memorandum of Appeal 5 with the NLRC. However, Emar mailed only on September 22, 2017 a copy of the Memorandum to UDS. On September 28, 2017, UDS received a copy of the Memorandum. On September 29, 2017, the NLRC resolved the Appeal and held that Emar was a regular employee of UDS. Nonetheless, the NLRC found no Illegal Dismissal because Emar failed to substantiate who barred him from entering the company premises. Notwithstanding, the NLRC ordered UDS to give Emar his separation pay, 13th month pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 10% attorney's fees. 6
UDS did not move for the reconsideration of the NLRC decision. Instead, UDS filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 153872. On January 10, 2018, the CA dismissed the Petition because UDS did not file a prior Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC, 7 thus:
Perusal of the record shows that petitioners did not file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration before filing this [P]etition.
The general rule is that a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is indispensable before resort [sic] to the [S]pecial [C]ivil [A]ction for [C]ertiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The rule is well-settled that the filing of [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of [S]pecial [C]ivil [A]ction for [C]ertiorari.
The rationale for the requirement of first filing a [M]otion for [R]econsideration before the filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board[,] or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.
xxx xxx xxx
Since no [M]otion for [R]econsideration of the assailed [D]ecision was filed with public respondent NLRC before the filing of this [P]etition, petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies and to avail of a plain and adequate remedy available to them. Thus, the filing of this [P]etition is premature.
WHEREFORE, the [P]etition is DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
UDS sought reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. UDS contends that its case falls under the exceptions to the rule that a Motion for Reconsideration must be filed prior to a Petition for Certiorari. Specifically, UDS argues that it was deprived of due process and that a Motion for Reconsideration would be useless because the issues raised in the Petition for Certiorari before the CA were the same as those passed upon by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.
The Petition is meritorious.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a Special Civil Action for Certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, a "plain" and "adequate remedy" is available in the form of a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution. A Motion for Reconsideration, when allowed to be filed, is an indispensable condition to the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. The rationale for the rule is to allow the NLRC an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. 8
Yet, the rule is not inflexible and is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court aquo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. 9
Here, the issues raised in the Petition for Certiorari before the CA, i.e., the presence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and the alleged Illegal Dismissal, were the very same issues raised and resolved before the NLRC and Labor Arbiter. To be sure, the parties did not pose any new questions or offer new evidence other than those submitted in the Labor Tribunals. The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter already had to consider and rule on the issues presented in the Petition for Certiorari. Moreover, UDS was deprived of due process in the NLRC proceedings. The records show that Emar did not timely furnish UDS with a copy of his Memorandum of Appeal. Worse, UDS received a copy of the Memorandum a day before the NLRC issued its assailed Resolution. In these circumstances, it is practically impossible for UDS to file a comment and for the NLRC to consider it. Verily, it is the NLRC's duty to require Emar to comply with the rule that UDS should be provided with a copy of his Memorandum of Appeal. 10 Nevertheless, it does not appear from the records that the NLRC reminded or sanctioned Emar for Non-Compliance.
Taken together, UDS is justified indirectly resorting to a Petition for Certiorari. 11 To rule otherwise would be clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention the undue prejudice to the litigant's rights. 12 Accordingly, the Court remands the case to the CA for a Resolution on the Merits. We reiterate that courts should give litigants every opportunity to present their conflicting claims on the merits of the controversy, as much as possible avoiding any resort to procedural technicalities. 13 Rigidity should not be affixed to procedural precepts when a party has a meritorious cause. 14 A straight-jacket application of the rules will do more injustice. Litigation is not a game of technicalities. The rules of procedure are designed to help secure and not defeat justice. 15
FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Resolution dated January 10, 2018 in CA-G.R. SP No. 153872 is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a Resolution on the Merits with dispatch.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 54-75.
2.Id. at 78.
3.Id. at 79-90.
4.Id. at 105-113.
5.Id. at 79-80.
6.Id. at 47-52.
7.Id. at 37-40. The Decision was rendered by the Second Division, penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan.
8.Del Monte Land Transport Bus Co. v. Abergos, G.R. No. 245344, December 2, 2020.
9.Mandaue Dinghow Dimsum House Co., Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 571 Phil. 108, 119-120 (2008).
10.EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 563 Phil. 1, 14-15 (2007).
11.Philippine National Construction Corporation v. NLRC, et al., 354 Phil. 274, 280 (1998).
12.Genpact Services, Inc., et al. v. Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso, et al., 814 Phil. 1091, 1011 (2017).
13.Tropical Homes, Inc. v. Villaluz, 252 Phil. 600, 605 (1989).
14.B. E. Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals and Isidro Climaco, 152 Phil. 588, 596-597 (1973); citing Carillo vs. Allied Workers Association, 133 Phil. 473, 480 (1968).
15.Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 107, 120 (2001); and Dayag v. Canizares, 350 Phil. 629, 637 (1998).