FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 199525. April 11, 2018.]
MARILU C. TURLA, petitioner, vs. MARIA T. CALMA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 11, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 199525 (Marilu C. Turla v. Maria T. Calma). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the June 29, 2011 Decision 2 and November 21, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115847, which denied the petition for certiorari of petitioner Marilu C. Turla (Marilu) and affirmed the Orders dated June 25, 2010 4 and August 25, 2010 5 of Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City in Special Proceedings No. Q-09-64479.
On March 11, 2009, Marilu filed a petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Mariano C. Turla, Petition for Letters of Administration." Claiming to be the daughter of Mariano C. Turla (Mariano), who died without a will on February 5, 2009, Marilu filed the petition as purported sole heir entitled to inherit and succeed to Mariano's estate. To support her claim, she presented her certificate of live birth which was allegedly signed and registered by Mariano himself with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. At the time of his death, Mariano left real properties in Quezon City and Caloocan City, bank deposits, and other personal properties with an estimated value of P3,000,000.00. 6
On April 21, 2009, the lower court issued letters of special administration to Marilu, appointing her as the special administrator of the estate of Mariano. 7
Subsequently, on June 1, 2009, Maria T. Calma (Maria), Mariano's half-sister, filed an opposition to the petition for letters of administration alleging that Marilu is not the daughter of Mariano. Maria asserted that Marilu could not have been the child of Mariano, since the latter and his wife, Rufina de Castro Turla (Rufina), were childless. Maria further claimed that Marilu was not legally adopted and that her purported birth certificate was merely simulated. 8 CHTAIc
Maria alleged that since she, and not Marilu, is the next closest surviving relative of Mariano, she is entitled, in her own right, to the administration of the estate of Mariano. Moreover, she named one Norma Bernardino, who had allegedly been managing Mariano's business and other financial affairs during his lifetime, the one in the best position to act in the management and preservation of Mariano's estate. 9
Marilu filed a reply to the opposition alleging that Maria has no right to oppose her appointment as administrator of Mariano's estate since Maria is only the half-sister of Mariano, and thus has no right to inherit from him. Marilu also alleged that Maria has no right to impugn her legitimacy and that her birth certificate is conclusive proof of her filiation with Mariano. 10
On June 29, 2009, Maria filed a motion to order DNA testing contending that Marilu's blood relation to Mariano is in issue. Marilu opposed the motion on the ground of Maria's lack of legal interest in the matter in litigation. 11
Maria then filed a supplemental motion to order DNA testing, invoking the provisions of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC 12 which granted courts the authority to order DNA testing motu proprio. Marilu opposed this supplemental motion, arguing that the motu proprio authority of the court to order DNA testing can only be exercised in cases where it would redound to the benefit of a party in interest, of which Maria was not. 13
In an Order 14 dated June 25, 2010, the RTC disposed of Maria's motion to order DNA testing in this wise: EATCcI
Amidst the protestation of the petitioner against the DNA analysis, the Court finds it prudent to allow the conduct of the DNA testing considering its definitive result will decisively lay to rest the issue of filiation of the petitioner with the deceased Mariano Turla for purposes of determining the issues on the other hand in this proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the said deceased and persons to whom the same should be distributed. The filiation issue will secure a legal right associated with paternity such as support or even inheritance as in the present case. The presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive and consequently may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. To reject the conduct of the same and result that may be obtained therefrom is to deny progress in proceedings of this case.
The assertion of the petitioner that oppositor has no legal right to ask for the same in court, she not being a lawful heir to the subject estate is of no moment. Indeed, under Section 4 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC dated October 15, 2007 on the New Rules on DNA Testing, the court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person having legal interest in the matter of litigation, order a DNA testing, the information of which that may be obtained from the said testing, as has already been shown by the oppositor, would be relevant to the proper resolution of the case. From the foregoing, the application for a DNA testing may not only be presented by a person with legal interest in the matter of litigation but also on the court's own motion for as long as there exists [sic] appropriate reasons for the need to have the same. More to the point, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above incidents are disposed in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The motion for DNA testing filed by the oppositor is GRANTED, and accordingly, the parties are directed to make arrangements for DNA testing and analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of petitioner Marilu Turla, upon consultation and coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, at the expense of the oppositor.
