Turner v. Court of Appeals

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 251221. June 28, 2021.]

MARKIS SCOTT TURNER, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 28, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 251221 (Markis Scott Turner v. Court of Appeals). — This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration and for Referral to the Court En Banc filed by Markis Scott Turner (petitioner), challenging the Resolution 1 of this Court dated March 2, 2020. This Court earlier dismissed his Petition for Certiorari outright for failure to show that the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 5, 2019 2 and November 26, 2019 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 159824, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Facts

The Republic of the Philippines and the Commonwealth of Australia have a longstanding treaty on extradition. 4

On September 15, 2017, the Philippine Government received a request for extradition 5 of petitioner from the Government of Australia. It referred the request to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, where the case was docketed as, Extradition Case No. R-MNL-18-05123-CV. 6 The Government of Australia initiated the extradition proceedings against petitioner to hold him criminally liable for his alleged involvement in illegal drug trade in said country. 7

In the course of the proceedings, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion (Motion) on September 10, 2018, asking that the requesting state, through the Department of Justice (DOJ) of the Philippines, be directed to produce the following documents to aid petitioner in his defense: a) transcripts of proceedings before the Mackay Magistrates Court on April 29-30, 2013, and May 5, 2013; b) transcripts of proceedings before the Supreme Court of Queensland on November 11, 2013; and c) the affidavit of Monique Shepherd, filed on November 8, 2013. 8 Petitioner contended that the production of the aforesaid documents would prove that the evidence attached in support of the petition for extradition against him were illegally obtained. 9 Moreover, he claimed that his right to be present in all proceedings and have a competent representation were violated by the requesting state. 10

The Government of Australia, through the DOJ, opposed the Motion by asserting that the requirements for the extradition of petitioner under the PH-AUS Extradition Treaty and Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 11 have been met, both in form and substance. 12

Ruling of the RTC

In its Order 13 dated October 30, 2018, the RTC held that the grounds invoked by petitioner cannot be raised in an extradition court. 14 Simply put, whether evidence attached to the petition were illegally obtained or inadmissible is not for the RTC, as an extradition court, to decide. 15 In any event, the RTC held that petitioner would be given the opportunity to oppose and present his side during the proceedings. 16 Hence, the RTC denied his Motion. 17

Disquieted, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid ruling, but it was similarly denied by the RTC in its Order 18 dated December 14, 2018.

Petitioner elevated the case before the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. 19

Ruling of the CA

In its Resolution dated July 5, 2019, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the assailed Orders. 20 The CA held that extradition proceedings do not delve into the merits of the charges that have been filed or will still be filed against the extraditee by the requesting state. 21 Thus, the issues which petitioner raised with respect to the exculpatory nature of the documents requested, or even the admissibility or illegality of the same, are matters best left to the resolution of a competent Australian court. 22

In any case, should the RTC find the documents submitted by the Government of Australia, as the requesting state, to be insufficient for purposes of determining if a prima facie case exists against petitioner as a potential extraditee, Article 8, paragraph 1 of the PH-AUS Extradition Treaty provides that the requested state "may request that additional information be furnished within such time as it specifies." 23 Hence, the CA dismissed the petition, in its first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 24

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, it was denied by the CA in its Resolution 25 dated November 26, 2019.

Unyielding, petitioner brought the case on appeal before this Court, by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 26

The Minute Resolution dated March 2, 2020

After considering the arguments adduced in the present petition, the Court resolved to dismiss the same outright for failure to show that the Resolutions dated July 5, 2019 and November 26, 2019 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 159824 were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 27

Unsatisfied with the disposition of this Court, petitioner filed the present Motion for Reconsideration and for Referral to the Court En Banc. 28 In his Motion, he asserts in the main that the RTC, as an extradition court, should grant his request for production and inspection of exculpatory evidence to ensure a fair hearing conformably with the requirements of due process. 29 He argues further that his request is akin to a mode of discovery sanctioned by our Rules of Court. 30 If granted, the documents requested would indubitably show that the evidence against him were illegally obtained and, therefore, cannot support a finding of a prima facie case. 31

Issues

In sum, the issues in this case are: (1) Whether there is sufficient basis to elevate the case to the Court en banc; and (2) Whether the motion for reconsideration raises any substantial argument or cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated March 2, 2020.

Our Ruling

Petitioner's motion must fail. The following reasons dissuade the Court from referring the case to the Court en banc.

I. The Court sitting en banc is not anvis-a-vis its divisions.

The Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which a decision or resolution may be appealed. 32 It is apparent in Section 4, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that decisions or resolutions of a division of the court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, are decisions or resolutions of the Supreme Court itself. 33 "When the Supreme Court resolves a case in division, it is not a separate entity from the Supreme Court en banc." 34 Hence, each division of the Court is considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, but sits veritably as the Court en banc itself. 35

For this reason, Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 36 states that the Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court to which the decisions/resolutions of the Divisions may be appealed. 37 In the same vein, the Court, in JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 38 held that the Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the Divisions of the Court can be forwarded for review. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en banc, 39 a situation which is not obtaining in this case.

