SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 242704. January 7, 2019.]
JON FERDINAND DE JESUS TUPAZ, petitioner,vs. MARIA DEL CARMEN A. SANTIAGO, JENNY C. TAN, JOSE NIÑO J. TUPAZ V, MA. JEANETTE TUPAZ-ANGELES, MA. JUNELLA TUPAZ, AND MA. JOCELYN TUPAZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 07 January 2019which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 242704 (Jon Ferdinand De Jesus Tupaz v. Maria Del Carmen A. Santiago, Jenny C. Tan, Jose Niño J. Tupaz V, Ma. Jeanette Tupaz-Angeles, Ma. Junella Tupaz, and Ma. Jocelyn Tupaz)
After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition 1 and AFFIRM the May 11, 2018 Decision 2 and the September 13, 2018 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 109241 for failure of petitioner Jon Ferdinand De Jesus Tupaz (petitioner) to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in finding that: (a) petitioner failed to sufficiently prove forgery; and (b) respondents Jenny C. Tan (Tan) and Maria Del Carmen A. Santiago (Santiago) were innocent purchasers in good faith.
As correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner failed to discharge his burden to prove forgery, which cannot be presumed and must be proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence. 4 Moreover, Tan and Santiago were innocent purchasers in good faith. 5 Jurisprudence provides that an innocent purchaser in good faith refers to someone who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. 6 Records show that Tan verified the title of the subject property with the Register of Deeds to confirm that it was free from any encumbrances. 7 She also relied on the Deed of Heirship with Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 8 which did not show any patent defect. 9 As to Santiago, she is also considered an innocent purchaser in good faith, since she only purchased the subject property after being satisfied that by virtue of the SPA, not one of the heirs of Maria Corazon De Jesus Tupaz was deprived of their respective shares in the estate, and that there was no annotation of any claim from any creditor on the title. 10
Finally, it bears stressing that the issues raised in the instant petition are factual in nature, and thus, outside the province of a Rule 45 petition. It is settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case, 11 which do not obtain in this case.
SO ORDERED." (HERNANDO, J., designated Additional Member per Special Order Nos. 2629 and 2630 dated December 18, 2018.)
Very truly yours,
MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 13-35.
2.Id. at 40-71. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.
3.Id. at 73-76.
4. See Philippine Trust Company v. Gabinete, G.R. No. 216120, March 29, 2017, 822 SCRA 185, 205. See also id. at 02.
5. See rollo, pp. 65-67.
6. See Leong v. See, 749 Phil. 314, 324-325 (2014).
7. See rollo, pp. 65-66.
8.Rollo, pp. 92-94.
9. See id. at 70.
10. See id.
11.Almojuela v. People, 734 Phil. 636, 651 (2014).