SO ORDERED. 15
Consequently, on July 12, 2010, Maria filed a motion for issuance of an order authorizing the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP NSRI) to conduct the DNA testing. Marilu filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the RTC's Order reiterating Maria's lack of legal standing on the matter in dispute. 16 DHITCc
On July 28, 2010, Marilu filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of an order authorizing UP NSRI to conduct DNA testing. She pointed out the failure of Maria's counsel to state the number and date of his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance in the motion. This failure, she argued, should result in the expunction of the pleadings from the records, pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1922. Thus, simultaneously, Marilu filed a motion to expunge all pleadings and motions of oppositor. 17
Maria filed a comment/opposition to the partial motion for reconsideration of the Order on DNA testing dated June 25, 2010, arguing that the order was immediately executory and non-appealable. With regard to the motion to expunge pleadings, Maria's counsel explained that compliance with Bar Matter No. 1922 had already been accomplished by his act of paying the non-compliance fee for MCLE II and MCLE III. 18
In an Order 19 dated August 25, 2010, the RTC denied Marilu's partial motion for reconsideration as well as her motion to expunge pleadings. The same order also granted Maria's motion for the issuance of an order authorizing UP NSRI to conduct the DNA testing on Marilu. Aggrieved, Marilu filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
In the assailed Decision 20 dated June 29, 2011, the CA denied Marilu's petition for certiorari and held that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted Maria's motions. It ruled that an interested party, in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed administrator. However, the determination of the legal interest of the parties in a petition for issuance of letters of administration, as well as their fitness to serve as administrator, should be threshed out in a proper, full-blown hearing before the probate court. This would be more in consonance with the intent and purpose of probate proceedings. 21
The CA further held it important to determine the filiation of Marilu through DNA testing, for such certainty would establish her claim that she is indeed the sole surviving heir of Mariano, and is therefore entitled to be declared administrator of his estate. The CA considered that it would help enlighten the probate court in its proper disposition of the case, since the determination of heirs is well within its jurisdiction. 22 It also emphasized that the Court has previously allowed DNA testing in a long line of cases that are not merely limited to criminal prosecutions. 23
Finally, the CA found no merit in Marilu's argument that Maria's motion for DNA testing should be expunged from the record due to her counsel's failure to comply with Bar Matter No. 1922. The CA agreed with the RTC that while compliance was belatedly made, the same was deemed substantial. As such, it cured the deficiency in the pleadings and motions. 24 cEaSHC
The CA denied Marilu's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution 25 dated November 21, 2011. Hence, this petition where Marilu maintains that the CA erred when it held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the determination of her filiation through DNA testing is proper, and in denying her motion to expunge Maria's pleadings and motions due to her counsel's failure to comply with Bar Matter No. 1922. 26
We deny the petition and affirm the CA Decision.
The remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is for limited purposes. For one, it is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The rationale for this is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision — not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision — the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. 27
Also, certiorari has for the purpose of preventing courts from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 28 For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 29
The petition Marilu filed before the CA did not have either one of the above limited purposes intended for a special civil action for certiorari.
Here, it was indeed Maria who initially moved or applied for a DNA testing order on Marilu, pursuant to Section 4 of the Rules on DNA Evidence which provides that "the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing." This prompted Marilu to oppose the motion on the ground that Maria is not an interested party contemplated under the Rules on DNA Evidence. This position was consistent with her counter-argument that Maria has no legal standing to oppose her petition for administration because she (Maria) is not an interested person contemplated under Section 4, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. Marilu argues that the trial court should have resolved first the issue of Maria's legal standing to oppose her (Marilu's) petition. CTIEac
In its assailed Order, however, the trial court chose not to dwell on Marilu's position. Likewise, it was obviously not impelled by the motion of Maria, notwithstanding the language of the dispositive portion of its Order. Rather, the trial court determined on its own that a DNA testing of Marilu would be helpful to the court in its resolution of the petition filed before it.
Procedurally, we do not see any mistake on the part of the trial court. As earlier quoted, Section 4 of the Rules on DNA Evidence expressly allows courts, on their own and at any time, to order DNA testing. Thus, we agree with the trial court that it does not matter if it was Maria who initially moved and applied for a DNA testing order of Marilu.
More importantly, we find that the trial court did not step out of bounds when it ordered the conduct of DNA testing. It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. 30
The necessity determined by the trial court for a DNA testing of Marilu is apparent. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court textually lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin, and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. 31 When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a "next of kin" or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. 32 SaCIDT
Here, Marilu's claim that she is Mariano's daughter and sole legal heir was squarely challenged by Maria. Maria opposed the former's appointment as administrator of Mariano's estate on the grounds that Mariano and his wife Rufina never had a child, and that Marilu's certificate of live birth is spurious. Marilu's right and preference to be appointed as an administrator of the estate of Mariano was, therefore, put squarely in issue. As such, the judgment or discretion of the trial court to order the DNA testing of Marilu to determine her filiation to Mariano was reasonable and justified under the circumstances.
In any case, as raised by Maria in her comment, the DNA test had already been conducted on Marilu. 33 Thus, the issue of the DNA testing order, as well as all other issues raised, has already been rendered moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated June 29, 2011 and Resolution dated November 21, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115847 are AFFIRMED. SCaITA
The petitioner's manifestation with motion for resolution, stating that she received reliable information that respondent had died on March 28, 2016 and appealing that the Court resolve the petition as soon as possible is NOTED.
SO ORDERED." Sereno, C.J. and Del Castillo, J., on leave; De Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-52.
2.Id. at 57-73. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring.
3.Id. at 54-55.
4.Id. at 135-138. Penned by Judge Edgar Dalmacio Santos.
5.Id. at 179-180.
6.Id. at 58-59.
7.Id. at 59.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Rollo, pp. 59-60.
12. Rule on DNA Evidence, October 15, 2007.
13.Rollo, p. 60.
14.Supra note 4.
15.Rollo, pp. 136-138.
16.Id. at 61.
17.Id.
18.Rollo, pp. 61-62.
19.Supra note 5.
20.Supra note 2.
21.Rollo, pp. 64-66.
22.Id. at 66.
23.Id. at 67-69.
24.Id. at 70-71.
25.Supra note 3.
26.Rollo, p. 23.
27.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 482.
28.Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. 179367, January 29, 2014, 715 SCRA 36, 45.
29.Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013, 705 SCRA 340, 344.
30.Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 667, 688.
31.Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012, 683 SCRA 439, 447-448.
32.Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 379-380.
33.Rollo, p. 413.