II. The duty of the RTC is to

In Government of Hongkong v. Muñoz, 40 the Court explained the nature of extradition in this wise:

Extradition is the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender. It is not part of customary international law, although the duty to extradite exists only for some international crimes. Thus, a state must extradite only when obliged by treaty to do so. The right of a state to successfully request the extradition of a criminal offender arises from a treaty with the requested state. Absent the treaty, the duty to surrender a person who has sought asylum within its boundaries does not inhere in the state, which, if it so wishes, can extend to [them] a refuge and protection even from the state that [they have] fled. Indeed, in granting [them] asylum, the state commits no breach of international law. But by concluding the treaty, the asylum state imposes limitations on itself, because it thereby agrees to do something it was free not to do. The extradition treaty creates the reciprocal obligation to surrender persons from the requested state's jurisdiction charged or convicted of certain crimes committed within the requesting state's territory, and is of the same level as a law passed by the legislatures of the respective parties.

[PD No. 1069] defines the general procedure for the extradition of persons who have committed crimes in a foreign country and lays down the rules to guide the executive department and the courts of the Philippines on the proper implementation of the extradition treaties to which the country is a signatory. Nevertheless, the particular treaties entered into by the Philippine Government with other countries primarily govern the relationship between the parties. (citations omitted)

Extradition is a process where the interplay of executive and judicial powers is recognized. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs evaluates the extradition request and its supporting documents, and upon finding that it is sufficient and complete in form and substance, they shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney to take charge of the case. 41 This evaluation procedure sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper RTC of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration. 42

With the foregoing as factual backdrop, what then is the nature of the role of the RTC in an extradition proceedings?

In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 43 the Court delineated the function of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as limited to assess whether the extradition petition can be filed in court. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is, thus, merely initial and not final. 44

Once the DFA finds the request to be sufficient in form and substance, it will forward the request to the DOJ for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. The Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. 45

"Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the extradition treaty and law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable." 46 After the hearing, the court will determine whether the extradition should be effected. 47 Hence, the trial court determines whether the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in the treaty between the contracting states. 48 The trial court also determines whether the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one. 49

Significantly, the Court, in a later resolution in Lantion, pointed out that while an extradition proceeding bears the earmarks of a criminal process, the RTC, acting as an extradition court, does not determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent, because it will be adjudged in the court of the state where they will be extradited. 50 In Lantion, the Court ratiocinated in this manner:

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. 51

In the same vein, the Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 52 explained that extradition is "merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person." Consequently, the duty to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the person to be extradited is a prerogative of the requesting state having jurisdiction over the potential extraditee. Hence, "[t]he ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty and whether the person sought is extraditable." Otherwise, it will result in needless delays and duplication. 53

Undoubtedly, petitioner requested for the production and inspection of certain documents that delved into the admissibility of evidence submitted in support of the criminal charges filed or that will still be filed against him by the requesting state. Since the RTC, as an extradition court, has no authority to pass upon his guilt or innocence, the alleged illegality of the said documents is a matter that must be raised before a competent court of the requesting state.

By asking the Philippine courts to compel the requesting state to produce certain documents, petitioner is insinuating that the latter will not afford him due process.

On this score, the Court stresses that one of the five postulates of extradition is that the requesting state will afford the accused due process. "[B]y entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein." 54 An extradition treaty "presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust each other's legal system and judicial process." 55 More pointedly, our duly-authorized representative's signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. 56 That signature signifies our full faith that "the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality." 57

All told, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and for Referral to the Court En Banc presents no new or substantial arguments that would warrant a reversal or even a modification of the assailed Resolution of the Court. His allegations are mere rehashes of arguments previously raised and adequately discussed in the earlier rulings of the court.

As a final note, worth reiterating is a quote from Government of United States v. Hon Purganan: 58

Courts "should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner's simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate, and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation." (citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Motion for Reconsideration and for Referral to the Court En Banc is hereby DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit. The Resolution of this Court dated March 2, 2020 is hereby AFFIRMED. No further pleadings will be entertained. Let Entry of Judgment be ISSUED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 146.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a member of this Court) and Manuel M. Barrios concurring; id. at 28-37.

3.Rollo, pp. 38-42.

4.Id. at 29.

5.Id. at 41.

6.Id. at 29.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 43.

10.Id.

11.Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country, issued on January 13, 1977.

12.Rollo, p. 43.

13. Penned by Honorable Presiding Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, id. at 43-44.

14.Id. at 43.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 44.

17.Id.

18.Rollo, p. 46.

19.Id. at 28.

20.Id. at 32.

21.Id.

22.Id.

23.Id. at 33.

24.Id. at 37. (Emphasis in the original)

25.Id. at 42.

26.Id. at 3-27.

27.Id. at 146.

28.Id. at 147-164.

29.Id. at 148.

30.Id. at 150-155.

31.Id. at 162.

32.Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, November 17, 2020.

33.Id.

34.Id.

35.Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Yangco, G.R. No. 199595, February 4, 2015. (Minute Resolution)

36. SC Circular No. 2-89 dated February 7, 1989, as amended by Resolution dated November 18, 1993.

37.Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 546 Phil. 166-169 (2007).

38. 490 Phil. 579-606 (2005) (Resolution).

39.Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, supra note 32.

40. 793 Phil. 167, (2016), citing Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).

41.Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 194 (2000).

42.Id.

43.Id.

44.Id.

45.Id.

46.Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 438 Phil. 417 (2002).

47.Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra note 41. (Emphasis supplied).

48.Id. at 195.

49.Id.

50.Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 397 Phil. 423 (2000) (Resolution).

51.Id.

52.Supra note 46.

53.Id., at 443.

54.Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 63, at 461.

55.Id., citing Coquia, "On Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty," The Lawyers Review, August 31, 2000, p. 4.

56.Id., citing Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p. 546.

57.Id., at 441-442.

58.Supra note 54.